The significance of postmodern theories of interpretation for contractual interpretation : a critical analysis by Du Toit, Gerhard
  
 
 
 
 
The significance of postmodern theories of interpretation for 
contractual interpretation: A critical analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The significance of postmodern theories of 
interpretation for contractual interpretation: A 
critical analysis 
 
 
by Gerhard du Toit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation presented for the Degree of Doctor of Law at the University of 
Stellenbosch, April 2006 
 
Promoters: Prof AJ van der Walt 
     Prof GF Lubbe 
 ii
 Declaration 
 
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my 
own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it 
at any university for a degree. 
 
 
 
Signature:……………………………………………… 
 
Date:…………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
English summary 
The objective of this study is to examine the significance of postmodern insights 
regarding interpretation (especially the rejection of intentionalism) and subjectivity 
for contractual interpretation theory.  
 
In Part One (consisting of chapters 2-5), the leading postmodern insights on 
interpretation, individual autonomy, texts and intentionalism are discussed. This is 
done by analysing the present interpretive practice in four chapters: 1) Different 
theories of interpretation ranging from objectivism and natural law theories to post-
structuralism are discussed in chapter 2. 2) In chapter 3 individual autonomy (as 
advocated by liberal theorists) is contrasted with communitarianism in order to 
problematize the notion of contracting parties as autonomous, self-regulating beings. 
By highlighting criticism against liberalism and communitarianism, and also by 
suggesting critical self-rule as an alternative, the assertion that contracting parties are 
autonomous and self-regulating is contested. 3) The process of textual definition is 
critically analysed with emphasis on the position reflected by the application of the 
parol-evidence rule and also post-structuralist ideas on the definition of texts in 
chapter 4. It is shown that textual definition consists of interpretation rather than 
identification. 4) The nature of intention and the process of intention “discovery” are 
analysed in chapter 5. Because of the centrality of intention in contractual practice, 
alternative theories on intention (and its role during interpretation) are postulated and 
it is suggested that post-structuralism can provide a critically reflective theory of 
intention. It is clear (from the critical analysis of intentionalism) that the way intention 
is presently approached is theoretically flawed. It is also apparent from the critique of 
liberal beliefs held regarding the nature of interpretation, subjectivity and the 
definition of texts that the theoretical foundations of these beliefs are fundamentally 
flawed. A critical re-imagination of contractual interpretation is necessary.  
 
In Part Two, questions about the justifiability of the present interpretive theories are 
posed. In chapter 6 the practical implications of a new theoretical basis for contractual 
interpretation are considered by examining the way various rules of interpretation are 
influenced by the new theoretical basis of interpretation. Three “rules” are examined: 
1) The golden rule of interpretation is examined because of its reliance on 
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intentionalist assumptions; 2) the parol-evidence rule is examined because of its 
relation to positivist assumptions about the definition of texts; 3) the relevance of 
bona fides as a substantial remedy during the interpretation of the contract is analysed 
to reveal assumptions about the nature of legal subjectivity in which the present 
consideration of the bona fides is grounded. It is shown that rules depend not on their 
content for operation, but rather on the assumptions upon which they are grounded. In 
short, we do not have to do away with our rules of contractual interpretation, but we 
have to re-evaluate how we apply those rules.  
 
The final part of this dissertation consists of a summary of the conclusions drawn 
during the course of this study. 
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Afrikaanse opsomming 
Die doel van hierdie studie is om die belang van postmoderne interpretasie (veral ivm 
die verwerping van intensionalisme) en subjektiewiteits teorieë vir kontraktuele 
interpretasie teorie te ondersoek. 
 
In Deel Een (bestaande uit hoofstukke 2-5), word die belangrikste postmoderne 
insigte aangaande interpretasie, individuele autonomie, tekste en intensionalisme 
bespreek. Dit word gedoen deur die huidige interpretasiepraktyke in vier dele te 
bespreek: 1) In hoofstuk 2 word verskillende interpretasieteorieë bespreek vanaf 
objektivisme, natuurreg en reëlgebasseerde teorieë, tot postmoderne teorieë soos neo-
pragmatisme en post-strukturalisme. 2) In hoofstuk 3 word individuele outonomie 
(soos aangehang deur liberaliste) gekonstrasteer met kommunitarisme om sodoende 
die idee van kontrakterende partye as vrye, self-regulerende entiteite te 
problematiseer. Deur die kritiek teen kommunitarisme en liberalisme uit te lig en 
kritiese self-regering as alternatief te postuleer word daar gepoog om ‘n alternatiewe 
teoretiese basis vir kontraksinterpreatasie daar te stel. 3) Die proses van tekstuele 
definisie word in hoofstuk 4 krities geanaliseer met klem op die toepassing van die 
“parol-evidence” reël en ook post-strukturalistiese idees aangaande die definisie van 
tekste. Daar word geargumenteer dat die definisie van tekste interpretatief eerder as 
uitkenningsgerig is. 4) Die teoretiese aard van bedoeling en intensionalistiese prosesse 
word in hoofstuk 5 behandel. Omdat intensie sentraal staan tot kontrakte word 
alternatiewe teorieë oor die rol van intensie asook die teoretiese samestelling daarvan 
bespreek en daar word aangevoer dat post-strukturalisme ‘n basis daarstel vir ‘n 
reflektiewe kritiese alternatiewe intensionalisme. Daar word geargumenteer dat die 
huidige teoretiese benadering tot intensionalisme teoreties gebrekkig is. Dit word ook 
duidelik uit die bespreking in Deel Een dat die huidige grondslag van kontraktuele 
interpratasie teoreties gebrekkig is en dat ‘n kritiese herevaluasie daarvan nodig is. 
  
In Deel Twee word vrae rondom die regverdigbaarheid van die huidige interpretasie 
teorie gestel. In hoofstuk 6 word die praktiese implikasies van ‘n nuwe teoretiese 
grondslag vir kontraktuele interpretasie ondersoek deur te kyk hoe so ‘n nuwe 
teoretiese basis die toepassing van verskeie interpretasiereëls sal raak. Die invloed op 
drie “reëls” word ondersoek: 1) Die goue reël van kontraktuele interpretasie word 
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ondersoek omdat dit nou saamhang met aannames oor die aard van bedoeling; 2) die 
toepassing van die “parol-evidence” reël word bekyk agv die noue band tussen die 
toepassing van die reël en aannames oor die aard van tekste; 3) die relevansie van 
bona fides as ‘n substantiewe remedie tydens die interpretasie van kontrakte word 
ondersoek omdat dit nouliks saamhang met aananmes oor die aard van 
regsubjektiewiteit. Daar word aangetoon dat die reëls toepassing vind op grond van 
die aannames waarin dit gegrond is, eerder as die inhoud van die reëls self. Die reëls 
is nie die problem nie, maar eerder die manier waarop ons dit toepas.  
 
In die laaste hoofstuk word die navorsingsresultate van die studie gelys.  
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1 
Introduction 
 
1. Research problem 
The objective of this study is to examine the significance of postmodern insights 
regarding interpretation (especially the rejection of intentionalism) and subjectivity 
for contractual interpretation.  
 
South African courts view the interpretation of contracts and the attribution of 
contractual liability as separate but related issues. It is commonly accepted that there 
must be liability before the contract can be interpreted. To the extent that the 
contractual agreement is necessarily constituted by declarations of will which attest to 
the intention to establish obligations, contract would seem to entail a text and amount 
to a language act (“taalhandeling”) that is determinative of the existence and content 
of the obligatory relations envisaged by the parties. Once the existence of contractual 
liability has been ascertained, the court will interpret the contractual text to determine 
its meaning. The primary strategy is the application of the so-called golden rule of 
interpretation, namely to look for the intention of the parties. Importantly, the court is 
not allowed to look at all available evidence regarding the intention of the parties but 
is constrained by, for example, rules like the parol-evidence rule (consisting of the 
integration rule and the interpretation rule) in respect of written contracts and the 
ordinary-meaning presumption. Although there are exceptions, the parol-evidence 
rule limits the investigation to the written document, while the ordinary-meaning 
presumption ties the interpretation to the supposedly ordinary meaning of the words 
of the text. If this process does not leave the court with a clear idea of the meaning of 
the contract, it may resort to various other presumptions and supplementary rules 
regarding the meaning of a contract. The traditional approach to contractual 
interpretation is accordingly of a hybrid nature, presupposing that words can clearly 
and precisely signify intention and, to the extent that they do not, that rules can 
accentuate the intention of the parties. 
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The current contractual interpretive practice rests upon various problematic 
assumptions about interpretation.  The first is that “normal” interpretation is in fact 
not really interpretation at all, but simply reading the text to see what it means, that is, 
a purely reproductive process; a replay of the intention of the parties. This presumes 
that an “ordinary” or “plain” meaning exists and that it can be ascribed to the text 
without the interpreter or the context influencing the meaning at all. It is also assumed 
that the creators of the text are autonomous and free to choose between the options 
available to them and to have this choice accurately reflected by the text. The text is 
therefore seen as a historical record of the meanings agreed to by the parties and it is 
assumed that meaning is fixed by the interplay of autonomous choice, text as a 
historical record and the ability to find and reproduce intention. 
 
It is also assumed in the current practice that the rules of interpretation only play a 
role when the creators of the text do not make their intention known unambiguously. 
In these limited instances, it is assumed that the rules of interpretation assist the 
interpreter in finding the meaning that should be ascribed to the text. At the same 
time, the rules limit the influence of the interpreter to the minimum. The rules of 
interpretation are presented as tools that can either extract the intention of the parties 
from the text or allow the interpreter to come to some acceptable interpretation of the 
text.  
 
All of these assumptions that underlie the present contractual interpretation practice 
conflict with postmodern theories regarding the nature of interpretation, the legal 
subject and texts. Postmodernists accept that meaning is always interpretive and thus 
always relatively unstable. The theoretical problem with the current practice is that it 
limits interpretive justifications, and by so doing, limits the possible solutions to 
contractual disputes. The rules of contractual interpretation (as they are presently 
applied and understood) are also subject to these limited justifications. The question is 
how this understanding of the rules of contractual interpretation will stand up to 
postmodern scrutiny and, if the assumptions prove unfounded, what the consequences 
will be for the present practice. 
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This study evaluates the present contractual interpretation practice from the 
perspective of postmodern theory. Postmodernists recognize that life is complex and 
that simple answers and generalizations cannot adequately provide answers to life’s 
(complex) questions. In postmodern literature concepts like interpretation, the nature 
of subjectivity, the nature of texts and also intention are critically analysed and the 
results of these analyses have important implications for contractual interpretation. 
Assumptions about the nature of interpretation, legal subjectivity, the definition of 
texts and the possibility of intention discovery are central to contractual interpretation, 
and theories like intentionalism (the basis of the present contractual interpretation 
practice) are based on these assumptions. Postmodernists claim that meanings 
resulting from the interpretation of the text are created during the interpretive process 
rather than inhering in the text, that legal subjectivity is a construction rather than a 
metaphysical reality and that texts are “created” through the interpretive process. 
Finally, postmodernists question the possibility of discovering intention and the 
ability of texts to reflect meanings objectively or mechanically. 
 
Postmodern developments in interpretive theory involve new understandings of 
context (neo-pragmatism) and of language (post-structuralism). Both include insights 
collectively known as the interpretive turn. The interpretive turn involves acceptance 
of the interpretive nature of meaning and an application of this insight (that meaning 
is always interpretive) to legal theory. The most important neo-pragmatist insight is 
that interpretation always takes place within a context that influences the interpretive 
process. The origin of meaning cannot be found in the words of the text or in the 
intention of the author(s) only. Because texts are always created and interpreted in a 
specific context, circumstances have an important effect on the meaning that is 
attached to a text. Neo-pragmatists do not see texts as historical records of meaning, 
because the interpretation of texts depends upon circumstances outside the text. Neo-
pragmatists argue that the context wherein individuals find themselves and relations 
between individuals determine their perception of reality, and as a result they question 
the possibility of absolute individual autonomy. In short, neo-pragmatism involves a 
theory about the influence of interpretive context on meaning. Post-structuralism, on 
the other hand, is more directly concerned with the nature of language. Post-
structuralists argue that meaning is the result of hierarchies of preference inherent in 
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all applications of words rather than the result of a correlation between the signifier 
(word) and the signified (that which the word connotes). In certain contexts, a word 
will have a “preferred” or “ordinary” meaning, not because of a shared understanding 
of the word, but rather because of preference of one meaning over another as the 
result of the existing power relations (which can be economic, moral or social in 
origin) in that context. The hierarchical relationships between the preferred and non-
preferred concepts are not stable but subject to continuous substitution as power 
relations shift. Moreover, the preferred concept is often dependent upon the non-
preferred.  Texts are construed and interpreted through language, and post-
structuralists who advocate the “interpretive turn” argue that meaning is always 
relatively arbitrary in the sense that interpretation always involves the selection of or 
preference for one possible meaning and the exclusion of others, for reasons that are 
not necessarily related to or justified by the words of the text or the intention of the 
authors.  
 
Because contracts are contextualised linguistic acts, it is crucial to understand how the 
interpretation of contracts is influenced by assumptions about the nature of language 
and context. By critically analysing the role of assumptions underlying the present 
contractual interpretive practice (regarding the nature of interpretation, individuality, 
the definition of texts and finally, the nature of intention) and comparing these 
assumptions to neo-pragmatist and post-structuralist theories, the reader can re-
evaluate the present interpretive practice. Finally, the feasibility of a postmodern 
interpretive practice can be demonstrated by re-imaging the role of specific 
contractual rules dealing with intention (the golden rule of interpretation), texts (the 
parol-evidence rule) and legal subjectivity (the role of bona fides during the 
interpretation of contracts) in the light of postmodern theories (about intention, texts 
and legal subjectivity).  While interpretive justifications (and therefore possible 
meanings) are limited in the present contractual interpretive practice, meanings 
abound in a postmodern interpretive practice. 
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2. Hypotheses 
This study is based on the broad hypothesis that South African contractual 
interpretation practices disguise the contingent nature of interpretation. This 
hypothesis will be tested by examining both the present interpretive practices and 
postmodern insights. Under the present interpretive process, meaning is established in 
a purportedly objective manner with reference to either the intention of the author or 
the rules of interpretation. While intentionalists argue that interpretation entails the 
search for the intention of the author, rule-theorists argue that unrestrained 
interpretation will lead to nihilism and that only consistent application of the rules of 
interpretation can prevent this.  
 
It is not contended that interpretation is completely arbitrary construction of meaning; 
but rather that meaning is strongly influenced by contextual and linguistic factors. At 
the same time, these linguistic and contextual factors cannot render meaning objective 
or determinate because they are themselves contingent upon other factors. 
Interpretation is argued to be a meaning-influencing practice rather than a meaning-
finding one as assumed by the intentionalists, or a meaning-limiting one, as assumed 
by rule-theorists.  
 
It is also argued that the present contractual interpretation practice is based on a 
coherent set of assumptions about the nature of interpretation, the nature of legal 
subjectivity, the nature of texts and, finally, the nature of intention. This hypothesis is 
tested by critically analysing the present practice and by comparing it to postmodern 
insights so that the flaws of the present interpretive practice can be highlighted. It is 
shown that interpretation is presently often regarded as a meaning extraction practice, 
individuals are assumed to be autonomous, texts are thought to be records and 
intention is viewed as a restriction on interpreters. These assumptions collectively 
form the basis of intentionalist interpretive practice. 
 
It is argued that re-imagining interpretation, legal subjectivity, the definition of texts 
and intention according to postmodern insights can render the interpretive practice 
more responsive. The emphasis should fall on justice rather than justification. This is 
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demonstrated by comparing the present practice regarding the rules of interpretation 
to a hypothetical postmodern practice. By highlighting the futility of attempts to 
restrict and absolutely justify interpretations and, on the other hand, by showing that 
just interpretations always involve some measure of justification it can be reasoned 
that an interpretive practice (such as the present contractual interpretation practice) 
aimed solely at justification is theoretically unsound. It is argued that a postmodern 
contractual interpretation practice is not less justifiable than the present practice 
(neither are completely justifiable), but is it more just because it provides more 
meaning possibilities. 
 
It is also argued that a different (postmodern) theoretical basis for contractual 
interpretation would not necessarily mean that the entire system of interpretive rules 
has to be done away with, but it will involve a critical rethink of the way rules are 
applied. This hypothesis is assessed by re-imagining the role of the golden rule of 
interpretation (which deals with intention), the parol evidence rule (which deals with 
texts) and also the role of the bona fides during interpretation and by observing the 
significance of a postmodern interpretive practice for meaning possibilities.  
 
3. Methodology 
The study consists of a critical analysis, the goal of which is to examine and 
deconstruct the present interpretive practice, rather than to create a comprehensive 
and coherent alternative model of interpretation. Critical analysis is a process by 
which the underlying assumptions, preferences and hierarchical oppositions that make 
up the rules within a practice are identified with the intention of illustrating the 
contingency of these assumptions, preferences and hierarchies.  
 
In Part One, postmodern theories on interpretation, individual autonomy, texts and 
intentionalism are discussed and the relation between these theories is shown. 
Assumptions about these (interpretation, individual autonomy, texts and 
intentionalism) underlie the present interpretive practice and these assumptions are 
demonstrated by critically analysing the present practice. The assumptions identified 
during the critical analysis are then evaluated against the postmodern insights 
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identified during the discussions on interpretation, texts, intentionalism and individual 
autonomy. This is done by analysing the present interpretive practice in four parts: 1) 
Different theories of interpretation ranging from objectivism and natural law theories 
to post-structuralism are discussed to problematize the notion of interpretation as 
“meaning extraction” and to highlight the contingent nature of interpretation. In this 
way, questions are raised regarding the justifiability of the present way of interpreting 
contracts. 2) Individual autonomy is contrasted with communitarian views of the 
persons in order to problematize the notion of contracting parties as autonomous, self-
regulating beings. The present interpretive practice rests upon the assumption that 
contractual parties are free to choose the content of the contract and to have the text 
reflect this. By highlighting criticism against liberalism and communitarianism, and 
also by suggesting critical self-rule as an alternative view of the person, the assertion 
that contracting parties are autonomous and self-regulating is contested and the effect 
on contractual meanings is assessed. 3) The process of textual definition is critically 
analysed with emphasis on the application of the parol-evidence rule and also post-
structuralist ideas on the nature of texts. In the present practice, texts are assumed to 
be records of the intention of the parties and the role of the interpreter is to identify 
the text and then read it. This assumption is contested by showing that textual 
definition consists of interpretation rather than identification. Texts are to be argued 
for, not from. 4) The nature of intention and the process of intention “discovery” are 
analysed. By comparing (and criticising) subjective and objective views of 
intentionalism, a better understanding is gained of the founding assumptions of 
intentionalism. It is shown that these assumptions cannot be reconciled with 
postmodern insights about the nature of language and thought. Because of the 
centrality of intention in contractual practice, alternative theories on intention (and its 
role during interpretation) are postulated and it is suggested that post-structuralism 
can provide a critically reflective theory of intention.  
 
In Part Two, questions about the justifiability of the present interpretive theories are 
posed. The practical implications of a new theoretical basis for contractual 
interpretation are considered by examining the way various rules of interpretation 
could be influenced by a new theoretical basis of interpretation. Three “rules” are 
examined: 1) The golden rule of interpretation is examined because of its reliance on 
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intentionalist assumptions; 2) the parol-evidence rule is examined because of its 
relation to positivist assumptions about the definition of texts; 3) the relevance of 
bona fides as a substantial remedy during the interpretation of the contract is analysed 
to reveal assumptions about the nature of legal subjectivity in which the present 
consideration of the bona fides is grounded. The rules are first explained as they are 
presently applied and then the significance of a postmodern interpretive application of 
the rules is examined.  
 
4. Sequence of chapters 
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 form Part One, which deals with the general theoretical 
determinants of meaning. The chapters focus on the basic theoretical foundations of 
concepts central to contractual interpretation (as identified above), namely theories of 
interpretation, legal subjects, the definition of texts and, finally, intention and the 
possibility of intention discovery. The nature of legal interpretation, legal texts and 
the role of the author in the interpretive process are discussed with emphasis on the 
influence of postmodernism on each of these fields. 
 
In chapter 2 the nature of legal interpretation is discussed. Positivist or meaning-
finding practices are analyzed together with the criticism of these practices. The focus 
then falls on the gradual shift in the direction of postmodern and post-structualist 
interpretive practice with specific reference to its implications for contractual 
interpretation. The aim of the chapter is to gain a better understanding of the relation 
between the reader, text and meaning. 
 
Because of its importance in the positivist interpretive practice, Chapter 3 briefly 
considers the notion of individual autonomy. In this regard, the liberal theory of rights 
and its notion of the self are examined. When the different theoretical and practical 
shortcomings of the theory have been identified, communitarianism and its 
conception of the self are also analyzed and contrasted. Practical and theoretical 
criticisms of the communitarian position are also investigated. An alternative critical 
position is postulated against the abovementioned theories. Finally the significance of 
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the findings in this chapter is drawn for the interpretation of contracts and specifically 
for the contractual interpreter. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the nature of the text, beginning with historicity. The link 
between historical perspective and the idea of text is analyzed, bearing in mind the 
implications for contractual interpretation. The purpose of this chapter is to explore 
the implications of the definition of texts for discourse and meaning possibilities.  
 
In Chapter 5 the search for intention is explored. The first subject of investigation is 
the possibility of the discovery of intention and the importance of this notion in the 
present system of contractual interpretation. The role of the author in the 
interpretation process is also analyzed. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to 
contemplate the role that should be afforded to the author in the contractual 
interpretation in an interpretive model of contractual liability. 
 
Chapter 6 forms Part Two, in which the significance of postmodern interpretive 
theory for contractual practice is discussed. The theory discussed in the preceding five 
chapters is applied to selected rules of contractual interpretation in Chapter 6. Here it 
is shown that the present application of the rules limit the scope for interpretive 
justification, while the possibilities abound when the interpretive turn is embraced in 
contractual interpretation. The purpose of the chapter is to provide the reader with 
examples of the practical effect of the change of interpretive strategy. 
 
The concluding Chapter 7 is deliberately structured as a beginning rather than an end. 
The purpose of the chapter is to evaluate the research results gathered in the thesis and 
to provide an experimental framework from which further investigation on the subject 
can be facilitated. 
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2 
Meaning in legal interpretation 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine recent developments in the field of legal 
interpretation and their significance for interpretation of contracts. These range from a 
return to natural law and foundationalism to post-structuralism and neo-pragmatism. 
The first step in my investigation is to identify the unique features of legal 
interpretation. The focus then shifts to the plain language movement and the work of 
natural law theorists. Thereafter the interpretive rule theories are discussed. The next 
section deals with the contextual and communitarian interpretation theories and 
includes neo-pragmatism’s explanation of the generation of meaning. Deconstruction 
and post-structuralism are themes for the subsequent section while the relationship 
between post-structuralism and neo-pragmatism as part of postmodern legal 
interpretation is discussed in the penultimate section. In the concluding section the 
significance of the recent interpretive theories is evaluated with reference to 
contractual interpretation. 
 
2. Legal interpretation as a unique field of interpretation 
Robert Cover, in discussing the relationship between interpretation and legal 
interpretation,1 argued that legal interpretation and its consequences cannot be 
understood apart from each other.2 Legal interpretation influences lives in a violent 
and disruptive way. As the result of a legal interpretation, someone might lose his or 
her freedom, property or dignity. Cover shows that legal interpretation does not create 
the same interpersonal reality that “normal” interpretation does.3 “Normal” 
interpretation takes place in a context of unity and persuasion, as interpreters try and 
find common ground between them in order to create a shared understanding. Even 
where there is disagreement, interpreters try to find common reasons why they 
disagree. In other words, they try to ascertain whether they in fact disagree or whether 
                                                 
1 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601. 
2 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1601; Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: 
Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill LJ   603 at 648. 
3 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1602; Cover “Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4 at 9. He argues “…(l)aw is that which licences in blood certain 
transformations while authorizing other only by unanimous consent…”. 
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they are merely misunderstanding each other. This type of interpretation brings 
interpreters together because they are creating shared meaning or reality. Cover 
distinguishes legal interpretation from this “normal” type of interpretation by arguing 
that pain (authorized by legal interpretation) destroys the possibility of an 
interpersonal reality between the inflicter of pain and the victim. Pain in this context 
is not just physical discomfort, although it includes physical pain. Pain is the 
collective expression for any discomfort that might result from the imposition of one 
interpretation on another, be it mental anguish, material dispossession or physical 
agony.4  
 
Martyrdom is used as an extreme illustration of violence as a dimension of 
interpretive practice.5 The martyr proclaims by her act of defiance that she is no 
longer willing, even in the face of overwhelming force, to accept the tyrant’s 
normative reality being imposed upon her. She will only accept continuing life if it is 
on her terms. Just as the death or torture of the martyr is the imposition of one reality 
upon another, legal interpretation entails the imposition of the interpreter’s reality 
upon the “victim”, often inflicting pain or deprivation upon the “victim”.6 Any 
interpretation contrary to the prevailing interpretation of law is resisted by the 
imposition of the authoritive legal interpreter’s7 views upon the interpretation of the 
dissident.8 This typically involves criminal sanctions. While legal interpretation 
ensures the continuing existence of law by imposition of violence upon dissidents, 
even its adherents9 often suffer violence at the hand of legal interpreters. This is 
illustrated by the civil procedure rules requiring compliance with judgement. Even if 
the parties agree that the law governs their dispute, the content or precise application 
of the law is disputed, and more often than not one party prevails. The loser has to 
suffer the adverse consequences by having the winner’s interpretation of the law 
                                                 
4 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 fn 16 at 1607; Twining & Miers How To Do 
Things With Rules (1999) at 375. 
5 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1604. 
6 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1605. 
7 The authoritive legal interpreter is usually the judge or magistrate, but can also be the chairman of a 
tribunal or an arbitrator or a legislator. For example, The Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
states in sec 39(2) that the interpretation of statutes can occur in a court, tribunal or a forum. 
Interpretation can therefore occur in many settings outside of the courts in the traditional sense, but will 
still fall within this definition of legal interpretation. An authoritive legal interpreter is one that falls 
within the scope of legal interpretation as described in this section. 
8 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1607. 
9 Persons who do not contest the legality of the process. 
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imposed on him, which often means that he loses property or privileges. The 
judgement is enforced according to an interpretation of the rules of civil procedure 
despite the fact that the loser was an adherent of the law, albeit often according to his 
interpretation of the law.10
 
The interpretation of what the law “is”, is a pre-condition to the exercise of violence 
against the victim.11  Cover illustrates that the victim experiences domination from 
the outset. 12 The violence does not only start when the victim loses his freedom or 
property. It starts with the possibility that the subject’s interpretation of the law might 
be rejected and that of the authoritive legal interpreter imposed upon the subject who 
then becomes the victim.13 The subject is being dominated and the authoritive 
interpreter dominates from the outset.14 This also destroys whatever common 
interpretation there might have existed between the authoritive interpreter and the 
subject, because it is not the common interpretation that is imposed upon the 
dissenting subject, but that of the authoritive interpreter. In other words, the divergent 
experiences (resulting from the violent imposition of hierarchy) of the subject and the 
authoritive interpreter during the interpretation process destroy the commonality of 
their interpretations.15 The possibility that the subject’s interpretation might be 
rejected and the consequences thereof militate against any meaning that the subject 
and the authoritive interpreter might have had in common. 
 
Cover argues that legal interpretation, because of its violent nature and violent 
behaviour, has three distinct characteristics.16 Legal interpretation is in the first place 
a practical activity. Secondly, it is designed to generate credible threats and actual 
                                                 
10 Cover “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4 at 16. Cover argues that a 
multiplicity of meaning is often undesirable and could result in anarchy. In its place he proposes critical 
reflection on meaning and revision in the face of such critical reflection. 
11 Cover “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4 at 18. 
12 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1608; Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: 
Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill LJ 603 at 648. 
13 Cover “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4 at 44. 
14 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1609; Cover “Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4 at 7. He remarks “… the force of interpretive commitments…do 
determine what law means and what law shall do…”. 
15 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1609; Cover “Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4 at 9-10. Cover states that “…law is that which holds our reality 
apart from our visions…”. 
16 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1610; Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: 
Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill LJ 603 at 649. 
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deeds of violence and it does this in an effective way. Finally, legal interpretation is a 
form of bonded interpretation.  
 
Legal interpretation is a practical activity in the sense that an authoritive interpretation 
in an institutional setting can be expected to be reacted upon in a predictable way by 
others with pre-existing roles within the institutional setting.17 Cover explains that 
practical wisdom is the imposition of meaning upon an institution and the subsequent 
restructuring of the institution in the light of that meaning.18 In other words, when the 
authoritive interpreter “speaks”, someone “listens” and “does”. When a judge gives 
judgement in a case it is reasonable to expect that judgement to be enforced by the 
persons in the judicial system according to their institutional job descriptions. When a 
judge sentences a convicted criminal to go to gaol or gives an order for the ejection of 
someone from premises, it can be expected that the relevant authority will place the 
criminal in prison or that the sheriff will forcibly eject the victim of the ejection order 
if she does not voluntarily comply with the order. The institutional order therefore ties 
practical acts to the interpretation by the authoritive interpreter.19 Cover then correctly 
states that the interpretations are themselves practices. The interpretive act cannot 
give itself effect.20 For legal interpretation to have an effect in the institutional setting, 
the authoritive interpreter must have an understanding of the possible institutional 
response to his interpretation. The judge must know or at least have an idea of the 
effect that her judgement will have upon the institutional machinery that enforces her 
judgements, otherwise her interpretation would no longer have the effect that she 
desired it to have. Legal interpretation as a practical activity involves authorized 
institutional responses and links between the interpretation and the resulting 
institutional response. 
 
                                                 
17 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1611; Cover “Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4 at 9. Here he states that “…law may be viewed as a system of 
tension or a bridge linking a concept of reality to an imagined alternative- that is, as a connective 
between two states of affairs both of which can only be represented in their normative significance only 
through the devices of narrative…”. 
18 Cover “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4 at 44; Van Oenen “Finding 
Cover” (2004) 15 Law & Critique 139 at 143. Van Oenen calls this moment the “…cleaving of 
origin…”. He explains that any originating act, or legal decision for that matter, involves the reduction 
from possibilities to solution and that this delineation always involves violence. 
19 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1611; Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: 
Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill LJ 603 at 649. 
20 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1612. 
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Legal interpretation is designed to create credible threats and actual deeds of 
violence.21 Cover illustrates that most people avoid the infliction of pain on others 
because of our psychological, cultural and moral conditioning.22 While there are 
certain exceptions, for example sadomasochists and people suffering from 
psychological illnesses, most of us would not intentionally inflict harm on others. 
However, there are certain social triggers or cues that suppress our avoidance of 
violence in certain circumstances – for example, I will not hesitate to fight back if 
someone assaulted me.23 The elements of inhibition of harm against others and 
suppression of that inhibition form the conditions in which legal interpretation is 
possible.  Cover demonstrates that these elements make law possible and necessary. 
Law would not be necessary if our inhibition against violence were perfect; and law 
would not be possible if the suppression of our inhibition against violence were not 
possible. Because law depends upon violence, the link between legal interpretation 
and the suppression of the inhibition against violence is important. Interpretations are 
distinct from the violent acts that they mandate.24 It is crucial to understand how the 
violence in the institutional domain of law is authorized and legitimised by the act of 
legal interpretation. Cover shows that it is the specific institutional and hierarchical 
context that provides the link between the violent act and the suppression of the 
inhibition against violence by legal interpretation.25 In the social and institutional 
setting recognized as a legal context, the interpretations of authoritive interpreters 
serve as triggers for agentic behaviour.26 While judges seem to provide their audience 
with their own interpretation of the case at hand, they also engage in a process that 
overrides the inhibition against violent behaviour of a substantial part of their 
                                                 
21 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill LJ 
603 at 649; Cover “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4 at 18. 
22 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1613. “Agentic” relates to the “command 
and obey” structure between the court and the institutions geared at the implementation of the decisions 
of the court, much like an agent must act on the legally relevant mandate by her principal. 
23 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1613; Van Oenen “Finding Cover” 
(2004) 15 Law & Critique 139 at 143. 
24 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1613; Van Oenen “Finding Cover” 
(2004) 15 Law & Critique 139 at 142. Van Oenen remarks that the distance between the interpretation 
and the violence it causes is similar to the distinction between the violence of law and the violence that 
establishes law. The violence that establishes law always has a hand in the violence of the law because 
all legal violence is ultimately based on the original violence that caused law, but the originating 
violence is distinct from the legal interpretive violence because only a replay of the original violence 
can lead to a change in the character of the law. Likewise, violent acts are always ultimately caused by 
the legal interpretation, but a change in its violent nature requires a different legal interpretation. 
25 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1614. 
26 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1615. 
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audience. Legal interpretation therefore creates not only meaning, but also an 
institutional interpretation of that meaning in order to act upon it.  
 
The act of legal interpretation must be linked to the violent act in some way, in other 
words there must be a condition of effective domination.27 These conditions flow 
from the institutional setting.28 The legal system will usually have conditions for 
violent behaviour and the authoritive interpreter must abide by them.29 For example, 
the rules of procedure must be followed before someone can be sentenced or the court 
can give judgement on a matter. Effective domination can only occur in the correct 
institutional setting. Outside of this setting an interpretation would cease to be a legal 
interpretation.30
 
Cover finally regards legal interpretation as bonded interpretation.31 This is explained 
as the continuous vital relationship between the understanding of the text and the 
actions that follow on that. Legal interpretation cannot be understood apart from the 
violent acts it occasions. Importantly, while coherent legal meaning is part of legal 
interpretation, it is potentially in conflict with the need to generate effective action in 
a violent context.32 This means that what is “right” is not always possible. More 
importantly, neither the coherent meaning nor the action is possible without an 
institutional structure of social cooperation.33 Legal interpretation is bound to the 
institutional structure for conditions of effective domination but also for the meaning 
                                                 
27 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1616; Van Oenen “Finding Cover” 
(2004) 15 Law & Critique 139 at 141; Cover “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard LR 
4 at 5 & 18. Cover remarks at 5 that “…[i]n this normative world, law and narrative are inseparably 
related. Every prescription is insistent in its demand to be located in discourse…”. 
28 Cover “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4 at 47 & 53. 
29 The sheriff will not attach the property of a person because of an utterance made to him by a judge 
while they where playing a round of golf at the country club. Likewise, even in court, a bailiff would 
not throw someone in jail simply because the judge remarked that he disliked the person. The 
conditions for effective domination must be present. 
30 It should be kept in mind that the institutional setting is something that needs to be interpreted. It 
cannot serve as a constraint in the positivist sense of the word. See Fish “Is There a Text in This 
Class?” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (1980) at 318. 
31 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1617; Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: 
Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill LJ 603 at 649; Van Oenen “Finding 
Cover” (2004) 15 Law & Critique 139 at 140; Cover “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97 
Harvard LR 4 at 11. 
32 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1617; Cover “Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4 at 40. Cover explains “…[i]nterpretation always takes place in the 
shadow of coercion…”. 
33 Cover “Violence and the Word” (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1617. 
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that is created. Legal meaning consists both of the normative meaning and the action 
that follows in the institutional setting.  
   
Cover provides us with convincing reasons why legal interpretation is different from 
other forms of interpretation without expressly preferring one theory of interpretation 
to another. The positivist and the relativist can agree on this characterization of legal 
interpretation without having to agree on the exact process by which we get from text 
to meaning.34 The relevance of Cover’s analysis lies in the responsibility he places on 
the shoulders of the legal interpretive theorist: The theorist must realize that she is 
dealing with violence and pain in an institutional setting where her findings have real 
consequences in the world.35 The interpretive process one advocates does not only 
affect meaning, it also affects whether someone will be heard, evicted or even 
imprisoned. With this important insight in mind we can now move on to the 
discussion of the link between legal interpretation and meaning. 
 
3. Plain meaning, objective meaning and natural meaning 
3.1 Introduction 
In this section various interpretation theories are discussed, ranging from the plain 
legal language movement (PLLM) and theories of objective meaning to natural law 
theories (metaphysics). These theories are grouped together because they share the 
assumption that language, if used correctly, can produce determinate meaning. 
Central to most of these theories is the assumption that language has a functional 
nature. Functionalists argue that language serves a pointing out (or sign-signified) 
function, and if the text creator is careful with the words she uses, and the interpreter 
can manage to link the text with that which it signifies, misunderstandings will be 
eliminated. As far as legal interpretation goes, most of the theories discussed in this 
section involve a search for the meaning of the text (as opposed to the postmodern 
insistence that there will always be more than one meaning), and many of the theories 
                                                 
34 These are the two extremes in legal interpretation. Positivists believe that interpretations are 
restricted by rules of interpretation, the intention of the author of the text or language itself, while 
relativists argue that there can be no restriction what so ever on interpretation. 
35 Van Oenen “Finding Cover” (2004) 15 Law & Critique 139 at 140. Van Oenen reminds us that we 
will always need interpretations as a cover for legal violence, but that the legal interpretation should 
always remind us of the violent nature that it occasions in the same way that scar tissue remind us of 
the pain of the wound. 
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justify the sense arrived at after the interpretation process as the true, natural or 
objective meaning of the text. 
 
 3.2 Objective meaning theory 
The first theory of language under discussion is the objective meaning theory held by 
legal positivists.36 The main contention of this theory is that language has objective or 
determinate meaning independent of context. These meanings are usually described as 
the core meanings of words. This belief has important implications for interpretation. 
If words have objective meaning, an interpretation of them can be right or wrong.37 
Furthermore, the rightness or wrongness of the interpretation can be determined 
regardless of the context.38  
 
It should be noted that very few scholars contend openly that language has objective 
meaning, but often their interpretive strategy rests on just this assumption.39 Common 
examples of this are objective intentionalism as a theory of contractual 
interpretation40 and purposive interpretation in the field of statutory interpretation.41 
With regard to objective intentionalism, the aim is to ascertain what the objectively 
manifested intention of the author is. If language were not determinate, the meaning 
of the text would depend on the interpreter alone (and this is precisely what the theory 
aims to avoid).42 As far as purposive interpretation is concerned, the aim is to 
reconcile the interpretation of the text (in the specific circumstance) with its purpose. 
                                                 
36 Dworkin The Philosophy of Law (1977) at 54. 
37 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 64. 
38 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 65. 
39 Campbell “Grounding Theories of Legal Interpretation” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal 
Interpretation in Democratic States (2002) at 32. 
40 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 29. Where contracts 
are governed by legislation, objective intentionalism is also often favoured. See for example Kalil v 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1967 (4) SA 550 (A) at 556; Swart en 'n Ander v Cape Fabrix (Pty) Ltd 1979 
(1) SA 195 (A) at 202; Coopers & Lybrand and Others v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 768; 
Blaauwberg Meat Wholesalers CC v Anglo Dutch Meats (Exports) Ltd, 2004 (3) SA 160 (SCA) at 166. 
41 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 96; De Ville Constitutional and Statutory 
Interpretation (2000) at 141; De Ville “Meaning and Statutory Interpretation” (1999) 62 THRHR 373 
at 376; Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students (1998) at 31; Aktiebolaget Hässle 
and Another v Triomed (Pty) Ltd 2003 (1) SA 155 (SCA) at 159-160; McLean v SASOL Mine (Pty) Ltd 
Secunda Colleries; McLean v SASOL Pension Fund 2003 (6) SA 254 (W) at 268-269; Nkosi and 
another v Bührman 2002 (1) SA 372 (SCA) at 388; Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action 
Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at 739. 
42 See further chapter 5. 
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If language were not determinate, the purpose of the statute would not be of much 
use, since it would be just as indeterminate as the text itself.43
 
The positivist model of interpretation distinguishes between interpretation in the weak 
sense and interpretation in the strong sense.44 Uncontroversial interpretation or 
interpretation in the weak sense occurs when the meaning of the text is readily 
available to the interpreter. Positivists do not see this as a construction of meaning, 
but simply as a deduction of meaning from the text.45 Interpretation in the strong 
sense, on the other hand, is required to make a text interpretable in the weak sense. 
Positivists contend that interpretation in the strong sense is only necessary when there 
is some vagueness, ambiguity or obscurity in the text because the author neglected to 
make sure that the text reflected clearly what he wanted it to reflect.46 The strong 
interpretation of the text therefore leaves interpreters with a text that is clear and 
precise. The interpreter can then proceed to “read” or interpret the text in the weak 
sense and deduce the plain or ordinary meaning from the text.47 It is clear from this 
distinction that positivists argue that there is a difference between rule making and 
rule application.48 It is also assumed that it is preferable that the interpreter should not 
have creative input and that the instances where this is permitted are limited to the 
                                                 
43 See further chapter 5 section 3. 
44 Campbell “Grounding Theories of Legal Interpretation” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal 
Interpretation in Democratic States (2002) at 31. 
45 Campbell “Grounding Theories of Legal Interpretation” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal 
Interpretation in Democratic States (2002) at 31; Schwarzschild “Mad Dogmas and Englishmen: How 
Other People Interpret and Why” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal Interpretation in 
Democratic States (2002) at 93. It is also telling that positivists almost always talk of judges when they 
are discussing interpreters. Interpreters should not make meaning, but if someone has to creative, let it 
be the judges. Hopefully they will be responsible!? This shows how deeply the idea that interpreting in 
the weak sense is regarded as the norm and interpretation as creation the exception have been 
embedded. 
46 Campbell “Grounding Theories of Legal Interpretation” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal 
Interpretation in Democratic States (2002) at 31; Schwarzschild “Mad Dogmas and Englishmen: How 
Other People Interpret and Why” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal Interpretation in 
Democratic States (2002) at 93. 
47 Campbell “Grounding Theories of Legal Interpretation” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal 
Interpretation in Democratic States (2002) at 31. The same assumption that the PLLM make is of 
course also made here. It is assumed that interpreters share a socio-linguistic context, in other words 
they agree what words mean on a general level. 
48 In positivist legal theory rule making consists of the creation of texts aimed at regulating behaviour. 
On the other hand, rule applying happens when the (rule) text (which is assumed to already have 
meaning) is applied to a specific situation. It is often argued that interpretation of legal texts is only 
concerned with the latter. 
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situation where the text creator “slipped up” and did not express himself clearly 
enough.49
 
Positivist lawyers are encouraged to be “careful speakers”.50 Morrison explains that a 
careful speaker is one who takes care with expression and investigates the possible 
meanings inherent in his speech.51 If a speaker or author foresees that a certain 
expression might be ambiguous, he will substitute that expression with one that has 
more determinate meaning, or take care to explain the expression to his audience. In 
short, the author of the text must predetermine the possible interpretations that the text 
he creates allows for. The second aspect of careful speaking involves interpretation. A 
careful interpreter is one who constantly questions the speaker or author’s intention.52 
By so doing the interpreter is always aware of the meaning of the text. The careful 
speaker/interpreter can only be more successful than the normal interpreter if the text 
and meaning (signifier and signified) can be predetermined by careful consideration 
and the author of the text can communicate his intention unambiguously to the careful 
interpreter. In South Africa the courts often call for objective interpretation of 
contracts.53  
                                                 
49 Campbell “Grounding Theories of Legal Interpretation” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal 
Interpretation in Democratic States (2002) at 31; Glass “A Hermeneutical Standpoint” in Goldsworthy 
& Campbell (eds) Legal Interpretation in Democratic States (2002) at 144. 
50 Morrison “Excursions into the Nature of Legal Language” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) 
at 20. 
51 Morrison “Excursions into the Nature of Legal Language” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) 
at 20. 
52 Morrison “Excursions into the Nature of Legal Language” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) 
at 20. Presence and by implication face to face communication is preferred to non-presence or writing. 
53 Mackay v Legal Aid Board 2003 (1) SA 271 (SE) at 287; NBS Bank LTD v Cape Produce Co (Pty) 
Ltd & Others 2002 (1) SA 396 (SCA) at 408; South African Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v NBS Bank Ltd 
2002 (1) SA 560 (SCA) at 573; Church of the Province of Southern Africa, Diocese of Cape Town v 
CCMA & Others 2002 (3) SA 385 (LC) at 394; ABSA Bank Ltd v Deeb & Others 1999 (2) SA 656 (N) 
at 662. Contractual interpreters often argue that the interpretation of contract is merely a way of reading 
a contract and that it should never amount to a construction of a contract for the parties. This so-called 
“objective reading” of the contract terms corresponds exactly with the positivist contention that normal 
interpretation is actually no interpretation at all, because the interpreter is merely extracting meaning 
that is already there in the text. The parties to the contract are seen as the only creative parties (in the 
sense that they are the only creators of meaning) provided if they express themselves properly. The 
statement that “the court will not make a contract for the parties” seems to suggest that the ideal 
situation with regard to interpretation of contracts is one where the court does not have to take any 
responsibility for the meaning that is attributed to the contract. The parties to the contract must create 
the meaning that the court can choose whether to enforce or not. Situations where the meaning of the 
contract is not immediately “apparent” are frowned upon, since the court has to make a decision with 
regard to the meaning. These situations are usually blamed upon poor language use and in extreme 
circumstances upon a lack of consensus between the parties. The distinction between objective 
interpretation and interpretation as a choice rests upon the assumption that contractual language can 
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 3.3 Plain legal language  
The Plain Legal Language Movement (PLLM) arose in South Africa in response to 
the historical tendency of drafting legal instruments in obscure legal jargon.54 The 
PLLM affords a central role to language in the process of development, because 
language is identified as the “vehicle” for the transmission of information and 
culture.55 The aim of the movement can therefore be described as the improvement of 
communication through the use of plain legal language, and through this improvement 
the promotion of development. 
 
Legal language is portrayed by the PLLM as a “language for special purposes”.56 This 
means that legal language was formed with specific (legal) concepts in mind. Legal 
language corresponds with the objects, people and processes it denotes because it is 
formulated through logical thinking and abstraction.57 It is a language created by 
lawyers, concerning the law (as opposed to everyday language concerning many 
things). Legal language is regarded as potentially more precise, shorter and 
intelligible than everyday English.58 Legal language is oriented towards legal 
institutions rather than the public at large and it is precisely this orientation that 
renders legal language unintelligible to the general public.59 The problem is thus not 
so much communication between lawyers as between lawyers and non-lawyers. The 
point is that lawyers, versed in this language (much like a scientist versed in the use of 
scientific symbols) know what other lawyers mean when they use this language, and 
the problem is not so much that lawyers do not understand each other but rather that 
                                                                                                                                            
simply be read if it is clear enough. In sections 5 and 6 this assumption will be subjected to critical 
scrutiny. 
54 Viljoen & Nienaber “Introduction” in Viljoen & Nienaber (eds) Plain Legal Language for a New 
Democracy (2001) at 9; Omar “Plain Language, the Law and the Right to Information” in Viljoen & 
Nienaber (eds) Plain Legal Language for a New Democracy (2001) at 57.  
55 Alberts “Plain Language in a Multilingual Society” in Viljoen & Nienaber (eds) Plain Legal 
Language for a New Democracy (2001) at 91. 
56 Alberts “Plain Language in a Multilingual Society” in Viljoen & Nienaber (eds) Plain Legal 
Language for a New Democracy (2001) at 90; Morrison “Excursions into the Nature of Legal 
Language” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) at 19. 
57 Alberts “Plain Language in a Multilingual Society” in Viljoen & Nienaber (eds) Plain Legal 
Language for a New Democracy (2001) at 90. 
58 Alberts “Plain Language in a Multilingual Society” in Viljoen & Nienaber (eds) Plain Legal 
Language for a New Democracy (2001) at 91; Morrison “Excursions into the Nature of Legal 
Language” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) at 22. 
59 Alberts “Plain Language in a Multilingual Society” in Viljoen & Nienaber (eds) Plain Legal 
Language for a New Democracy (2001) at 91; Morrison “Excursions into the Nature of Legal 
Language” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) at 22. 
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the public at large (who is not necessarily versed in this language) does not 
understand lawyers.60
 
Daniels states that the key to good plain legal language communication is to achieve a 
balance between precise communication and plain communication.61 The important 
assumption is therefore that understanding is somehow linked to the language usage, 
and if we can get the art of communication right, the problems of indeterminacy will 
disappear. If we can get a perfect measure of our audience, and if we ensure that we 
communicate in language that is “plain” to that audience and we formulate what we 
want to say precisely in that “plain” language, the result will be perfect understanding 
of the communication.62  
 
                                                 
60 Fine “Plain Language Communication: Approaches & Challenges” in Viljoen & Nienaber (eds) 
Plain Legal Language for a New Democracy (2001) at 19; Campbell “Grounding Theories of Legal 
Interpretation” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal Interpretation in Democratic States (2002) at 
31. Derrick Fine defines plain legal language in general as the capacity of the community, government 
and legal sector to communicate plainly and effectively. Plain language is defined as clear, 
understandable and accessible language that is user friendly. He distinguishes between interpreters at 
different levels of linguistic sophistication and interpreters who are all from a specific level. Fine 
places language on a continuum from difficult to plain. He argues that text creators must always 
attempt to create texts that are as plain as possible. The “plainness” of language is determined by the 
audience, the complexity of the material and what Fine calls “plain language skill”. The PLLM 
assumes that enhanced understanding flows from communication that is as simple as possible. It 
follows from this that the use of plain legal language in communication, especially legal 
communication, will overcome many of the interpretive difficulties encountered by legal interpreters. 
61 Daniels “Plain Language in the Current Practice of Drafting” in Viljoen & Nienaber (eds) Plain 
Legal Language for a New Democracy (2001) at 82. 
62 Daniels “Plain Language in the Current Practice of Drafting” in Viljoen & Nienaber (eds) Plain 
Legal Language for a New Democracy (2001) at 82; Alberts “Plain Language in a Multilingual 
Society” in Viljoen & Nienaber (eds) Plain Legal Language for a New Democracy (2001) at 90. The 
standardization of language is presented as the solution to the problem of different audiences. The 
PLLM argues that precise communication is only possible if the receiver and the sender of the message 
attach the same meaning to the message. Various strategies are proposed to achieve standardization of 
language. The first strategy is to ensure that the linguistic labels (signifiers) attached to objects 
(signified) correlate across the different audiences. The ideal situation for the PLLM is where one 
signifier signifies one signified. In other words, the linguistic label must be attached to only one object. 
Standardization of terms is required when creating new signifiers. The creator must make sure of the 
underlying meaning of the signifier that he creates and its translation into other audiences.62 Five ways 
of creating new signifiers are identified. Standardization of the present system of language is preferred 
to the creation of new terms. 
The second strategy is to eliminate culture- and context-specific signifiers. This is believed to be 
possible if the communicator has a sound knowledge of her own language and the language of the 
targeted cultural group. The communicator must translate the culture-specific signifier into the general 
language signifier. In this way the problem of signifier differentiation can be eliminated. 
The third strategy is to deal with the interrelationship of terms across different audiences. The 
meanings of terms often change when they are used in conjunction with other terms. The PLLM 
proposes to deal with this by not studying the terms in isolation, but to study them as concepts. They 
want to capture the meaning that results from the relationship between the terms rather than to study 
the terms in isolation. 
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Excusus: the plain meaning rule 
 
The notion of plain or ordinary meaning plays an important role in contractual 
interpretation.63 According to South African courts, the so-called plain meaning rule 
of contractual interpretation requires that words must be afforded their plain, ordinary 
and popular meaning when a contract is interpreted, unless the context suggests 
otherwise.64 The burden of proof is on the party who contends that the meaning of the 
text in issue deviates from the ordinary meaning.65 The rule itself can have at least 
two understandings that are important in order to establish possible views courts 
might hold of plain meaning. The first understanding of the rule is that meaning exists 
on a general level that is readily accessible to the interpreter, and that interpreters can 
assume that the parties to the contract communicate on this general level, except when 
the context suggests otherwise. This level of communication is called ordinary or 
popular communication and it correlates closely with the contentions of the plain legal 
language movement.  The context that will require deviation from the plain meaning 
is the exception to the general rule. This understanding of the rule seems to be the 
most likely one if one keeps in mind that the onus of proving meanings other that the 
plain meaning rests on the person who avers such meanings. The implication of this 
understanding of the rule is that the use of ordinary language, when drawing up 
contracts, will greatly diminish the interpretive difficulties encountered with the 
interpretation of contracts. This also means that this rule will fail where the PLLM 
fails because the rule and the PLLM rest upon similar assumptions about the nature of 
communication.  
 
However, there is a second understanding of the rule according to which, context 
plays the central role. The rule then requires the court to investigate the context of 
each case to interpret the contract; only if the context does not prescribe a conflicting 
meaning the interpreter can take the words of the contract to have their ordinary 
meaning. The fact that the onus of proof is on the party who claims that a specific 
contextual meaning is correct is not fatal to this understanding of the rule, because 
                                                 
63 Coertzen v Gerard NO & Another 1997 (2) SA 836 (O) at 845; Fedgen Insurance Ltd v Leyds 1995 
(3) SA 33 (A) at 38; Da Meyer Consultants CC v Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd & Others 1994 
(4) SA 451 (W) at 454; De Ujfalussy v De Ujfalussy 1989 (3) SA 18 (A) at 23. 
64 This rule was first formulated by Wessels AJ in Scottish Union & National Insurance Co Ltd v 
Native Recruiting Corporation Ltd 1934 AD 458 at 464-5. 
65 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 121. 
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plain meaning is dependent upon the discharge of this onus. The finding of a plain 
meaning is either the result of a proven special context (which will render the 
meaning general in that context) proven by the onus discharger,66 or by a failure to 
prove such a special context, the imposition of the courts’ idea of plain meaning. In 
other words, the meaning that is ultimately decided upon would either be an imposed 
plain meaning (if the averrer fails to discharge the onus) or a proven plain meaning. 
This understanding does not align with the contentions of the PLLM because the court 
does not suggest that plain meaning is the norm and context the exception. Rather, the 
court uses plain meaning as the exception when the context does not provide the 
interpreter with the meaning. This plain meaning claim is much softer in the sense 
that the court recognizes that it imposes something on the parties by using plain 
meaning, because context provides the meaning and the court will only fall back on 
plain meaning when it cannot “read” the context. Unlike the first understanding of the 
rule, the present one does not suggest that the use of plain language will clarify 
meaning or simplify the interpretive process, since contractual meaning is seen as the 
result of context rather than the plain meaning of the language used.67
 
3.4 Metaphysical realism 
The theory of interpretation known as metaphysical realism can be described as the 
opposite of the plain language theories. The PLLM argues that effective 
communication results from the study and effective use of signifiers or words, while 
the metaphysical realists argue that effective communication results from the study of 
the signifieds or the real world out there. Metaphysical realists contend that any 
communication is based on a metaphysical understanding of language.68 In other 
words, when we speak we intend to convey meaning based on the way things are 
rather than the way language portrays it. Language is regarded as an imperfect tool for 
describing reality.69 Metaphysical realists agree that language may be ambiguous, but 
language should not be the focus of our efforts to avoid ambiguity. We should rather 
look at the way things really are.  
 
                                                 
66 If he (the party who has to discharge the onus) claims that the relevant meaning is plain meaning 
because the context in which the contract was concluded was a general context. In other words he 
wants the court to accept his plain meaning and not impose plain meaning as they see it. 
67 The role of context in the interpretive process is discussed in sections 4 and 5 of this chapter. 
68 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 137. 
69 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 138. 
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In the place of the positivist semantic theory, metaphysical realists propose a theory 
according to which the meaning of signifiers is determined by the actual reality of the 
signified.70 This theory implies that meaning is not dependent upon the whims of the 
communicators but founded upon reality. The content of meaning depends upon the 
characteristics of the actual object rather than the word that signifies the object. 
Reality provides a standard against which meaning can be measured.  Consequently, 
different opinions regarding the meaning of terms can exist and a differentiation 
between belief and reality can be maintained. 
 
Metaphysical realists have proposed a very specific method of interpretation based on 
two contentions. The first contention is that there are real answers to our questions in 
the real world — there exists a reality beyond language that can provide real answers 
to our real questions.71 The second contention is that legal interpreters must look at 
this “real” reality when they interpret legal texts.72 The interpreter must look beyond 
the text to the “actual expressions” of the authors or the “actual” meaning that the text 
intended to convey. The metaphysical realist is therefore looking for something 
outside of language in the “real” world that determines the meaning of indeterminate 
terms.73 This means that the meaning of a term is independent of the interpreter and 
that meaning can be established and determined objectively.74  
 
                                                 
70 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 158. 
71 Remember that metaphysical realists argue that our communications are based on a conscious or 
unconscious belief that a metaphysical reality exists out there. Our language is a system of imperfect 
signifiers pointing to the signifieds that form the reality that we want to communicate. We want to 
express reality as it is, but we are hampered by language. See Bix Law, Language and Legal 
Determinacy (1993) at 138; Radin “Reconsidering the Rule of Law” in Schauer (ed) Law and 
Language (1993) at 302. 
72 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 138; Radin “Reconsidering the Rule of Law” 
in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) at 302. 
73 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 149. More specifically, metaphysical realists 
believe in natural rights. This entails four assumptions. The first assumption is that moral entities exist 
independently of the belief in their existence. This “morality” exists alongside of our perception and 
even our linguistic reality. It is something, according to the metaphysical realists, that we must try to 
know the true nature of because we do not construct it but are influenced by it. The second assumption 
is that rights exist as a distinct part of moral entities. Rights are something concrete alongside our 
understanding rather than through our understanding. The third assumption is that rights are pre-legal 
and pre-conventional entities, in other words they exist independently of such laws and conventions. 
The fourth assumption is that people have rights simply by virtue of being human beings. Rights are 
fundamental in the sense that they are not earned or acquired. See Moore “Natural Rights, Judicial 
Review & Constitutional Interpretation” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal Interpretation in 
Democratic States (2002) at 211; Radin “Reconsidering the Rule of Law” in Schauer (ed) Law and 
Language (1993) at 303 fn 106. 
74 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 149. 
 24
According to metaphysical realist semantic theory words mainly have an ostension 
function:75 Words are acts of pointing to some real thing in the real world. Words are 
not the summary of a person’s belief regarding that word, or even some communal 
consensus of meaning.76 However, the connection of the term to the real object is 
done by the community.77 The community ascribes certain attributes to the real object 
and its kind. Following this, the word or signifier is attached to the object or signified 
that fits the attributes assigned to the real kind.  
 
The metaphysical realists criticize the semantic theory held by the PLLM and other 
positivists, according to which meaning must be associated with the properties that 
the speaker associates with that term.78 Two shortcomings are identified with regard 
to this semantic theory.79 The first is the inability of a theory that rests upon the 
beliefs of the speakers to explain disagreement. Because the speakers provide the 
terms with meaning, a speaker cannot be wrong in her assessment of meaning and 
positivists are theoretically forced to conclude that the speakers are speaking about 
different things when they disagree about the meaning of a term.80 A positivist 
semantic theory cannot distinguish between changes in the signified as supposed to 
changes in belief about the signified either.81 In other words, the meaning of the 
signifier in the positivist scheme will sometimes change even though the signified 
stays the same, and the meaning can stay the same even if the signified changes. Both 
these contentions rest upon an assumption that meaning without an objective basis is 
delivered into the hands of the speaker to shape it as she pleases. The speakers cannot 
agree that they disagree because they do not have any way to measure right or wrong. 
The speakers cannot differentiate between change in substance and change in 
perception because they cannot measure where perception starts and substance ends. 
 
                                                 
75 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 162. “Ostension” is described in the Oxford 
Dictionary as the act of “…directly demonstrating that which is signified by the term…”. See Allen 
(ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1992) at 840. 
76 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 162. 
77 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 163. 
78 The PLLM contend that we must agree about the meaning of terms so that a plain language can be 
created that will facilitate better communication. The speakers must agree what they want to say when 
they use certain terms. If X & Y agreed that Z=1 even if Z=2 the PLLM will be happy. Metaphysical 
realists would argue that we should rather look at the true nature of Z. That way we can objectively 
evaluate the value of Z when there is a disagreement. 
79 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 158. 
80 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 158. 
81 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 158. 
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These criticisms against the positivist model are also based on the assumption that 
there is in fact a reality apart from our linguistic comprehension of the world, in other 
words a metaphysical reality.  
 
3.5  Summary of objectivist theories 
Objectivist positivists argue that we do not understand each other when and because 
we do not take enough care when we speak to make sure that our signifiers 
correspond with our intended signifieds. They hold that interpretation in the strong 
sense is only necessary when and because we do not speak carefully. If we spoke 
carefully and chose our signifiers carefully so that they correspond with our intended 
signified, meaning indeterminacy would be prevented. This approach therefore 
assumes that the perfect correlation between signifier and signified already exists, it is 
only for the speaker to make these matches successfully. The PLLM argues that 
misunderstandings result from the use of specialized language, cultural linguistic 
differences and diverse signifier-signified relationships. They propose to solve these 
problems by simplifying the speaker-audience relationship and agreement regarding 
the signifier-signified relationship. If we use “plain” language and agree about the 
meaning of that language, we will understand each other perfectly. Metaphysical 
realists, on the other hand, argue that the relationship between signifier and signified 
is not perfect and that this imperfection is the cause of indeterminacy. They assert that 
the true nature of the signified should be the subject of investigation. If we want 
perfectly correlating signifiers and signifieds we must determine the true nature of the 
signifieds and attach to them signifiers that reflect the true nature of the signifieds. 
That way we can judge when an utterance or script is true, false or based on a 
misunderstanding. Although positivism, the PLLM (as a specific form of objectivist 
positivism) and metaphysical realism seem to be irreconcilably different, they share 
the assumptions that meaning determinacy is dependent upon a correlation between 
the signifier and the signified. To sum up, the PLLM, positivists and metaphysical 
realists depend upon the possibility that signifiers and signifieds can correlate and that 
strong interpretation can be avoided by thus avoiding indeterminate meaning. All 
these theories assume that objective or reliable meaning is possible and that it can be 
established independently of the context and of interpretation. 
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3.6  How objective are the objective theories? 
Stanley Fish argues that in order to claim that the real world correlates with language, 
one has to make extensive claims regarding the nature of reality, the structure of the 
mind, the dynamics of perception, the autonomy of the self, the independence of fact 
from value and, most importantly, the independence of meaning from interpretation.82 
The following discussion centers on Fish’s arguments against the assumption that 
language is a purely formal description of being. Because the legal positivists and 
natural (or metaphysically realist) lawyers share the assumption that language and 
what it signifies can correlate, I will discuss Fish’s criticism of their position as a 
general critique of objectivism.  
 
Because objectivists argue that language (and, by implication, communication) can be 
determinate if signifiers correlate with the signified, the possibility must exist that the 
signifiers do not correlate with the signifieds.83 In other words, for it to be better that 
we say exactly what we mean, and assuming that we can in fact say what we mean, it 
must be possible that we can say what we do not mean. This by itself does not upset 
the notion of objective meaning as advanced by objectivists, but it introduces the need 
to distinguish between what we mean and what we do not mean. If signifiers can 
correlate exactly with signifieds, one must be able to distinguish between cases where 
signifiers do correlate and when they do not. We cannot know if the signified 
correlates with the signifier without this distinction. In other words, for someone to be 
able to know what I mean, they must be able to know what I do not mean. The 
problem facing objectivists is the linguistic situatedness of the distinction between 
correlations of signifier and signified and non-correlation. Language can only signify 
because it can also miss-signify. We can only understand that an apple is an apple 
because we can say that a pear is an apple or an apple is a pear and know that it is 
not.84 Words that cannot be appropriated for different meanings cannot be words, 
because words can only be intelligible when opposed to other words.85 The very 
element that objectivists want to limit provides us with crucial elements of meaning. 
                                                 
82 Fish “How Ordinary is Ordinary Language?” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class? (1980) at 97. 
83 Fish “How Ordinary is Ordinary Language?” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class? (1980) at 101. 
84 I do not mean this in a metaphysically realist way, in other words that we know the true nature of an 
apple. An apple can also be a computer or an example of the genus fruit, which might also include a 
pear etc The point is that signifiers must be divorced or separate from the signified in order for them to 
have any usefulness. 
85 This specific occurrence is called difference and it is explained in more detail in the section 7. 
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To summarize: Objectivists cannot (objectively) distinguish between true and untrue 
statements without resorting to an unrealistic description of language. 
 
There are various other objections to the contentions of objectivists, for example the 
lack of an all-inclusive interpretive community from which one can judge meanings,86 
the linguistic situatedness of meaning and the consequent lack of an objective 
Archimedes point of reference from where we can agree on meaning.87 Most of these 
criticisms are discussed in the remainder of this chapter because they flow from the 
discussion of other interpretive practices.  
 
4. Constraining rules and interpretation 
4.1 Introduction 
Many theorists, especially positivists, are uncomfortable with the notion that 
interpreters construct meaning.88 Meaning relativism is portrayed as a state of anarchy 
where the law cannot be effective and the application of law to a particular situation is 
arbitrary and unrestrained. Many theorists recognize that language does not have 
objective meaning and that objective theories of interpretation are untenable. 
However, most of these critics believe that meaning is best managed when one can 
limit the possible interpretations of a text. Since language-use fails to constrain the 
possible meanings of texts, such theorists resort to rules of interpretation to limit the 
possible meanings that can be attached to a text. These rules are perceived to play an 
important role in contractual interpretation, where the ultimate interpretive 
catastrophe is perceived to be a court that uses subjective judgement when 
interpreting a contract.89  
 
 
                                                 
86 This objection complicates the task of all objectivists, but is especially fatal to the PLLM. Without 
some common ground (or interpretive community) from where “plain meaning” can flow we can never 
have meaning that is accessible to all persons because some people will always stand outside the 
interpretive community that is regarded as the common ground. As a result no meaning can ever be 
completely plain. 
87 This objection renders the theory of the metaphysical realists at the same time meaningless and 
impossible to implement. The theory is meaningless because even if a “real world out there” exists we 
cannot know it. Because we cannot measure or evaluate the “real world” against language, we cannot 
conform to that reality. 
88 Fiss “Objectivity and Interpretation” (1982) 34 Stanford LR   739 at 740. 
89 See ABSA Bank Ltd v Deeb & Others 1999 (2) SA 656 (N) at 663; Phone-a-Copy Worldwide (Pty) 
Ltd v Orkin & Another (1986) (1) SA 729 (A) at 734; Detmold “Law as the Structure of Meaning” in 
Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal Interpretation in Democratic States (2002) at 164. 
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 4.2 Rule theories 
A good place to start the discussion of this approach is to look at the rule theorist’s 
definition of the role of rules of interpretation. William Twining wrote the following 
about rules of interpretation: “…‘Rule’ is used here to mean a general norm 
mandating or guiding conduct or action in a given type of situation…”.90 The general 
idea of the rules of interpretation is to guide the behaviour of the interpreter in such a 
manner that the meaning that the interpreter produces is pre-determinable to a large 
extent. In other words, while it is acknowledged that the interpreter plays an important 
part in the process where meaning is produced, the rules of interpretation are an 
attempt to limit the role of the interpreter. 
 
Rules of interpretation have four characteristics that play an important part in the rule 
theorist’s interpretive strategy. The first characteristic is the normative or prescriptive 
nature of the rules:91 Rules say what must be done in a situation rather that what is 
done in a situation. Rules prescribe rather than describe. Secondly, rules are general in 
that they govern behaviour in different circumstances and contexts rather than in 
specific contexts:92 Rules must be applicable in different scenarios. The third 
characteristic of rules is that they guide and serve as standards of behaviour for 
interpreters.93 Dworkin affirms this by arguing that the best justification of a legal 
finding or interpretation is to show that it conforms to existing authority and that it is 
justified in the light of the institution.94 Finally, rules provide justification for 
behaviour according to those rules.95 Rules are said to be the means by which values 
can be implemented.96  
 
Rule theorists have specific ways of dealing with open texture or vague language (of 
the interpreted text) that might inhibit the application of the rules of interpretation. 
                                                 
90 Twining & Miers How To Do Things With Rules (1999) at 123. 
91 Twining & Miers How To Do Things With Rules (1999) at 123; Radin “Reconsidering the Rule of 
Law” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) at 284. 
92 Twining & Miers How To Do Things With Rules (1999) at 123; Radin “Reconsidering the Rule of 
Law” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) at 284. 
93 Twining & Miers How To Do Things With Rules (1999) at 124; Radin “Reconsidering the Rule of 
Law” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) at 284. 
94Eg rules of interpretation and precedent. See Dworkin Law’s Empire (1986) at 243. In sections 5 and 
6 below, the institutional part of Dworkin’s statement will be discussed in more detail. 
95 Twining & Miers How To Do Things With Rules (1999) at 124; Radin “Reconsidering the Rule of 
Law” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) at 284. 
96 Twining & Miers How To Do Things With Rules (1999) at 129. 
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The first way to deal with a vague text is to use the rules of interpretation to ascertain 
what value must be placed on the text.97 In principle this means that vague words are 
determined by the surrounding words that are not vague. The second strategy (of rule 
implementation) is to require of the interpreter to choose among permissible meanings 
the one that is in line with the policy that governs the interpretation of the text.98 For 
example, when interpreting a contract a South Africa interpreter could be asked to 
choose the meaning that is the closest to the intention of the parties to the contract, 
because that is the policy of interpreting contracts. The last strategy is to revert to the 
status quo and assume that a vague text only proposes to change the status quo as far 
as change is indisputably required by the surrounding language.99
 
The rules of interpretation have a specific function in the rule theorist’s scheme of 
interpretation, namely to guide behaviour.100 This presupposes that rules can in fact 
guide behaviour in the direction that the rule-maker intended. In other words, if I 
make a rule that evidence outside of a contractual text may not be considered to 
determine the meaning of that contractual text, I must assume that the application of 
the rule will make a difference in the eventual outcome of the interpretation of the 
text. The meanings that can be produced must be different, more specifically limited 
in quantity, under the application of the rule than otherwise. The rules should also 
guide the interpreter to the kind of meanings that the rule theorist intended when she 
composed the rules. 
 
Some rule theorists do not make the strong claim that interpretive rules will guide the 
interpreter to specific meanings. Instead, they argue that the utility of rules of 
interpretation lies in their clarification function.101 If we take the various rules into 
consideration we obtain a so-called holistic picture of the interpretive task and 
                                                 
97 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 31. 
98 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 31. 
99 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 31. 
100 Twining & Miers How To Do Things With Rules (1999) at 147; Fiss “Objectivity and Interpretation” 
(1982) Stanford LR 34 739 at 744; Radin “Reconsidering the Rule of Law” in Schauer (ed) Law and 
Language (1993) at 287; Levinson “Law as Literature” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) at 
350. Levinson calls this belief weak textualism. Weak textualism is the belief that one has found a 
scientific method of interpretation. The method of interpretation is regarded as universally applicable. 
Strong textualists, on the other hand, hold beliefs that are neo-pragmatist and discussion of their 
theoretical positions will fit in with the discussion of the role of context and community in section 6. 
101 Twining & Miers How To Do Things With Rules (1999) at 372. 
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generate meanings that are relevant to our specific circumstances.102 This approach is 
similar to the contextual theorist’s position that is discussed in the next section. These 
theorists mostly recognize that language is not determinate, but they seek a way of 
interpreting that will limit the indeterminacy to the minimum. They assume that the 
interpreter who looks at the interpretive task from the most angles will get the whole 
picture and the best answer to his interpretive problem.103  
 
There are also rule theorists who argue that law itself is a constraining rule.104 They 
differ from contextualists because they argue that law has a constraining function, 
rather than a constraining effect.105 These theorists argue that the law does not create 
new meanings; it rather allows us to find the lawful relation between competing 
meanings.106 Detmold explains this concept by referring to the interpretation of 
contracts.107 He begins by assuming that two parties, who approach the court to 
adjudicate their case, have two different interpretations of the contract, namely X and 
Y. The court must decide which interpretation entails a lawful relationship between 
the parties. Detmold argues that the court cannot create its own meaning and impose it 
on the parties, but must find the lawful relationship between the parties’ 
interpretations. In other words the answer, or acceptable interpretation, lies 
somewhere between X and Y. The judge might think that the real interpretation is Z 
but she is bound to find only the relationship between X and Y that will be lawful. 
This conception of the law itself as a constraining rule rests on two assumptions. The 
first is that the court can know exactly what the parties’ interpretations are and know 
this without itself having to interpret X and Y. This assumption has to do with the 
nature of communication. For this assumption to be valid, perfect communication of 
meaning must be possible, in particular perfect communication of the intention of the 
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text creator. The second assumption is that the interpretation of the lawful relationship 
between X and Y by the court could be both constraining and unoriginal.108 The 
interpreter must be limited in what it can do because of the legal nature of the 
interpretive task.109
 
Owen Fiss also argues that law places inherent restrictions on the legal interpreter by 
its institutional nature.110 His view of the practice differs from that of Detmold in that 
he goes further to state that the legal interpreter’s interpretations can be measured 
against the institutional rules of interpretation to see if it is objectively correct.111 Fiss 
claims that the rules of interpretation are not simply standards or principles held by 
the legal interpreter, but rather the elements that constitute the legal profession.112 The 
legal profession is presumably held together by the interpretive rules and the legal 
interpreter’s adherence to them. Fiss might be making one of two claims. The first is 
that interpretation is limited in a non-absolute way by an interpretive community.113 
However, Fiss is also making another claim. He seems to be suggesting that the 
interpretive practice in which an interpreter is situated is absolutely restrictive.114 The 
claim is that any interpretation that does not fall within the boundaries set by legal 
interpretive practice cannot be a legal interpretation.115 The assumption is of course 
that we already know what a legal interpretation entails. We know the rules and the 
rules are objective and uncontroversial because everyone must know the rules and not 
their interpretation of the rules. If the rules were something that must be interpreted, 
Fiss would be back to square one. 
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Frederick Schauer shares the belief that law itself can be a constraining rule but 
qualifies this with two contentions about the nature of constraining rules.116 The first 
contention is that rules are only effective in a system of assumptions and practices.117 
One can only measure compliance with a rule against contexts and assumptions that 
already exist. For example, if one would want to enforce a rule that reads “no dogs 
allowed”, one must have some idea what a dog is. Schauer claims that precedent 
provides necessary contexts and assumptions.118 The second contention regarding the 
effectiveness of rules is that rules owe their effectiveness to the internalization of 
rules as reasons for action by rule-followers.119 In other words, rules can only be 
effective if persons adhere to the rules because they recognize the rules as something 
to be adhered to.  
 
Schauer’s contentions regarding the nature of rules move his position closer to 
contextualism than genuine rule theory. It also shows how closely related rules of 
interpretation are to other theoretical positions on interpretation. Someone who 
advocates that the rules of interpretation must play a part in the interpretive process is 
not necessarily a positivist and can be classified as a contextualist without a great leap 
of imagination. On the other hand, it also shows how dependent rule theorists’ 
contentions are on more fundamental beliefs about interpretation. If the positivist 
contention that rules can constrain interpreters is to prevail, rules have to be objective 
and above interpretation.120 If this is not the case the rules can be just as indeterminate 
as the language that it is supposed to interpret and as a result the interpreter will be 
just as unconstrained.  
 
4.3 Criticism against rule theories 
I will now turn to the criticism of rule theory. The focus will be on strong rule-
theorism, the kind that contends that application of rules of interpretation can stabilize 
meaning and make it determinable. Strong rule-theory can be described as a position 
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where a set of rules is imposed between the reader and the text.121 These rules specify 
the weight and relevance that should be afforded to the material and define the 
procedural circumstances under which the interpretation must take place.122 The rules 
must ultimately guide the interpreter to the meanings that are appropriate in the 
institutional setting.123 Two underlying assumptions are present here. The first is that 
rules can be imposed between the reader and the text, in other words from the outside 
into the interpretive situation. This position also depends upon the assumption that the 
rules of interpretation are themselves above interpretation in the sense that they 
already have meaning by the time they are imposed on the interpretive situation. This 
meaning must be accessible to the interpreter without her having to interpret the rules. 
The second assumption is that the institution has meaning that it views as appropriate. 
More specifically, it is assumed that the members of the institutional setting have a 
shared vision of what can be regarded as ideal meaning. 
 
The assumption that rules are outside of the interpretive process, with a meaning 
independent of the interpretive situation that they are applied to, is important to rule 
theorists because it provides an objective tool which can shape interpretations to 
correlate with the institutional expectations. If this was not the case and interpretive 
rules were subject to interpretation, different interpreters could interpret the rules 
differently and rules would lose their utility.124 The problem for rule theorists is that 
rules are in fact texts and they must be interpreted in every situation where the 
interpreter attempts to apply them.125 A good example is provided by the so-called 
golden rule of interpretation of contracts. This rule states that effect must be given to 
the subjective intention of the parties to the contract once it becomes known.126 The 
subjective intention is distinguished from the expressed intention of the parties.127 
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The words of the contract must be given the meaning that the parties originally 
intended (subjective intention), in other words the meaning that they had in mind 
when they drafted the contractual text. The rule seems clear enough, but it actually 
opens up various other inquiries, for example: what evidence is allowed in order to 
find the subjective intention and what if the subjective intentions differs? Efforts to 
answer these questions will inevitably lead to more questions. The point is that rules 
of interpretation must also be interpreted and the rules are subject to exactly the same 
interpretive circumstances as other texts.128 Rules can only constrain in so far they are 
interpreted to do so. 
 
The second assumption, namely a shared institutional vision of ideal meanings, is 
important to rule theorists because it allows the interpreter to measure her 
interpretation against the institutional ideal.129 If there were no institutional ideal the 
rules would have no purpose, because there would be no reason to attempt to 
constrain interpretation. This assumption is false because of the institutional 
situatedness of both the rules and the ideal.130 The rules point towards the ideal and 
cannot be formulated without an idea of the ideal that the rules are supposed to 
promote. The golden rule of interpretation can only be understood if one can imagine 
why such a rule exists, presumably to promote liability by consensus. The rule is 
situated within an institution where such a rule makes sense. The institutional ideal is 
therefore linked to the rule and, by implication, to the interpretation of the rule. The 
ideal can therefore only be a shared ideal in so far it is interpretively possible. The 
second effect of the institutional situatedness of the ideal is that it can only be 
constraining in so far as the contextual and communal factors allow. The ideal can 
only bind the interpreter if he can be bound by institutional and contextual factors.  
 
5. Examining contexts and interpretive communities 
5.1 The role of interpretive communities and contexts in interpretation 
During the preceding discussions of the nature of legal interpretation the notions of 
interpretive context and interpretive communities were raised with regard to various 
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theoretical positions.131 In this section these concepts will be analyzed and their role 
in the interpretive process will be discussed. The discussions will range from the view 
that these concepts can make meaning determinable to the latest theories that 
contradict the determinacy view. 
 
 5.2 Contexts and community as constraints in interpretation 
We begin with HLA Hart’s explanation of the “general rule”.132 Hart argues that law 
cannot exist without the possibility of the communication of shared standards of 
conduct. He contends that law consists of communications of general standards of 
conduct to individuals that require of these individuals to act in certain ways under 
certain circumstances.133 This communication, according to Hart, is best done by 
means of general rules. When the public can understand the general rule, individuals 
can draw logical conclusions regarding the desired actions. If a general rule states that 
“no vehicles are allowed in the park”, the individual can see that this rule would 
include her car, because it might pose a danger to other park users.134 Hart argues that 
the individual can, through general rules, reasonably perceive what the legislator 
intended to achieve with the rule because he assumes that the legislature and the 
public share some kind of understanding regarding the meaning of words. Friedrich 
Waismann’s view of the nature of law is very similar to that of Hart with regard to the 
role of context. He argues that law is always and can only be socially and contextually 
situated.135 Laws are designed to operate in a specific society and to represent the 
dominant characteristics of that society. Both these writers show that legal 
interpretation is at least generally dependent upon shared understandings.  
 
Brian Bix takes this insight one step further. He argues that our concept of meaning is 
dependent upon shared understanding. Bix uses the Wittgensteinian example of 
colour to explain this.136 Wittgenstein stated that the concept of “colour” is dependent 
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upon general agreement regarding the colour of things, and that the case where colour 
is undetermined is the exception. If differences in individual judgements and 
instabilities in the world caused us to get different results every time we interpreted a 
text or measured a colour, then not only would the results that we get from the 
interpretation cease to have meaning, but the practice of interpretation or measuring 
colour would cease to have meaning.137 If one person came upon a new concept but 
could not communicate that concept to anyone else, that person would not know that 
the concept he perceives is a new concept, because there would not be any way for 
him to distinguish that concept from what is already known.138 The communal 
understanding provides a space where communication is possible precisely because 
difference and sameness is possible. 
 
 Unlike Hart and Waismann, Bix does not claim that law is dependent upon a 
common understanding. He claims that the very act of understanding is dependent 
upon a common understanding of the concept. Our interpretive community and 
nothing else creates our reality.139 Our social situatedness creates the framework out 
of which we understand. Understanding is a circular concept. We understand because 
we have prejudices, but the very act of understanding also makes us question these 
prejudices.140 The prejudices that “survive” the questioning are separated from those 
that are false. Yet, because we are historical beings, we never have complete 
knowledge of our prejudices and any knowledge of ourselves must remain partial.141 
Understanding originates from a historical and cultural perspective that forms our 
                                                 
137 Bix Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (1993) at 43; Detmold “Law as the Structure of 
Meaning” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal Interpretation in Democratic States (2002) at 156. 
138 Detmold “Law as the Structure of Meaning” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal Interpretation 
in Democratic States (2002) at 156. Detmold explains this by using the concept of colour 
differentiation. If I were the first person on earth to distinguish between colours, while the rest of the 
world saw thing in black and white, I would not be able to communicate this concept to them because 
there is no common denominator between us. We have no way of distinguishing what is new from 
what is not. My different black cannot be explained to the person who sees in black and white because 
I have no way of distinguishing it from his concept of black. Because I cannot distinguish it, I cannot 
know that I am different from him. It is only when more of us start to see colour that our shared 
experience can be related and contrasted against the norm. 
139 Detmold “Law as the Structure of Meaning” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal Interpretation 
in Democratic States (2002) at 156. 
140 Glass “A Hermeneutical Standpoint” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal Interpretation in 
Democratic States (2002) at 134. 
141 Glass “A Hermeneutical Standpoint” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) Legal Interpretation in 
Democratic States (2002) at 134. 
 37
understanding of what is important and what interests are worth pursuing.142 If I 
interpret a text from an intentionalist background, I will value that which I perceive as 
the intention of the author. Every interpretation brings the interpreter in conflict with 
his perspective. The interpreter is not finally bound to his present perspective, but 
continually exposed to further development of his perspective by his social 
position.143 Understanding is always a product of past experience and present 
perception. This process is not a “fresh outlook” or totally new input, but rather a 
fusion of past interpretations that link the text, read with past experience, to the new 
perception.144
 
5.3 Legal context as a specific context 
Robert Cover and others also show how legal interpretation takes place in a context 
where there is a denial of meaning.145 This makes legal interpretation unique. Under 
normal circumstances interpretations are privileged or suppressed according to the 
preference of the day. We might interpret literature according to one school today and 
according to another tomorrow. However, in the legal sphere the losing interpretation 
is violently denied and the losing interpreter often has to suffer adverse consequences 
because of this. The finality and adversity of legal interpretation is unique and 
necessary for law to exist. If interpretations and the decisions between interpretations 
could be revisited perpetually, no judicial decision would ever be made for fear of 
mistake or a change in preference.  
 
Like Cover, Arthur Glass highlights the fact that legal interpretation always takes 
place in a limiting context and therefore interpreters always presuppose that the law 
has authority and that this approach to law limits their interpretive efforts.146 The 
author bases this contention on three characteristics of law as a special context. The 
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first characteristic is the prescriptive nature of law.147 Interpreters must contend with 
the fact that law, as a system, is always aimed at providing guidance for behaviour. 
When we interpret law-texts, we interpret them with the purpose of finding what kind 
of behaviour the law allows or disallows.148  Secondly, the interpreter must accept 
that the interpretation of the text is prescriptive.149 It is not sufficient that the law is 
prescriptive; the interpreter must also accept that the law is prescriptive.150 The 
interpreter is not free to simply “read” the law, since this is not legal interpretation. 
The interpreter must realize that she is formulating prescriptive meaning. The final 
characteristic of interpretation of law is the presupposition that law provides answers 
to legal questions.151 When a problem is identified as a legal problem, the interpreter 
already assumes that a legal answer exists for that problem. Glass goes on to accept 
that all these factors culminate in limiting the authority of the legal interpreter. It is 
crucial, he argues, that the interpreter cannot amend the texts or ignore them.152 The 
work of the interpreter in this theoretical model is simply to find what texts mean in 
every circumstance. Interpreters are also required to justify their interpretations by 
way of established law.153 The author further states that this theoretical model of 
interpretive practice is how interpreters should interpret and he accepts that there are 
instances when “in the real world” legal interpreters do not interpret this way. 
However, he regards this as an unfortunate result of intentional disregard for the 
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relevant legal materials or gaps in the legal meaning system.154 He argues that the 
nature of the legal system is one where texts demand to be read in their clear and 
literal sense but also in context.155
 
5.4 Contextual plain meaning 
Many contextualists argue that “contextual plain meaning” can be used as a strategy 
to find the meaning of terms.156 Bix and others explain plain meaning as the 
unreflective attachment of meaning to words within a social context.157 The word 
might seem to have only one meaning in that social context but it can mean something 
radically different in another context. The point these authors make is that 
interpretation is based on context and interpretive communities. They assert that this 
strategy will yield acceptable results every time it is used correctly, because each 
community has unreflective meaning for the words they use.158 For example, if one 
interprets a contract in the building industry, one should try to find out what actors in 
this industry regard as plain meaning, and interpret the contract accordingly. This 
strategy is based on the assumptions that knowledge of an interpretive community can 
make meaning more determinate and that an interpreter can know exactly how the 
interpretive community a person is part of influences his perceptions.  
 
Contextualism, like objectivism, involves a search for constraints on the interpreter. 
Whereas objectivists claim that language has objective meaning, contextualists argue 
that meaning comes from the context of the text. However, there is a subtle difference 
regarding the “objectivity” of each claim. Most objectivists allege that any text has 
(and will always have) one correct interpretation. Contextualists accept that different 
contexts will lead to different meanings of a single text. As it will become clear, the 
latter position is closer to postmodernism. 
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 5.5 Criticism against the use of interpretive communities and context as 
constraints on interpretation 
In her discussion on the nature of rules, Margaret Jane Radin provides telling criticism 
against the contextualist claim that the interpretive community and context can 
provide an objective basis for adjudicating the truth of meaning.159 She begins by 
arguing that rules always depend upon the existence of a social practice in which rules 
make sense.160 If society were not in the habit of following rules and there were no 
institutional structure for the application of rules, our concept of rules would not exist. 
We interpret rules as rules because we already have an idea what it is to interpret 
rules. A person who reads the sign ”Do Not Litter” in a park can only comprehend 
what he is expected to do because he already has an idea what it is to follow a rule. He 
will not throw his candy wrapper on the ground because he can imagine what would 
happen if he did throw the wrapper on the ground and the warden saw him. He is 
conditioned to understand the concept of rules. Rule making and rule following are 
not seen as radically different activities because of the socially situatedness of rules. 
Rules are created every time that we act on those rules and undermined every time 
that we ignore them.161 The important aspect for our argument is the social 
contingency of rules. Rules, according to this definition, do not exist before the 
context. The rules do not make out the background against which we act, but are 
themselves contingent upon the context and the application or “misapplication” of 
them.162 As a result, one cannot say before the context exists what the context is going 
to be like and what its influence will be on the rule.163 There is a dynamic interaction 
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between the rule and the context, from which both emerge changed. Like the rule, 
texts are subject to interpretation in context rather than through context. The context is 
not the glasses through which the text is read. The context does not only change the 
way we see the text, but the text also influences what we see as the context. 
 
 “Contextual Plain Meaning” as a constraint on interpretation is a strategy based on 
the assumptions that knowledge of an interpretive community can make meaning 
more determinate and that an interpreter can know exactly how the interpretive 
community a person is part of influences his perceptions. Even if we accept these 
assumptions (which I do not) the strategy is still bound to fail to provide an objective 
basis from which we can judge the correctness of a given meaning. Any interpreter, 
and in fact any text creator, is bound to be part of any number of interpretive 
communities and therefore can potentially attach any number of different communal 
connotations to a text. In our building contract example, a builder might also be a 
freemason and think of a word in his Masonic capacity, while the other party to the 
contract might think of the text purely in a building context. The interpreter would 
still have to choose among the meanings and in the process prefer one contextual 
interpretation to another. Even if the parties do not belong to different interpretive 
communities, subtle differences within the overall interpretive context can influence 
the meaning of the text. If one takes the building contract as an example, the parties 
might decide that they will work towards a joint reading of the contract. This joint 
interpretation might be done in a reconciliatory fashion, in other words, differences 
will be minimized. On the other hand, the parties might be in a very adversarial mood, 
and as a consequence differences in opinion regarding the meaning of the contract 
will abound. The same overall context is present, but different meanings emerge. 
 
6. Neo-pragmatism 
6.1 Introduction 
This brings us to neo-pragmatist interpretive practice. One of the leading theorists in 
this field is Stanley Fish and I concentrate mainly on his work. The main project of 
neo-pragmatism is to provide an anti-foundationalist explanation for meaning. This 
means that they want to explain meaning as context-bound and interpretational. The 
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central claim of neo-pragmatists is that meaning is context-bound.164 They further 
claim that it is impossible to have meaning or understanding that operates across 
contexts and that such a meaning would be superfluous because we are only called to 
understand in specific contexts. They argue against the possibility of nihilism and 
meaning indeterminism as well as objective linguistic meaning165 because literal 
meaning is the product of interpretive communities (and therefore not merely 
arbitrary, as argued by nihilists) rather than an inherent feature of language (“out 
there” to simply find, as argued by objectivists).166
 
The first claim made by neo-pragmatist scholars is that the characteristics that we 
usually attribute to language are actually part of the interpretive system (context or 
interpretive community) in which the interpretation takes place.167 Interpretation is 
not a free activity where the interpreter can impose any meaning on the text. The 
interpreter is constrained by the institutional norms and boundaries that she perceives 
or understands to be part of the interpretive context. If I were to interpret a contract of 
sale of a house and I had to interpret the clause “All garden tools on the estate at the 
time of sale will be deemed part of the fixed property on the estate”, I would 
immediately assume that the tools belonged to one of the parties to the contract, 
because one can generally not dispose of the things of a third party without his 
consent. However, if I read the same clause in a municipal by-law I might come to the 
conclusion that the municipal council intended to include all garden tools regardless 
of the owner thereof. The meaning is limited by what I perceive to be the context. 
While individuals are not normally entitled to dispose of the property of third parties, 
the state is sometimes allowed to do so. If I read the same contractual clause in 
relation to the municipal by-law, I will no longer assume that the tools belong to the 
parties because of the impact of the by-law. While the language stays the same, the 
meaning differs because the context differs. Any text can have infinite possible 
meanings, depending upon the context. 
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 The fact that any text can have an infinite number of possible meanings does not 
mean that it does.168 For any text to have an infinite number of meanings, that text 
must be absolutely non-contextual. In other words, the text must exist across all 
contexts and free of contextual constraint. However, there is no such space. Every 
space or room for language is inherently contextual. Any text will always be part of a 
context and a situation where the meaning will be accessible.169 The text depends 
upon the context for meaning, but this does not make the meaning determinate. 
 
Some meanings are more “normal” than others.170 Meanings can be ranked according 
to normality and as Fish shows, that ranking is always already there. If we take the 
clause “All garden tools will be deemed part of the fixed property on the estate”, the 
meaning of property as the property of the contractual parties is more “normal” than 
the meaning of property as all property (belonging to anyone). When we read the 
clause, the first meaning is the most likely one we will think of. If we read the 
municipal by-law first, the second meaning (property meaning all property) will likely 
be the most “normal” reading. In each situation our perceptions of “normal” will 
differ because of our institutional prejudices or pre-understandings of the likely 
meaning will differ.171 This does not mean that one cannot imagine the second 
meaning in situation one and the first meaning in situation two: The fact that one 
reading in context is more “normal” than another does not make meaning determinate, 
since contexts are not universal and there are thus no “normal” meanings of language 
in the universal sense.172
                                                 
168 Fish “Is There a Text in This Class?” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (1980) at 307; Fish “Fish vs. Fiss” in Fish Doing What Comes Naturally: 
Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 126; Levinson 
“Law as Literature” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) at 351-353. 
169 Fish “Is There a Text in This Class?” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (1980) at 307; Fish “What makes an Interpretation Acceptable?” in Fish Is 
There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (1980) at 341. 
170 Fish “Is There a Text in This Class?” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (1980) at 307. 
171 Fish “Is There a Text in This Class?” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (1980) at 308. 
172 Fish “Is There a Text in This Class?” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (1980) at 309. The meanings that seem universal are usually the result of 
very widely shared beliefs regarding the meaning of that term. In other words, a very large interpretive 
community will yield widely shared assumptions and therefore widely shared meaning. See also Fish 
“What makes an Interpretation Acceptable?” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (1980) at 341. 
 44
 Fish rejects the notion of a two-stage interpretive process in which the interpreter 
scrutinizes the text and then gives it meaning.173 He argues that there is no stage 
where the interpreter hears an utterance before he confers meaning upon it. By 
“hearing” the utterance the interpreter already confers meaning on the terms used. He 
already has knowledge of the purposes and a prejudice surrounding the usage of the 
words, so that when he hears it, it is already heard in context.174 Meaning 
indeterminacy can therefore only occur in a situation where the interpreter does not 
have these purposes and prejudices to guide him. Fish correctly argues that such a 
state does not exist.175 This does not mean that an interpreter cannot be wrong in his 
assessment of the context of the word;176 a contractual interpreter can interpret the 
term in our example wrongly. However, the mistake is not a result of a 
misunderstanding of the language or the text, but rather a misunderstanding regarding 
the context of the text. The interpreter thinks property equals property of the parties in 
an unlegislated sense, while the parties meant property equals all property in 
conformity with the existing legislation. The misunderstanding is a result of wrong 
contextual presumptions. If the parties correct the interpreter, his presumptions shift 
to presumptions that he holds regarding the interpretation of legislated terms. He 
interprets from a new angle or context with its assumptions and prejudices.177 It is 
important to note that the interpreter did not misunderstand the inherent properties of 
the language. A closer look at the text would not have yielded better results, since it 
was never a misreading.178
 
An interpreter is limited with regard to his interpretations by his context, but it does 
not mean that he is always limited by the same interpretive understandings. In other 
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words, the prejudices and assumptions that shape meaning are not static, rigid or 
permanent.179 Interpretive contexts are constantly modified and expanded by 
interpretation. If the interpreter is confronted by a text that is unintelligible, she (so to 
speak) falls back on common ground. The interpreter latches onto an aspect of the text 
that she understands in the sense described above, and from there she works through 
the text until the text is intelligible. The interpreter thus modifies and adds to her 
existing interpretive background the new understanding as a new pre-understanding. 
If she comes across the text or something similar she would be able to interpret it.180 
The point that Fish makes is that the understanding by interpretation and the coming 
to understand a novel text are not broadly speaking different processes and neither is 
dependent upon the text for understanding.181 The interpreter is still dependent upon 
his pre-understanding, even in the case of new understanding. It is important to note 
that the route to new understanding is not an imposition of meaning but a 
modification of the pre-understanding already in place.182 The new meaning stands in 
relation to the meaning that was already in place. 
 
In order to understand the neo-pragmatist view of interpretation we have to take a 
closer look at the concept of context. As already mentioned, context for the neo-
pragmatist is always already present. Any interpretation takes place in a context that is 
already there prior to the interpretation.183 The first characteristic of this context is 
that it contains norms and structures that provide meaning in the interpretive 
process.184 The interpreter is constrained by these norms in his interpretation. Words 
do not mean anything by themselves. In so far as they do mean something, that 
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something is defined by the interpretive context through the norms and practices 
contained in that context.185 The second characteristic of context is its social 
nature.186 The context is not a fixed structure within language that produces meaning, 
but rather a privileged relationship of one meaning over another in a certain 
interpretation. As the situation or circumstances change, one such privilege gives way 
to another. Context is not a stable concept against which meaning can be measured 
because of this fact. The third characteristic of context is that everyone is always in 
context.187 Every person is always situated within a system of beliefs and prejudices 
that will shape her outlook and interpretation.188 Any experience will take place from 
within this structure and will be shaped by this structure. This means that nothing can 
be completely relative because we always already believe something. Our experience 
and consciousness are formed by beliefs about things and about the nature of things, 
therefore we can never believe anything about something because that would override 
our consciousness. The final characteristic of context is that it is never completely 
individualistic. In other words, context is always linked to the communal.189 The 
individual understands and can communicate with the other because the individual 
and the other share some view of reality. Fish strikingly observes ”…Disagreements 
are not settled by the facts, but are the means by which facts are settled…”.190 This 
illustrates that observations of the facts are always unstable and are only momentarily 
settled by the interpreter being convinced by one of the sides to the disagreement.191 
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He agrees with someone that reality is the way they think it is, although that does not 
settle reality into a determinate concept.192
 
To summarise, while Fish claims that context influences the meaning of a text, he 
does not claim (as contextualists do) that contexts make meaning determinate. There 
will always be interpretations other than the dominant interpretation because there 
will always be more than one context and interpretive community. 
 
6.2. Criticism of neo-pragmatism 
Neo-pragmatism is not without its critics. Owen Fiss and other rule theorists argue 
that neo-pragmatism is nihilism because the interpreter is unconstrained in his 
interpretation.193 However, neo-pragmatist scholars have defeated these criticisms 
convincingly. By far the most telling and important criticism comes from fellow 
postmodern scholars like Rosemary Coombe regarding the complacent nature of the 
neo-pragmatist interpretive model.194  
 
Most of these critics agree that meaning is socially constructed and they accept the 
neo-pragmatist explanation of interpretive communities.195 They also accept the 
contention that these social constructions are unstable and cannot provide the 
interpreter with a stable platform from which she can determine truth in a 
metaphysical sense. The interpreter’s role in the interpretive process is seen as 
decisive and it is accepted that there are no metaphysical realities, only interpreted 
realities.196  
 
Coombe begins by looking at interpretive communities as a referent in interpretation. 
Owen Fiss contends that an interpretive community provides the interpreter with a 
type of bounded objectivity or, to put differently, he argues that the interpretive 
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community can constrain the interpreter.197 In this argument Coombe finds the 
essence of contextualist and neo-pragmatic thinking. She states that contextualists and 
neo-pragmatists use these arguments to try and find a source of constraint on the 
interpreter that will leave her interpretation politically more neutral.198 She argues that 
these interpretive communities have just the opposite effect: no interpreter can escape 
the perspectives that come with their particular backgrounds and experiences.199 Not 
only are the influences particular to the interpreter political, but the conventions that 
guide interpretation in general reflect the values of privileged groups in power as 
well.200 Coombe goes on to state that the interpretive communities and conventions 
that guide interpretation are not static but the product of a constant struggle, and 
hence the definition of the interpretive community is itself continually being 
interpreted and politically negotiated.201 If we simply accept that the meanings that 
we have are the product of interpretive communities and context without reflecting on 
the process by which those communities gained ascendancy, we are in danger of 
rejecting all non-privileged (and by implication marginalized and non “legal”) 
meanings. Coombe says to do so is to “…effectively assign legitimacy to the victors 
by virtue of their victory…”.202
 
Coombe accepts most of Fish’s contentions about the nature of interpretation but 
disagrees with what she classifies as the silencing of the experience of the other.203 
She argues that the interpretation process always affirms the legitimacy of the 
experience of some while denying the experience of others. The particular aspect of 
Fish’s theory that seems to cause this problem is the process of settling differences 
between interpretations.204 Coombe reads Fish as saying that differences between 
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interpretations are settled by a political, social and institutional method that is itself 
subject to constant change. It is argued that this process will always result in the 
acceptance of the dominant political agenda to the exclusion of the weaker voices.205 
This result is portrayed as inevitable because, Coombe argues, Fish wants us to 
believe that there will always be a dominant context in which an interpretation will be 
seen as obvious.206  
 
This view of Fish and neo-pragmatist theory lends itself to two readings. The first is a 
superficial reading regarding the responsibility of the reader. Coombe might be 
arguing for a responsible reader in the sense that the reader should as far as possible 
have regard for the conflicting understandings of the text being interpreted.207 Any 
interpretation should be justifiable and there is never an excuse for complacency. 
With this I would wholeheartedly agree. However, Coombe could (although I do not 
think she is) also be making a claim about the nature of the interpretive community, 
namely that an interpretive community can be wilfully changed and utilized to 
improve the inclusion of the fringe understandings of meaning. With this I would not 
agree. Interpretive communities are always already in place. Even our idea of an 
interpretive community is constituted by one. If this is the reading that Coombe 
intends, she is making the mistake that Fish warns against repeatedly.208 She is 
dividing interpretation into a two-stage process in which the interpreter identifies the 
text and then proceeds to interpret according to the interpretive community of her 
choice. Fish shows that the options open to the interpreter in the first stage are already 
determined by the interpretive context. The interpreter can of course broaden her 
interpretive perspective, but she is never in the position to choose freely, because the 
options will be predetermined.209 As Cover so strikingly warns us, legal interpretation 
is always about the denial of one interpretation. 
                                                 
205 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603 at 632. 
206 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603 at 633. 
207 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603 at 651-652. 
208 Fish “Is There a Text in This Class?” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (1980) at 310; Fish “Fish vs. Fiss” in Fish Doing What Comes Naturally: 
Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 126. 
209 Fish explains that one can come to a new understanding but that the new understanding is not an 
outside inside relation, but rather a broadening and a complementing of existing knowledge. See also 
 50
 7. Deconstruction and legal interpretation 
7.1 Understanding deconstruction 
Lawyers have to deal with the increasingly common notion that meaning does not 
reside in language.210 Literary theorists, anthropologists, and linguists are showing 
that words themselves are only arbitrary symbols that bear no necessary relation to the 
real world. The language that we use to describe this world constructs it rather than 
reflecting it, and it does so in a contextually distinct manner.211  
 
Jacques Derrida and other deconstructionists claim that there is no single objective 
interpretation of any text. The text authorizes innumerable interpretations and there is 
no such thing as one correct interpretation.212 Deconstruction is a practice developed 
by Derrida to attack Western metaphysical thought by showing how it (metaphysical 
thought) privileges ideas and concepts213 that form the basis of the Western belief 
system. Derrida argues that in each concept there resides one privileged and one 
suppressed idea.214 Deconstruction is an attempt to show that the privileged idea 
depends upon the suppressed idea for meaning.215 Every concept has its opposite 
against which that term can be understood. The rules of logic ask for a “different” or 
an “opposite” from which a definition can flow. The basis of any definition of a 
concept is its differentiation from other concepts.216 Derrida does not deny the 
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existence of these oppositions but asks that we look for that “opposite”. What Derrida 
wants to show is that which we have forgotten. He wants to recall that on which 
meaning is dependent but which is not immediately apparent, namely the “other”.217
 
Deconstructionists argue that signs are iterable. If one wants to understand a sign, that 
sign must be compatible with differing circumstances and contexts.218 If one had to 
invent new signs every time that one wants to communicate, we would never know 
what signs meant. It is a property of words that they can be repeated in many differing 
contexts.219 This is called iterability. The sign and that which it signifies must be 
separate. If the sign were always attached to the signified, the sign would have to be 
in the presence of the signified in order for a connection to be made between the sign 
and the signified. The sign would be an aspect of the signified, because the sign 
would not be apart from the signified. However, if we want to communicate the 
signified to someone else the sign must be apart from the signified, so that we can 
“give” the listener something that the listener can connect with a signified. The 
meaning that accompanies a sign is therefore not dependent upon the intention of the 
speaker and it is not a product of the sign itself either. The meaning of the sign is 
dependent upon a shared understanding of the sign.220  
 
According to the deconstructionists, language is a purely arbitrary and unstable 
differential system.221 This is explained with the concept of diffèrance. Diffèrance is a 
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word play on the French word différer, which means both to differ and to defer.222 
This term connects the differing of the one concept from the other, with the deferral of 
the one concept of the other and the deferral of the one concept to the other.223 The 
second idea that is central to deconstruction is the idea of “trace”.224 
Deconstructionists argue that terms are always in opposition to other terms. “Light” in 
our example is in opposition to “darkness”. As the concept of diffèrance illustrates, 
these oppositions between the idea and its opposite always define meaning. But when 
we speak, we use only one idea, while the opposite is absent. It is here that trace 
becomes important. When one idea or term is used there is always a trace of the 
opposite term or idea that leaves its mark on the term that is used.225 When we use the 
word “light”, the word “darkness is absent”, but it is still necessary for the 
understanding of “light”. The trace of the other that is absent makes deconstruction 
possible.226  
 
The main deconstructionist project is the identification of hierarchical oppositions and 
the temporary reversal of those oppositions.227 The aim of this reversal is to show the 
possibilities inherent in a hierarchical shift as well as the unstable nature of 
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hierarchical oppositions.228 If A is the rule and B the exception, the project of 
deconstructionists is to show that A is not the rule because of its metaphysical 
qualities, but because of a decision. This relationship will then be temporarily 
reversed so that B is the rule and A the exception, to observe the possibilities inherent 
in a hierarchical shift. The shift is only temporary because the aim is not to establish a 
new hierarchy, but rather to observe the consequences of the shift.229 Any hierarchical 
opposition can be deconstructed this way.230 The aim of this type of investigation is to 
disentangle us from our accustomed modes of thinking and to explore the inherent 
possibilities of the other interpretation. There is always another interpretation 
possible.231
 
Deconstruction shows that the reasons for privileging one interpretation over another 
are often also the reasons for the reversal of the hierarchy.232 The faults of the 
unprivileged are often also true of the privileged, and the advantages of the privileged 
are often also true of the unprivileged. The aim of this type of analysis is to unsettle 
the privileged concept and to show that its privileging is more arbitrary than is at first 
apparent. Balkin provides a striking example using the privileging of speech over 
writing.233 Balkin identifies various reasons why speech is often privileged over 
writing, the most striking and common being the fact that writing is often merely a 
record for what is being said. Because people do not use phonetic signs when writing, 
alterations and misunderstandings creep in. The problem is thus that writing is only a 
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sign or representation of speech. But, as Balkin illustrates, speech is only a sign for 
thought, and therefore subject to the same problems as writing.234  
Deconstructionists undermine hierarchies of preference using the logic of 
supplement.235 This technique is used where one concept is defined as the norm and 
another is defined as a supplement to the norm in exceptional circumstances. The 
word “supplement” includes two important ideas. The first idea is that the preferred 
concept is a whole concept apart from the supplement.236 The supplement is not a part 
of the preferred concept, nor is it an ingredient of the preferred concept. The second 
idea included in the notion of supplement is that the preferred concept cannot account 
for all circumstances.237 There will be circumstances where the preferred concept will 
not suffice, and a need exists for the non-preferred concept to supplement the 
preferred concept in these circumstances. Deconstructionists argue that for a preferred 
concept to be able to be supplemented in the first sense, it must have the lack 
identified in the second sense.238 If the preferred concept is complete, it does not need 
supplementation and it can be used independently. This crucial insight shows that the 
use of the preferred concept is dependent upon the non-preferred concept.239 A good 
example of this particular relationship between the preferred concept and the non-
preferred concept can be found in the contractual presumption that there are no 
superfluous words in a contract.240 It is presumed that the parties thought about every 
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word that they inserted into the contract and that the contract contains no superfluous, 
tautologous or meaningless words. The exception to this presumption is that words 
can be ignored if no sensible meaning can be attributed to the words.241 The 
presumption itself is a separate entity; it can stand on its own. However, if it is used 
alone it can have unjust results in circumstances where the contract contains words 
that are unintelligible and as a consequence the contract would have to be struck down 
as being unintelligible. The supplement is the proviso that unintelligible words can be 
ignored. The implementation of the presumption is therefore dependent upon the 
exception. The underlying assumption is that parties pay attention when they conclude 
a contract, but the presumption and its supplement also prove the opposite. Parties 
often do not pay attention when they conclude contracts and therefore a supplement is 
necessary. The whole process can be repeated over and over again.   
 
7.2 Criticism against deconstruction as a theory of interpretation 
Deconstruction is not without its critics. Paul Cilliers has identified the most 
important of these criticisms together with their rebuttals.242 The first criticism is that 
deconstruction is relativistic.243 Cilliers calls this type of criticism a knee-jerk reaction 
against deconstruction and postmodern positions in general. The accusation of 
relativism is levelled at deconstructionists because of the perception that 
deconstructionists hold a position that any meaning goes because truth is supposedly 
not objectively knowable.244 It is argued that if any meaning is made up of a number 
of oppositions it cannot be objectively established and cannot provide us with 
anything to work from. We are always stuck with a word that might mean something 
different the next moment.  
 
True relativism is impossible. If “everything is relative”, the claim of complete 
relativity is rebutted. If everything is relative, then the statement that everything is 
relative is true and everything is therefore not relative. If the statement is false, then 
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some things must be true and then everything is not relative any more!245 One would 
have to agree with Cilliers that a true relativist is simply a disappointed 
foundationalist, because the claim itself is an indication that the accuser thinks in 
foundational terms. If something is not objectively true then, according to this line of 
thinking, it is not worth much. The deconstructionist will agree that finding objective 
knowledge is impossible but she will not agree that this means that anything goes.246 
Deconstruction is simply a process by which that we do have is investigated to try to 
come to a better understanding of the process of generating understanding.247 The 
deconstructionist works with the same meanings as the foundationalist. The difference 
is in their attitude to that meaning. The deconstructionist is prepared to accept that she 
might be wrong while the foundationalist basks in an arrogant self-assurance that she 
is right because of the position that she occupies. The foundationalist forecloses any 
discussion on her view of meaning by occupying a right-wrong position. The 
deconstructionist invites discussion of her view of meaning. 
 
The second criticism identified against deconstruction is the so-called performative 
contradiction.248 Philosophers like Habermas bring this claim against deconstruction 
especially when defending reason against the deconstructive onslaught.249 The 
performative contradiction involves a contradiction between the result of an enquiry 
and the method used. Critics of deconstruction argue that deconstructionists inevitably 
depend upon the very things that they want to disprove in order to do so. When 
deconstructionists want to disprove reason, so the argument goes, they show that 
reason exists by the process of proof.250 What is said at a locutionary level is 
contradicted by what is done at a performative level.  
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Cilliers argues that there are three reasons why this type of criticism must fail. The 
first is that the performative contradiction rests upon the assumption that we can 
adequately distinguish between what is being said and how it is said.251 This 
distinction in turn depends upon the ability to judge between meaning (what is said) 
and meaning exchange (how we say it) from an objective point of view, an 
Archimedes point. It is this type of thinking that deconstruction opposes. As a result 
the critic is at least back to square one and at most defeated.252 The second reason 
why the performative contradiction fails to be persuasive when applied to 
deconstruction is because deconstruction theory acknowledges that it works with this 
kind of contradiction.253 In fact, deconstructionists embrace this kind of contradiction. 
Cilliers argues that the way deconstructionists talk should reflect the difficulties 
inherent in language. To accuse deconstructionists of performative contradictions is to 
accuse them of doing what they set out to do. They are reflecting the complexities 
inherent in language and the inherent contradictory nature of their language theory. 
They want to show that saying one thing is always contradicting oneself in a sense.254 
The final argument against the performative contradiction is that the reasoning called 
for in the performative contradiction test stems from intellectual arrogance.255 
Deconstructionists show that we have limits to our understanding of language and the 
use thereof. To make claims about the nature of language in the absolutist terms of the 
performative contradiction is to make claims about language (that cannot be 
completely understood as a system) and in the process close off further inquiry into 
the nature of language. 
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The final objection against deconstruction that Cilliers discusses is the accusation that 
deconstructive positions are always weak positions.256 The argument is that 
deconstructionists cannot claim to have a definite position on anything. 
Deconstructionists, or so the argument goes, always have to resort to vague claims 
that offer little resistance to rigorous interpretation.257 However, meaning is not 
attributable to some external guarantee of meaning but to its differentiation from other 
meanings.258 There is nothing vague about this differentiation. The deconstructive 
claim is also not that meaning is fuzzy, but that there are limits to the objectivity of 
meaning.259 The point is not that meaning does not exist. It does exist and can be 
witnessed all around us every day. The point is that meaning is not fixed. It changes 
from one circumstance to the next. There is a constant “play” between the differences 
that constitute meaning.260
 
7.3 Deconstruction and contractual interpretation 
The final aspect that needs to be looked at is the potential impact of deconstructive 
interpretation on contractual interpretation. Deconstruction helps us to imagine 
contractual interpretation as something other than a purely intentionalist exercise. It 
allows us to examine contractual interpretation and the assumptions underlying the 
practice. In this way, one can examine why texts, intentions and contractual parties 
are depicted in a certain way, and also how unsettling the basic assumptions 
underscoring the present depictions (of texts, intentions and contractual parties) might 
influence the way we see (and interpret) contracts. It allows for the examination of the 
reasons why we prefer one theory (or one set of assumptions for that matter) to 
another. At the end of the examination one should be able to evaluate these reasons. 
This will hopefully leave us with a better understanding of the reasons why we do 
things the way we do and how changes will affect the present system of interpretation 
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and ascription of liability. In the following chapters deconstruction is the main 
strategy aimed at the unsettling of the present hegemonies in contractual interpretive 
practice, particularly with regard to texts, intentionalism and individual autonomy.  
 
8. Legal interpretation in a postmodern world (or, perhaps, postmodern 
interpretation in a modern legal world) 
Postmodernism is characterized by four basic contentions.261  The first contention is 
that the self is a cultural, historic, social and linguistic creation. The second is that 
there are no foundational principles from which we can verify other assertions. 
Thirdly, knowledge of reality is always merely a belief that can only apply to the 
context in which it is asserted. Finally, language is socially and culturally constituted 
and as a result all interpretations and even the texts themselves are social 
constructions.262 As a result of these factors knowledge is always mediated through 
our social, historical, cultural and linguistic circumstances and it changes as the 
circumstances change.263 The truth can never be transparent to us because it is always 
mediated though language and thus subject to the same conditions as language.264 
Postmodernists claim that all activities are interpretive in nature and the theories of 
language are thus of paramount importance.265  
 
Two theories of language are discernible in postmodern theory, namely post-
structuralism and neo-pragmatism.266 These theories have been discussed under the 
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headings of neo-pragmatism and deconstruction, but it remains to be shown how these 
theories interact.267 Neo-pragmatism focuses on the social construction of knowledge 
while post-structuralists emphasize the role of language and the structures underlying 
language in our understanding.268 Post-structuralists argue that there is nothing 
outside of the text while neo-pragmatists argue that there is no text outside of our 
interpretations.269 Peter Schanck argues convincingly that these differences are 
merely different ways of conceptualizing the same ideas.270
 
The central contention of both neo-pragmatism and post-structuralism is that the 
truths that we have are always evaluated from within our own knowledge system. 
According to both theories, there are generally accepted criteria within particular 
contexts against which we can determine whether something is true or not.271 
Therefore, while we do not have an objective standpoint from which to determine 
truth, we are not left helpless. The reason why the two different theories exist is not 
because one is more true than the other one. The reason probably lies with the 
predecessors of each theory.  
 
Post-structuralism developed from structuralism.272 Structuralism is a theory 
regarding the nature of language. The basic idea was that signs refer to thoughts or 
ideas and not to things. Meaning was seen as the result of the relationships between 
signs. The theory held that the relationship between the signifier and the signified was 
purely arbitrary and that the meaning that we attribute to signs is produced by the 
relationship (structure) between signs.273 The system of language is held to predate 
the individual and to the structuralist, the system of language (relationship between 
words, structure of language) produces meaning. The important difference between 
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structuralism and post-structuralism is that structuralists hold that one can ultimately 
know language if one understands the linguistic systems and structures underlying 
language.274 The structures of language are seen as a sort of objective framework 
which, if understood, can lead us to better understanding of meaning.275 Post-
structuralists counter that these structures and codes of language are themselves 
interpretations and that they cannot hold any objective status.276
 
Neo-pragmatism, like post-structuralism, developed out of a modernist theory of 
meaning. In this case it was pragmatism. Pragmatism has two main contentions, 
namely that objective truth cannot exist and that truth can be identified by looking at 
“the way things work”.277 Leading proponents of the theory argued that language is 
the social, historic and culturally contingent content of our thoughts, and as a result 
everything that we think or feel must be in linguistic terms.278 What we have is what 
we received from others before us and so on. Neo-pragmatism is pragmatism divorced 
from the early scientific methods that were used by pragmatists to try and understand 
and ultimately know the way language works. The neo-pragmatist recognizes that we 
can never know language and never fully understand how it works and how we 
employ it. We are bound to know just that which we already can know.279 The 
possibilities of meaning depend upon our position in history. 
 
The differences between neo-pragmatism and post-structuralism turn on three aspects. 
Firstly, where the post-structuralist would argue that self-evident meaning will 
disintegrate when we look at the alternative or silent meanings inherent in any 
meaning, the neo-pragmatist will accept that there are self-evident meanings but argue 
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that these meanings are contingent upon a shared understanding.280 The origin of 
meaning is disputed. The second disagreement lies in the importance of interpretation. 
Post-structuralists inherently look for more or marginalized meanings in 
interpretation. An interpretation that highlights this is preferred while it is kept in 
mind that this preference is itself a social construction.281 Neo-pragmatists on the 
other hand argue that no interpretation can claim special status but that the merits of 
one meaning over another should be measured against the communal standard.282 The 
third difference lies in the conceptualization of the interpretive process.283 While neo-
pragmatists have a simple yet inclusive model of interpretation, the post-structuralist 
model is complex involving many elements such as trace and diffèrance.284
 
Postmodern theories of interpretation and their adherents’ denial of objective truth 
must not be seen as an attempt to find closure. The very task of the postmodern 
interpreter is to try to restore life to its original complexity, in the process letting go of 
notions like closure.285 A critical analysis, be it a neo-pragmatist investigation into the 
context or a post-structuralist deconstruction of a text, has at its core the necessity of 
creating an opening.286 The text is prised open to reveal that which lies hidden, the 
invisible context or the perpetual opposites that constitute meaning. This process is 
very helpful to the legal interpreter. She will always have an avenue open to her for a 
new interpretation. Even in the most entrenched concepts in the legal system there is 
an inherent possibility that things can be different. No interpretation is ever final. 
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Coombe illustrates this with the example of a rape case.287 The problem for the legal 
interpreter is not finding the truth, but finding what is just. The interpreter can no 
longer justify the meanings that she arrived at by arguing that they are simply the way 
things are. Nothing is just the way it is. Everything is subject to interpretation and the 
meaning that is found is again open to interpretation. This does of course not mean 
that the interpreter is busy with perpetual invention of meaning. The neo-pragmatist 
insights go against exactly this view. Pure invention can only happen in a non-
contextual space and there is no such space.288 In most legal systems legal 
interpretations will reproduce the contextual factors that make such interpretation 
possible.289 However, this should not blind us to the potential for change that is 
always inherent in any context. Postmodern interpretive strategies allow us to look 
behind the privileged social visions that form the contexts in which law is 
interpreted.290
 
Postmodern interpretive practice shows us that there is no “normal” condition.291 Any 
version of normality is always in conflict with other versions thereof and the 
privileged condition has not always been privileged and will not always be privileged. 
The version that prevails is always based on social, historical and cultural conditions 
and therefore susceptible to change.292 Language reproduces the social conditions that 
help produce that linguistic possibility.293 Postmodernism allows us to look into the 
                                                 
287 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603 at 615. Resent research shows that in rape cases, often neither the rapist nor raped lies about the 
situation where the alleged rape took place, but that they understood the same situation very differently. 
The rapist often claims that the raped led him to believe that she wanted intercourse, while the raped is 
convinced that she did not lead the rapist on. It is a question of multiple truths rather than one truth and 
one lie. 
288 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603 at 635. 
289 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603 at 634. 
290 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603 at 637; Balkin “Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory” (1987) 96 Yale LJ 743 at 755. 
291 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603 at 638. 
292 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603 at 638. 
293 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603 at 650. 
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margins of society and contexts to challenge the “normal positions” and to show that 
things can in fact be different.294
 
The question arises whether postmodern interpretation claims for itself the preferred 
status that it denies positivist theories. Are postmodern theorists not claiming to have 
reached the transcending position that they are denying other theorists?295 If the world 
we lived in or are embedded into happens to be a simple, singular system this 
criticism would be valid. If the world were simple, postmodernists would be claiming 
to know more about life than the positivist and they would claim to have the right 
answer. But the world that we live in is not simple or singular. It is complex and 
constantly changing. The world around us provides the resources that make criticism 
possible and necessary.296 Language, like the world, is complex. Small changes might 
have big consequences.297 The complexity of things makes postmodern interpretation 
possible and necessary.298
 
9. Conclusion 
In this chapter the different theoretical positions on interpretation (especially 
interpretation of legal texts) were discussed together with the main criticism against 
each theory.  The chapter started out with a discussion of the uniqueness of legal 
interpretation as explained by Robert Cover. In essence, legal interpretation differs 
from other types of interpretation because of the violent nature of legal interpretation. 
Where normal interpretation is characterized by (indeed aimed at creating) a space 
where inter-personal interaction can be facilitated, legal interpretation is characterized 
by the lack of a shared experience between the participants. During the process of 
legal interpretation, one participant’s interpretation is often violently denied and, 
importantly, the violent denial results in violent consequences (such as incarceration, 
                                                 
294 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603 at 638. 
295 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603 at 642. 
296 Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603 at 642; Cilliers “Do Modest Positions have to be Weak? A View from Complexity” (2004) at 4. 
297 Cilliers “Do Modest Positions have to be Weak? A View from Complexity” (2004) at 4. 
298 Cilliers “Do Modest Positions have to be Weak? A View from Complexity” (2004) at 4; Coombe 
“Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill LJ 603 at 
642. 
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deprivation of property, loss of dignity etc) for the party whose interpretation is 
denied. Cover lists the unique characteristics of legal interpretation as follows: 
 Legal interpretation is a practical activity aimed at occasioning practical acts of 
violence. In other words, legal interpretation is aimed at achieving certain effects. 
A judgement is handed down because it is assumed that someone will act on that 
judgement. 
 Legal interpretation is designed to create threats and actual deeds of violence. 
There is a whole institutional system aimed at enforcing authoritive legal 
interpretations.  
 Legal interpretation is bonded interpretation. This means that legal interpretation 
cannot be understood apart from the violent acts it (legal interpretation) occasions, 
and also, the violent acts cannot be understood apart from the interpretation. 
Cover’s analysis of the nature of legal interpretation leads us to the important insight 
that working with (and theorizing about) legal interpretation is a serious business with 
potentially serious consequences. One should always keep in mind that any theory of 
legal interpretation (if accepted) will have real consequences for real people. 
 
In section 3 various objective meaning theories were examined, including 
objectivism, plain legal language theory (PLLM) and natural law theory. All of these 
theories are aimed at eliminating misunderstandings and, by so doing, perfecting 
communication, based on the assumption that clear objective meaning is possible. 
Objectivists contend that language itself has independent (objectively certifiable) 
meaning and that careful language use eliminates misunderstandings. Consequently, 
careful authors can guide interpreters to the meaning she (the author) intends to 
convey with the text. The PLLM contends that misunderstandings are the result of 
special-language (like legal language) use. They hold that standardization of terms 
and their meanings (correlation between signifiers and that which they signify) will 
minimize misunderstandings because there will be a correlation between what we say 
and what we mean. Metaphysical realism (as an example of natural law theory) is 
based on the contention that language has a pointing out (ostension) function, and 
perfect understanding is the result of a successful connection of the word (signifier) 
with that which it represents (signified). Metaphysical realists argue that one must 
look past the text (and the different meanings inherent in that text) to the actual 
intended message. The main criticism against all three theories is that the possibility 
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of a correlation between signifiers and what they signify is dependent upon the 
possibility that signifiers do not correlate with only one signified. There must be the 
possibility of metaphoric communication. The problem facing objectivists is the 
linguistic importance of the possibility of a correlation of signifier and signified and 
possibility of non-correlation. Language can only signify because it can also miss-
signify. The very element that objectivists want to limit (non-correlation of signifiers 
and signifieds) provides us with meaning. 
 
In section 4 the influence of rules of interpretation on the elimination of 
misunderstanding is examined. (The) rules of interpretation are often the result of 
anxiety about the meaning possibilities inherent in language. The rules are used as a 
way of eliminating some of the meaning possibilities, and many rule-theorists argue 
that consistent application of  (the) rules will lead to a situation where the outcome of 
the interpretation process is predictable. The main problem with the rule-based 
approach to interpretation is that (the) rules are also linguistic texts and are therefore 
subject to the same conditions of interpretation as any other text. Interpreting with 
rules involves interpreting rules and the outcome is just as determinate (or 
indeterminate) as any other interpretive process. The rules can only delineate insofar 
as they have meaning. 
 
Context and interpretive communities (as the subject of section 5) are also used to try 
to restrict the possible meanings of legal texts. Many interpretation theorists argue 
that careful consideration of the legal context in which a text is created eliminates 
possible meanings other than the contextually correct meaning. In other words, if we 
look closely at the circumstances that gave rise to the text, we will be able to 
objectively interpret the text. Other theorists believe that the interpretive assumptions 
of the legal community serve as constraints on the legal interpreter. Accordingly, the 
extent of the possible meanings that can result from a legal interpretation is restricted 
to those meanings that are legally relevant. The greatest difficulty facing these 
theorists (who believe that either (or both) context or the interpretive community can 
restrict interpretation) is that any interpreter is always bound to interpret any context 
from her unique perspective and is bound to be part of many diverse interpretive 
communities. A context can only constrain an interpretation insofar as that context 
can be reproduced. Any reproduction is subject to the interpretation of the original 
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text (or context) and therefore subject to the same conditions as any other 
interpretation. As far as interpretive communities are concerned, any person is at the 
same time subject to various interpretive communities (and by implication interpretive 
influences), and the dominance of one interpretive community is not guaranteed. To 
rely on an interpretive community to restrict an interpretation is to rely on constantly 
shifting and fluctuating dichotomies of influence on the interpreter. Interpretive 
communities do not make interpretation determinate, but rather add to the complex 
meaning possibilities inherent in any text. 
 
Neo-pragmatism is the postmodern equivalent of pragmatism. Like pragmatists, neo-
pragmatists reject the notion of objectively certifiable meaning and they share (with 
pragmatists) the belief that meaning can only exist after interpretation. Both theories 
of interpretation hold that meaning is the product of our interpretive communities, 
context and historic situatedness. However, neo-pragmatists reject the belief (held by 
pragmatists) that ultimate knowledge (and subsequent control) of the way we interpret 
is possible because our historic situatedness. Our interpretive communities and the 
context in which we find ourselves will always influence us, but not in a predictable 
way. There is always a dynamic tension between the various interpretive communities 
and contexts that influences any given interpreter. For the neo-pragmatist, any 
meaning is merely a product of the interpretation framework (which includes the 
context of the interpretation and the interpretive communities in which the interpreter 
finds himself) that is not rigid but fluid and any examination of the framework is 
merely an interpretation. The main criticism against neo-pragmatism is that it leaves 
the “authorization” of meaning in the hands of the powerful (or dominant interpretive 
community) and marginalizes the meanings of the weaker interpretive communities. 
Because neo-pragmatists deny interpreters access to the influences on interpretation 
(they argue that interpretive communities are always already in place), the 
marginalized in society are left without recourse. Neo-pragmatists rejoin by arguing 
that although interpretive communities are always already in place, the interpreter is 
always free to broaden the influences on interpretation by including the marginalized 
and weak in the decision-making processes. 
 
Post-structuralism (the subject of section 7) developed out of structuralism. Both 
theories hold that language predates understanding and that language consists of 
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purely arbitrary relations between signs and what they signify. Meaning is the result 
of interplay between the signs and not the result of a relationship between the sign and 
that which it signifies. While structuralists hold that one would ultimately be able to 
know how language works, post-structuralists contend that this is not possible. Post-
structuralists hold that signs are iterable, that is: they are repeatable in many contexts. 
Meaning exists of a preferred concept and a non-preferred concept. The preferred 
concept is always dependent upon the non-preferred and the process by which this is 
shown is called deconstruction. Deconstruction is used to show how preferred 
concepts are dependent upon the non-preferred, and how the preferred concept is 
supplemented by the non-preferred. In legal interpretation deconstruction is often 
utilized to highlight the dependency of concepts like individual autonomy upon 
various preconditions that are often contradictory. Various criticisms have been 
levelled against deconstruction, ranging from allegations that post-structuralism is a 
relativist theory to arguments that post-structuralists are guilty of a performative 
contradiction. Post-structuralists have been able to successfully defend the theory 
against these criticisms and post-structuralism is at present the most promising theory 
of interpretation as far as highlighting marginalized and critical meanings go.  
 
In the following chapters post-structuralist interpretive techniques are used to 
highlight the deficiencies of present contractual interpretation theory and post-
structuralism (allied occasionally with neo-pragmatism) provides a basis from which 
an alternative approach is suggested. 
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3 
Contemplating Individual Autonomy 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter the concept of individual autonomy is examined with reference to 
liberal, communitarian and critical theories of the self. Each theory is first discussed 
in broad terms and then with specific emphasis on each theory’s description of the 
individual or self.  
 
Any theory of interpretation necessarily involves a theory of self. Meaning (as the 
product of interpretation) is always aimed at influencing human behaviour. 
Interpretation always involves a text (created by a person/s) and a text is always 
interpreted (by a person/s). Therefore, any understanding of an interpretation process 
(such as the interpretation of contracts) necessarily involves an understanding of the 
nature of text creators and interpreters. Moreover, to evaluate assumptions about 
interpretation, there is a need to study theories of the self and evaluating assumptions 
about the nature of the contracting party. To understand (and ultimately criticize) the 
South African contractual interpretation practice, assumptions about the nature of the 
contractual party (text creator) and interpreter must be discussed. Interpretation and 
legal subjectivity go hand in hand. Understanding the one is impossible without 
reference to (and an understanding of) the other. 
 
One of the purposes of this chapter is to show that common assumptions about 
individual autonomy and its significance for interpretation are contested and dubious 
at best. It will be shown that the concept of individual autonomy is a construction 
rather than a natural state of affairs. While liberal theories seem to be a description of 
the actual state of things, with the maximization of individual freedom as the ideal, 
communitarian critique will show that this is not the case. At the same time, 
communitarian views of the self do not establish a sound basis for interpretation 
theory either. 
 
The ultimate goal of this chapter is to sever contractual interpretation from the 
autonomy assumptions of atomistic individualism that serve as a basis for present 
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practice. By looking at the (often communal) nature of contract construction, contract 
can possibly be imagined as being both a purely private medium of exchange and a 
social instrument that could be construed to maximize benefit for both the individual 
participants and society at large. 
 
It should be noted that liberalism and communitarianism (and to an extent critical 
theories of the self) are not totally homogenous theoretical concepts. Deep divisions 
between divergent liberal, communitarian and critical views characterize both 
theories. It is not my intention to discuss either theory comprehensively. I intend to 
give an overview of each theory to sketch the outlines of the divergent views that 
exist and to postulate a critical theory of the self, particularly that of Frank 
Michelman, as an alternative. The endeavor to understand the role of  contractual 
parties in the creation of meaning differently is intended to provide possible points of 
departure rather than a comprehensive alternative to the present hegemony of liberal 
theory, at least as far as the authorial role in interpretation is concerned. 
 
2. The liberal theory of rights 
2.1 Introduction 
Liberalism in the modern commercial society can be characterized as the proposition 
that the ascendancy of the egocentric and isolated individual is the ideal way of life.1 
The individual will is valued as an end in itself and detached from any perceived 
greater social or communal order. The assumption is that establishment of community 
is predated by the existence of asocial individual subjects engaged in the pursuit of 
self-interest.2 The individual is seen as the point of origin of consciousness, choice 
and action.3 Politics and the law in society are merely tools allowing individuals to 
pursue their own self-interest and the satisfaction of their own desires.4 The 
fundamental quest of all individuals is described as an interest in liberty and 
                                                 
1 Gazra “Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism and Natural Law: Reconstructing Ethical Life” (1991) 9 Law 
and Philosophy 371 at 372; Van Blerk Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 127. 
2 Gazra “Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism and Natural Law: Reconstructing Ethical Life” (1991) 9 Law 
and Philosophy 371 at 383; Van Blerk Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 136; Lipkin “In 
Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and Tolerance in 
Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 269. 
3 Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1813; 
4 Gazra “Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism and Natural Law: Reconstructing Ethical Life” (1991) 9 Law 
and Philosophy 371 at 379; Dyzenhaus “Liberalism, Autonomy and Neutrality” (1992) 42 University 
of Toronto LJ 354 at 355. 
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autonomy.5 Liberals argue that persons should be granted space to live their lives in 
accordance with their own wishes, as long as they do not interfere in a harmful way 
with the lives of others.6 Liberals presuppose that individuals who are granted the 
maximum possible freedom will end up maximizing their own benefit and that the 
result would benefit all. To sum up, liberalism values strong individual rights and 
liberties to enable persons to live according to their own conceptions of good.7
 
State action with regard to the freedom of individuals is mainly sanctioned in 
accordance with the harm principle. This principle allows state intervention only 
when an activity (that triggers the intervention) is harmful to individuals (or more 
specifically individual autonomy).8 Most liberals argue that the division between the 
public and private realms must be maintained.9  In this theory, the public realm is 
perceived as the space where the autonomous private life of the individual is 
facilitated.10 For example, while the state might prohibit pornography in public 
because of its perceived negative moral impact, it cannot prohibit it in the private 
because it would lead to coerced perfectionism.11 Equality (in the liberal sense) is not 
the sum of the individual preferences.12 The state must therefore be morally neutral 
and only prohibit those things that negatively or harmfully impact on the autonomy of 
other individuals.13 The ideal state is one that does not prescribe its conception of 
                                                 
5 Dyzenhaus “Liberalism, Autonomy and Neutrality” (1992) 42 University of Toronto LJ 354 at 355; 
Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 779; Van Blerk Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 136. 
6 Dyzenhaus “Liberalism, Autonomy and Neutrality” (1992) 42 University of Toronto LJ 354 at 355 
and at 369; Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 
University of Pennsylvania LR 741 at 780. 
7 Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1814; Hutchinson “Indiana 
Dworkin and Law’s Empire” (1987) 96 Yale LJ 637 at 646. 
8 Dyzenhaus “Liberalism, Autonomy and Neutrality” (1992) 42 University of Toronto LJ 354 at 355; 
Van Blerk Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 138. 
9 Dyzenhaus “Liberalism, Autonomy and Neutrality” (1992) 42 University of Toronto LJ 354 at 364 
10 To put it very simply, the public realm is the place where we decide what may be done in private. 
This is seen as a social contract between individuals to work towards the maximisation of their 
autonomy. The precise nature of this proposed social contract differs substantially depending on the 
definer. See Van Blerk Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 127-141. 
11 Coerced perfectionism seems to be a state where all is well (in the communal sense), but not because 
of the maximization of individual autonomy, but rather because of the overriding pursuit of the greater 
social good. In such a state moral majoritarianism is the rule. 
12 Dyzenhaus “Liberalism, Autonomy and Neutrality” (1992) 42 University of Toronto LJ 354 at 366. 
In other words a liberal state is not a moral majoritarian conglomerate. It must facilitate all the 
preferences of the society subject to the harm principal. Individuals must be allowed to act according to 
their own beliefs so long as those beliefs do not infringe on those of others. 
13 Dyzenhaus “Liberalism, Autonomy and Neutrality” (1992) 42 University of Toronto LJ 354 at 364; 
Lipkin “In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and 
Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 264. 
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good (in the private sphere).14 However, the public realm can be regulated to provide 
an atmosphere that promotes individual autonomy.15 The only areas where the state is 
required to be non-neutral are the preservation of freedom and autonomy.16 The ideal 
seems to be the creation of an environment where the widest number of opposing 
views can be accommodated.17 According to liberal theory, freedom is situated in 
limiting state power, because the individual would then be free to form the social 
unions that she pleases.18 In so doing, the state ensures that individual choice is 
maximized, which in turn would lead to the maximization of public good.19
 
Liberty further includes the right of individuals to participate in collective decision-
making (essentially rule making) and to pursue the opportunities that the rules make 
available.20 The right to be an equal member of a self-governing community is seen as 
crucial for the ultimate realization of the self.21 Liberalism envisages a government of 
laws, not men.22 The political is portrayed as an arena for discussion of the opposing 
doctrines held by persons. This also implies that individuals must agree to make 
politics the arena for such discussion.23 Many liberal theorists argue that this 
agreement takes the form of a contract concluded by individuals before the advent of 
society.24 This contract contains the rules of engagement (so to speak). The goal of 
                                                 
14 Lipkin “In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and 
Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 268. 
15 Public hate speech can for example be prohibited because the affected persons are hindered in living 
out their autonomy as a cultural group. See Lipkin “In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of 
Reasonableness, Public Reason and Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul 
LR 263 at 264. 
16 Lipkin “In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and 
Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 302-303. 
17 Lipkin “In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and 
Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 268. 
18 Dyzenhaus “Liberalism, Autonomy and Neutrality” (1992) 42 University of Toronto LJ 354 at 368; 
Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1815. 
19 It is assumed that individuals, when granted freedom, will maximise their own interests, and by so 
doing maximise the collective good. 
20 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 816. 
21 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 748; Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 
1816. 
22 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 267. 
23 Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1816. 
24 Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1821; Hutchinson “Indiana 
Dworkin and Law’s Empire” (1987) 96 Yale LJ 637 at 646. Rawls and other liberal theorists argue that 
there was never a social contract, but rather individual realization of inter-subjective being. See Lipkin 
“In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and Tolerance in 
Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at fn 21. 
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dialogue is the creation of a deliberative culture that performs social inquiries to 
resolve conflicts. 25 A deliberative culture presupposes that clear, decisive methods 
exist to resolve conflicts.26 Deliberation is regarded as a neutral way of solving 
conflict. The answer that survives the deliberative gaze is clothed in moral authority, 
and is seen as the result of a transcending objective process that stands neutral to 
actual cultural and social practices.27 Conflict must be resolved in one of the arenas 
allocated to the resolution of such conflict --law-like conflicts in court and other 
conflicts in politics--. In this process, people get to choose the rules by which they 
want to be governed in the political process. 28 The courts must test these rules against 
the paramount value of liberty enhancement, because it is the reason for the 
conclusion of the social contract in the first place. 
 
Liberals argue that judges must approach their job in a dispassionate spirit.29 The role 
of the judge is to apply the rules in as objective a way as possible. Judges should be 
aware of their feelings and prejudice, and purge themselves of such influences before 
deciding a case.30  By sustaining a stance of “disinterestedness” judges are perceived 
to be able to adjudicate between the arguments presented to them objectively and 
according to the law and not according to individual emotions.31 When interpreting 
statutes, judicial officers must pay due regard to the intention of the legislature and 
the purpose of the statute and take care not to usurp the role of the legislature.32 Only 
by doing that can the judiciary stay true to the principle of government by law, not 
men.  
 
                                                 
25 Lipkin “In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and 
Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 328. 
26 Lipkin “In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and 
Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 329. 
27 Lipkin “In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and 
Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 329. 
28 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 267; Hutchinson “Indiana 
Dworkin and Law’s Empire” (1987) 96 Yale LJ 637 at 646. 
29 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 298. 
30 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 298. 
31 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 298. 
32 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 299. 
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The role of a supreme constitution in the liberal scheme is to promote participation in 
democracy.33 The role of the judiciary when interpreting the constitution is to perfect 
representative democracy.34 Because politics is governed by the rule of the majority, 
it can be misappropriated to infringe on the autonomy of minorities. The role of the 
court when interpreting the constitution is therefore to combat infringements on the 
rights of the marginalized in society in order to promote a truly representative 
democracy.35 The constitution is a framework of fundamental rights and liberties 
aimed at providing a minimum set of values in the quest for autonomy.36 The role of 
these rights and liberties is to act as a set of principles against which the actions of 
state and also private (non-state) actions can be measured and evaluated. The point is 
to establish whether the action under scrutiny in fact advances liberty and autonomy. 
According to the liberal conception of a constitutional dispensation, constitutional 
mechanisms provide ways of reaching public agreement, while permitting individuals 
to act on their views in their private lives.37 This description of a constitutional 
dispensation reinforces the liberal ideal of a strict division between the public and 
private spheres of life. 
 
The development of liberalism as a way of life (and its attribution of authority over 
the self to the individual) is seen as a historical product.38 Liberals argue that 
authority was not always seated in the self. Practices like slavery, serfdom and male 
                                                 
33 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 301; Lipkin “In Defence of 
Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and Tolerance in Multicultural 
Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 284. 
34 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 301. 
35 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 302; Lipkin “In Defence of 
Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and Tolerance in Multicultural 
Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 302. 
36 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 308; Lipkin “In Defence of 
Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and Tolerance in Multicultural 
Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 302. 
37 Lipkin “In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and 
Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 284. 
38 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 780; See also Mensch “The Colonial Origins of Liberal Property Rights” 
(1982) 31 Buffalo LR 635 at 693. Mensch shows how the liberal conception of property rights came 
into being in colonial New York. Far from being the natural state of affairs, she argues that property 
rights as we know them are the result of an uneasy marriage between the idea that property results from 
the hierarchal relationship between the king and subject and the idea that property rights result from the 
utilisation of the property. 
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domination demonstrate that liberty or self-control did not always lie with the 
individuals themselves.39 However, because of the historical development of 
autonomy it is so deeply embedded in political, economic and ethical practices that it 
can be regarded as natural.40 Baker argues that careful investigation of most political 
institutions, moral commitments and communication practices will show that 
individualism is a prerequisite for the said institutions.41 He avers that even 
exceptions to the rule that the self must have control over the self are aimed at 
furthering individualism.42  
 
2.2 The liberal conception of the self 
The liberal theory of law and society conceives the self (the person) as an atom (or 
building block) of society. The self is independent of other selves and is self-
authenticated and commands itself.43 Persons are perceived to be in charge of their 
own thoughts and actions. Michelman asserts “…[The liberal self is] a spontaneous 
author of plans and doer of acts inspired by its own cognitions, calculations, and 
desires…”.44  
 
Michelman argues that most liberal theorists would agree that a liberal “person” must 
have the following attributes:45
• Each subject must be ethically separate.46 This means that each individual 
subject leads his or her own life, distinct from the lives of other subjects. Each 
life must also have a distinct field of value. This means that people’s lives 
                                                 
39 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 782. 
40 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 782; Hutchinson “Indiana Dworkin and Law’s Empire” (1987) 96 Yale LJ 637 
at 646. 
41 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 783. 
42 He demonstrates this with the rule that parents have control over children. He argues that this control 
of the parent over the child is not to promote the interest of the parent over that of the child, but rather 
to promote the development of the child in order for the child to become autonomous. See Baker 
“Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 783. 
43 Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1809. Michelman is a 
republican liberal theorist himself, but provides a very detailed description of the typical liberal self. 
44 Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1809. 
45 Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1812. 
46 Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1812; Van Blerk 
Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 136. 
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must not be assessed as a collective, but each life must be assessed 
individually.  
• Each subject must be interest-bearing.47 Subjects must be capable of being 
affected differently by events and the influence upon each individual’s well-
being must be capable of independent assessment. 
• Each subject must be self-activating.48 This means that each subject can 
contemplate its own interests, understand its reason for doing something and 
accommodate action according to that understanding. 
• Each subject must be communicative.49 This means that each subject is 
capable of intentionally influencing the reasoning of another subject and is 
itself subject to such influence from another subject. 
• Each subject must be self–conscious or reflective.50 This means that the 
subject must be aware of itself as an ethically separate, interest-bearing, self-
activating and communicative subject. 
 
In liberal theory, persons are defined as “selves gaining identity in terms of their 
activities, their personal relations, their values and capacities, their projected or hoped 
for futures, their individual histories and their collective traditions”.51 Because of this 
definition of the self, much of the identity of the self is realized and defined by the 
things around them, in other words the material world.52 This relation to the material 
world requires persons to control their environment in order to control their own 
identity. Property rights are necessary to protect the self’s control over the objects that 
define and occupy the spaces that are entwined with their developing and present 
identity.53 Personhood is central to the liberal claim and the relationship between the 
selves and specific objects (in which selves invest some degree of their identity) 
                                                 
47 Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1812; Van Blerk 
Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 136. 
48 Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1812; Van Blerk 
Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 136. 
49 Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1812; Van Blerk 
Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 136. 
50 Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1812. 
51 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 745. 
52 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 745 and 46; Van Blerk Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 136 and 138-
141. 
53 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 746; Van Blerk Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 139. 
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justifies legal protection of the control of such objects.54 Strong property rights are 
therefore crucial to the liberal notion of autonomy. 
 
Individualism and the realization of the self are perceived to flow from conformity 
with certain collective structures.55 The self can reasonably expect of other selves to 
conform to these collective structures to the extent that these structures embody 
respect for individual equality and autonomy. A system of law must therefore respect 
the twin values of autonomy and individual equality for it to be legitimate.56 Baker 
argues that the self can only reach her full capability in moral and communicative 
action if these twin values are seen as prerequisites for legality.57 Dyzenhaus argues 
that there cannot be true self-determination if one cannot rise above the circumstances 
in which one is born.58 A liberal society is one that makes the self’s ambitions, rather 
than the self’s circumstances, the determinant of her fate. 
 
The self is an individual that includes a physical body and a personality. The self is 
the locus of the decision-making authority over itself, as far as that decision-making 
does not involve another self’s body or resources without consent.59 This means that 
the self constitutes and controls itself, but in relation to other selves. The autonomous 
self is that which is left alone (to mind its own business) except for the limits imposed 
by the offence and harm principles when a minimum level of economic and health 
well-being is provided.60
 
Finally, because of the deliberative nature of liberalism, the individual is also said to 
possess the capacity for practical reason,61  which presupposes that the self has a 
conception of good and a sense of justice. However, this is not enough. Rawls argues 
                                                 
54 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 762; Van Blerk Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 138-141 
55 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 778. 
56 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 778; Van Blerk Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 140. 
57 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 778. 
58 Dyzenhaus “Liberalism, Autonomy and Neutrality” (1992) 42 University of Toronto LJ 354 at 364 
59 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 471 at 782. 
60 Dyzenhaus “Liberalism, Autonomy and Neutrality” (1992) 42 University of Toronto LJ 354 at 361. 
61 Lipkin “In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and 
Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 279. 
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that the self must also possess an idea of the extent of the so-called basic terms of 
social life.62 The self must further recognize that there are other selves similarly 
situated to herself, and that the democracy that she forms part of recognizes and 
encourages multiple conceptions of good.63 A self is regarded as reasonable if she is 
willing to modify and revise her conception of good in the face of social conflict if it 
is in the interest of social cooperation. This principle is of course not absolute because 
it must be measurable against the über-value of individual autonomy and the 
possibility of multiple truths. The reasonable self always tries to justify his actions to 
others on grounds he cannot reasonably reject.64
 
An acceptance of liberalism has important theoretical implications for any description 
of an author or interpreter. Liberal theorists regard the author of a text as autonomous, 
and consequently, her wishes for (or intentions with) the text is of paramount 
importance. The author is assumed to be in control of the interpretive process through 
her creation of the text. Any meaning resulting from the interpretive process must be 
attributable to the author of the text; otherwise it is no longer authorized. The 
interpreter is not given any scope for interpretive creativity since his aim should be to 
replay the intention of the author as accurately as is possible. 
 
2.3 Criticism of liberalism 
Liberalism as a theory of law and society has been widely accepted in South African 
jurisprudence. Our courts accept the premise that individuals are autonomous, which 
is the central claim of liberalism.65 It is also this contention, namely that persons are 
autonomous, which constitutes the first target of communitarian criticism. 
 
 Communitarians contend that self-realization is a prerequisite for autonomy.  Without 
an understanding of herself, there cannot be any autonomous decision-making by the 
self. The self is the locus of decision-making in liberal theory, and a sense of self-
                                                 
62 Rawls Political Liberalism (1993) at 62; Lipkin “In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of 
Reasonableness, Public Reason and Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul 
LR 263 at 279. 
63 Lipkin “In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and 
Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 279. 
64 Lipkin “In Defence of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason and 
Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism” (1996) 45 DePaul LR 263 at 280. 
65 See for example Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at 788; Du Plessis 
and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at 870-887. 
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understanding (before the decision is made) forms the basis of any liberal 
dispensation. In short, for the liberal argument to succeed, the self must have a sense 
of (or understand) herself before she makes any social connection or decision. The 
communitarian attack focuses on the origin of that understanding. Communitarians 
argue that the liberal contention that understanding originates from the individual 
cannot be upheld, because understanding is built on previous understanding or pre-
understanding, and that understanding is again built on pre-understanding.66 This pre-
understanding is community-specific because the individual understands only as the 
pre-understanding allows. In other words, the individual only understands or reasons 
within the possibilities open to him.67 These possibilities are particular to the 
community that is here and now. Knowledge is historical, contextual and contingent 
because of this communal influence.  
 
The second critique of liberalism is centered on the self-destructing tendency of 
liberalism. Liberal theorists contend that the ultimate realization of the self can only 
be achieved by state regulation of the public and non-intervention in the private. The 
problem that emerges is that the public is being weakened and the private 
strengthened because of commercial reality.68 The prioritization of the pursuit of 
wealth and property weakens the identification of individuals with the social.69 
Because of the exclusionary nature of liberal property and personal rights, the 
identification with such rights leads to the perception that the private is preferable to 
the public, since the non-interventionist liberal state does not interfere with the 
private. This leads to the gradual privatization of the public.70 Because of the non-
interventionist stance regarding the private sphere, the very tools that were supposed 
to ensure the maximization of autonomy are being neutralized by autonomy. The 
minimum economic levels necessary for an autonomous life cannot be attained 
                                                 
66 Christodoulidis “The Suspect Intimacy Between Law and Political Community” (1994) 80 ARSP 1 at 
4. 
67 Christodoulidis “The Suspect Intimacy Between Law and Political Community” (1994) 80 ARSP 1 at 
4. 
68 Van der Walt “Un-doing things with words: the colonization of the public sphere by private property 
discourse” 1998 Acta Juridica 235-28. 
69 Gazra “Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism and Natural Law: Reconstructing Ethical Life” (1991) 9 Law 
and Philosophy 371 at 375. 
70 This trend can be seen in South Africa with regard to the privatisation of the telephone networks, the 
power supply, rails systems etc and the resultant lack of regulation thereof (especially concerning 
affordability. Many formerly public services are now run by the private sector). See Van der Walt “Un-
doing things with words: the colonization of the public sphere by private property discourse” 1998 Acta 
Juridica 235-28. 
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because the privatization of the providers of services makes it too expensive for a 
large part of the population.71 The liberal role afforded the state will therefore 
eventually lead to the demise of autonomy, because the state will disappear and with 
it the public. As Dyzenhaus concedes “…[v]ital social relations might in fact 
disintegrate without help from the state…”.72 Liberal theorists thus have to revise their 
insights regarding the realization of autonomy. 
 
The third criticism of liberalism centers on the liberal conception of property rights. 
Liberal theorists often proclaim that property rights have to protect the individual 
against the exploitation of his rights by others because of the strong identification 
persons are seen to have with property.73 Identity is linked with property and property 
plays an important role in upholding the autonomy of the individual.74 Individual 
autonomy is the goal of liberalism and its conception of property rights reflect that. 
This exclusive conception of property leads to the entrenchment of existing property 
relations and resistance to change. Furthermore, the exclusive property rights that are 
supposed to protect individuals against unjust exploitation often leads to the 
protection of the property rights of past exploiters.75 This is especially evident in the 
South African context in the case of land reform.76 The liberal conception of property 
                                                 
71 See Van der Walt “Overview of Developments since the Introduction of the Constitutional Property 
Clause” (2004) 19 SA Public Law 46-89; Van der Walt “Property rights and hierarchies of power: an 
evaluation of land reform policy in South Africa” (1999) Koers 259-294; Van der Walt “Exclusivity of 
ownership, security of tenure, and eviction orders: a model to evaluate South African land-reform 
legislation” (2002) 119 SALJ 254-289; Van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure, and 
eviction orders: a critical evaluation of recent case law” (2002) 18 SAJHR 371-419;  
http://www.landaction.org/display.php?article=67 “[t]he privatisation of Eskom has ensured that 
electricity prices will rise above inflation, and that poor people pay more for power than rich people. 
The Eskom thugs turn the lights off in millions of poor homes when people cannot afford to pay, and 
criminalize the poor when they fight against these policies. The denial of basic services to the poor is a 
gross human rights violation... Poor people are also being evicted from their own private homes when 
they are too poor to pay for water and electricity.” In South Africa, the state has begun to realize that 
this might be a problem and initiatives like the basic water ration are aimed at combating the effects of 
privatization on the poor. However, the collapse (and immanent collapse) of may rural municipalities 
serve as a reminder that we are a long way from realizing a balance between the rights (and needs) of 
the poor and the monetary pressures on the state. 
72 Dyzenhaus “Liberalism, Autonomy and Neutrality” (1992) 42 University of Toronto LJ 354 at 369 
73 Baker “Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty” (1986) 134 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 741 at 747. 
74 See section 2.1 above. 
75 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 287. 
76See Van der Walt “Overview of Developments since the Introduction of the Constitutional Property 
Clause” (2004) 19 SA Public Law 46-89; Van der Walt “Property rights and hierarchies of power: an 
evaluation of land reform policy in South Africa” in LM du Plessis (ed) 1999 Koers Potchefstroom 
University 259-294; Van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure, and eviction orders: a 
model to evaluate South African land-reform legislation” (2002) 119 SALJ 254-289; Van der Walt 
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rights seems to be objective and it is precisely this that masks the inevitable moral and 
social decisions that underlie the existence of such rights.77
 
Possibly the most compelling and relevant criticism against the liberal conception of 
law came from the critical legal studies movement or CLS.78 The CLS identified three 
contradictions central to liberal thought.79 The first contradiction is between the 
mechanical application of rules in dispute resolution, which is thought to advance 
individualism and self-reliance, and the application of ad hoc standards that are 
situation-sensitive, that are seen as advancing altruism. This contradiction is 
illustrated by South African jurisprudence on eviction.80 The second contradiction in 
liberal thought is between the belief that values and desires are arbitrary and 
individually conceived, while ethical and social truths are established objectively 
received because facts and reason are objective. This contradiction can be observed in 
                                                                                                                                            
“Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure, and eviction orders: a critical evaluation of recent case 
law” (2002) 18 SAJHR 371-419; Baartman and Others v Port Elizabeth Municipality 2004 (1) SA 560 
(SCA);http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/landreformsa/South-Africa.asp; 
http://www.landaction.org/display.php?article=67 and http://www.nkuzi.org.za/land-reformsa.htm 
where it is reported that “…[I]t is estimated that seven million inhabitants of farmland face eviction by 
60000 farmers who own the land. This is ascribed directly to the liberalization of the South African 
society. The notes of a think-tank meeting in Pretoria, the capital, organised to seek ways out of the 
impasse on land reform in the region, reflect the results of these difficulties: ‘Land redistribution to 
provide land for the landless in rural areas has been very slow, and falls far below the government’s 
target of transferring 30 percent of agricultural land by 2015….’ and ‘…At the current rate, it (land 
reform) is unlikely to reach 5 percent by that date,’ the meeting concluded. Also noted was the ‘general 
failure to deliver post-transfer support services to land reform farmers’…”. For more on land reform 
see http://land.pwv.gov.za/legislation_policies/white_papers.htm; 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2002/tm0208.html; 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2002/0202281146a1001.htm
77 Mensch “The Colonial Origins of Liberal Property Rights” (1982) 31 Buffalo LR 635 at 639. 
78 For a general history and account of the movement see Unger The History of the Critical Legal 
Studies movement (1986); Kelman A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (1984). 
79 Kelman A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (1984) at 3; Fisher “The Development of Modern 
American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen 
(eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 289. 
80 In Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 21 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the only 
elements to be proven in order for an owner to be entitled to an eviction under art 26(3) of the 
Constitution of South Africa act 108 0f  (1996) 45 was ownership and possession by the lessee. In 
Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and another v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) at 123, the same court interpreted 
the same area of constitutional law to include an investigation into the circumstances of the unlawful 
occupier before an eviction order can be granted. The point is that while mechanical rules of law are 
perceived to promote individual autonomy, liberalists realize that the mechanical application of rules 
might lead to unjust and socially immoral results. However, note that Brisley was decided on the basis 
of sec 26(3) of the Constitution, while Ndlovu was decided on the basis of the PIE act (Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998, sec 4), which necessitates 
consideration of the circumstances. While sec 26(3) expressly require that all circumstances be taken 
into account, the court (in Brisley) interpreted “all relevant circumstances” as simply consisting of the 
common law onus of ownership and possession. Conversely, the Ncobo-test includes a PIE inquiry 
(PIE requires that attention be paid to circumstances expressly mentioned in the act) that goes much 
wider than the Brisley-test. 
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the jurisprudence on the role of boni mores in contracts.81 The third contradiction is 
between the commitment to an intentionalist discourse, where human actions are 
perceived to result from human intent and determinist discourse, while human action 
is perceived to result from existing structures. Fisher argues that these three 
contradictions form part of an underlying trauma of liberalism identified by Duncan 
Kennedy.82 Kennedy argues that the goal of individual freedom and the means of 
attaining individual freedom are mutually incompatible. As members of society we 
impose upon others and have imposed upon ourselves collective hierarchical 
structures of power and welfare that are supposed to protect individuality. The place 
attained on this hierarchy depends mostly on accidents of birth or genetic endowment. 
The hierarchy that is supposed to protect and encourage individualism implies the 
type of control that curbs individualism.  The goal of individual freedom is at the 
same time dependent upon and incompatible with the communal coercive action that 
is necessary to achieve that goal. 
 
The CLS critics also contend that predictability in legal decision-making does not 
result from clear and accessible rules that guide judges, but from two related aspects 
of legal culture.83 The first is a shared understanding of a proper legal system, the 
extent to which the existing hierarchy must be maintained or altered and, lastly, the 
“plain meaning” of rules, conventions that govern each dispute and politics.84 This 
particular understanding of the system of law rather than the rules themselves 
provides the answers.85 The second aspect of legal culture that aids the predictability 
of legal decisions is the dominant position afforded to one of the contradictory 
                                                 
81 In Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk. v Saayman NO 1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA) the court 
reached a unanimous decision regarding the validity of an act of surety. However, the majority chose to 
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82 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 289. See also Kennedy “The 
Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries” (1979) 28 Buffalo LR at 211-212. 
83 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 290. 
84 Singer, “The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory” (1984) 94 Yale LJ at 22. 
85 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 290. 
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impulses always present in law. Some impulses carry more weight than others. Values 
like individualism, formal realizability (the question: Can it be done?) and free will 
are presumed to be applicable while values relating to altruism, sensitivity to context 
and determinism are assumed to be applicable only in special circumstances.86 
Mechanical rules are favoured over ad hoc standards, objective facts and reasons are 
privileged over individual desires and values and intentionalism is privileged over 
determinism. This does not mean that legal decision-making is determinate. The CLS 
critics argue that any lawyer can argue any case in a number of ways, drawing 
arguments from the “mainstream legal discourse”.87 The result is that there is no 
integrated justificatory system supporting and shaping the legal order.88
 
The CLS scholars also criticize the liberal conception of rights. This criticism flows 
from the abovementioned criticisms against liberalism in general. Three distinct 
themes can be identified.89 The first criticism is the so-called indeterminacy 
critique.90 Two reasons are advanced to support the indeterminacy thesis. The first 
reason why rights are indeterminate is because of the way they are construed by the 
courts. Individual rights are often balanced against the social interest.91 The courts 
also routinely balance competing rights.92 These practices lead to the indeterminacy 
of rights because the content of the right depends upon the social circumstances as 
well as other rights involved in the dispute. The second and more fundamental reason 
for the indeterminacy of rights is connected with the interpretation of rights. Rights 
are not interpreted in a vacuum but in a particular social setting. Abstract rights must 
be interpreted in a social setting, which implies that there is already a certain 
understanding as to the content of the rights. The interpretation of, for example, the 
right to emergency medical care will differ in a very affluent society and in a poor 
                                                 
86 Fisher “The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights” in Lacey & Haakonssen (eds) A Culture of Rights (1992) at 290; Kelman A Guide to 
Critical Legal Studies (1984) at 4. 
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92  In the Soobramoney case at 773 par 11 the court balances the right of access to emergency medical 
care of the applicant against the rights of the general public to reasonable medical care. 
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society, which means the right does not have an independent content. It can mean 
many things depending upon the social setting of the interpretation. 
 
The second theme that is identified is the so-called inhibitory nature of the language 
of rights.93 The CLS scholars argue that the use of “rights language” stunts our 
imagination. This concern is divided into two issues. The first is that rights language 
cannot describe the rich texture of our existence and restricts our capacity for good 
communication.94 By clothing things and experiences in rights language we are often 
prohibited from examining those concepts truly critically. When value does not 
correspond with rights value, value can be lost in the act of communication, because 
rights are perceived to have independent value. The second issue relating to the 
language of rights flows directly out of the liberal conception of rights. Rights are 
perceived to create opportunities for community and to promote autonomy,95 but this 
illusion obscures the actuality of the dichotomy underlying autonomy and community. 
Our desire for autonomy and our yearning for community are fundamentally opposed. 
By obscuring this, rights language leads us to believe that we have been delivered 
from this dichotomy and therefore stunts our imagination and efforts to create a better 
world.96
 
Although not part of the mainstream CLS movement, Lipkin extended the “inhibitory 
nature” critique.97 He argues that so-called political neutrality towards social cultures 
in a liberal system is in fact a culture in itself. The liberal view of culture is that all 
cultures must be allowed within the structures created to facilitate culture. Individuals 
must be free to move to or embrace any culture that they like within the limits that are 
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justifiable.98 Liberal theorists value autonomy and deliberative reflectionism as core 
values.99 Individuals can therefore not only choose the culture that they prefer, but 
also reject those that they judge to “fail” the test of deliberative reflection. In this way 
liberalism becomes a super-culture that transcends other cultures in order for 
individualist deliberative reflection to take place.100 Instead of deliberation from 
within culture, specific sets of (liberal) values are incorporated into the culture 
through the liberal process of deliberative reflection. Difference is negated and 
conformity is imposed in the deliberative process. That which is liberally justifiable is 
highlighted while the rest is played down. Culture no longer exists as a unique entity, 
but rather becomes a mutation of liberal justifications and the original (pre-liberal) 
culture. The liberal culture therefore inhibits cultural diversity rather than promoting 
it. 
 
Lipkin further states that the liberal culture of tolerance towards “other” cultures is 
both inadequate and pernicious.101 It is inadequate because it expresses the wrong 
attitude towards multi-cultural life.102 Lipkin argues that instead of mere tolerance we 
should fully embrace and respect otherness. That way we can learn from otherness 
rather than merely accommodating it. The liberal culture of tolerance is pernicious 
because it allows for the tolerance of otherness that is sometimes harmful to selves. 
Lipkin uses the example of hate speech to illustrate this point.103 According to the 
liberal culture of tolerance, borderline hate speech must be allowed in certain 
circumstances to accommodate freedom of speech, yet the autonomy of those who are 
the victims of the hate speech suffers. On the other hand, if hate speech is disallowed 
the autonomy of the hate speakers suffers.   
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The third theme of criticism leveled against the liberal conception of rights is the 
critique that rights are ineffective as facilitators of social transformation.104 The main 
concern here is the so-called strategic concessions of rights. The argument goes that 
those in power often grant strategic rights to those opposing the established hierarchy. 
The protesters are pulled into the power structures and the hierarchy of power is 
maintained. Instead of wholesale change, change to the present structures of power is 
limited and because of the indeterminacy of rights, it is ultimately neutralized. It is 
this limiting role that rights often play that makes them suspect as facilitators of 
change. 
 
After examination of the above criticisms two points should be highlighted. The first 
point is that liberalism is not an explanation of a factual situation that exists “out 
there”. Liberalism is a constructive exercise. It presupposes a certain view of 
humanity, and importantly for this study, autonomy. Persons are not naturally 
autonomous. It is simply a choice between various possible interpretations of human 
nature. The second point flows from the first. Liberalism is not the only road to social 
change. The CLS thinkers and others showed that the liberal conception of rights and 
its overemphasis on individuality might in fact hamper change, rather than promoting 
it. While wholesale abandonment of individual rights might not be the way forward, 
individual rights and autonomy are not simply the products of an objective 
examination of the way things are.  
 
Together with the criticism of liberalism as a description of the self comes a criticism 
against liberal interpretive methods. Because the self is essentially a creation (an 
interpretation), he cannot serve as a basis or originator of meaning. Meaning depends 
just as much on the influence of the interpreter, context and inherent linguistic 
meaning possibilities as on the influence of the author. When feasibility of autonomy 
as a basis of “the good life” is criticized, the role of the author and interpreter in the 
interpretation process is also subject to the same critical scrutiny. 
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3. Communitarian theory of law and society 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this section on communitarianism is not to describe communitarianism as 
an alternative meta-theory of law and society (or description of individual life). If 
communitarianism is elevated to a meta-theory, it will in principle be subject to the 
same criticisms as the liberal theory. The idea is rather to examine and evaluate the 
insights as an alternative construction of being, provided by the communitarian view 
of the self. 
 
Communitarianism and liberalism are two fundamentally opposed points of view 
regarding the nature and the place of the individual.105 The liberal conception of the 
self is that of an individual whose rights derive from her status as a pre-social human 
being.106 By contrast, communitarians regard the self as fundamentally constituted by 
a variety of social settings and communal relations.107 They argue that human good 
must be evaluated and defined in terms of communal life.108 For communitarian 
theorists the “good life” consists of public participation and state intervention is 
therefore accepted on a much larger scale than envisaged by liberals.109
 
Communitarianism is said to be a product of postmodernism and antimodernism. The 
postmodern view of individual autonomy consists mainly of a denial of the 
universality of individual autonomy. Postmodern theorists argue that individual 
autonomy is not the product of human nature or evolution, but is rather culturally and 
socially constituted.110 The individual is a construction of society and not the product 
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of the natural attributes of human nature. Human nature itself is regarded as a social 
construct. The postmodern communitarian stance does not advocate the wholesale 
abandonment of all liberal structures.111 What the postmodern communitarian stance 
urges is a re-evaluation of the central liberal claim that the aim of social life is the 
extension of individual autonomy. The antimodern communitarian stance is a much 
stronger denial of liberalism. Antimodern communitarianism has often been called 
“strong” communitarianism. This stance envisages communitarianism as an 
alternative to liberalism.112 Strong communitarianism involves the rejection of the 
whole liberal structure and replacement thereof by communitarian structures.113
 
Within these two movements three debates appear.114 The first so-called agency 
debate about the nature of the human agent is discussed more comprehensively in the 
section on the communitarian conception of the self. The second so-called meta-
ethical debate,115 centers on the understanding of values. Communitarian theorists 
reject the liberal universal understanding of normative values (that values are 
common to all humans because of their human nature). In liberal theory, these values 
are building blocks for a social order.116 The communitarian argument is that values 
are intrinsic to political entities, contexts and traditions situated in community.117 
Christodoulidis argues that even the evaluation of a value is impossible outside of 
community. He states that the shift from the plain-fact view to the interpretive view 
brought the community directly to bear on the possibility of meaning.118 Values (in 
the communitarian scheme) are not universal but rather contingent upon communal 
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settings that constitute a society. Theorists like Ronald Dworkin and Owen Fiss argue 
that this community can be used as a value on which to build society.119 The third 
debate is the so-called political debate.120 The contention advanced by the 
communitarian theorists is that endorsement of communal life and values is preferable 
to the liberal conception of life.121 This contention is usually linked to the strong or 
antimodernist communitarian stance and includes the wholesale rejection of 
liberalism and its institutions. I now turn to the contentions that most communitarians 
share. 
 
Communitarians focus on the relations between selves rather than how the selves 
relate. It is the relation rather than the related that interests them.122 They argue that 
intersubjective experiences contain rich and valuable possibilities. Understanding 
intersubjectivity will lead to acceptance of the vulnerability and dependence of selves 
upon others.123 Community of shared context is a necessary pre-condition for 
meaningful interaction between the members of such a community.124 These contexts 
are sometimes in conflict. This does not pose a problem for communitarians, who 
argue that communal identities are defined in contradiction to each other.125 Because 
of the importance of conflict in the communitarian scheme, persons must be 
encouraged to participate in politics. For communitarians, politics is not legitimated 
by principle (such as the liberal justification of politics, namely that it maximizes 
individual autonomy) but by participation.126 Since it is argued that there are no such 
things as universal principles, imposition of such principles would disenfranchise 
those with contrary beliefs. Because identity is historically contingent and can change, 
communitarians argue that it is best that persons participate in its constitution.127
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 The second shared contention from the first. Communitarians argue that the excessive 
liberal emphasis on individual autonomy and the marketization of everyday life leads 
to a severe deficiency with regard to public responsibility and civic duty.128 The space 
of ethics and morality is taken up by notions of public good that are little more than 
individual market-driven decisions motivated by efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy.129 Communitarianism is an attempt to fill this void with an appeal to 
strengthen moral voices.130 The family is seen as the nucleus of the communitarian 
claim and it is here that the moral shoring-up should take place.131 Many 
communitarian theorists argue that the lack of parenting is a direct cause for the 
present collapse of moral and ethical life.132 They require parents to show greater 
commitment to their parenting roles. 
 
Communitarians have a particular way of looking at the law. For the most part they 
argue that the law is interpretive in nature.133 They argue that the law is obeyed 
because of the cognitive processes of internalization and imagination.134 
Internalization relates to the (already in place) behavioral patterns that persons 
observe in everyday life. Winter illustrates the point by using the example of a traffic 
light.135 Persons who stop at a traffic light do so because they already have a habit of 
conformity to legal rules. It is further apparent that any rule will only work when there 
already is a culture of obedience and a culture of imagination. Internalization is 
supplemented by imagination. Where no culture of obedience exists, rules are still 
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observed because of the imagination of possible detection and adverse consequences 
that could follow.136 Communal and contextual influences are seen as the origins of 
internalization and imagination.137 Because of the important role that community 
plays in interpretive practice closer attention must be given to the concept. 
 
In order to understand the communitarian concept of community, one must first 
understand what it is a reaction against. The liberal conception of community is one 
of choice of roles. Because the self is seen as an atomistic and self-constituting 
individual, the self is capable of choosing the roles or communities she wants to join. 
Her communities can define the self, but only the communities she chooses have this 
possibility. Communities therefore are constituted by more or less free association. 
The self can be a father and a civil servant because he chose to become so. The 
communitarians disagree with this conception of community. A communitarian 
conception of community is one where the members share a particular way of 
understanding and living in the social world and constitute a community because of 
this shared understanding.138 Unlike the liberal autonomous self who chooses roles, 
the communitarian self is constituted by the roles he embodies.139 The self cannot be 
separated from his roles.  The self is a father and a civil servant because he is a father 
and a civil servant and because society recognizes that there can be such a thing as a 
father and a civil servant. The community in the larger sense of the word is therefore 
nothing more than the social space marked out by the relations between recognized 
communities in the restricted sense of the word.140
 
The second characteristic of the communitarian community is that of continuality. 
Unlike the liberal community where the community is as much a product of history as 
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of the autonomous self, the communitarian community is a product of continuous 
community. What is now is a product of what was yesterday.141 Community is an end 
product of common ways of understanding and living in the world.142 However, the 
community is not something “out there” that we can latch on to give us value, because 
there will always be a degree of slippage.143 Winter identifies three forms of 
slippage.144 Firstly, it is unlikely that humans in different generations will have the 
same characteristics of the previous generations because of genetic difference. People 
simply do not have the same talents or intelligence. The second form of slippage is the 
result of differing circumstances. People are constantly confronted by differing 
circumstances that require innovation. This results in modification of their 
interpretation of the world. The third form of slippage results because there is no 
determinate regularity by which others in community internalize interpretations. The 
internalized interpretation is not an exact replica of the original, but rather a unique 
interpretation. Because of slippage, the successor can always potentially differ from 
the original.145  
 
The third characteristic of the communitarian community is that it is a necessary 
precondition for the self. The self is regarded as a product of community, but the 
community is also a product of the self. These two cannot be understood apart from 
each other.146 The communitarian argument is that interpretation is contingent upon 
the existence of a community understood as a shared way of living and understanding 
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in the world.147 Fragmentation of this common community of life will not lead to 
perfect autonomy (as liberals often claim), but to irreparable alienation.  
 
3.2 The communitarian conception of the self 
The communitarian debate on the conception of the self is also known as the agency 
debate.148 The communitarian conception of the self has its roots in the rejection of 
the liberal conception of the self.149 The communitarian view is that our identity is the 
product of the particular community that we belong to.150 We are who we are because 
of where we are.151 We cannot define ourselves without reference to our role in life, 
our social situatedness.  
 
Adam Crawford divides the communitarian conception of the self into two parts.152 
The first is so-called situatedness and embodiment.153 Communitarians begin by 
arguing that individuals are constitutive of each other. Identity (in the communitarian 
scheme) is deeply embedded in the community of which the individual is part.154 
Winter asserts that the individual is not a pre-role entity.155 The individual is not a 
person who takes on roles in life, but rather a combination of roles. Susan is not a 
mother and an accountant because she is Susan, but rather Susan is Susan because she 
is a mother and an accountant. Susan did not become Susan by assuming the roles but 
rather became Susan because of the roles. The roles cannot be detached form the 
individual, because the self is defining the role just as the role is defining the self. 
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These roles are themselves contingent upon the communal understanding thereof, 
which in turn defines the individual participant’s understanding of the role.156  
 
By defining individuals in this way, communitarians criticize the liberal conception of 
the self in an important way. The liberal conception of the autonomous self cannot 
account for the moment of autonomy. When can a person be regarded as autonomous? 
The communitarian scholars show that the self can never escape the communal since 
even a liberal conception of self is contingent upon some kind of understanding of 
autonomy, which is in turn dependent upon the recognition of that understanding by 
the other. That shared understanding is contingent upon a pre-understanding formed 
as an infant under the influence of its parents.157 Even action contrary to that pre-
understanding is a reaction from within the pre-understanding and an acceptance of a 
mode of action that is perceived to be open to the self.158 To sum up the first part, “… 
the self is a thickly textured complex of learned modes of interaction with the physical 
and social world; both the ‘self’ and its ‘roles’ are largely matters of what in 
psychology is called ‘internalization’…”.159
 
The second part of Crawford’s explanation of the self is contingent upon the first.160 
Because the communitarian self is constituted by a person’s community, her 
conception of the good is situated in (and formed by) that community.161 In other 
words, the self can only live a fulfilling life in community.162 The roles by which the 
                                                 
156 Winter “Contingency and Community in Normative Practice” (1991) 139 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 963 at 987. Our understanding of who we are is continuously being reshaped. A 
person who is recognized as a doctor in medieval times will definitely not be regarded as one today. 
Likewise, our idea of a doctor today might be regarded as absurd in a 1000 years time. 
157 Winter “Contingency and Community in Normative Practice” (1991) 139 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 963 at 987. 
158 Winter “Contingency and Community in Normative Practice” (1991) 139 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 963 at 988. 
159 Winter “Contingency and Community in Normative Practice” (1991) 139 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 963 at 989. 
160 Crawford “The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda” 
(1996) 23 Journal of Law and Society 247 at 248. 
161 Crawford “The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda” 
(1996) 23 Journal of Law and Society 247 at 249. 
162 Crawford “The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda” 
(1996) 23 Journal of Law and Society 247 at 249; Kube “The Legitimacy of the Communitarian 
Critique― or: Can a Liberal Theory of Social Justice Accommodate the Public Trust Doctrine? (1997) 
83 ARSP 67 at 69. 
 95
self is constituted can only be understood in the communal setting.163 This implies 
that the only good that can be pursued is the good defined as a possibility by the 
process of understanding in the communal setting. The self must fully engage with the 
community if it wants to live a fulfilled life. The self shapes the community and the 
community shapes the self, so if the self wants to change the community, he must do 
so in community with others. Unlike the liberal autonomous self, the self will not only 
change that which he sets out to change, but will also be changed in the process. 
Christodoulidis articulates the situated self thus: “… I understand my politics and I 
understand my identity because I understand the Other … Communities, and 
especially communities that generate identity, are based on the sharing of a normative 
universe that commands commitment, makes difference visible and in the process 
makes identity visible too, provides reasons to argue and engage in justification for 
practices…”.164
 
Winter explains the origin of morality as resulting from the communal being.165 
Communitarians argue that the self is situated and constituted by communal 
interaction. Winter shows that a change in circumstance combines with existing 
“knowledge” to form seemingly new moral theories. He argues that morality is 
embedded in practice. Morality can only be understood in conjunction with the 
practices that the moral voice seeks to address. The different positions regarding the 
legality of the death penalty, for example, can only be imagined if the punishment 
itself can be imagined.166 Moral voices are thus historically contingent. This has a 
profound influence upon the conception of the individual. The individual cannot have 
a moral existence outside of the communal. Moral plurality, for communitarians, is 
not the product of individual choice but of circumstances.  
 
The communitarian conception of the self can be summed up as inescapable 
situatedness. The self constitutes the community, but is in turn constituted by that 
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community.167 As with liberalism, acceptance of communitarianism involves beliefs 
about the nature of the author and interpreter. Communitarianism affords much less 
control over the eventual meaning of the text to the author than liberalism. 
Communitarians contend that the meaning of a text is not the result of the intention of 
the author (or the will of the interpreter for that matter) but rather of the context and 
the interpretive communities in which the interpreter finds herself. Communitarians 
argue that authors and interpreters are completely interchangeable without affecting 
the meaning of the text, provided the context and interpretive communities are 
constant.168
 
3.3 Critique against communitarianism 
While communitarians expose some fundamental flaws in liberal philosophy, 
communitarian theory is not above reproach. The first and foremost criticism levelled 
against communitarianism is the threat of over-socialization.169 In the eyes of 
communitarians, the main flaw in the liberal agenda is the overemphasis on the 
individual and the lack of recognition of social situatedness. It is argued that the 
liberal conception of individual autonomy does not take account of the social 
composition of the self. Yet, when communitarianism is elevated to a meta-theory 
exactly the opposite happens. Communitarians tend to over-socialize the self and the 
self disappears into the fog of community. While it is true that the self is socially 
situated and this largely defines the life that the self would lead, this social 
situatedness causes the self to be an individual. Slippage and imagination are just two 
of the elements that create possibilities beyond the present for the individual that 
cannot be adequately accounted for by looking only at the communal.170 Because 
circumstances and people themselves are constantly changing, our customs and 
communities are constantly changing. Therefore, meaning is constantly being lost and 
created by us living both as individuals and as communal beings. Just like autonomy 
language cannot adequately describe life in all its fullness, purely communitarian 
discourse will also fail, because it does not recognize the unique, albeit socially 
                                                 
167 Winter “Human Values in a Postmodern World” (1994) 6 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 
233 at 244. 
168 See chapter 2 section 5 for elaboration on this theme. 
169 Hutchinson “Indiana Dworkin and Law’s Empire” (1987) 96 Yale LJ 637 at 653. 
170 See Winter “Contingency and Community in Normative Practice” (1991) 139 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 963 at 963 for a discussion of slippage and imagination as factors that influence 
meaning and continuality. 
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situated, self. Just like the self cannot be described without reference to community, 
community cannot be described without reference to the self. Hutchinson urges us to 
embrace intersubjectivity as a source both of self and community.171 He argues that 
an acceptance of intersubjectivity can lead to better understanding of both autonomy 
of the self and commitment and dependence on others. 
 
Furthermore, the communitarian solution of a return to the family as a building block 
of the better social life is not reflective enough. While the communitarian claim 
resounds in strong and searching criticism regarding the liberal claim of individual 
autonomy, the same in-depth examination of the communal structures is not 
undertaken.172 The proposed communitarian structures like the family and political 
community are assumed rather than proven to be preferable to liberal structures. Yet, 
contemporary literature is filled with studies that show the negative impact that can 
result from structures like the family.173 The family is the place where the child’s 
perceptions regarding race, gender and violence etc is formed. It is also the site of 
widespread abuse and violence towards women and children and men. An unhappy 
family life will become an inescapable fate if there is no individual or communal 
recourse open to the abused. Political communities can also be instruments of 
wholesale indoctrination, and of disastrous “communal political life” patterns.174 
While communal life might be a more accurate description of the human condition, it 
is not by implication less brutal. 
 
There also exists a certain amount of conceptual confusion regarding the precise 
nature of the communitarian community.175 Communitarians can only account for 
individual differences by claiming that the individual self is part to many overlapping 
                                                 
171 Hutchinson “Indiana Dworkin and Law’s Empire” (1987) 96 Yale LJ 637 at 652. 
172 Crawford “The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda” 
(1996) 23 Journal of Law and Society 247 at 251. 
173 Crawford “The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda” 
(1996) 23 Journal of Law and Society 247 at 251; http://www.familydomesticviolence.org/; 
http://www.relationships.com.au/services/violence.asp; “… We accept our responsibility to challenge 
the social structures, which permit and encourage violence, and to confront the effects of our 
patriarchal heritage, which still supports inequality between the sexes, and between generations…”. 
174 One might simply ask an inmate of the Stalinist Gulags or the Nazi interment camps whether 
unreflective communal life is good. See http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/gula.html; 
http://www.scrapbookpages.com/Buchenwald/SpecialCamp.html; 
http://uncommonlives.naa.gov.au/klaphake/contentse8f5.html.  
175 Crawford “The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda” 
(1996) 23 Journal of Law and Society 247 at 252. 
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communities. This might be correct in itself, but it has important implications for the 
communitarian theory. The community as a restraint must have the ability to force or 
at least convince its members into one course of action or another. In the system of 
overlapping communities the individual will tend towards the most persuasive 
community when there is conflict. Because individual selves have different attributes, 
different communities will hold different degrees of power over different members. 
This brings the regulative possibilities inherent in communal life into question. The 
question is not really whether it is the community or the individual who chooses, but 
what the relationship is between the different influences on choice. 
 
Crawford identifies four problems emerging from the gap between what community is 
and what community ought to be. Firstly, membership of community is neither 
voluntary nor natural.176 There are entrenched power relationships in most dominant 
communities that govern entrance to that community. In many cases an “us against 
them” relationship exists. The result is social alienation rather than unity. Communal 
dialogue becomes increasingly unlikely in an environment of inclusion and exclusion. 
Secondly, communal solutions tend to be community specific without regard for the 
larger ramifications of the solution. Crawford illustrates this problem by referring to 
community policing in the United Kingdom.177 The community formed local pickets 
to “discourage” prostitutes and the associated problems from operating out of their 
neighborhoods. As a result the problem moved to the poorer, less organized 
neighborhoods. The already deep divide between poor and wealthy was deepened. 
Powerful communities end up dominating less powerful ones. Instead of diversity, 
hierarchical relationships emerge. Thirdly, communities do not consist of equals. 
Every community is characterized by hierarchical relationships formed along the lines 
of gender, class, race and age among others.178 The voice of the community is often 
simply the voice of the dominant figures in the community. Communal discourse does 
not guarantee that all will be heard. The fourth problem is the relationship between 
communities. For the communitarian model to work, communities must have dialogue 
with other communities. This includes both the communities that overlap within a 
                                                 
176 Crawford “The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda” 
(1996) 23 Journal of Law and Society 247 at 253. 
177 Crawford “The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda” 
(1996) 23 Journal of Law and Society 247 at 253. 
178 Crawford “The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda” 
(1996) 23 Journal of Law and Society 247 at 255. 
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certain sphere (for example in the area of welfare like schools and churches) as well 
as other communities in the bigger community (for example schools with the national 
government and the provincial government). This implies both a vertical and a 
horizontal dialogue. However, the reality is very different. Different communities do 
not necessarily live in happy equilibrium with each other. They compete for space, 
resources, interest and identity. The larger community competes with smaller 
communities within itself and the larger community competes with other large 
communities and other small communities.179 Communities tend to divide just as 
often as they unite. 
 
Various preliminary conclusions emerge from the discussion of the communitarian 
theory of the self. The first is that life exists apart from the autonomous self. The very 
existence of the self seems to be connected to the existence of a communal space. The 
self emerges from complex interaction in communal life. The second conclusion is 
that maximum social benefit does not necessarily flow out of the promotion of 
individual autonomy. The promotion of individual autonomy can in fact lead to the 
maximization of good for some while totally disenfranchising others.180 Being 
allowed to do something is not the same as being able to do something. The concerns 
of the community are at least as important as those of the individual and are as 
relevant to the debate regarding the allocation of resources. The third conclusion is 
that communitarian discourse provides insightful perspective on the life of the self, 
but is not in itself capable of sustaining the burden of providing rules for the good life. 
As soon as communitarian discourse is elevated to a meta-theory, it loses much of its 
appeal because of the threat of authoritarianism. The community can oppress just as 
much as the individual. The community can also become the weapon of oppression of 
difference against the marginalized and weak who do not conform to the idea of 
communal good. Unreflective community can become the breeding ground for 
religious fanaticism, patriarchy and hierarchical society. While the unbridled self-
seeking individualist good is not desirable, unchecked overarching communal 
conceptions of good can be just as (or even more?) dangerous.  
 
                                                 
179 In the modern world for example, the state typically competes with big business and for big 
business. The provinces compete for business with each other and with other countries. Cities compete 
with each other and with the province. 
180 The influences of privatisation of certain public services provide ample evidence of this. 
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When dealing with interpretation, unreflective communitarianism leads to meaning 
majoritarianism. In other words, dominant interpretive communities will always 
decide the outcome of the interpretive process. The strong will always win. Such an 
interpretive dispensation is neither just nor justifiable.181
 
4. Self as I or Self as Us (or neither) 
The preceding arguments make it clear that neither simple individualist theories nor 
the call to unqualified communal life can provide the answer to the burning question 
of identity, agency and its implications for interpretation. The question itself can be 
the subject of an independent study and thus the following comments should be seen 
only as starting points rather than concrete answers. 
 
We have seen that the individual is socially situated and that individuals constitute the 
community. Gazra argues that this tension must be maintained for meaningful 
existence.182 He states that the ability of the individual to critically evaluate her social, 
legal and political circumstance must be maintained. Since meaning is contingent 
upon community, there must be some or other communal commitment to this goal. It 
should also be kept in mind that community is not a homogenous entity but rather a 
space that includes many communities who are in constant conflict with each other. 
The different communities identify each other and give rise to individual identity 
through contradiction.183 Communities identify each other by the differences between 
them and by implication identify the members of the various communities by their 
association to those communities. Identity is therefore intertwined in this conflict. 
This conflict does not transcend the subjects but involves them and shapes them. 
What we are is as much a product of what we are not as what we are. This conflict 
also seems to be the building blocks and standard against which we confront and 
criticize each other. The dynamic tension between where we are and where we want 
to be comes into existence in this conflict. We cannot escape who we are and what 
communities we come from. Likewise the community cannot escape the subjects that 
constantly form them. Hutchinson argues that by recognizing and embracing 
                                                 
181 See Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 
McGill LJ 603; chapter 2 section 6.2. 
182 Gazra “Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism and Natural Law: Reconstructing Ethical Life” (1991) 9 Law 
and Philosophy 371 at 373. 
183 Christodoulidis “The Suspect Intimacy Between Law and Political Community” (1994) 80 ARSP 1 
at 17. 
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intersubjectivity we can come to terms with our vulnerability and dependence but also 
commitment and responsibility to others.184
 
5. The critical self and freedom 
In Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution185 various critical scholars 
examine the legal subject and its relation to self-government (as including both self 
rule and law rule).186 In classical liberalism there is a strong commitment to the 
paradoxical values of democracy and rights.187 This commitment is built around 
conceptions of the self as  self-sufficient and community as a collection of selves. 
Michelman takes this description of the self to task. To begin with, Michelman shares 
the liberal view that the individual’s life should be the focus of moral concern. 
However, he does not share the belief that the self is unencumbered or self-sufficient, 
but rather that thinks the self is socially constituted and enmeshed in various social 
connections (relationships, communities and power relations). However, he does not 
agree that the interests of the self are subordinate to those of the collective either, in 
fact, he proposes that there can be no rigid divide between the self and the 
collective.188 In this theoretical framework, rights are conceived not as trumps, but 
rather as “…‘a relationship and a social practice’; ‘a form of social cooperation’; ‘an 
expression of connectedness’…”.189 Michelman accedes to the point made by 
Kennedy that the presence of others is always both a threat and a pre-condition to 
                                                 
184 Hutchinson “Indiana Dworkin and Law’s Empire” (1987) 96 Yale LJ 637 at 653. 
185 Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution 
(2003). 
186 See for example Boshoff  “Law as Dialogical Politics” at 1-12; Botha “Rights, Limitations and the 
(Im)Possibility of Self-Government” at 13-32;  Kroeze “God’s Kingdom in Law’s Republic: Religious 
Freedom in South African Constitutional Jurisprudence” at 117-130; Van Marle “Love, Law and South 
African Community: Critical Reflections on ‘Suspect Intimacies’ and ‘Immanent Subjectivity’” at  
231-247; all contributions in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a 
Transformative Constitution (2003). See also Du Toit “Book review of Botha, Van der Walt & Van der 
Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003)” in (2005) 16 Stell LR 
(forthcoming). The book is a tribute to Frank Michelman and develops some of his theories on the legal 
subject. It is very relevant for this study because Michelman can be placed between communitarianism 
and liberalism. He provides a theory that can be described as a critical and reflective theory of the self. 
187 Botha “Rights, Limitations and the (Im)Possibility of Self-Government” in Botha, Van der Walt & 
Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) at 15. 
188 Michelman “Constitutional Conversation with Professor Frank Michelman” (1995) 11 SAJHR 477 
at 481; Du Plessis ‘some of Frank Michelman’s Prospects for Constitutional Interpretation in South 
Africa- In Retrospect” in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a 
Transformative Constitution (2003) at 69. 
189 Botha “Rights, Limitations and the (Im)Possibility of Self-Government” in Botha, Van der Walt & 
Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) at 16 
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individual autonomy, and consequently, legal relations reflect this contradiction.190 A 
judge is never free simply to choose the applicable legal principle in the case, because 
for every principle there is an equally applicable counter-principle. A text cannot have 
a single message and there will always be meanings other than the intended ones. 
 
On the other hand, Michelman is not a communitarian either. Communitarianism is 
based on the belief that we are “trapped” (communitarians will probably use the word 
“situated”) in our communal consciousness and it leaves no real space for critical re-
assessment of our situation outside of this consciousness. Michelman believes that we 
are indeed capable of transcending the competitive pursuit of  communal interest that 
so often characterizes politics, and in doing so to revise our own beliefs and 
perceptions.191 Du Plessis describes this conception of the self as a zoon politikon or 
the belief that a person can only achieve self-realization through active participation 
in the political life of his social setting.192 The operative word here is active. Unlike 
the communitarian citizen who is bound to collective ideas about the nature of being a 
citizen, the Michelmanian one has the capability (the option) to change what it means 
to be a citizen though her interaction with the other. Where the communitarian citizen 
always lives both from and towards the (abstract) ideals of the collective, the 
individual Michelman describes is continuously (re-) formulating the terms of her 
existence albeit in a social context.  
 
                                                 
190 Kennedy ‘structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries” (1979) 28 Buffalo LR 205 at 213; Van der Walt 
“Frankly Befriending the Fundamental Contradiction: Frank Michelman and Critical Legal Thought” in 
Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution 
(2003) at 223. 
191 Michelman “Foreword: Traces of Self-Government” (1986) 100 Harvard LR at 22; Botha “Rights, 
Limitations and the (Im)Possibility of Self-Government” in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) 
Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) at 17; Kroeze “God’s Kingdom in 
Law’s Republic: Religious Freedom in South African Constitutional Jurisprudence” in Botha, Van der 
Walt & Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) at 120; Van 
Marle “Love, Law and South African Community: Critical Reflections on ‘Suspect Intimacies’ and 
‘Immanent Subjectivity’” in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a 
Transformative Constitution (2003) at 147. 
192 Du Plessis “Some of Frank Michelman’s Prospects for Constitutional Interpretation in South 
Africa— In Retrospect” in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a 
Transformative Constitution (2003) at 69-72. Du Plessis describes this zoon politikon as a civic citizen 
capable of displaying civic virtues and with that, a willingness to subordinate private interests to the 
general good. This image is central to civic republicanism, in which it is impossible for a person to 
visualize her personhood without reference to her role as citizen. The citizen’s conception of good is a 
common perception that flows out of the response of the citizen to otherness. The crucial factor is the 
active participation of the citizen in the formulation of the common good. This involves both a 
commitment to change and a willingness to participate and be heard. 
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In order to be “free” or “autonomous” two kinds of (often contradictory) types of 
liberty are needed. The first is self-rule. This means that individuals should be free to 
decide the terms of their lives. Mr Prince must be free to smoke his cannabis if he so 
pleases. The second type of liberty is law-rule or political freedom. This type of 
freedom entails the freedom of the political process from governmental interference 
or arbitrary use of government power. Mr Prince can only be denied his choice of 
religious practice by a law of general application and not by some whim of the regent. 
The individual must therefore, at the same time, be free to decide how he wants to 
live, and to be governed by rules and not man.193 It is easy to see that these two types 
or sides of autonomy can (and will) frequently be in conflict. The resolution of this 
conflict is often merely a case of pluralist, market-like balancing of competing 
interests in order to maximize as many individual freedoms as is possible.194 
Michelman rejects this type of reasoning and proposes that we embrace a concept of 
“dialogic” self-rule in its place. This type of freedom involves a reasoned and constant 
re-determination of the terms under which we live. Michelman rejects the idea that the 
parameters of life are predefined and argues that constant critical evaluation of our 
situation is necessary. In this vein, the conflict between self-rule and law-rule 
becomes less problematic, because law-rule becomes a type of dialogic self-rule.195 
The application or not of laws are no longer simply determined by formalistic 
considerations, and the actual circumstances of each case will always play a role in 
the determination of the meaning of law in that circumstance. On the other hand, 
unlimited self-rule is then limited by the possibility that the citizen will have to 
change her choices in the face of reasoned and critical assessment of her life (she 
must be open to considerations that might be contrary to her own, but always with the 
knowledge that she will also be heard). 
                                                 
193 Kroeze “God’s Kingdom in Law’s Republic: Religious Freedom in South African Constitutional 
Jurisprudence” in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a 
Transformative Constitution (2003) at 117 referring to Prince v President, Cape Law Society, and 
Others 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC). 
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and ‘Immanent Subjectivity’” in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in 
a Transformative Constitution (2003) at 234. 
195 For telling criticism of this thesis see Van Marle “Love, Law and South African Community: 
Critical Reflections on ‘Suspect Intimacies’ and ‘Immanent Subjectivity’” in Botha, Van der Walt & 
Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) at 237-239. For 
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the specific into general and by expressing the particular in general terms. Consequently the voices of 
minorities tend to get lost in the majority and the particularity of different discourses is reduced to legal 
discourse. Van Marle urges us to resist this phenomenon, which she calls “legal imperialism”. 
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 6. Implications for the interpretation of contracts 
The critical self is more of a description of what the ideal self would look like than a 
depiction of the present situation of the self in society. Unlike the liberal conception 
of the self that requires both a public sphere (for the common good) and a private 
sphere (for individual realization of freedom), or the communitarian position which 
calls for (or describes as inevitable) a purely public sphere, the critical self is located 
in a sphere that encompasses both the traditional private sphere and the public sphere. 
The critical self is never only in the private sphere, since her life is always subject to 
critical reflection, but neither is she simply situated in the public sphere since the 
critical self is always involved in the realization of her life (she will always be heard). 
The critical self is situated but she also situates. She is defined but she also defines. 
The critical self is not wholly responsible for her situation, but she is not without 
responsibility either. She is responsible not only for her own life but also for that of 
her companions. This model is not a modernist one, as the self is reflective and 
reflexive because the society she inhabits is moving along at a rapid pace and the 
context of her being is in constant flux. It is in this radically unstable environment that 
the interpretation of contracts must be re-evaluated. 
 
In the liberal model, contracts are private transactions between autonomous beings 
and the extensions of those beings (like corporations and companies). Contracts are 
tools to exchange and maximize wealth and personal freedom. The interpretation of 
contracts is an exercise of deciding the nature and extent of the undertakings by each 
party and only that. Since contracts are simply private tools for private benefit, 
governments and legislatures can only regulate this practice in so far as it will 
maximize individual freedom in society. The legislature may for example require that 
some formalities be complied with when we trade in fixed property, because property 
is seen as one of the foundations of individual autonomy and the regulation would 
result in better use of property and, consequently, a freer society. Law and Economics 
scholars argue that regulation is sometimes necessary in order to maximize the 
economic benefits that can flow from contracts.196 The interpretation of contracts is 
thus an exercise in risk allocation and the maximization of wealth. The liberal model 
                                                 
196 See for a recent example Schwartz & Scott “Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law” 
(2003) 113 Yale LJ 541-620. 
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regards the parties to the contract as free individuals acting in their own interest. The 
interpretation of the contract must therefore give effect to their wishes as far this is as 
possible and legally viable. 
 
In most communitarian models, the aim of contracts is to maximize collective interest 
and to promote social good. Because the self in this model is a manifestation of his 
social circumstances and situatedness, any interaction between selves necessarily 
implies that the community will be affected in some way or another by the contractual 
relationship. Consequently, the interpretation of contracts is first and foremost a tool 
to ensure the continuation and advancement of the communal good and good social 
practices. In communitarian theory, there is no private space (private space is seen as 
a manifestation of social relations which is in turn a communal space) and therefore 
no need to cater for the individual needs of the parties in the liberal sense. The 
interpretation of the contract cannot be a method of giving effect to the intentions of 
the parties because those intentions are already effects (of social consciousness and 
situatedness) rather than pure meanings. A wholly communitarian interpretation of 
contracts would be one that is conscious of the social situatedness of the contract and 
that would involve an investigation regarding the best possible way (in a communal 
sense) of enforcement. In a similar vein, communitarianism would require a 
justification for the meanings that result from the construction because the theory 
takes cognizance of the contingency of meaning. This is in contrast to the liberal 
belief that contractual meaning is to be “found” and not created.  
 
The critical self can have contractual relations in the liberal sense as one individual 
with another, but like the communitarian self, he would constantly be aware of the 
wider implications of his actions and his dependence upon the broader society for 
enforcement of the contract. The description of the critical self is not a mere dream, 
but something concrete that courts can work with. By embracing the ideals of dialogic 
self-rule courts can facilitate the interpretation of contracts as dialogues to construct a 
just outcome in each individual circumstance.197 The court will, by embracing 
dialogic self-rule as a point of departure, compel individuals to begin to reformulate 
                                                 
197 Each circumstance brings with it its own considerations and problems and by treating the 
interpretation of the contract as a dialogue, the courts will be able to weigh up relevant factors in each 
case. 
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their goals and ambitions in the light of a dispensation that has respect both for 
individual concerns and for social needs and responsibilities. In order to facilitate just 
contracts, the courts need to create the circumstances in which critical self reflection 
(and all that it entails) will flourish. The nature of preferred contractual outcomes is a 
political issue that should not be answered by the courts,198 but the ideal contracting 
party (the type of persons that we will help in the courts) will depend upon the court’s 
depiction of the contractual party.199 If persons are likely to be forced to accept a 
negotiated outcome reached by a court (which they feel would have been the result of 
reflective deliberation), they will be much more likely to already have negotiated 
themselves before the proceedings and in that way save the legal cost.200
  
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter three theoretical positions on individual autonomy were considered, 
namely liberalism, communitarianism and a critical theory of the self. In liberalism 
individual autonomy is valued both as a foundational principle and as an ideal. The 
theory relates a narrative of being in which the self is best served by extending 
autonomy while the state is relegated to the role of guardian of individual autonomy. 
In liberalism the role of the state is to facilitate autonomy by regulating the actions of 
autonomous actors in such a way that they can be as free as possible while not 
infringing on the freedom of others. The constitution and the rights it contains are 
postulated as boundaries between the selves, and the self is guaranteed a minimum 
freedom by these rights. Rights are minimum freedoms into which the self can retreat 
                                                 
198 The embracing of the critical self does not entail the reception of a certain political theory like 
redistribution of wealth or socialism. The type of society that we want to further must be the product of 
the political process. If the political process yields a vision of society that embraces capitalism and 
emphasizes individual freedom, then the courts must accept these ideals and construct contracts in a 
way that reflects this policy. The difference is that each contract will be looked at with its own set of 
circumstances and context and the court will be frank and honest about the reasons for finding for one 
version of the contract and not another. Courts will respect the input of the parties to the contract, but 
they will also take into account the social responsibility of themselves and the parties. The contract 
becomes the effect of the interpretation and not the object of it. 
199 Lawyers tend to learn quickly which type of person the court is likely to help. By forcing parties to 
act in a certain manner, ie partaking in reflective dialogue, courts will send a clear message to lawyer 
and non-lawyers alike about the values and beliefs that the courts embrace. 
200 It is very interesting to note that contracts that do not go to court and are successfully discharged 
mostly involve some kind of compromise at one stage or another. See for example Lloyd “Making 
Contract Relevant: Thirteen Lessons for the First-Year Contracts Course” (2004) 36 Arizona State LJ 
257 at 263-267. He remarks in lesson three that “…[b]usiness people won’t pay attention to the 
contract…[t]he …likely scenario is that the contract will be stuffed in a drawer and pulled out only 
when there is a dispute. Even then the parties are likely to consult the contract only when they’ve tried 
to resolve the dispute amicably and are threatening litigation…”. 
 107
when threatened by either the state or other selves. The role of the state is to regulate 
the public sphere in order to create a private sphere conducive to individual 
autonomy. The liberal self is an atomistic being who can choose between the roles 
available to her in society, and collections of these atomistic individuals make up the 
community. The self is privileged over the community and the community is a result 
of the self. In liberal theory, property plays a defining role. Property serves as a 
medium through which the self can express his autonomy and, consequently, property 
rights are to be as free from regulation as is possible and protected. Property rights 
serve as barriers against expropriation and re-division of property. In the liberal model 
contracts are instruments of exchange. Contracts are ways in which autonomous 
individuals can express themselves and, provided the contracts do not infringe on the 
autonomy of others, contracts are construed (in the liberal sense) to have the 
consequences intended by the parties to the contract. An autonomous self can have an 
autonomous intention and has the capacity to act according to that intention. When 
interpreting a contract (and assuming that the contracting parties are autonomous in 
the liberal sense) the liberal interpreter must interpret the contract in such a way that 
the wishes (intentions) of the contracting parties are respected and autonomy (as the 
main aim of liberalism) is maximized. 
 
The main criticism against liberalism is that a liberal dispensation does not necessarily 
attain the goals it sets for itself. In fact, rights are often stumbling blocks in the way of 
freedom and the extension of freedom to all sectors of society. History has shown that 
liberal societies are often characterized by great differences in material wealth, and 
that the liberal state often falters before the powerful and the rich. Privatization and 
state minimalism often result in a lack of basic amenities for the poor in society and, 
while the availability of things like water and electricity is improving, these services 
become unaffordable (as a direct result of privatization) for those in desperate need. 
Without these basic services, the poor cannot become autonomous, and the ideals of 
liberalism are undermined. These practical criticisms aside, liberalism is also faced 
with substantial theoretical criticism. The CLS highlighted the indeterminacy, 
instability and reification of rights and their theoretical incompatibility with 
transformative policies. Duncan Kennedy in particular argued that persons are always 
caught up in a fundamental contradiction in the sense that we both need others to be 
free, but that others are at the same time a threat to our freedom. The communitarian 
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critics aim their criticism at the liberal depiction of the self, arguing that the self does 
not predate the community and that individual consciousness is always the result of 
social situatedness and not the other way round. 
 
Communitarianism is in many ways a reaction to the failure of liberalism. This theory 
of the self flows out of beliefs placing the origin of consciousness in communal life 
and not in some inherent human capacity. Communitarians argue that the self or 
individual is nothing more than the product of social relations and influences. In this 
theory, interaction in the community is emphasized, and unlike the liberal ideal of 
emerging autonomy, value is placed on the recognition of dependence upon the 
community. Like liberalism, communitarianism is also characterized by internal 
divisions and different theoretical positions within the larger theory. Strong 
communitarianism is an antimodern movement that advocates the replacement of the 
present legal dispensation with a communitarian one. On the other hand, the 
postmodern strand of communitarianism emphasizes the critical aspects of 
communitarianism as a critique against the perceived universality of liberal values. 
Postmodern communitarians argue that the value of communitarianism lies in its 
rebuttal of the liberal claim that the maximization (or emergence) of autonomy is the 
only logical way to achieve the “good life”. Between these theoretical positions, three 
distinct claims emerge. The first claim is the social composition of the self. 
Communitarians claim that the self cannot be understood without reference to the 
social situatedness of the self and that the self often consists of not so much what the 
self is, but where the self is. The second claim, or meta-ethical claim, is that values 
are not universal but particular to the societies in which they occur. Freedom and 
autonomy are not necessarily ideas shared by humanity simply because we are 
human, but particular societies rather instill values by social interaction. Thirdly, 
communitarians argue that embracing of communal values and consciousness is 
preferable (or at least worth consideration) to life in a liberal society. 
 
Communitarians approach contracts from their communal nature and therefore argue 
that contracts are not to be interpreted simply as individual means of exchange, but 
rather as legal actions with effects beyond the parties involved. Communitarians  see 
contracts as relation- rather than exchange-orientated, and issues like good faith and 
contractual equity are strongly emphasized. The aim of communitarian contract 
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construction is to give the contract a meaning that will have the widest possible 
benefit, not only for the parties but also for the community at large. The 
communitarian contractual party is therefore not an atomistic, self-interested being, 
but rather a manifestation of a communal interest in contact with another such 
interest. The idea is to interpret this meeting (signified by the contractual text) in the 
way that leaves the largest nett benefit. 
 
Various objections have been raised against the communitarian vision of society, 
largely centering on the lack of accountability in the communitarian model. The 
accountability critique has various facets, beginning with the concept of community 
itself. Critics claim that the ideal communitarian community does not exist and that 
there is a lack of reflection on the precise nature of the proposed social existence. 
While liberal theories of the self are depicted by communitarians as overly 
individualistic, communitarians in turn fail to analyze their own solution, namely 
communal existence, critically. Critics point out that some of the worst social 
deviance take place in the communal setting, most prominently the family. They point 
out that Stalinist gulags and Nazi death camps also advanced steps to make society 
stronger. Furthermore, communitarianism does not solve the problems of poverty and 
need because there is no recourse to a standard outside of the communal and, 
consequently, the strong will still prevail. There is no structure inherent in the 
community that can guarantee a restructuring and critical reflection that precedes 
greater material and social parity. 
 
Any viable theory of the self would have to incorporate both the need for autonomy 
and the need for social justice. Such a theory must provide space for individual selves 
to flourish, while at the same time realizing that the self is socially situated and 
therefore has a social responsibility. Michelman provides a theory (the theory of 
dialogic self-rule) that incorporates both these elements. This is an ideal description of 
the self rather than an actual description but, unlike many ideal theories, it can be 
practically implemented through judicial participation. This depiction of the self 
requires that the self, when confronted with the other (typically in a dispute, but also 
in business, relationships), engages in a dialogue aimed at finding the best solution to 
the common dilemma. This should be a process where both parties have a chance to 
make themselves heard and both parties must be prepared to change in the face of 
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convincing criticism. This is the ideal model for a contractual situation because the 
parties to the contract are forced to reach a negotiated settlement and, where one party 
is unwilling, the court can enforce the just solution in that context. Unlike the liberal 
model, this model is not overly individualistic in that the parties must be prepared to 
change their own positions in the light of convincing critique. Like the liberal model, 
it allows the court to implement whatever policy (economic and social) the political 
institutions deem appropriate while still maintaining a capacity for contextually just 
decisions. This model does not have the overly social nature of a communitarian 
model and the strong economic benefits of the present contractual dispensation are 
retained. The theory of the dialogic self also incorporates many of the communitarian 
insights around the need for reflection on the social impact of legal decisions. It calls 
for a contractual interpretation practice that takes seriously the individual interests 
involved and the need for contextually sensitive critical reflection on contractual 
meaning and its impact. 
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4 
Texts 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the concept of a text. When is something a text? 
What are the elements of a text? What is the relationship between text and fact (if 
there is a relation at all)? In legal theory, much is written about the interpretation of 
texts. Passionate debates take place regarding the nature of interpretation and many 
theoretical positions are postulated on the subject of interpretation. Yet, despite the 
centrality of the text to the theory of interpretation, very little is written (at least in 
legal theory) about texts as such. In liberal theory, texts are regarded as an 
embodiment of authorial intention, a (unproblematic) constant in the interpretation 
process which serves as a link between the author and the interpreter. It seems that 
most theorists assume that the definition of legal texts is straightforward and do not 
warrant special investigation. This chapter seeks to critique such an assumption. 
 
The definition of texts is closely related to understandings of the nature of personhood 
and interpretation. Theories of interpretation such as functionalism and objectivism 
require that the text-creator be understood as an autonomous individual, implying that 
the text can reflect the intentions of the text creator clearly and unambiguously1. As 
the text-creator is understood as autonomous and self activating, the text is also 
understood as independent, predetermined, (if it is a good text) self-explanatory and 
authoritative. On the other hand, theories like contextualism and pragmatism require 
understandings of the self as a communal being whose consciousness is the product of 
his social relations, implying that texts reflect socially constructed and contextual 
meanings. According to these theories the key to the meaning of a text lies in 
understanding its context and relation to the community. One cannot divorce the 
definition of texts from theories of interpretation or understandings surrounding the 
nature of legal subjectivity. 
 
                                                 
1 See chapter 2 and 3 in this regard. 
 112
In liberal theory assumptions about interpretation, legal subjectivity and the definition 
of texts2 are interconnected. To understand the liberal interpretation process 
(especially liberal contractual interpretation), understandings surrounding texts, legal 
subjectivity and interpretation theory must be approached as being interdependent and 
mutually constitutive. The autonomous individual (who dominates liberal thought) 
must be able to communicate accurately (be understood in the way promoted by 
objectivism) and authoritatively, which means that the communication (or text) must 
be individualized (externally manifested), preserved (recorded) and executed. The text 
must be of her (the speaker’s/author’s) making, to serve her ends. This view has 
significant implications for the interpretation of contracts, and therefore the question 
is: Can texts be defined in as such? 
 
The chapter is divided into two main parts and a conclusion. The first main part, 
which consists of two subsections, investigates and analyzes the definition of texts. 
Since the nature of texts is not frequently discussed, most of the definitions of texts 
must be deduced from the rules of interpretation that deal with texts. Literary theory 
and historical theory also provide clues regarding the present understanding of texts. 
First, attention will be paid to the relation between texts and “facts” (or more 
accurately texts as records of facts). Secondly, the parol-evidence rule, together with 
its qualifications, will be analyzed as a central indicator of legal assumptions about 
the nature of texts as records. The second part of this chapter deals specifically with 
postmodern insights regarding texts. The interdependence of texts on other texts is 
analyzed. It will become apparent that the definition of texts is much more 
problematic than at first anticipated, that texts are not merely records of facts and that 
a particular definition of texts can influence meaning significantly. (In the conclusion 
of this thesis the parol-evidence rule is revisited and evaluated in the light of new 
theoretical insights). Finally, the conclusions drawn in the preceding sections will be 
summarized. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Which ultimately culminate in intentionalism as we will see in chapter 5. 
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2. Texts as records 
2.1 Introduction 
“…The text has well defined features; unity, totality, authorship, self-referentiality. 
The unity of the book is both material and semantic…”3
 
The quoted passage illustrates the central features of the definition of texts as 
entertained by many in the legal fraternity. In short, texts are seen as complete entities 
that are separate from that which is outside the text.4 The text can be identified and 
fully described. The text has an author and a reader. It has a well-defined beginning 
and end. The text has its place among other texts. Importantly for lawyers, texts can 
be owned and alienated.5 The essential aspect here is the separateness of texts from 
other texts and the singularity of the text.6 This idea is probably best illustrated by 
looking at books, because they are seen as the ultimate example of a text. The Oxford 
Dictionary defines a text as “…1 the main body of a book…2 the original words of an 
author or document as distinct from the…commentary on them…”.7 Book is defined 
as “…1a a written or printed work consisting of pages glued or sewn together…and 
bound in covers…4 (in pl.) a set of records…”.8 Books contain texts. Texts contain 
records. Meanings are captured (recorded) by texts and contained in books. Books are 
there for all to see. One can find books in the library and read them and find the 
meanings recorded in the texts. The text begins where the front cover starts and ends 
with the back cover.9
 
This elaborate description of texts in terms of their separateness and as records serves 
as an introduction into the present understanding of texts in law. These 
understandings of the text are the result of a broader understanding of language and 
the role of the text. The discussion will therefore first focus on the understanding of 
text as a record, separate from other texts; and then the focus will shift to the parol-
                                                 
3 Douzinas et al Post-Modern Jurisprudence. The Law of Text and the Texts of Law (1993) at 45. The 
authors of this work are postmodernists, but they provide the reader with an excellent analysis of the 
modernist perceptions of texts. 
4 Douzinas et al Post-Modern Jurisprudence. The Law of Text and the Texts of Law (1993) at 45. 
5 Douzinas et al Post-Modern Jurisprudence. The Law of Text and the Texts of Law (1993) at 45. 
6 It is often conceded that texts need supplementation in the Derridian sense, but the second step, 
namely the realization of interdependence of the supplemented upon the supplement, is rarely taken. 
7 Allen (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1992) at 1263. 
8 Allen (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1992) at 126. 
9 Douzinas et al Post-Modern Jurisprudence. The Law of Text and the Texts of Law (1993) at 45. 
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evidence rule. The aim is to evaluate the rule against the understanding of text as a 
record to try and find a correlation. If one can assert that the parol-evidence rule is 
based on the assumption that text equals record, then we can assert that the criticism 
of the idea of text as a record is also valid against the parol-evidence rule. The 
interesting question is to what extent a different text-defining strategy will influence 
contractual interpretation and liability. 
 
Let us start by looking at texts as records of history. A record is an account of 
something that happened. The Oxford Dictionary defines a record as …”the state of 
being set down or preserved in writing or some other permanent form…”.10 History is 
defined as a record of important events.11 It is clear that the text itself is not the 
important element when texts are described as records (reflection) of history (past 
events). The text is merely a medium that allows its creator to inscribe or record 
events that are important. The reader of the text must be able to comprehend what the 
author wanted to record. The events are the crucial elements that should be reflected 
by the text.12 The text is portrayed as a “picture” of a past reality. 
 
Most positivists believe that we can separate fact from fiction.13 Texts that are true 
reflections of reality trump texts that provide a skewed picture of reality. Facts are 
objectively known elements that form the substance of the narrative of being.14 These 
facts form the bedrock of the text.15 If the text conforms to the facts, the text is a true 
and an accurate reflection of reality. Truth in this sense is not moral truth but rather 
compatibility with the constituting (bedrock) facts of the genre.16 Constituting facts 
                                                 
10 Allen (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1992) at 1003. 
11 Allen (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1992) at 559. 
12 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 92. Green refers to this view 
of texts as a crude view that seeks to assert the dominance of one text over another. The idea seems to 
be that if one can show that your text is a “truer” reflection of the “facts” one rises above subjectivity 
and one’s contentions will be objective and thus “truer”. 
13 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 93. 
14 History is perceived to be an objectively true story about our lives and the lives that preceded us.  
15 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 92. 
16 For example: Let’s assume Y and X agreed that Y would teach X to farm if X paid Y R50. Text A 
reflects this, while text B reflects this but also that Y has never been on a farm before and can therefore 
not teach X to farm. While text B might be morally truer than text A, text A is the better reflection of 
the contract according to the prevailing theory of contract. The prevailing theory regards a true 
reflection of the intention of the parties (to contract on certain terms) as truer than an account of the 
ability of the parties to fulfil their obligations. It is irrelevant (except where the so-called public interest 
is involved) whether X and Y can in fact do what they promised to do, as long as their intentions are 
accurately reflected by the text.  
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are depicted as the facts that are important when one judges whether a certain text is 
part of a genre.17 A contractual text, according to this view, is a text that reflects the 
elements that constitute a contract. Carr remarks that a good historical account is one 
that takes account of historical facts because “…not all facts about the past are 
historical facts…”.18 But which facts are considered to be “constituting (bedrock) 
facts”? Carr identifies a so-called commonsense approach.19 Firstly, it is the duty of 
the author of the text to be familiar with the constituting facts in the genre he is 
writing a text in. A poet should know what constitutes a poem just like a historian 
should know what constitutes a historical account. This implies that authors must be 
schooled in the “art” of creating texts. Owen Fiss has similar ideas regarding the 
nature of legal interpretation.20 Secondly, the author must decide beforehand what he 
considers to be “constituting” facts in his specific circumstances.21 The constituting 
facts of an historical account will differ from one situation to the next. According to 
this approach, if the author consistently remains within these parameters, his work 
will reflect the constituting facts and will therefore be a “true” record of the event.  
 
The mere fact that one text is a truer version of the constituting facts in itself is not the 
reason for preferring the true version over the distorted version. The reason for 
preferring the true version over the distorted version lies in the positivist preference 
for objective facts over subjectivity or, more specifically, history over literature.22 
Objective facts are perceived to authorize creativity. History is seen as authorizing 
literature.23 Positivists argue that history is linked to the world because of its close 
reflection of reality. Historians, at least in the formalist tradition, do not have any 
poetic license. They must stick to the facts and “preserve” the facts. History as a genre 
is perceived to be closer to reality than literature. Literature builds on the reality that 
history reflects. Positivists contend that literature is a genre where historical 
significance is denied in order to give it aesthetic significance.24  
                                                 
17 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 94; Carr What is History 
(1961) at 10. 
18 Carr What is History (1961) at 10. 
19 Carr What is History (1961) at 10; see also the discussion by Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and 
Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 95. 
20 Fiss “Objectivity and Interpretation” (1982) 34 Stanford LR 739 at 744. 
21 Carr What is History (1961) at 11. 
22 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 96. 
23 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 96. 
24 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 96. 
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 A problem emerges when history, like literature, is based on other texts rather than on 
“facts”.25 The danger is that the distinction between literature and history will 
collapse since both the historical text and the literary text are based on “second hand” 
facts (other texts rather than the real objective facts). This problem is partly the result 
of a lack of access to the “facts” and distance between the reader and the facts. The 
reader must navigate a text that is based on another text. In the field of history this is 
an everyday problem,26 and historians developed techniques of getting around it. The 
first method, presuming that authors share a language with readers, is a linguistic 
search for intention. If the author expressed himself well and the reader is diligent in 
her search for the intention or message of the text, the reader can understand what the 
facts were.27 It is of course assumed that the message (recording) of (in) the text is 
determinate and that the text, if well written, will only carry (transmit) the intended 
message.28
 
The second way of dealing with historical texts based on other texts is called 
contextual reading. The reader is urged to keep the circumstances in mind that were 
prevalent when the text was created.29 The reason for this contextualisation of the text 
is the two possible readings that positivists identify. First there is the present reading. 
The reader must realize that her interpretation of the text is a “present” 
interpretation.30 The “present” reading is a reading in the context that the reader finds 
herself surrounded by in the moment of reading. Secondly, there is a “past” reading. 
                                                 
25 Abrams “The Deconstructive Angel” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts (1991) at 238. 
Positivists readily recognize this danger. Abrams outlines the response of the traditional historian to 
this problem (which he incidentally agrees with). Kellner discusses a similar and related problem, 
namely the existence of gaps in the string or narrative of history. He also proves us with a description 
of the typical positivist response. Interestingly, it is very similar to the methods discussed by Abrams. 
See Kellner Language and Historical Representation (1989) at 28. 
26For example if a historian wants to investigate the everyday life of ancient Egyptians he will be 
confined to studying texts about this era because there are no longer any of the ancient Egyptians 
around. 
27 Abrams “The Deconstructive Angel” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts (1991) at 238; Kellner 
Language and Historical Representation (1989) at 28. Kellner remarks that this specific response often 
takes the form of a blatant disregard for the gap. The historical text is presented as complete. 
28 Abrams “The Deconstructive Angel” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts (1991) at 238. Abrams 
readily admits to this. 
29 Abrams “The Deconstructive Angel” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts (1991) at 238; Kellner 
Language and Historical Representation (1989) at 28. 
30 Abrams “The Deconstructive Angel” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts (1991) at 238; Kellner 
Language and Historical Representation (1989) at 29. Kellner calls this method the fourth method of 
explaining missing evidence. The historian would often admit that her text is not complete, but she 
would aver that a specific investigation of the gap shows that it is unimportant. 
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The author had a certain reading in mind when he created the text. He intended 
readers to read in a certain way. The reader is urged to move from the present reading 
to the past (intended) reading.31 This will establish a close link to the initial creation 
of the text and therefore a close proximity to the constituting facts. In other words, the 
reader will know what the author meant with the text. 
  
The final method of negating the distancing effect of a history based on another text is 
the search for core meaning.32 The positivist historian presents her work in the hope 
that her interpretation will correlate with that of the expert reader and therefore 
confirm the objectivity of the meaning recorded by the text.33 For the interpretation of 
the author and the reader to conform, the text must have a core meaning. The author 
must underscore the core meaning of the text, while the reader must seek out the core 
meaning of the text. If the core meaning correlates with the constituting facts of 
history, then the work will be vindicated as an objective account, but if the bulk of the 
core meaning does not correlate with the constituting facts, the work will be a 
historical fiction.34 Abrams maintains that any historian must be able to claim that, 
whatever else the text may signify, he at least asserts the core meaning.35 The core 
meaning must be sufficiently clear to enable the reader to evaluate the claims made in 
the core meaning. 
 
The preceding discussion highlights the positivist assumptions about texts as records 
of meaning. The distinction that these theorists draw between literature (stories) and 
history (facts) is crucial. Stories may deviate from the facts, but history as a record of 
the facts may not. This distinction highlights the essential assumption that texts are 
records of objective truth. The truth must not only be objective, but also discernable 
                                                 
31 Abrams “The Deconstructive Angel” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts (1991) at 238; Kellner 
Language and Historical Representation (1989) at 29. 
32 Abrams “The Deconstructive Angel” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts (1991) at 238; Abrams 
“Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts (1991) at 
126; Kellner Language and Historical Representation (1989) at 29. Kellner shows that (traditional) 
historians often expressly say that they do not know exactly what happened, but that at least that which 
they asset, did in fact happen. If anything, their version is the truth. They portray their text as a core of 
necessary facts that are beyond doubt. 
33 Abrams “The Deconstructive Angel” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts (1991) at 238. 
34 Abrams “The Deconstructive Angel” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts (1991) at 238. It is 
interesting to note that texts that do not conform to the expert view are labelled “fictions”. Fictions or 
stories are those accounts that seem to skew and distort reality (or at least those views that seem to be 
real). This characterization of different accounts as fictions serves to highlight the assumption that there 
is in fact a reality out there that can be mirrored by texts. 
35 Abrams “The Deconstructive Angel” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts (1991) at 239. 
 118
as such. Only if we can record objective truth in the text, can the text serve as a 
record. Hans Kellner wrote that “…to get the story right is the first duty of the 
historian…”.36  He goes on to state that this assumption rests upon the contentions 
that there is in fact one “story” (reality) and that the industrious and honest historian 
can in fact get the “story” straight. Whether these assumptions can be upheld or not is 
another question altogether. When the parol-evidence rule is discussed it will be 
analyzed in order to ascertain whether the rule is based on the same assumptions. 
 
The second important aspect of texts as records is the perceived separateness of texts. 
Texts are seen as “monuments” of past reality. Abrams begins by saying history must 
be something determinate and determinable.37 He argues that a history is a recording 
of a distinctive event or moment in time. The reader must find the correct (objective) 
interpretation of the text.38 The argument is that “competent readers” already know 
the truth and that the reader must test her reading of the text by having it evaluated 
against that of competent readers.39 The text is comprehended as a completion of facts 
couched in language that can be decoded by applying the rules of language.40 The 
only link between the text and other texts is the language in which it is put. The text 
(message or recording) itself is unique. Texts, especially histories, are not there for 
interpretive creativity; they are there to be understood.41
 
Historians do not approve of language play when it comes to their texts. Kellner 
suggests that “…[h]istorians as a guild feel a corporate anxiety about language and 
about those who study language…”.42 This anxiety flows from three beliefs that 
                                                 
36 Kellner Language and Historical Representation (1989) at vii. Kellner gives a post-structuralist 
account of history and historical writing, but also provides a detailed account of current historical 
writing techniques and assumptions. 
37 Abrams “Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts 
(1991) at 126. 
38 Abrams “Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts 
(1991) at 126. 
39 Abrams “Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts 
(1991) at 126. 
40 Abrams “Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts 
(1991) at 126. 
41 Abrams “Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts 
(1991) at 126. This provides an insight into the positivist historical view of interpretation. The readers 
are urged to stop playing games with the text (it is after all not a novel) and to start finding what the 
author deposited in the text. The text is unique and the voice of someone. Historical texts (texts that are 
supposedly records of events) are most useful when conveying a message. 
42 Kellner Language and Historical Representation (1989) at 12. 
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positivist historians hold regarding texts. The first is that texts form part of a complete 
whole (reality) and that the text is best understood when reference is made to the 
whole.43 The whole is seen as more secure in its meaning than the part. The text refers 
to the whole for justification of the meanings that it supposedly carries (transmits). 
While the historian can get her meanings wrong in the text, the whole cannot be 
wrong. The whole is the bedrock against which the text must be measured. The 
distinction between the whole and the text highlights the “moment” (separateness) of 
the text. If the text were the whole, there would not be a need for reference outside of 
the text; in fact such an “outside” would not exist. However, positivist historians see 
the need to supplement the text (more specifically the meanings resulting from the 
text) by referring to the whole as a justification. For the text to allow supplementation, 
it must be separate from its supplement.44 In others words, in the positivist scheme 
there exists a whole, which provides all historical accounts with justifications and 
then there is a text that records (emulates) a part of the whole. The text is apart from 
the whole in order for it to be justified by the whole.45
 
The second anxiety entertained by traditional historians concerns the unity of texts.46 
The idea is that texts form part of a (perfectly) coherent whole and that it is therefore 
not necessary to study each text separately. At first glance this anxiety seems to 
indicate the opposite of the argument made so far, that positivist historians see texts as 
separate, since it seems to indicate that texts are interdependent. Yet just the opposite 
is true. Texts are not seen as interconnected as texts but connected through their 
message. Texts are perceived to be records of parts of the coherent whole. The value 
of texts in the positivist scheme is not their interpretability, but rather the message that 
they carry (transmit).47 The anxiety is therefore not recognition of the 
interconnectedness of texts but a reaction to the potential effect on the unity of the 
                                                 
43 Kellner Language and Historical Representation (1989) at 12. 
44 Schanck “Understanding Postmodern Thought and its Implications for Statutory Interpretation” 
(1992) 64 Southern California LR 2504 at 2525; Balkin “Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory” 
(1987) 96 Yale LJ at 747. Both these writers provide a good explanation of the so-called “logic of 
supplementation”. 
45 As soon as the logic of supplement is taken to its end, it becomes clear that the text is dependent 
upon the whole, but the whole is also dependent upon the text. If the whole was really “complete”, 
nothing could refer to that whole because any reference would have to be complete as well. The whole 
would be referring to itself. However, most historians do not take this final step. 
46 Kellner Language and Historical Representation (1989) at 13. 
47 Abrams “Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts 
(1991) at 126. 
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message if texts are not read in conformity. This realization or fear (that the message 
will fragment if coherence is not advocated) flows from the understanding that texts 
are separate. 
 
Kellner finally identifies anxiety about closure as a fear expressed by historians when 
confronted by language theorists.48 This anxiety is probably the result of post-
structuralist and neo-pragmatist scepticism about final closure. Neo-pragmatists argue 
that finality in any interpretation will have to be the result of a stable and final 
community of interpreters that cannot exist, while post-structuralists argue that 
meaning is never final and simply the result of some temporary hierarchy of 
preference that is subject to continuous reversal. Historians who believe that texts can 
represent parts of reality distrust this inherently unstable representation of 
interpretation because it does not allow them to test the text against the reality of the 
whole. If texts cannot have a core meaning that can be tested, how can we evaluate 
the ability of the text to replay the events recorded by it? If texts do not have a final 
interpretation, historians fear that the message of the text (and in the positivist scheme 
this is after all the utility of texts) will be lost. The singularity of texts will be lost 
because there is no way to finally decide what the text says. Paul de Man describes 
this as the demise of the “text as a box” metaphor.49 The arrival of the new criticism 
in language led to the demise of the perception that texts are merely boxes containing 
meaning that the reader could unpack.50  The anxiety confirms the assumption that 
texts are separate entities, each with a unique but appraisable message.  
 
Before the investigation can shift to the parol-evidence rule, one last argument for 
texts as separateness must be examined. Ronald Dworkin argues that any theory of 
interpretation must have some way of distinguishing between interpreting and 
changing a work.51 Dworkin requires of the interpreter to limit her interaction with 
the text to finding the meaning of the text and to refrain from changing the text in her 
interpretation. Douzinas identifies the assumption that underlies this thinking as the 
                                                 
48 Kellner Language and Historical Representation (1989) at 13. 
49 De Man ‘Semiology and Rhetoric” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-
Structuralist Criticism (1979) at 123.   
50 De Man ‘Semiology and Rhetoric” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-
Structuralist Criticism (1979) at 123. 
51 Dworkin Law as Interpretation (1983) at 53. See also the discussion by Douzinas et al Post-Modern 
Jurisprudence. The Law of Text and the Texts of Law (1993) at 62. 
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perception that texts are complete before interpretation.52 The point of this rule is to 
delineate the spheres of the author and the interpreter. The reader is cautioned to take 
account of all the words in the text and not to extend or limit her interpretation so that 
the text is “changed” in the process. The interpreter should not disregard words in 
order to find a better interpretation and should not add words to the text that will 
enhance its worth.53 This perception fits in with the positivist belief in the 
separateness of a text. 
 
The idea of texts as records and the separateness of texts is based on the functional 
understanding of language as signs that refer to something in the world.54 
Functionalists understand language to be connected with the world as a referent and 
the sign is perceived to have an external relation to something in reality. Texts are 
collections of signifiers that record the history of the real world and the reader is 
considered able to reconstruct events by understanding the text as a signifier of a 
certain reality.55 The correlation between the signifier and the signified in the real 
world is important. Likewise in text as history, correlation between the historical facts 
and the message that the reader gets out of the text is important. The (traditional) 
historian does not want his text to be creative in any sense; he simply wants to get the 
chronicle straight. The functionalist theory of language provides the historian with 
substantiation for his views on reality and our ability to reflect it. Text as separateness 
revolves around the supposed ability of language to serve as a monument of events. 
Language, like the figure or depiction in a monument, must provide the reader with a 
link (a common denominator) to the unique message of the author. Language, in this 
understanding of texts, is a route marker to the past experience. The functionalist 
language theories provide the separateness theorist with a foundation from which to 
justify texts as carriers of unique messages.  
 
                                                 
52 Douzinas et al Post-Modern Jurisprudence. The Law of Text and the Texts of Law (1993) at 62. 
53 Dworkin Law as Interpretation (1983) at 254; Douzinas et al Post-Modern Jurisprudence. The Law 
of Text and the Texts of Law (1993) at 62. 
54 Douzinas et al Post-Modern Jurisprudence. The Law of Text and the Texts of Law (1993) at 93 
55 This specific understanding of language correlates very closely with the meta-physical realist 
understanding. Meta-physical realists argue that all interpreters inherently believe that language is a 
guide or a representation of a “real world” “out there”. They argue that misunderstandings are the result 
of misrepresentations of reality.  The argument goes that if language reflects the “real” reality, there 
would be no misunderstandings. See also chapter 2 section 3 and Bix Law, Language and Legal 
Determinacy (1993) at 138 and Radin “Reconsidering the Rule of Law” in Schauer (ed) Law and 
Language (1993) at 302. 
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To conclude this part, it is useful to also note that the assumptions regarding the 
nature of texts (that texts are separate from other texts and records of facts) often 
correlate with similar assumptions about the nature of the self and the nature of 
interpretation. Where the abovementioned assumptions about texts are prevalent, one 
will also find a positivist interpretation strategy (interpretation as meaning extraction 
rather than meaning construction) and a liberal description of the self who is 
autonomous and separate from other selves. If perceptions about texts, the nature of 
the self or interpretation changes, it influences assumptions about the other two. 
 
2.2 The parol-evidence rule 
As mentioned earlier, in South African law there is no express strategy for the 
definition of texts. The rules dealing with texts must be analyzed in order to identify 
the underlying assumptions concerning texts. The primary rule dealing with texts in 
contractual practice, the parol-evidence rule, deals with the admissibility of so-called 
extrinsic evidence when a (written) contractual text is interpreted. The rule, as it is 
applied in South Africa, together with the principal academic observations about the 
rule, are discussed in the following paragraphs to relate assumptions inherent in the 
parol-evidence rule to assumptions about texts as records and the separateness of 
texts. 
 
The parol-evidence rule is often (wrongly) called the integration rule because it 
applies to situations where “…the contract has been integrated into a single and 
complete written memorial…”.56 Where a contract has been reduced to a written 
document, disagreements can arise regarding the meaning of the written terms. The 
parol-evidence rule regulates to what extent external evidence will be allowed as 
proof of the meaning of the written text.57 The rule is applied to limit evidence other 
than the written document itself because the document is regarded as the exclusive 
memorial of the transaction, so that no evidence other than the document itself may be 
produced to prove the meaning of the document.58 The theoretical foundation of the 
rule is the belief that parties can in fact fully record their agreement in a text and that 
                                                 
56 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 99. The integration 
rule is but part of the parol-evidence rule. See discussion below. 
57 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 157.  
58 Union Government v Vianini Pipes (Pty) Ltd 1941 AD 43 at 47; Van der Merwe et al Contract: 
General Principles (2003) at 157; Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South 
Africa (2002) at 99. 
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in such an instance external or parol evidence will be irrelevant and misleading.59 Van 
der Merwe et al argue that the rule consists of two parts, namely an integration rule 
and an interpretation rule.60 The integration rule, which is regarded as the parol-
evidence rule proper, involves an enquiry  into the question whether the parties to the 
contract regarded the written document as an exclusive and final memorial of the 
contract terms.61 The interpretation rule regulates the extent and nature of evidence 
that may be produced in order to interpret the terms of a document that was intended 
to be a final memorial of the agreement.62
 
The application of the integration rule precedes that of the interpretation rule. Under 
the integration rule, a document will be regarded as the exclusive memorial of the 
agreement of the parties if the parties intended it to be a final and exclusive record of 
the contract.63 The inquiry whether a document is in fact an exclusive memorial is not 
subject to the integration rule. In other words, it is only once it is established that the 
writing was in fact intended to be a record of the contract that it will be subject to the 
parol-evidence rule.64 Where only part of the contract is committed to writing, only 
the written part will be subject to the parol-evidence rule.65 The integration rule is 
central to the parol-evidence rule. Without the distinction between a recorded contract 
and a non-recorded one, the parol-evidence rule will have no application. The ratio for 
the parol-evidence rule is inseparably linked to the assumption that documents have 
the ability to serve as a record of the agreement. 
 
The inclusion of the interpretation rule in the parol-evidence rule process is an attempt 
to negate the possible adverse consequences of the application of the parol-evidence 
rule. If the integration aspect of the parol-evidence rule is applied strictly, no extrinsic 
                                                 
59 Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 944; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 
(2003) at 158. 
60 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 157. 
61 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 157. 
62 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 157. 
63 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 158. 
64 External evidence will be admitted if it is aimed at disproving that the text is an exclusive record. 
Even in cases where the document states that the text is an exclusive memorial, extrinsic proof can be 
presented to prove that the parties had a contrary intention. Printed standard contracts that have not 
been filled in completely will warrant the introduction of extrinsic evidence regarding the open spaces. 
See Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 159. 
65 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 159.  
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evidence could ever be produced if the text was found to be a full integration.66 Terms 
in the text that were unclear would have to stay unresolved or the court would have to 
impose an interpretation of the text on the parties. The interpretation rule negates this 
difficulty by allowing extrinsic evidence insofar it does not contradict the text.67 If the 
court judges that the evidence, although extrinsic, aims to explain the text rather that 
contradict it, the evidence will be allowed. The distinction between the explanation of 
a text and the contradiction thereof is not clear.68  
 
The discussion of the parol-evidence rule, as applied in South Africa, would not be 
complete without mentioning the main criticisms against the rule. Two streams of 
criticism can be identified. The first focuses on the practical difficulties with the 
application of the parol-evidence rule.69 The rule does not allow for a clear distinction 
between the explanation of words and the contradiction thereof70 resulting in 
confusion about the admissibility of extrinsic evidence. The court is left more or less 
to its own devices when deciding whether the tendered evidence contradicts or 
explains the written document and consequently the very ratio of the rule is 
undermined.71 The aim of the parol-evidence rule is to provide legal certainty and to 
protect the integrity of written documents and without a proper distinction between 
contradiction and explanation, this aim is not met.72
 
The second and more fundamental problem is the theoretical incompatibility of the 
parol-evidence rule and the will theory as applied in South Africa.73 It is accepted that 
                                                 
66 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 100; Van der Merwe 
et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 160. 
67 Spur Steak Ranch Ltd v Mentz 2000 (3) SA 755 (C) at 763; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General 
Principles (2003) at 160; Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) 
at 100. 
68 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161. In some instances extrinsic 
evidence has been allowed to show that a person who was ostensibly a party to the contract, had in fact 
been an agent. (Ten Brink v Motala 2001 (1) SA 1011 (D) at 1013). Extrinsic evidence has been 
allowed to show that an oral agreement existed to the effect that the written contract will not become 
operational if certain circumstances did not occur (Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank CC 1996 (2) SA 15 
(A) at 23). It seems that the court will have to make the distinction in every case. 
69 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161. 
70 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 159-161; Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v 
Mosselbank CC 1996 (2) SA 15 (A) at 23; Ten Brink v Motala 2001 (1) SA 1011 (D) at 1013. 
71 This is evident from the widely divergent decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence. See Van 
der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 160-161 and footnotes 158-169. 
72 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 109. 
73 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161; Cornelius Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 109. 
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the basic principle that influences contractual liability is the subjective intention of the 
parties.74 The parol-evidence rule restricts investigation into the actual subjective 
intentions of the parties by confining the investigation to the written contractual 
text.75 Subjective intention is that intention held by the parties, regardless of the 
expressed intention. The subjective intention will therefore not necessarily coincide 
with the expressed intention. Under the accepted theory of liability, parties can (in 
theory) write down X and mean Y, so long as they understand each other. The parol-
evidence rule eliminates this possibility.76
 
Although many different ways of dealing with these shortcomings have been put 
forward, most are variations of two major responses. The first response to the 
shortcomings of the parol-evidence rule is outright rejection of the rule. Van der 
Merwe et al argue that “…the technical complexity of the rule undermines the 
…certainty it seeks to achieve, and the justification for its continued existence has 
become doubtful…”.77 Many academics, especially intentionalists, argue that the 
impossibility of recourse to the subjective intention under the rule is fatal to its 
continued utility. The South African Law Commission recommended that the parol-
evidence rule be scrapped and that extrinsic evidence be allowed to prove meaning in 
contracts.78 The reason for this response is the perception among theorists that the 
parol-evidence rule hampers the search for the subjective intention (which is after all 
the basis of contractual liability) and, at the same time, that the rule does not reach the 
goals set out for it (in short: legal certainty) because of its technical complexity.79 It 
assists neither a completely subjective intentionalist approach, nor a completely 
objective one. 
 
                                                 
74 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161. 
75 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161. 
76 Remember that the parol-evidence rule is often used in conjunction with the plain-meaning rule. The 
plain-meaning rule holds that effect should be given to the ordinary meaning of the words in the text. If 
the ordinary meaning of X=X then the court must find that X=X even thought the parties might have 
intended X=Y. Also keep in mind that the parties before the court would most likely contest the 
meaning of X and therefore the party asserting that X=X will in all likelihood succeed because of the 
parol-evidence rule (even though both might have subjectively intended X=Y and evidence of this 
exists outside of the text). 
77 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161. 
78 Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts (Project 47) 
1998 at 198 and clause 5 of the draft bill attached to the report; Cornelius Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 109. 
79 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161. 
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The second response calls for the so-called liberalization of the rule.80 Cornelius 
argues that South Africa should adopt the liberal American approach81 according to 
which, no distinction is made between integrated and unintegrated contracts and 
extrinsic evidence would always be relevant, provided it does not change the contract 
and helps with the interpretation thereof.82 The crucial question in this approach is 
whether the text can be reasonably susceptible to the meaning that is suggested by the 
extrinsic evidence.  The question is one of fact. This response to the shortcomings of 
the parol-evidence rule flows from certain beliefs about the nature of contractual 
interpretation. Theorists who advocate this response believe that documents (written 
texts) promote legal certainty and are reliable sources of meaning,83 arguing that 
documents form the backbone of modern day commerce and that the abandonment of 
the parol-evidence rule will effectively destroy commerce as we know it.84  Many 
academics who recommend the second response fear that abolition of the rule will 
lead to a situation where contractual disputes are “your word against mine” affairs.85 
This, they argue, is exactly what parties sought to avoid in the first place when 
resorting to written documents. They recognize the need for reliable documentation 
but, like traditional historians, they claim that the utility of texts lies not in their 
interpretable nature, but in the reliability of documents as records of transactions.86 
The liberalization of the parol-evidence rule would (in their view) allow the 
interpreter to find out exactly what the authors meant with the text. In other words, the 
relaxation of the parol-evidence rule would lead to a more accurate decoding of the 
text, while retaining its evidentiary value.  
 
To ascertain whether the parol-evidence rule is based on the same linguistic 
assumptions that positivist historians make about texts, the rationale of the rule must 
be analyzed critically. The justification for the parol-evidence rule is that it creates 
legal certainty because it regulates the extent to which extrinsic evidence is allowed to 
                                                 
80 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 109. 
81 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 105. 
82 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 102; Pacific Gas & 
Electrical Co v GW Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co Inc 40 ALR 3d 1373 at 1377. 
83 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 108. 
84 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 109. 
85 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 110. 
86 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 109. 
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influence the meaning of the contractual text.87 The argument goes that it is 
economically sound to confine contractual consequences to those stipulated in the 
written text because it allows the parties and others with access to the text to manage 
their affairs in the knowledge that the contractual text will define the legal 
consequences associated with the contract. In this scheme the text can readily reflect 
the state of affairs regarding the contract. The rule affords evidence outside of the text 
a mere explanatory role, restricted to cases where such evidence does not change the 
information in the text. Two elements are crucial to the justification for the rule, 
namely the certainty of the text and the potential influence of extrinsic evidence. 
 
The certainty of texts is central to the parol-evidence rule. The argument goes that 
written contractual texts are easier to prove than oral agreements. The written text is 
seen as tangible evidence of the agreement that warrants special treatment because of 
the presumed certainty of the message in the text. The written text is perceived to be 
more reliable than the oral evidence. While persons can go back on their word, it is 
seemingly not possible with a written and signed text. Had the written text not been 
more certain or reliable than oral evidence, the parol-evidence rule would have had no 
utility. The very existence of the parol-evidence rule turns on this distinction between 
written and unwritten texts. 
 
Extrinsic evidence is defined as evidence from outside the document and also as 
evidence that do not form part of the written record.88 The first part of the definition 
concerns the physical separateness of the text from the extrinsic evidence. The text of 
a so-called exclusive memorial is held to be physically complete and the external 
evidence as physically other than the text. While the text may be a sheaf of papers 
containing writing and the signatures of both parties, the extrinsic evidence could be 
something else, for example a recollection of the utterances by the parties during 
negotiations by a typist who was present during the negotiations. The second part of 
the definition relates to the meaning separateness of the text and the extrinsic 
evidence. The (written) text is said to contain a specific message and the extrinsic 
evidence to contain another message. While the text may reflect X=Y, the extrinsic 
                                                 
87 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 157; Cornelius Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 109. 
88 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 157; Cornelius Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 99. 
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evidence could conversely reflect X=T. Both parts of the definition of extrinsic 
evidence are crucial to the justification of the parol-evidence rule. The physical 
separateness of the written text and the extrinsic evidence makes it possible to identify 
a textual reality and an external reality. At the same time, the meaning separateness of 
the text and the extrinsic evidence makes it possible to observe the influence of 
external evidence on the text. If the text cannot be said to have an independent 
meaning (that can be influenced), potential changes to that meaning cannot be 
measured and as a result the parol-evidence rule (that attempts to control this change) 
would be meaningless. 
 
Now that it has been established that the certainty of texts and the distinction between 
texts and extrinsic evidence stand central to the parol-evidence rule, the correlation 
between texts as portrayed under the parol-evidence rule and the definition of texts by 
conventional historians can be examined. Traditional historians contend that texts are 
records of parts of larger reality and texts are separate from this larger reality. Good 
texts are ones that reflect the constituting facts of their genre in their core meanings so 
that the text can both conform to its genre and be sufficiently distinct to allow the 
reader to evaluate the truth of the text. A contractual text that conforms to this 
(historical positivist) description is one that reflects the agreements reached between 
the parties (reflecting the facts); shows that the agreement conforms to the 
requirements for a binding contract (corresponding with the constituting facts of the 
genre); and reflects both these things sufficiently clearly so that the reader can 
determine the extent of the contract (evaluate the truth of the text). The requirements 
for an ideal text under the parol-evidence rule conform exactly to this. The type of 
text that the parol-evidence rule aims to protect is not the unclear text but the 
unambiguous text that might be complicated by extrinsic evidence. 
 
Once it has been established that the general description of the parol-evidence rule 
and the subsequent understanding of texts conform to the positivist historical 
description of texts, it becomes necessary to relate general criticism on the parol-
evidence rule to texts as records and separateness. The first criticism raised against the 
parol-evidence rule is that it is a practical failure.89 It is often held that the parol-
                                                 
89 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161. 
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evidence rule cannot adequately distinguish between actions aimed at changing the 
text and actions that help with the interpretation of the text.90 This involves 
recognition that texts are not always complete and that information outside of the 
physical text can have an influence on the meaning of the text. However, this criticism 
seldom leads to a call for abandonment of the parol-evidence rule, since this line of 
argumentation is usually the precursor to a call for the liberalization of the parol-
evidence rule.91 Critics agree with the rationale of the rule, but they argue that the rule 
(as it is presently applied) fails to protect the sanctity of the written document.92 It is 
clear that these critics are not so much concerned with the apparently faulty 
conception of texts as with the need to establish legal certainty. This type of criticism 
correlates with the Dworkinian contention that interpreters need to distinguish 
between the interpretation and altering of a text.93 Finally, this type of criticism only 
makes sense in a theoretical framework where texts are seen as records that are 
separate from other texts. If the interpretive turn is embraced, the distinction between 
changing and interpreting falls away. All meaning becomes interpretive in nature.94 
This is clearly not the theoretical position of the critics of the practical effect of the 
parol-evidence rule. 
 
The second criticism of the parol-evidence rule is that the rule is theoretically 
incompatible with the will theory of contractual liability.95 This is an intentionalist 
criticism. Intentionalists normally believe that the intention of the author of the text as 
portrayed by the text is of paramount importance, but with the parol-evidence rule the 
problem is that the text is often inadequate. This criticism is based on the belief that 
                                                 
90 It is interesting to note that the criticism is called “practical”. The perception seems to be that the 
problem is associated with specific cases where it is difficult to distinguish between the interpretation 
and alteration of a meaning rather than problems surrounding the theoretical basis of the rule. Many 
theorists believe that the problem can be solved, without revising theoretical understanding surrounding 
texts, by creating a standard that can adequately distinguish interpretation and change. I will argue that 
the “practical” problems with the rule are not “practical” at all, but the result of theoretical 
misconceptions surrounding language in general and specifically texts. 
91 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161; Cornelius Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 100-102. 
92 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 108. 
93 Dworkin Law as Interpretation (1983) at 53. See also the discussion by Douzinas et al Post-Modern 
Jurisprudence. The Law of Text and the Texts of Law (1993) at 62. 
94 Schanck “Understanding Postmodern Thought and its Implications for Statutory Interpretation” 
(1992) 64 Southern California LR 2504 at 2570. See chapter 2 sections 6 and 7 for discussions around 
the nature of language and interpretation. 
95 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161; Cornelius Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 100. 
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texts are records (otherwise the link between the intention of the author and the text 
cannot exist), but that extrinsic evidence is sometimes required to prove the intention 
of the author. Most argue that the problem is not that the text does not reflect the 
intention of the authors, only that the parol-evidence rule restricts access to evidence 
that might prove a meaning in the text as an intended one.96 Put differently, because 
of the operation of the parol-evidence rule it is difficult to prove which of the 
meanings reflected by the text were intended and which ones not. In this sense, 
intentionalist criticism against the parol-evidence rule is also “practical” criticism. 
Cornelius, for example, argues that the relaxation (liberalization) of the parol-
evidence rule will preserve the high evidentiary value of the written text, while also 
allowing for an investigation into the actual subjective intention of the parties.97 
However, even this limited relaxation of the parol-evidence rule begins to undermine 
the idea of texts as records and separateness. The moment extrinsic evidence is 
allowed in the interpretation process of a written text, the interpreter is in fact 
acknowledging that the text is not a complete record of meanings and that the text is 
not completely separate from other texts. 
 
The liberalization of the parol-evidence rule calls for the rejection of the 
integration/non-integration distinction in favour of a casuistic evaluation of the effect 
of extrinsic evidence. As was mentioned in the previous paragraph, relaxation of the 
parol-evidence rule is a de facto acknowledgement of the failure of the written text to 
record and set apart the intention of the author. Like the historian’s difficulty in 
having her text reflect reality when she only has access to second hand facts, the 
intentionalist is left with a text that is a representation of the subjective intention of 
the parties rather than the subjective intention itself. This intentionalist response 
(liberalization of the parol-evidence rule) corresponds with the second response by 
historians when faced with a similar dilemma: Demanding access to extrinsic 
evidence that is perceived to be closer to reality than the text; calling for a contextual 
reading of the text. The extrinsic evidence provides the context and it is argued that its 
inclusion will connect the text with the meanings intended by the authors.98
                                                 
96 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 103 and also 
footnotes 50-58. 
97 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 103. 
98 Remember that liberalization theorists are anxious about the retention of documents as reliable 
evidence and as a result they are careful to formulate their response as such. They argue that the plain 
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 There is also a correlation between the search for core meaning in historical practice 
and the liberalization critique of the parol-evidence rule. Traditional historians argue 
that whatever the linguistic (meaning) possibilities a text may have, its core meaning 
must correlate with the facts as put forward by expert readers.99 South African pro-
liberalization theorists claim that the core of any contract is the subjective intention of 
the parties and that this core must be sought out above all else.100 They maintain that 
resorting to extrinsic evidence is justified by the centrality of subjective intention to 
the formulation of the performance due by each party, and that the text does not 
always reflect this subjective intention. The theoretical ramifications for the definition 
of texts are immense. The text is perceived to hold not only the recorded (and desired) 
meaning, but also undesirable possibilities that can potentially increase the 
involvement of the interpreter in the definition of texts. The interpreter is asked to 
judge which meanings are the intended ones and which not. Because of this choice, 
the text is no longer something that exists prior to interpretation. If the text does not 
exist prior to the interpretation, the text cannot be a record because the contents are 
only decided during interpretation. 
 
Finally, before introducing the criticism against texts as records and separateness, the 
theoretical understanding regarding text that underpins proposed abolition of the 
parol-evidence rule must be discussed. The proposal to abolish the rule is based on the 
two general criticisms of the parol-evidence rule namely theoretical incompatibility of 
the rule and the will theory, and practical difficulties surrounding the application of 
the rule.101 Proponents of abolition of the rule remind policy makers (legislatures, 
courts) that the rule places a normative restriction on certain types of contract and that 
this seems to infringe on the basis of South African contractual liability.102 This 
                                                                                                                                            
meanings (see chapter 2 section 3) fortify the meaning of texts, and that the evidentiary burden on 
parties claiming meanings other than the plain ones is daunting. See Cornelius Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 103. 
99 Abrams “The Deconstructive Angel” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts (1991) at 238; Abrams 
“Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts (1991) at 
126; Kellner Language and Historical Representation (1989) at 29. 
100 The South African situation must be distinguished from the American one because the American 
law of contract is based on consideration while South African contracts are based on subjective 
intention. 
101 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161; Cornelius Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 109-110. 
102 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161. 
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theoretical insight, together with the practical difficulties experienced in 
implementing the rule, are advanced as reason enough for discontinuing the parol-
evidence rule. Important for the definition of texts, while the division between written 
texts and other texts is maintained, contracts are depicted as uniformly dependent 
upon texts.103 In other words, all contracts are texts. 
 
The traditional historical understanding of texts, as held by proponents of the parol-
evidence rule as it stands, together with the major criticisms, on the rule are 
essentially modernist. The rule is aimed at providing a catch-all regulation of the 
interpretation of written contracts to provide legal certainty, while the criticism 
against it is aimed at its lack of practical utility and theoretical incompatibility with 
the will theory. The belief that one can in fact have legal certainty also rests upon the 
assumptions that individuals are autonomous and thus best served by a society where 
legal certainty makes choice and consequence predictable and that interpretation 
involves meaning extraction (texts are presumed to always yield the same meaning, at 
least on a basic level).  
 
The postmodern understanding of texts goes against all the assumptions made so far. 
Texts are depicted as interpretable in the strong sense rather than records and texts are 
described as interdependent (as texts not just messages) rather that apart.    
 
3. Postmodern texts (or definition of texts) 
3.1 Introduction 
This part of the chapter starts out with an (essentially modernist) Marxist description 
of texts, which is useful as a link between the traditional historical definition and 
postmodern understandings of texts. The Marxist definition is radically different from 
the traditional historical understanding of texts, in that the latter is based on a 
presumed common knowledge of texts while the former looks for social facts as a 
                                                 
103 The argument that the parol-evidence rule is a unjustified normative restriction on certain types of 
contract is based on the belief that on a general level and as a point of departure, all contracts are the 
same and should be treated the same. This the first step in the direction of a recognition that all texts 
are in fact similar and as far as their interpretability is concerned, all texts, written or otherwise, are 
subject to the same conditions.  
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basis for definition of texts.104 Marxism serves as a good point of departure as it 
provides links with later postmodern thought. After the Marxist definition has been 
discussed the focus will shift to the postmodern understandings of textual 
interconnection and the interpretability of textual meanings. These concepts are in 
direct conflict with the traditional historical definition of texts. The relationship 
between oral and written texts, which is central to the parol-evidence rule, is also 
analysed. The aim of this section is to give an overview of developments regarding 
the definition of texts and the possible implications for contractual interpretation. 
 
Marxist literary criticism is one of the most coherent and substantial developments of 
the twentieth century literary genre.105 While early Marxism advanced preordained 
economic class division as the driving force behind the definition of texts, later 
developments take into account more diverse political influences originating from the 
economic divisions in society.106 According to the Marxist understanding, history is 
defined by political and institutional contexts that are themselves defined by the 
economic foundation of society.107 In other words, what we see as a text will largely 
depend upon our station in life and, according to this theory, there will be a 
correlation between the economic power inherent in an institution and its influence on 
the definition of texts.108 Marxists regard terms like “literature” and “aesthetics” with 
distrust and treat these as products of existing economic power relations.109 This line 
of thinking challenges the divide between “literature” and “history” and also between 
“creativity” and “fact”. Marxist theory questions whether interpreters can distinguish, 
in the metaphysical way claimed by traditional historians, between a story and a 
history. It is argued that the distinction is not natural at all, but subject to the 
                                                 
104 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 124. I will not make an 
attempt do comprehensively discuss Marxism but will merely briefly describe what is commonly 
viewed underlying ideas of the Marxist literary theory. 
105 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 124. 
106 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 124. 
107 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 124. 
108 A court, for example, is subject to the economic realities in the society over which it presides. The 
meanings emanating from the court will, in the Marxist frame of thinking, show a close relation with 
the economic possibilities open to the court. Courts will, for example, be more likely to give a heavy 
monetarily penalty against a big company in a first world country where the effect of the judgement 
will have less economic impact, than in a third world country where the economic impact, on 
employment for example, will be substantial.  
109 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 125. 
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economic ideology of the ruling class.110 Accordingly, legal texts will be the texts that 
seem legal because of the existing economic hierarchy. 
 
Marxist theory introduces a role for the other in the definition of texts.111 Texts are by 
definition created in relationship with something other than the text. Marxists argue 
that the text is the product of an ideology.112 The text is portrayed as a lack of 
meanings rather than a compilation of meanings.113 In the Marxist context, a text will 
not only be a reflection of the prevailing material dispensation, but also a lack of 
reflection of the non-dominant ideology. In a system where X is economically 
dominant and Y is not, the text will reflect not only the ideology of X but also not 
reflect the ideology of Y. Y would be conspicuous in its absence. This view of text is 
contrasted with the traditional historical view, since text does not have a purely 
referential value, but includes, by definition, something other than the signified. It 
includes the non-signified, and by implication the functionalist view of language 
becomes increasingly difficult to justify. 
 
Ideology is defined as “…something subjective that slips into discourse and pretends 
to describe reality…”.114 Marxists often use the concept of ideology in opposition to 
science.115 Ideology is different from science in the sense that ideology is a perception 
of reality, while science claims access to reality itself. History based on ideology is 
exactly what traditional historians want to avoid when they justify their histories as 
objectively true. Yet, Marxists claim that we cannot escape ideology. The economic 
reality of our being forces ideology upon us, and even claims to objectivity by 
traditional historians are based on ideology, namely belief about the desirability of 
objectively certifiable truth (in the Marxist scheme this is an effect of the material 
dispensation and this dispensation reproduces itself through ideology). 
 
While Marxism provides us with interesting insights into the definition of texts, it is 
still not a postmodern theory of texts, but rather an example of very advanced 
                                                 
110 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 125 and 127. 
111 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 131; Macherey A Theory of 
Literary Production (1978) at 154-155. 
112 Macherey A Theory of Literary Production (1978) at 154-15. 
113 Macherey A Theory of Literary Production (1978) at 154-15. 
114 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 132. 
115 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 132. 
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modernist analysis of texts. The aim of the Marxist analysis, like the positivist 
theories, is to provide a complete and coherent theory of texts. Marxist literary theory 
is similar to structuralism (the precursor to post-structuralism, a postmodern language 
theory),116 while postmodernism is a reaction against ideas like objective perception 
(Archimedes points) and the possibility of complete knowledge. In this respect, the 
following analysis will deviate from the modernist scheme. The following analysis 
will not seek to privilege one description of text but aims to give a glimpse into the 
complexity of definition of texts. 
 
Postmodern historians are often called “new historians”.117 New historians do not 
view historical texts as the episodes of a homogeneous whole history, but deny the 
existence of objective truth, coherence and unity between the meanings of texts.118 In 
its place they propose that history is contingent, unstable and interpretable. 
Postmodernists argue that history and literature are not really in binary opposition to 
each other and that both are subject to the same linguistic conditions. Two 
postmodern claims are of special importance: The interpretability of texts and the 
interconnectedness of texts. The ideas are related, but will be discussed separately. 
Before these ideas are discussed, new historicism will be examined briefly.  
 
Michel Foucault sees history as a power struggle that binds the disparate forces of 
society together.119 Because history is about perspective, and dominant history is 
often about dominant perspective, many contrasting views meet in history.120 While 
the dominant view might prevail for a time, other views are constantly competing 
with it. Traditional historians, for example, try to erase any link between their 
preferences and a certain time and hegemony121 because histories are seen as records 
of reality and objectivity is perceived to be obtainable. On the other hand, postmodern 
historians often expressly state their theoretical grounding and beliefs. History is the 
place where the positivist meets the postmodernist. The important implication of this 
insight is that definition of texts is relatively arbitrary. The definition of a historical 
                                                 
116 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 131. 
117 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 112. 
118 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 112. 
119 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 117. 
120 Rainbow Foucault: The Foucault Reader (1986) at 90. 
121 Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 117; Rainbow Foucault: The 
Foucault Reader (1986) at 90. 
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text will depend on the dominant hegemony in society and, importantly, this 
characterization of a text is not stable.122 As soon as power relations shift, the 
definition of texts will shift with it. 
 
For Foucault, history is without constants.123 He argues that nothing can provide 
human beings with a stable platform from which the self and the other can be 
recognized and fully understood.124 There is no way of discovering (or in fact 
rediscovering) the past in an objective way.125 Foucault asks that we discard the 
perception that the past is a patient and continuous development.126 In its place he 
proposes a history that is fragmented and continually reassessed in the light of itself. 
History is something that challenges ─ not represents ─ meaning. Foucault 
proclaimed that “…knowledge is not made for understanding: it is made for 
cutting...”.127 Historical perspective is therefore at the same time interpretive and 
changing. With these Foucauldian insights regarding history in mind, the focus can 
shift to the discussion of the interpretability of the message and the 
interconnectedness of texts. 
 
Roland Barthes separates texts from works.128 For Barthes, this separation is the result 
of late modern and postmodern thought,129 where focus shifted from author-, reader- 
and critic-defined works to interpretation-bound texts. The first insight is that works 
are not physically separate from the texts, but rather while the work is something 
                                                 
122 Douzinas et al Post-Modern Jurisprudence. The Law of Text and the Texts of Law (1993) at 106. 
123 Rainbow Foucault: The Foucault Reader (1986) at 87-88; Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and 
Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 118. 
124 Rainbow Foucault: The Foucault Reader (1986) at 87-88; Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and 
Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 118. Foucault’s historical theory links up strongly with his theories on 
individuality. Many of the insights around the contingency of history flow out of a understanding of the 
self as a fragmented and infinitely complex structure. 
125 The traditional ratio of the parol-evidence is that is protects the text, as a path to the discovery of the 
facts of the contract.  It is understood that the interpretation of the text is a rediscovery of the meanings 
(facts) that existed at the conclusion of the contract. Foucault challenges this understanding of texts and 
proposes that texts serve a radically different purpose. 
126 Rainbow Foucault: The Foucault Reader (1986) at 87-88; Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and 
Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 118; Douzinas et al Post-Modern Jurisprudence. The Law of Text and 
the Texts of Law (1993) at 106. 
127 Rainbow Foucault: The Foucault Reader (1986) at 88.  
128 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 74. 
129 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 74. 
 137
concrete (occupying book space for example), the text is a methodological field.130 
While the work can be held in hand, the text only exists in discourse. The implication 
of this separation is that the work stops where the book covers stop, but the text is 
never completely defined.131 There will always be meanings (definitions) outside of 
the present meaning of the text. Horizons rather than boundaries characterize the 
text.132 Accordingly, the end of one meaning is the start of another. The work, on the 
other hand, has boundaries. It has a start and a well-defined end. In this sense, a 
contractual script under the parol-evidence rule is a work rather than a text.133
 
The second point made by Barthes is that the relationship between the work and the 
sign is different from the one between the text and the sign.134 The relationship 
between the work and the sign depends upon two contingencies. If the signified is 
obvious, the work becomes a scientific experience.135 In this case the work is said to 
reflect its message.136 In the second scenario, the signified is secret or unknown. In 
this case the work is subject to an interpretive process.137 The idea is that the signified 
can eventually be identified or found. Conversely, the text practices infinite deferral 
of the signified.138 Barthes notes that the signifier in a text is not the first step toward 
                                                 
130 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 74 
131 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 75. 
132 Horizons might seem like boundaries, but they connect the end of vision with what is beyond. 
Likewise, an interpretation of a text does not end the utility of the text, but rather provides a connection 
with what is not yet said. As Foucault puts it “…’Effective history… will not allow itself to be 
transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending. It will uproot its traditional 
foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity…”. See Rainbow Foucault: The Foucault 
Reader (1986) at 88; Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 118 
133 The parol-evidence rule aims to protect the written document as a memorial of the contract because 
of its supposed certainty. This ratio is compatible with the description of a work but not with that of the 
text. An interpretable and contingent instrument is not what the rule aims to protect. See Cornelius 
Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 108. 
134 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 74. 
135 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 75. 
136 This is the ideal written record and the type of work the parol-evidence rule aims to protect.   
137 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 75-76. Marxist theories of literature are an example of a theory that describes 
documents in this way. While Marxists reject the contention that works merely reflect a objective 
reality, they contend that the meanings of documents reflect of ideological hierarchies. If the correct 
(just) ideology can be found, documents could reflect correct (just) meanings.  
138 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 76. 
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a meaning (as is the case with a work), but rather the result (aftermath) of meaning.139 
The signifiers in a text refer to an infinite amount of possible meanings. The text is 
part of language and, like language, without closure.140 While the work is symbolic of 
something (after the connection is made, the symbolism ceases), the text is symbolic 
of symbolism.141 The contractual document or record necessitating the parol-evidence 
rule is one that seems to provide closure in the inquiry regarding the contents of the 
contract.142 In this sense the parol-evidence rule aims to protect a work rather than a 
text. 
 
Finally, Barthes distinguishes work and text on account of the role of description.143 
The work is caught up in a process of filiation.144 The work consists and develops out 
of a determination by the outside world,145 the fitting in of the work among other 
works146 and finally the allocation of the work to its author.147 The whole process is 
aimed at delineating the work and finding its place among other works.148 On the 
other hand, a textual meaning is a combinatorial effect.149 The author of the text is 
                                                 
139 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 76. 
140 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 76. 
141 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 76. This is a very interesting and powerful metaphor. The work is like a route-
marker that loses its utility as soon as the traveller reaches her destination. The text, on the other hand, 
is more like a photograph of a route-marker. Its utility lies in not in the representation of a scene, but 
rather in the signification of memories. Its starts a train of thought or reminisce. The depiction in the 
photo is the catalyst of memories, but not memories itself. Barthes says “…The Text is plural. It does 
not mean just that i(t) (sic) has several meanings, but rather that it achieves plurality of meaning, an 
irreducible plurality…”.  
142 The ratio of the rule is that it protects the determinate meanings in the document, as by so doing, 
speeds up the investigation. The rule is not aimed at protecting documents that do not provide final 
closure. See Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 108 
143 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 78. 
144 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 78. Filiation is described in the Oxford dictionary as the act of being parented. See 
Allen (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1992) at 436. The author, reader and 
critic make the work. 
145 Under the parol-evidence rule this would be done with the integration rule. The crucial question 
would be is the text was meant to be a representation of the agreement. 
146 This would also be done with the integration rule, but the question would now be if the text were 
meant to be a complete representation of the agreement.  
147 The interpretation rule would facilitate this part of the filiation. The question is what exactly the 
authors intended with the work. 
148 See the comments about the unity of texts in Kellner Language and Historical Representation 
(1989) at 13. 
149 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 78. The “combinatorial” is a mathematical term depicting the relation of an answer 
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irreversibly alienated from the text and can only return as a guest.150 The text is no 
longer demarcated by its author, its place among other texts, or by its critics. The text, 
in a paradoxical way, resists demarcation because of the attempted demarcations.151 
The relation between the reader and the text, for example, ensures that the 
demarcation by the reader is never final. There can always be another reader and a 
different reading.152 The application of the parol-evidence rule depends upon a 
demarcation of the contract. Again, the parol-evidence rule reflects contracts as works 
rather than texts. 
 
The question now arises if language use can result in works. Can works exist? This 
question is central to the positivist line of reasoning that texts can be records. If 
language can be used in works, the positivist claim can survive. Jacques Derrida 
defines language as a metaphorical identification of the non-identical.153 Language 
relies on the repeated use of signs that are not the signified, but call into the 
imagination the signified. Language is not the subject but a representation of the 
subject. It identifies the subject as something other than the sign but at the same time 
represented (in the sense of a re presentation, an imitation of the original) by it. Like a 
metaphor, language is used to call into the imagination a subject that is similar to the 
image of the metaphor but separate from it. Effective communication depends upon 
the successful connection of language with the intended message. This in itself is not 
problematic to the theory of texts as records, if it can still be proven that thought and 
language are separate.154 Even if language were a metaphor, it would only be a 
                                                                                                                                            
to combinations of other items. See Allen (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 
(1992) at 224. 
150 Barthes “From Work to Text” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) at 78. The relation of the author and text will be discussed in more detail in the 
chapter 5. 
151 The text will only be finally demarcated once the author stops writing, the reader stops reading and 
the critic stops criticising. The text can only be finally demarcated once it is totally ignored.  
152 The courts of 1968 regarded the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 as valid legislation, but presently, 
under the Constitution Act 108 of 1996, a similar act will not be valid legislation. The Group Areas Act 
36 of 1966 is now regarded as an example of Apartheid legislation. In future different periods within 
Apartheid might be identified, which will change the classification of the Act once again. 
153 Derrida “The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy before Linguistics” in Harari (ed) Textual 
Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism (1979) at 83. He remarks “…Language has 
within it, however, an illogical element, the metaphor. Its principal force brings about an identification 
of the nonidentical (sic); it is thus an operation of the imagination. It is on this that the existence of 
concepts, forms, etc., rests…”. 
154 It does however complicate the interpretation process. The language is no longer, strictly speaking, a 
reflection of the intended message. The interpreter is required to be familiar with the code of the 
metaphor. She must be able to decipher the metaphor. 
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connection between thoughts. The author would think, express that thought in 
language (the metaphor) and the reader would read the language (the metaphor), 
translate the language into thought and consequently, the language served as a record. 
It served as a container for the thoughts of the author.  
 
However, Derrida, investigates the nature of this distinction between thought and 
language,155 and convincingly argues that language can never be a container for 
thought and thought can never be outside of language.156 In order to fashion 
categories like thought and language, one has to step outside of thought and 
language.157 A transcending perspective is necessary, but Derrida reminds us that the 
categories (language and thought) that we draw always involve both language and 
thought, and the distinction between language and thought depends upon the relation 
between the two entities.158 Language and thought, on which the idea of a work (in 
the sense used by Barthes) hinges, have a complex relationship of supplement. While 
the two entities are discernible, there is a strong referential relationship between 
language and thought. Thought is part of language and language is part of thought, 
since we speak thoughts and we think in language. It is not possible to classify 
thought and language without using both concepts. When classifying language or 
thought, one either thinks of language or speaks (writes) of thought. The distinction is 
not transcendental, but practical. The distance between the work and the thought 
disappears as the thought is necessary to produce the language (text) and, at the same 
time, language is necessary to produce a thought. Texts cannot be records because 
thought cannot be separated from language and vice versa.  
 
Further problems with the idea of texts as records are encountered when the reader is 
expected to extract the recorded message from the text or work. This, like all meaning 
                                                 
155 Derrida “The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy before Linguistics” in Harari (ed) Textual 
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problems, is an interpretation problem.159 The aim of any interpretation is to achieve 
coherent meaning. Any interpreter is always situated within an interpretive 
community that shapes his or her beliefs and prejudices.160  Interpretation takes place 
within these beliefs and prejudices. This realization in itself is fatal to the idea of texts 
as records, because the meaning of the text will not be determined solely by the text. 
The meaning of the record is no longer a reflection, but a construction. However, even 
more important for the process of definition of texts, interpretation involves the 
renunciation and disregarding of meanings. The record (or the code of the record) is 
so complex in its possibilities that it can never be completely settled.161 The possible 
meanings in a text can never be exhausted. Any coherent meaning involves the 
rejection of other possible meanings. This rejection takes place according to the 
norms of the interpretive community that the interpreter belongs to. Consequently, the 
demarcation of the text (and of course the meanings) is up to the interpreter and not 
the author. 
 
While the abovementioned is a criticism of texts as records, it is also a criticism of 
texts as separateness. The interpretability of language poses an insurmountable 
obstacle to the idea of texts as separateness. Paul de Man examined the relationship 
between a sign and a signified and he recognizes that the sign and its relation to the 
signified rely upon a third element, namely an interpreter.162 The relationship between 
the signified and the sign is not strictly referential; rather, meaning is derived from the 
sign by a process of interpretation. The meaning itself is not a decoding of the sign, 
but further signs ad infinitum.163 The text by itself cannot signify anything. What sets 
one text apart from another is not the interpretation (in the sense of a decoding), nor 
its composition, but an interpretation. While the traditional perception is that the 
message of texts is unique and language is the sole common denominator between 
                                                 
159 This chapter will not contain a comprehensive discussion on interpretation, because although crucial 
to the argument made so far, the major theoretical positions on interpretation has already been set out 
in the chapter 2. 
160 Fish “Is There a Text in This Class” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class: The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (1980) at 318; Fish “Fish vs Fiss” in Fish Doing What Comes Naturally: 
Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 126. 
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interpretation. See also De Man ‘Semiology and Rhetoric” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  
Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism (1979) at 122. 
162 De Man ‘Semiology and Rhetoric” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-
Structuralist Criticism (1979) at 126. 
163 De Man ‘Semiology and Rhetoric” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-
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texts, 164 new insights lead us to believe that texts are not separate per se, but simply 
read that way. One might think that the parol-evidence rule protects the sanctity of 
written documents, but in fact the text does not exist before it is “protected”.165 The 
process of applying the parol-evidence rule defines the text.166  
 
From the preceding the following can be gleaned: Contracts are texts rather than 
works because (1) thought cannot be adequately separated from language; (2) 
interpreters create meaning by “cutting”; and (3) the extent of contracts is determined 
after interpretation (by the meaning, not the contractual text). Consequently, 
contractual texts are never completely defined; that which is signified by the text is 
infinitely deferred and textual meaning is combinatorial in nature. What remains to be 
seen is what the implications of this analysis are for the parol-evidence rule. 
 
3.2 From parol evidence to just definition 
After the traditional and the postmodern theories of text have been discussed, the 
question arises what the ideal definition of contractual texts will look like and what 
the implications will be for the interpretation of contracts. Despite the theoretical 
criticism against the positivist description of texts, it still appears to provide at least a 
semblance of certainty. Parties believe that interpreters will furnish the contract with 
the consequences that they intended the contract to have, and they believe that written 
documents can reflect these intended consequences. Most people see texts as records 
and as separateness. Any new notion of texts must be workable in practice and it must 
preserve contracts as an instrument of exchange.  
 
Postmodern theory shows that any total description of texts will inevitably become a 
new hierarchy that is vulnerable to the same exceptions raised against the positivist 
model. Any theory of texts must therefore be sufficiently flexible to entertain texts 
                                                 
164 Abrams “Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History” in Fischer (ed) Doing Things with Texts 
(1991) at 126. 
165 Fish “The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence” in Norrie (ed) Closure or Critique: New 
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that do not exactly fit the description provided by the descriptive model. Finally, as 
Paul Cilliers reminds us, any description must be responsible,167 the best we can do. 
The following is an attempt at a practically workable but theoretically correct method 
of definition of texts. It is short and incomplete since a comprehensive model of 
definition of texts is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
In his groundbreaking essay “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’”, 
Derrida examined the relationship between law and justice.168 In the course of his 
argument, Derrida described the law as general and justice as particular.169 A 
completely just interpretation is one that recognizes the unique in the text as 
unique.170 The law, on the other hand, constantly relates the text to other texts, 
inquiring what is shared with others. It imposes a reading on the text. Both these 
tendencies are present when a contract is interpreted.171 When one looks at these two 
tendencies, an irreconcilable tension is apparent between the unique in the text as a 
created text and universality of the enforceability of the text as a law text.172 We want 
to hear exactly what the parties wanted to say, but at the same time we want to know 
what can be enforced. The definition of the text as a contractual text severs some of 
the unique in the text from the contractual text, because not all meanings are 
contractually relevant. The definition of a contractual text, therefore, happens at the 
moment when the interpreter interprets the contract as such. The interpretation is both 
a constituting and a demarcating act. There is no guarantee that the intended 
consequences will be attached to the contract.173
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relationship. 
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intention and its influence on the outcome of interpretation. 
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 This insight leaves courts with an opportunity to “find” the most just contract that 
they can. The definition of the contract is up to them, and there is no escape from the 
responsibility that this implies.174 No person can ever be said to be responsible simply 
because he agreed to the terms of a contract, since the contractual text is made when it 
is read, not when it is written. It is the responsibility of the contractual interpreter to 
keep the consequences of his reading in mind. He must read the text in a way that will 
be just and a way that is legally enforceable. He must do the impossible. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter started out with a discussion of the present, essentially positivist, 
understandings of the nature of texts. Texts are regarded as records that are separate 
from other texts. Legal texts are classified as historical texts and distinguished from 
fictional texts. Consequently, the aim of defining texts is to ascertain exactly what 
history a text purports to record. Maintaining a distinction between fact and fiction 
requires a system where reality can serve as an objective standard against which the 
accuracy of the text can be measured. In such a system, reality must be singular and 
objectively ascertainable. In positivist historical theory, reality is represented by the 
constituting facts of every genre. These facts are taken to be neutral, objective and 
“true”. For a text to fit into the genre (such as being a historical text), it must reflect 
these facts. The text serves as a medium through which these facts are communicated 
and, as a result, the text loses its utility (other than a preserving function) once it is 
read. Where the text is not sufficiently clear, the interpreter is authorized to resort to 
intentionalism (what did the author want to say?), contextualism (in what context was 
the text created?) and finding the core meaning of the text (an objective appraisal of 
the meaning of the text). In short, meaning (or the “facts”) exists before the text and 
the text is a record of (the) meaning. 
 
Texts are also portrayed as separate from other texts. Because texts are regarded as 
records of facts, they are seen to represent a “moment” or “incident” in time. Texts 
are portrayed as a monument to a factual situation. Positivists see texts as separate 
entities, connected only by their reference to reality. The reality serves as a 
                                                 
174 This is obviously not a final definition, but is often the end of the road for the parties. The legal 
decision signals the end of the discussion for them and the start of “payment”.  
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justification for texts since the reader can verify the truth of the text by examining its 
correlation with (the) reality. Also, although texts are connected through their 
messages, the texts themselves are distinguished from each other because (in 
positivist history) reading of texts must highlight the unique message of each text. 
 
 The prevailing view in the law of contract is that texts are essentially records of the 
intention of the author and that the interpreter should not tamper with the text but 
simply extract the message deposited by the author of the text. The parol-evidence 
rule as it is presently applied strengthens this theory of texts and the influence of the 
interpreter on them. The rule is divided into two parts: 1) The integration rule, aimed 
at establishing the extent to which the contract was integrated into the written 
document, and 2) the interpretation rule, aimed at ascertaining the message of the text 
as demarcated by the integration rule. Two main criticisms are leveled against the 
rule, namely that it is theoretically incompatible with the subjective intentionalist will 
theory of contractual liability and that it is a practical failure. These criticisms are not 
aimed at undermining present understandings of texts, but rather at negotiating the 
problems that arise surrounding the application of the parol-evidence rule. Analysis of 
these criticisms shows that they in fact acknowledge the failure of the view of texts as 
records. The proposed remedies (such as liberalization of the rule or scrapping it 
altogether) are also motivated by the belief that the present interpretive dispensation 
(subjective intentionalism) will benefit from such remedies, rather than a reaction to 
the failure of the existing process for defining texts. 
 
In the second part of the chapter, the definition of texts in the Marxist tradition is 
examined. This shows the relatively arbitrary nature of definition of texts and the 
importance of social situatedness in the perception of texts. Marxists argue that the 
definition of texts depends not on the content of the text, but rather on the dominant 
ideology in the interpretive community. Terms like “aesthetics” and “literature” are 
not objective characterizations of texts but represent the dominant view in society, 
based on economic power relations. Marxists also introduced concepts like the 
“other” and “definition by absence” to the theory of defining texts. They show that 
what is absent from a text is often just as indicative of the process of defining texts as 
the actual content of the text.  
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The focus then shifted to the post-structuralist definition of texts with special 
emphasis on the Barthian distinction between a work and a text and the metaphoric 
nature of language as analyzed by Derrida. Barthes shows that texts differ from works 
because 1) works are not physically separate from the texts, but rather while the work 
is something concrete (occupying book space for example), the text is a 
methodological field; 2) the relationship between the work and the sign is different 
from the one between the text and the sign and finally; 3) Barthes distinguishes work 
and text on account of the role of description. Derrida shows that language does not 
have a functional nature but a metaphoric one. This means that language deals with 
the identification of the non-identical, an exercise in imagination. Understanding is 
premised on the possibility of misunderstanding. Together with this insight, Derrida 
shows that language can never be separated from thought and vice versa. The 
positivist theory of defining texts (as separate and a record) hinges on the possibility 
that a work can exist. Derrida shows that it cannot.  
 
In the penultimate section the interpreter is reminded of his important role in 
definition of texts and interpreters are urged to take seriously the responsibility that 
goes with that. The act of defining a text (especially a legal text) always involves two 
urges, specifically the urge to find the unique in the text and the urge to find how the 
text fits in with other texts. The interpreter must take these urges seriously. He must 
pay close attention to what the parties seemed to intend, while at the same time 
keeping the needs of the particular situation in mind. He must find a text that is both 
just (in the circumstances) and one that can be justified (in the community in which 
the interpreter finds himself). No text is already defined (before interpretation); it is 
always waiting to be constructed. 
 
If interpretation is not essentially predetermined, if there is more to the nature of 
subjectivity than liberal theory admits and the definition of texts is essentially an 
interpretative exercise, can we still maintain a liberal theory of contractual 
interpretation? 
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5 
Intentionalism, intention discovery and intention creation 
 
1. Introduction 
In contractual interpretation theory, assumptions about the nature of interpretation, the 
autonomy of the contractual party and the function of the contractual text have a lot of 
bearing on beliefs about the role of intention. The crucial connection between the 
contractual party, the interpreter and the contractual text is the quest for the intention 
of the former. Assumptions about the nature of interpretation, the individual and texts 
culminate to make intentionalism feasible. No understanding of our contractual 
interpretation process would be complete without a critical assessment of 
intentionalism and its influence on the interpretation of contracts. 
 
In the recent past (and the not so recent past), much has been written on the possibility 
of intention discovery, the politics of intentionalism and the role of the author in legal 
interpretation.1 In classical liberal thought, the idea of intention of the author was 
referred to in an effort to restrain interpretations of activist judges.2 The intention of 
the author is also regularly used as a justification for a certain interpretation.3 The aim 
                                                 
1 See for example Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies: Perspectives in 
Post-Structuralist Criticism (1979) 141-160; Dworkin “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 60 Texas LR 
527-550; Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral 
Principles” (1983) 96 Harvard LR 781-827; Peller “The Metaphysics of American Law” (1985) 73 
California LR 1151-1290; Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in 
Fish Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and 
Legal Studies (1989) 87-102; Lewis “The Demise of the Exceptio Doli: Is there Another Route to 
Contractual Equity?” (1990) 107 SALJ 26-44; Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of 
Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173-1219; Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and 
Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) 213-239; Mootz “The New Legal 
Hermeneutics” (1994) 47 Vanderbilt LR 115-143; De Ville “Legislative History and Constitutional 
Interpretation” (1999) TSAR 211-223; De Ville “Meaning and statutory interpretation” (1999) 62 
THRHR 373-389; Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002); Du 
Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002). 
2 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 784. In the classical liberal model the sovereign (government) and the 
citizen are placed under the rule of law. Laws are passed by the citizens (or their representatives) in the 
legislature and the executive and judicial branches of government should adhere to those laws. This is 
achieved with recourse to the intention of the legislature. The theory goes that judges will be less 
tempted (or in actual fact likely) to make use of free reading if they are constrained by the intention of 
the legislature (if intentionalism is a requirement for justifiability). In the law of contract, persons are 
similarly held liable to their intentional conduct because of the belief that persons should be free to go 
about life in a way they see fit. See Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 1-15; 
Chapter 3 section 2.1-2.3. 
3 De Ville “Legislative History and Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) TSAR 211 at 211. 
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of this type of justification is to distance the interpreter from the meaning product by 
ascribing meaning to an external influence like the author of the text.4 Others, like 
members of the Critical Legal Studies movement, advocated judicial activism to 
escape the restricting influence of intentionalism.5 Many jurists argue that authorial 
intent has no special privilege in textual interpretation.6 Whichever way 
intentionalism is approached, questions surrounding the role of authors and their 
intentions in legal interpretation are thoroughly political.7 The question to be 
answered in this chapter is to what extent the intention of authors binds us and 
whether we can really be free of intentionalism. Can there be a happy medium? The 
implications for the law of contract are immense.  
 
Liberal beliefs about the nature of interpretation, individual autonomy and the 
definition of texts are tied together by the doctrine of intentionalism. If an interpreter 
is true to the values of liberalism, she must interpret texts (as records of facts) in an 
intentionalist way, so that the actions (text creation) of the autonomous and self-
regulating author will have the effects that he (the text creator) intended. The inverse 
is also true, as intentionalism depends on general liberal beliefs about the nature of 
interpretation as a recovery (or at most recreation) of meaning, the legal subject as an 
autonomous self-regulating being and texts as records of facts. It is clear that the way 
intention is approached will depend upon beliefs regarding the nature of 
interpretation, subjectivity and the definition of texts. Therefore, in a broader sense, 
                                                 
4 Peller “The Metaphysics of American Law” (1985) 73 California LR 1151 at 1171. This interpretive 
justification is used to relieve the interpreter of responsibility for the meaning resulting from the 
interpretation and aim to cancel out the influence of the interpreter and her own prejudices and social 
situatedness on meaning. 
5 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 1181. 
6 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 1179. 
7 Mootz “The New Legal Hermeneutics” (1994) 47 Vanderbilt LR 115 at 130. In the United States this 
is especially apparent. Here the debate centres largely on constitutional interpretation, and conservative 
politics often involves an embrace of intentionalism (in the originalist mode) while more liberal politics 
often includes a rejection of the authority of original intention in favour of contemporary 
interpretations. In South Africa, intentionalism is more prevalent in private law, and the debate is not so 
much whether intentionalism is tenable or not, but whether one should embrace a subjective 
intentionalism or a more objective one. The so-called private nature of private law often disguises and 
distorts the political choices underlying this branch of the law. See also Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: 
The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 1179 where he argues that 
“…questions of interpretive authority and validity can have direct and devastating consequences for 
individuals and society generally…”. 
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the aim of this chapter is also to analyze the role of intention in postmodern 
interpretation theory.8
 
This chapter is divided into eight parts, starting with a discussion on intentionalism 
and original meaning. In this section, theories about subjective intention discovery 
and the search for original intention are analyzed. The focus then shifts to the belief 
that intention is to be deduced from or discovered in a text. These theories are often 
called objective intention theories. In the following section, theories critical of 
intentionalism (as presently applied) are discussed, starting with theories of free 
reading (section four) and then shifting to neo-pragmatist (section 5) and post-
structuralist understandings of the role of the author (section 6). Then the new theories 
of intention discovery and the role of the author in the interpretation process and their 
relevance for the interpretation of contracts are discussed. In the final section, the 
conclusions of the chapter are drawn. 
 
2. Intentionalism and original meaning 
“…The coming into being of the notion of ‘author’ constitutes the privileged moment 
of individualization (sic) in the history of ideas…”.9
 
Strict or subjective intentionalism proposes a strong relationship between the text and 
the author, more particularly between the text and its relation to the authorial figure 
who seems to be outside it and who precedes it.10 Subjective intentionalism is the 
search for the intention of the author at the time when the contract was concluded. 
This theory is based on liberal beliefs regarding individual autonomy and a traditional 
historical understanding of texts as records.11 Traditional subjective intentionalism is 
based on the premise that authorship is a communicative act through which an author 
                                                 
8 It remains to be seen how the critique of the objectivist interpretation, liberal self and texts as records 
(in Chapters 2-4) will impact on the way an intention is portrayed. 
9 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 141. 
10 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 141; De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 9-11. 
11 Individual autonomy is the belief that individuals choose, in a relatively free way, which type of life 
they want to lead. The argument goes that individuals have the ability to choose which message they 
intend to convey in the text and that the texts in turn have the ability to accurately reflect this intention. 
For a discussion of individual autonomy see Chapter 3 (especially sections 2.1 and 2.2) and for a 
further discussion of the nature of texts see Chapter 4. 
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projects her consciousness by means of a text.12 Importantly, readers are urged to find 
the true intention of the author even if it means going behind the text.13
 
The subjective theory of interpretation has been widely recognized and accepted by 
the South African courts when it comes to contractual interpretation.14 In its purest 
form, this theory requires that the intention of the author of the text be ascertained 
from the text and surrounding circumstances.15 Furthermore, a distinction is drawn 
between the meaning reflected by the text and the meaning intended by the author.16 
Subjective intentionalists argue that liability should follow the latter. For them, 
contracts consist only of the actual intended consequences, not all the possible 
consequences that the text seems to allow. In this scheme, texts are reflections of 
intention and should be the starting point in the search for intention, but texts should 
never be privileged over intention.17 Once the intention of the parties has been 
ascertained, the text loses all relevance except as a reference to (and as evidence of) 
the intention of the author.  
 
                                                 
12 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 1179. 
Hutchinson describes this theory as an attempt to “…open a channel to the mind of the author…”. See 
also De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 9-11. 
13 Going behind the text involves looking at evidence of the drafting process and other evidence 
parallel to the text. In the case of contracts this process is governed by the parol-evidence rule. See 
Chapter 4 section 3. 
14 See for example Rand Rietfontein Estates Ltd v Cohn 1937 AD 317 at 326; Cinema City v 
Morgenstern Family Estates and others 1980 (1) SA 796 (A) at 803; Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Escom 
Pension and Provision Fund 1987 (2) SA 580 (A) at 584; Sonap Petroleum (SA) Pty Ltd (formerly 
known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A) at 239-240; MV Navigator 
(No 1): Wellness International Network Ltd v MV Navigator and Another 2004 (5) SA 10 (C) at 23-24.  
See also Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 28 footnote 
34.  
15 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 28; National and 
Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato Board 1958 (2) SA 473 (A) at 479; Ponisammy 
and Another v Versailles Estates (Pty) Ltd 1973 (1) SA 372 (A) at 387; Sonap Petroleum (SA) Pty Ltd 
(formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A) at 239; Bierman v 
Mutual & Federal Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 2004 (1) SA 205 (O) at 211. In South Africa 
subjective intentionalism is supplemented and restricted by the parol-evidence rule and the rule for 
clear and unambiguous meaning. Both rules aim to regulate the admissibility of evidence outside the 
text. See Chapter 4 section 3 for a discussion of the working of the parol-evidence rule. 
16 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 28; Sonap 
Petroleum (SA) Pty Ltd (formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 
(A) at 239. 
17 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 28 suggests that 
“…[o]nce the original intention of the parties has been ascertained, effect should be given thereto, since 
the intention of an author is more important than his or her words…”.  
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Subjective intentionalism receives considerable tacit support in legal practice.18 The 
support for this theory can also be gleaned from the criticism against subjective theory 
of interpretation as applied in South Africa. The first criticism against the South 
African practice is that the South African courts apply a literalist theory under the 
guise of intentionalism,19 because they supposedly determine intention ex post facto 
objectively by looking at the literal meaning of the contractual text at the expense of 
the actual intention of the parties.20 On this basis it is said that adherents of the 
subjective-cum-literalist interpretation theory equate the text with the contract, while 
in actual fact it is merely a representation of the contract and not the contract itself.21 
As a result, extra-textual factors that might influence meaning are ignored in favour of 
the literal meaning of the contractual text.22  
 
The main consequence of acceptance of the subjective-cum-literal theory of 
interpretation is that intention is relegated to an aid in the interpretation process rather 
than the object of interpretation.23 Cornelius and others ask interpreters to take the 
subjective or actual intention of the parties seriously, arguing that a true subjective 
intentionalism is necessary if application of the will theory were to be possible.24  
 
                                                 
18 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 1178. 
See also the example provided by Hutchinson. See also Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A 
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” (1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 786. Tushnet is a 
critical legal scholar and his discussion of intentionalism is aimed at debunking it. 
19 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 29; Du Plessis Re-
Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 100. 
20 In short, this theory holds that language (at least on a general level) has objective meaning and that a 
diligent interpreter can know what a competent author meant with a certain text. For further discussion 
of the literalist and objective theories of interpretation see chapter 2 section 3.1. See Lewis “The 
Demise of the Exceptio Doli: Is there Another Route to Contractual Equity?” (1990) 107 SALJ 26 at 
44. 
21 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 30. 
22 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 31. Cornelius states 
that “…[t]his theory creates the possibility that the interpreter may substitute the intention of the parties 
with his or her own supposed intention, which may substantially differ from that which the parties may 
actually have had in mind…the subjective theory might cause an interpreter to arrive at an 
interpretation that neither of the parties may have actually intended…”. See also Lewis “The Demise of 
the Exceptio Doli: Is there Another Route to Contractual Equity?” (1990) 107 SALJ 26 at 44. 
23 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 31.He shows that 
interpreters often use intention as a justification for deviating from the ordinary meaning of the text. 
Also, strict application of the subjective-cum-literalist prohibits direct evidence of intention and as a 
result the aim of strict subjective intentionalists are frustrated. 
24 Lewis “The Demise of the Exceptio Doli: Is there Another Route to Contractual Equity?” (1990) 107 
SALJ 26 at 43. 
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Subjective intentionalists remind interpreters that the written or oral text is merely an 
outward and visible sign of the contract.25 In this scheme, contracts are constituted by 
the thoughts behind the text, which are the thoughts that make up the psychological or 
mental agreement between the parties. Subjective intentionalists proclaim that even 
language itself merely surrounds the thoughts that represent the contract. Language is 
seen as a medium through which thought is communicated.26 Thought is before 
language and outside of it and thought (and thus the contract) can never be identified 
by scrutinizing only the language.27 The first step in the direction of true subjective 
intentionalism is the realization that the interpretation of a contract is not the reading 
of the contractual text, but a search for what the text signifies. Once the signifieds and 
not the signifiers are examined, the distinction between written and oral texts 
disappears.28 All texts are firsts pointers toward the reality signified by the text and it 
does not matter that one text is spoken while the other is written. Finally, interpreters 
are urged not to confine their interpretations to the linguistic aspects, but to also 
include non-linguistic considerations when determining the intention of the author. 
 
In the United States constitutional originalism (as the most prominent intentionalist 
theory) has been the subject of various critical analyses that are important to this 
study. However, before the underlying assumptions are examined it is useful to relate 
constitutional originalism to subjective intentionalism. American constitutional 
originalism has at its core a purpose very different from that of South African 
                                                 
25 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 33; Kerr The 
Principles of the Law of Contract (2002) at 124; De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 
(2000) at 9. 
26 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 33; Lewis “The 
Demise of the Exceptio Doli: Is there Another Route to Contractual Equity?” (1990) 107 SALJ 26 at 43 
27 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 33. This is a 
startling statement that reminds strongly of Moorish metaphysical realism. The idea behind 
metaphysical realism is that language is always a representation of a reality beyond itself. For further 
discussion see chapter 2 section 3.5 and also De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 
(2000) at 9. 
28 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 34-35 claims that he 
comes to this insight through the influence of deconstruction. While deconstruction has a considerable 
value in the examination of the role of the author in interpretation, as I will try to show in section 5, I 
seriously doubt whether it can be used to justify some kind of subjective intentionalism. Cornelius 
offers a glimpse of his theoretical understanding (misunderstanding?) in the sentence that follows his 
deconstructive excursion “…[w]hat this implies, then, is that the language of the instrument refers to a 
reality beyond the text…”. See Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa 
(2002) at 35. Deconstructionists do not claim that all texts are the same (have the same failings) and 
can therefore never truly represent reality (as Cornelius seems to suggest), but rather that all reality is a 
text to be interpreted. We are caught up in a textual and linguistic reality that we cannot escape. There 
is no way of knowing reality outside of texts because we can never transcend language. 
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subjective intentionalism. While subjective intentionalism is aimed at retrieving the 
intention of the author of the text, originalism is aimed at restraining interpreters.29 
Originalists argue that the authors of a text intend to fix the meaning of the document 
and that the interpretation of the text must reflect this intention. Interpretation of the 
constitution must reflect the intention of the original framers or at least be in line with 
meanings that they would have accepted.30 In addition, while subjective 
intentionalism is mostly concerned with interpretation, originalism also involves a 
theory of adjudication that recommends to the courts how the interpreted constitution 
must be applied.31  
 
David Lyons identifies three justifications for intentionalist interpretation.32 The first 
is that interpretation in general should be governed by the intention of the author of 
the text.33 This is especially true in a liberal contractual dispensation where the idea is 
that individual subjects should be free to govern their own affairs as they see fit. The 
second justification is that intentionalism is in line with general legal interpretative 
canons and inherently justifiable.34 In other words, intentionalism is justified because 
                                                 
29 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 213 states “…[t]he Constitution was written down to fix its content, and its rules remain 
unchanged until it is amended. Courts have not been authorized to change the rules. So courts deciding 
cases under the Constitution should follow the rules laid down. By what right would courts decide 
constitutional matters on any other grounds…”. The idea that the intention of authors who might have 
been dead for hundreds of years binds interpreters raised much criticism in the progressive legal 
fraternity. The idea was that it was improper for courts to be bound by intentions formed when society 
was very different from the present. Originalists responded that it was better to be bound by the “dead 
hand” of the past that being subject to the whims of wilful judges. See Tushnet “Following the Rules 
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” (1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 787; 
Mootz “The New Legal Hermeneutics” (1994) 47 Vanderbilt LR 115 at 131. 
30 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 215. It is interesting to note that considerable disagreement exists regarding the precise 
intentions that “count”. Some argue that the framers’ intention counts while others argue that the 
persons who voted for the text count. 
31 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 214. Fish and fellow neo-pragmatists will of course argue that there is no distinction 
between interpretation and application. More about that in section 5. 
32 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 217-220. 
33 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 217. Lyons remarks that this justification is especially plausible in the case of wills and 
contracts. 
34 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 218. It should be remarked that this justification only makes sense in a liberal state with 
all the theoretical underpinnings of individual autonomy. In South Africa, legal arguments (especially 
in private law) are often settled in a similar way. The theorist who prevails often succeeds because she 
can show that the version of the law that her argument proposes is more closely related (more “pure”) 
to the Roman Dutch Law than the counter argument. Why is it relevant that the one argument is more 
Roman Dutch than the other? Does this make the argument inherently just? 
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all lawyers do it, have always done it and will continue doing it when they interpret 
texts. They will always ask, “Who authorized it?” The final argument in favour of 
intentionalism is that it is justified by the accepted theories of political morality.35 
Two political theories are characteristically used to justify intentionalism. The first is 
the idea that society is based on a social contract.36 The second theory developed out 
of the first, and adherents hold that both the government (representative of the 
“people”) and its citizens (the “people”) are bound to live according to the 
constitution which both tacitly accepted as binding.37 In short, intentionalism is 
justified because a) it is the way one should interpret texts; b) all lawyers interpret 
texts this way; and c) it is the only way to ensure that courts stay honest and do not 
cheat the government or the people. 
 
The question arises whether subjective intentionalism is similarly justified in the law 
of contract since the scopes of the two branches of subjective intentionalism differ. As 
was pointed out earlier, originalism is a much more comprehensive and overtly 
political theory of interpretation than contractual subjective intentionalism. However, 
the justifications for originalism also hold true for contractual subjective 
intentionalism. Firstly, subjective intentionalists argue that contracts are texts that 
intend to convey a consensus held by authors apart from and prior to the text.38 They 
could thus argue that intentionalism is the way texts should be interpreted in general. 
Secondly, contracts are said to form part of deliberate human conduct with the 
intention of forming legal relations. These acts are called juristic acts and include, 
apart from contracts, marriage, making of a will and abandonment (negligence) of 
                                                 
35 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 219. 
36 The basic idea is that the citizen and the government have a contract that provides how the 
government might act in order to be able to legally require its subjects (collection of citizens) to adhere 
to its laws. The contract is said to be based on the constitution. Thus, as long as the government stays 
within the bounds of the constitution, it can rule as it pleases. In this model it is necessary for the 
government to be held to what was originally agreed under the contract for the system to make any 
sense. Courts, the guardians of the constitution, must therefore be restrained from stretching or 
restricting the constitution. See Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer 
(ed) Law and Language (1993) 213 at 218-219. 
37 The difference is that the constitution is no longer simply a restraint on the government, but also on 
the citizen. Both have to act in accordance with the constitution. The intention of the authors is 
important because neither the citizen nor the government has the right to impose its reading of the text 
on the other. The meaning of the text must be objectively knowable. See Lyons “Constitutional 
Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) 213 at 219-220 
38 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 33; Lewis “The 
Demise of the Exceptio Doli: Is there Another Route to Contractual Equity?” (1990) 107 SALJ 26 at 43 
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ownership.39 The interpretation of juristic acts is also intentionalist in nature; with 
willed (intentional) acts it seems logical to use an intentionalist interpretation strategy. 
Thirdly, subjective intentionalism, although not primarily aimed at constraining 
interpreters, can be held to constrain interpreters to respect intentional conduct.40 The 
need for this kind of respect flows out of a larger socio-political theory of classical 
liberalism in which individual autonomy is a cherished value. Subjective 
intentionalism therefore shares its justifications with originalism. 
 
The main criticism against subjective intentionalism is that subjective intentionalists 
have an overly simplistic idea of what an intention is.41 For subjective intentionalism 
to make any sense, it must be possible to identify a moment of intention. That 
moment is the thought behind the contract, the catalyst of the record and the means of 
the text. In other words, the text has a reflection function; it communicates this 
significant moment to the audience, the interpreter. Yet, as Dworkin pointed out, there 
are at least two subjective intentions in relation to any work.42 There are intentions for 
a work and beliefs about it. The authors of a contract have both intentions regarding 
the contract that they intend to create, and beliefs about the possibilities that exist 
under contract.43 The problem facing the interpreter is one of proof. The interpreter 
will never have complete access to the mental state of the author and as a result there 
is always the possibility, even where the parties to the contract are absolutely frank 
and truthful about their intentions in their evidence, that the author’s intention evolved 
after the contract was concluded.44  
                                                 
39 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 5; Cornelius Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 7-24. 
40 The nature of the respect will probably include refraining from giving effect to unwilled 
consequences and so on. The interpreter will only burden the authors with legal obligations he (the 
author) intentionally took on himself. 
41 Dworkin “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 60 Texas LR 527 at 536-540. Although Dworkin is not a 
critical theorist, his exposition of the complexities of determining subjective intention is well worth 
looking at. 
42 Dworkin “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 60 Texas LR 527 at 538. 
43 Say, for example, X intends to buy a car from Y and the parties agree that X will pay R 20000 for the 
car on the 22 September 2004 and X will receive the car on the same day. They reduce the contract to 
writing. The contract reads that X will buy car A from Y for R20000 and that performance is due on 22 
September 2004. Afterwards X realizes that he likes the radio in the car, which incidentally can be very 
easily removed, and decides that he will demand that Y leave the radio in the car. X had the intention to 
buy the car. He has the belief that the contract now allows him to demand that the radio be left in the 
car. It will make a big difference which intention is regarded as his contractual intention. 
44 Dworkin explains that this happens when the author is confronted with his own work. In our example 
X is confronted with possibilities that he did not previously envisage. It is not necessarily a new 
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 Any discovery of the actual intention of the author relies upon the possibility of 
historical discovery.45 Contemporary hermeneutics takes issue with the contention 
that history is simply there to be discovered46 and postmodernists argue that history is 
subject to continuous reinterpretation and reformulation.47 Therefore, any intention is 
subject to the same continuous reinterpretation and reformulation because it is (at the 
insistence of subjective intentionalists) a historical “fact”. Furthermore, as Mark 
Tushnet points out, lawyers are notoriously bad historians.48 Because lawyers are 
used to operating in an adversarial legal system, the history that they formulate will 
always be aimed at strengthening their case. This will often be done by 
overemphasizing fragmentary evidence and minimizing conflicting evidence.49 Also, 
any evidence regarding the intention of the author must be interpreted and there is just 
as big a chance that this will be interpreted wrongly as there was with the original 
text. Going behind the text does not guarantee that the actual intention will be found.  
 
Finally, subjective intentionalism must fail because the theory detaches individual 
intention from the historical and social context in which it was formulated.50 Since 
subjective intentionalism is part of a larger liberal political theory, subjective 
intentionalists understand history as the sum of individual experiences. In other 
words, what we understand as a social or historical scenario is the sum of the 
                                                                                                                                            
intention, just a more detailed one. See Dworkin “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 60 Texas LR 527 at 
539-540. 
45 Mark Tushnet identifies three steps that undercut the logic of subjective intentionalism. The first is 
that the author formed her intention in circumstances that differ from the present. Secondly, to 
understand this intention, the interpreter is required to transport himself into imaginative circumstances 
similar to those prevalent when the intention was formed. The third step is a realization that the 
imaginative transposition of the interpreter opens up the interpretation to exactly those elements that 
the subjective intentionalists wish to avoid, namely interpretive subjectivity. The interpreter is bound to 
find a history as he sees it. His perspective will define his history. The point is that the search for 
intention leads to the introduction of factors that will differ from person to person. See Tushnet 
“Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” (1983) 96 
Harvard LR 781 at 793. 
46 Mootz “The New Legal Hermeneutics” (1994) 47 Vanderbilt LR 115 at 132-133. 
47 See Chapter 4, especially section 4 and the discussion of Foucault’s description of history. 
48 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 793. 
49 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 793 remarks “…[w]here the interpretivist seeks clarity and definiteness, 
the historians seeks ambiguity…”. 
50 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 796. 
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individual perspectives that exist.51 In this vein, if one envisages a contract, it is seen 
as a collection of the perspectives held by each party, which happen to coincide. 
However, postmodern theory reveals that social contexts are not the aggregate of 
individual preferences but the other way round. Individual consciousness is the result 
of multiple social influences and contexts. Social consciousness cannot be abstracted 
into summaries of individual experiences because there is a dramatic interaction 
between the person and her context.52 Any emotion or experience by a person is the 
result of numerous economic, intellectual and social influences, interactions and 
contexts. When a person forms an intention, that intention is part of the larger social 
meanings accessible to and realities of that person, and to abstract that intention is to 
deny its contingency upon the social reality that is ever changing.53 The intention 
itself stands in relation to the specific contexts that give rise to it in the first place. To 
find true subjective intention, the interpreter would have to reconstruct the entire 
reality surrounding the intention creation, which is of course not possible.  
 
3. Intention deduction and intention discovery 
“…The words are the primary and main source of information from which the 
intention of the parties should be ascertained and an interpreter may not venture 
beyond the words of the text to determine the meaning thereof. This is known as the 
golden rule of interpretation…”54
 
                                                 
51 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 796. 
52 JWG van der Walt “The Future and Futurity of the Public-Private Distinction in the View of the 
Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights” (2000) at 128-129. Delivered at Rand Afrikaans 
University at 21 June 2000 as his inaugural lecture as Professor of Law (published in TSAR as JWG 
van der Walt “Die toekoms van die onderskeid tussen die publiekreg en die privaatreg in die lig van die 
horisontale werking van die grondwet” 2000 TSAR 416-427, 605-618). 
53 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 797. Tushnet proclaims (while discussing the work of Leon Litwack on 
slavery) “…[t]he ambiguity and contradiction Litwack discloses in individual responses to 
emancipation demonstrate the impossibility of singling out specific past intentions or beliefs without 
denying the shifting, complex circumstances that led each person to develop such ambiguous and 
contradictory understandings of his or her world…”. 
54 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 29. Where contracts 
are governed by legislation, objective intentionalism is also often favoured. See for example S v Zuma 
and Others 1995 (1) SACR 568 (CC) at 578; S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) at 
13; S v Boesak 2001 (1) SACR 1 (CC) at 2; S v Mhlungu and Others 1995 (2) SACR 227 (CC); MEC 
for Local Government and Developmet Planning, Western Cape v Paarl Poultry Enterprizes CC t/a 
Rosendal Poultry Farm 2002 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 24; Kalil v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1967 (4) SA 550 
(A) at 556; Swart en 'n Ander v Cape Fabrix (Pty) Ltd 1979 (1) SA 195 (A) at 202; Coopers & 
Lybrand and Others v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 768; Blaauwberg Meat Wholesalers CC v Anglo 
Dutch Meats (Exports) Ltd, 2004 (3) SA 160 (SCA) at 166 
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Objective intentionalists recognize the difficulty of finding the actual intention of the 
parties. They realize that the actual intention of the parties will always remain veiled 
by words and that language will perpetually hide the actual intention from view, yet 
they also recognize the need for certainty when interpreting texts. These 
intentionalists feel uncomfortable with the notion that judges can find any meaning 
they like in the text and they feel that the parties to the contract need protection and 
that their expressed wishes must be adhered to where possible. In short, they believe 
that interpretation is either completely constrained or completely open. It is the latter 
objective intentionalists seek to avoid. Objective intentionalism is based on the belief 
that the words of the contract are certain enough to provide us with the intention of 
the parties. The contractual text is perceived to be a language act which the parties 
intend to give legal effect. 
 
In statutory interpretation, the intention of the legislature has long been the main 
justification for judicial interpretations. After the advent of constitutionalism in South 
Africa, much of the focus shifted from intentionalism to the so-called purposive 
approach to interpretation.55 In this strategy the focal point shifts from the subjective 
intention of the legislature to the object or purpose of the legal text.56 The interpreter 
is urged to find the reason for promulgation of the statute and to interpret the statute in 
the light of this purpose. In line with this theory, courts are allowed to modify the 
plain meaning of a text to bring it in line with the purpose of the text.57 Adherents of 
                                                 
55 See for example Aktiebolaget Hässle and Another v Triomed (Pty) Ltd 2003 (1) SA 155 (SCA) at 
159-160; McLean v SASOL Mine (Pty) Ltd Secunda Colleries; McLean v SASOL Pension Fund 2003 
(6) SA 254 (W) at 268-269; Nkosi and another v Bührman 2002 (1) SA 372 (SCA) at 388; Minister of 
Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at 739. 
This is of course not always the case. See for example Rashavha v Van Rensburg 2004 (2) SA 421 
(SCA) at 429. However, broadly speaking, purposive interpretation has gained remarkable popularity 
in recent years. 
56 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 96; De Ville Constitutional and Statutory 
Interpretation (2000) at 141; De Ville “Meaning and statutory interpretation” (1999) 62 THRHR 373 at 
376. De Ville is critical of this strategy. See further Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for 
Students (1998) at 31; Aktiebolaget Hässle and Another v Triomed (Pty) Ltd 2003 (1) SA 155 (SCA) at 
159-160; McLean v SASOL Mine (Pty) Ltd Secunda Colleries; McLean v SASOL Pension Fund 2003 
(6) SA 254 (W) at 268-269; Nkosi and another v Bührman 2002 (1) SA 372 (SCA) at 388; Minister of 
Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at 739. 
57 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 97; De Ville Constitutional and Statutory 
Interpretation (2000) at 142-143; De Ville “Meaning and statutory interpretation” (1999) 62 THRHR 
373 at 377; Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students (1998) at 31. This brings a 
subjective element into the equation because the interpretation of the purpose of the statute is left up to 
the interpreter. In Rashavha v Van Rensburg 2004 (2) SA 421 (SCA) at 429 Lewis JA remarks that this 
may only happen if the meaning of the text is not clear. 
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this theory argue that the court has an inherent applicatory function, which entails the 
application of texts to specific contexts.58
 
The purposive theory of interpretation is a reaction on three specific criticisms against 
the literalist-cum-intentionalist strategy of statutory interpretation. The first criticism 
is that context only becomes relevant once a text is ambiguous.59 This is absurd 
because the context of the text becomes retrospectively important once it has been 
established that the text is unclear.60 Secondly, decisions whether a text is ambiguous 
or not are subjective, and decisions regarding the relevance of contextual factors are 
therefore relatively arbitrary.61 Finally, purposivists argue that courts have a 
lawmaking function through interpreting and that the literalist-cum-intentionalist 
approach disguises this fact.62   
  
Despite criticism in the field of statutory interpretation, courts have accepted that the 
purpose of contractual interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the parties to the 
contract by means of a literal interpretation of the contractual text.63 The theory is 
commonly known as the literalist-cum-intentionalist theory of interpretation. The 
theory holds that, provided that the document is clear and unambiguous, no evidence 
outside of the document may be presented to contradict the intentions of the parties as 
reflected by the text, even if extrinsic evidence might lead the court to a different 
                                                 
58De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 144-145; De Ville “Meaning and 
statutory interpretation” (1999) 62 THRHR 373 at 377; Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction 
for Students (1998) at 31; Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) at 406. 
59 De Ville “Meaning and statutory interpretation” (1999) 62 THRHR 373 at 377. 
60 De Ville “Meaning and statutory interpretation” (1999) 62 THRHR 373 at 377; Botha Statutory 
Interpretation: An Introduction for Students (1998) at 30. In other words, the meaning of an 
unambiguous text is determined by the text itself while the meaning of an ambiguous text is determined 
by the surrounding circumstances and evidence of the actual intention of the authors. The author is 
better of the text is ambiguous, because his opinions about the text will come into play. 
61 De Ville “Meaning and statutory interpretation” (1999) 62 THRHR 373 at 377; Botha Statutory 
Interpretation: An Introduction for Students (1998) at 30. 
62 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 183; De Ville “Meaning and statutory 
interpretation” (1999) 62 THRHR 373 at 377; Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for 
Students (1998) at 30. By referring to meaning as either intention or plain meaning, literalist-cum-
intentionalists disguise their necessary input and involvement in the creation of that meaning. 
63 Lewis “The Demise of the Exceptio Doli: Is there Another Route to Contractual Equity?” (1990) 107 
SALJ 26 at 35; Richter v Bloemfontein Town Council 1922 AD 57 at 69-70; Worman v Hughes & 
Others 1948 (3) SA 495 (A) at 505; Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 (3) SA 447 (A) at 454-5; 
Rashavha v Van Rensburg 2004 (2) SA 421 (SCA) at 429. Incidentally, the last-mentioned judgement 
was handed down by Carole Lewis, who earlier criticized this type of reasoning.  
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understanding of the meaning of the text.64 However, if the text is ambiguous and 
recourse to such evidence might clear up the uncertainty, the court may for example 
examine evidence of the negotiations before the contract was concluded.65 The 
interpreter is not allowed to look at words in isolation, and all the words must be read 
in relation to the contract as a whole.66  
 
Objective intentionalism has been accepted in South Africa because of the certainty 
that it supposedly provides.67 The argument goes that the text of the contract is there 
for anybody to see, and as a result it is possible to arrange one’s affairs accordingly.68 
Parties would not have to conduct extensive and expensive investigations into the 
actual intention of a party, but could rely on the text of the contract.69 It is also argued 
that an objective theory of interpretation makes it unnecessary for the courts to answer 
factual questions that are impossible to prove; allows the parties to obtain a decision 
on linguistic grounds without resort to extrinsic evidence; and allows for policy 
                                                 
64 Lewis “The Demise of the Exceptio Doli: Is there Another Route to Contractual Equity?” (1990) 107 
SALJ 26 at 36. Interestingly, Justice Lewis states “…evidence may not be led as to any factor that 
sheds light upon the real (my italics) meaning of the words in the document…”. Lewis AJ is making a 
claim about the nature of language here. She is arguing that the purpose of language is to convey the 
intention of the parties and that outside evidence might lead us to this “real” meaning of the text. This 
identifies her firmly as a subjective intentionalist. Yet, in Rashavha v Van Rensburg 2004 (2) SA 421 
(SCA) at 429, she handed down a judgement that departs from true subjective intentionalism to 
something that looks a lot like objectivism or even objective intentionalism. At 429 she remarks 
“...[t]here is no need to resort to an interpretation of a section, generous, purposive or otherwise, where 
there is no uncertainty as to its meaning…”. One can only speculate whether this is a statement 
supportive of apparent consensus over real consensus in contractual practice (the case dealt with the 
interpretation of a statute). 
65  Schreiner JA in Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 (3) SA 447 (A) at 455; Total South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd v Bekker NO 1992 (1) SA 617 (A) at 624; Coopers & Lybrand and Others v Bryant 1995 (3) 
SA 761 (A) at 768; Lewis “The Demise of the Exceptio Doli: Is there Another Route to Contractual 
Equity?” (1990) 107 SALJ 26 at 37. 
66 Lewis “The Demise of the Exceptio Doli: Is there Another Route to Contractual Equity?” (1990) 107 
SALJ 26 at 37; Coopers & Lybrand and Others v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 768; Van Rensburg en 
Andere v Taute en Andere 1975 (1) SA 279 (A) at 303; Shoprite Checkers Ltd v Blue Route Property 
Managers (Pty) Ltd and Others 1994 (2) SA 172 (C) at 180. 
67 Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 944; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 
(2003) at 158; Lewis “The Demise of the Exceptio Doli: Is there Another Route to Contractual 
Equity?” (1990) 107 SALJ 26 at 37. Constitutional originalism found acceptance in America for the 
same reason. 
68 For example, where X buys the car from Y, X can now go and obtain a taxi licence because he can 
rely on the promises made by Y as reflected by the contractual text that he will receive a car against 
payment. He can assume that the contract will be executed as the text reflects it would. If he incurs 
costs because of some or other non-compliance by Y, he can on the strength of the text, argue that Y 
intended to sell him the vehicle as set out in the text, even though Y might subjectively not have 
intended to sell X the car. 
69 Lewis “The Demise of the Exceptio Doli: Is there Another Route to Contractual Equity?” (1990) 107 
SALJ 26 at 37; Rashavha v Van Rensburg 2004 (2) SA 421 (SCA) at 429. 
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considerations to come into play.70 Du Plessis concludes that this literalist-cum-
intentionalist theory of interpretation is based on two linguistic suppositions, namely 
that language does in fact have a grammatical structure that allows for an “ordinary 
meaning” to be found; and that reasoned and competent use of language will allow the 
interpreter and the author to be of one mind with regard to the meaning of the text.71
  
Apart from the branch of American originalism already discussed, there is also a 
textualist branch.72 Textualism is again divided into two strands, namely strict 
textualism and moderate textualism.73 Strict textualists argue that the text must be 
understood in the context that it was produced.74 They argue that the intention of the 
author will become clear once the text is read as it was created. The moderate strand 
of textualism involves recognition of the so-called “open-texture” of language.75 
Open-textured language is held to have a core of determinate meaning when applied 
to situations where the specific type of language is normally used.76 Moderate 
textualists hold that indeterminacy only comes to the fore when the language is used 
in a way that is not clearly correct or wrong. 
 
                                                 
70 Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway Contract: Cases Materials and Commentary (3 ed 1988) at 
463 note 35; Lewis “The Demise of the Exceptio Doli: Is there Another Route to Contractual Equity?” 
(1990) 107 SALJ 26 at 37-38. 
71 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 107. Du Plessis  states that the “…court actually 
submits that the intention of the legislature, packaged in language as it were, is knowable because the 
linguistic form also offers the means to unpack this intention…”. 
72 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 221. Textualism is the study of the text in the belief that it will yield the intention of the 
author. It is a type of intention discovery theory or objective intentionalism. 
73 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 221. 
74 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 221. This approach is subject to the same criticisms raised against subjective 
intentionalism with regards to the nature of historical facts. Like the intention (as held by the author at 
the creation of the text) is subject to and dependent upon various contextual factors, any contextual 
reading is subject to the same conditions. A context is subject to innumerable economic, social and 
intellectual conditions, which are uniquely interactive at any one time. A context cannot be abstracted.  
If anything, the reader who tries a contextual reading alone is worse off, because he can only look at 
the text while the subjective intentionalist is allowed to look at all available evidence regarding the 
intention. 
75 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 221; Hart The Concept of Law (1961) at121-132. 
76 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 221. Lyons explains “…[a]n open-textured” word has a core of determinate meaning, 
encompassing fact situations to which it uncontroversially applies…”. 
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For moderate textualists, constitutional language is inherently open-textured.77 
Therefore, while they disapprove of constitutional interpretations that “create” new 
applications or meanings for the constitutional text, they do agree that there is some 
scope for applicatory creativity.78 In other words, while interpreters are prohibited 
from changing the text, they are allowed to apply it to new situations that were not 
envisaged during the creation of the text. Moderate textualists often justify this type of  
“nonoriginalism” by reasoning that the vague clauses of the text incorporate disputed 
concepts.79 The argument goes that the vague clauses are purposely written in that 
way in order to require the court to interpret the clauses in each case. In such a way, 
the court will not permanently settle the meaning of the clause, but keep it dynamic so 
that it can negotiate the difficulties that gave rise to the dispute in the first place. 
 
Ronald Dworkin proposes that texts be interpreted to maximize their value as legal 
text.80 He urges interpreters to put the text in its best possible light. To achieve this, a 
distinction must be made between interpretation of a text and changing a text.81 
Dworkin proposes that we do this by taking account of all the words of the text and by 
devising a theory of identity.82 In so doing, he puts forward a theory of interpretation 
that relies heavily on the impression created by the text on the interpreter. The 
emphasis on the difference between interpreting and changing hinges on the 
assumption that the author places a restriction on the amount of information 
(meaning) that a text can yield by the language she (the author) uses. Accordingly, the 
                                                 
77 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 222. 
78 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 222. Lyons correctly argues that this type of textualism tends to collapse into 
nonoriginalism when the theory is taken to its limits. Extending the application of constitutional 
provisions to situations not envisaged by the framers is changing the meaning of the text, strictly 
speaking. Strict textualists will condemn any such actions because they argue that the courts have no 
authority to change the constitution. 
79 Lyons “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language 
(1993) 213 at 223; Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977) at 132-137. 
80 Dworkin “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 60 Texas LR 527 at 531. While Dworkin opposes subjective 
intentionalism, his “best art” theory seems to be a development of objective intentionalism, as I will try 
to show.  
81 Dworkin “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 60 Texas LR 527 at 531. 
82 Dworkin “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 60 Texas LR 527 at 531-532. While Dworkin seems to focus 
on the work, he is actually focusing on the identification of a work as prior to the interpretation thereof. 
Consequently, Dworkin is always referring back to the author of a text as the source of identification. 
What ever follows is premised on the assumption that all the possibilities revealed by the text has its 
source in the text provided by the author. “Perhaps Shakespeare could have written a better play than 
he did…This interpretation fails, not only because an Agatha Christie novel, taken to be treatise on 
death, is a poor treatise less valuable than a good mystery, but because the interpretation is a 
shambles”. 
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true nature of meaning possibility in the Dworkinian model rests neither in the 
language of the text nor in the readings of the interpreter, but in the creation act of the 
author.83 If this theory is followed, it will mean that the author of the text can, 
provided she is a careful and diligent drafter, restrict the possibilities open to the 
interpreters by utilizing supposedly restrictive or narrow language. This theory is 
based on the assumption that language can be used in this way and that interpretation 
is largely dependent upon the possibilities of meaning inherent in a certain text. 
 
With his idea of a chain novel Dworkin reveals some of his assumptions about the 
nature of the restrictions that an author can place on an interpreter. In short, he argues 
that for the novel to make any sense as a novel, the writers later on in the chain must 
stick to the characterization of the previous authors.84 In other words, the characters 
must continue to have the same description throughout. Mary must stay Mary and 
John must stay John. This implies that the description of Mary and John in the text 
has meaning prior to the interpretation by the next author.85 An author can therefore 
largely fix the descriptions in his text if he uses language correctly. While Dworkin 
argues that the subjective intentions of the authors is created and not found, his own 
theory shares assumptions with objective intentionalism.  
 
Dworkin also discusses the possibility that objective intentionalism is simply a way of 
justifying interpretations.86 He recognizes that the authors of a text often had no 
intention regarding an eventuality simply because they did not foresee it. Contractual 
disputes often arise because the parties to the contract are faced with a situation that 
they did not foresee at the outset.87 Since contracts in our law are expressly based on 
                                                 
83 Dworkin concedes that the intention of the author is sometimes at the heart of the matter but then 
distinguishes these instances from cases when it will not really affect the meaning of the text. However, 
the type of intention Dworkin mentions here is the subjective intention of the author, for example she 
actually thought of an element in the book (the meaning of a word etc.). The rest of his theory rests 
upon the assumption that the author objectively demarcates the possibilities inherent in the text by the 
language she used. See Dworkin “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 60 Texas LR 527 at 537. 
84 Dworkin “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 60 Texas LR 527 at 542. 
85 Dworkin makes it seem that the reader (next author in the chain novel) finds the characters in a 
certain way. This implies that language has at least some fixed content. 
86 Dworkin “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 60 Texas LR 527 at 529. 
87 In Bank of Lisbon v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A), the parties to the contract were confronted 
with a situation where the applicability or not of a contract of surety was concerned. Neither of the two 
parties had foreseen that specific situation occurring (see 608 of Joubert JA’s judgement), and the 
question confronting the court was whether the surety could escape liability on grounds of good faith. 
The court decides that the surety could not escape and justified their decision by arguing that the 
wording “clearly” reflects an intention to cover the unforeseen situation. Joubert AJ proclaims at 609 
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intention courts are faced with a dilemma. This difficulty is often solved by referring 
to the meaning created by the court as the intention of the parties or as an objectively 
demonstrated intention.88 This justification distances the court from the interpretation 
and shifts the responsibility of the outcome of the interpretation process to the authors 
of the text. 
 
The basic claim of intentionalists, be it subjectivists or objectivists, is that judicial 
interpretation can only be legitimate if it gives effect to the intention of the authors of 
legal texts.89 The proposal is that the ideals of democracy and individual autonomy 
are best served if, when it comes to statutes, the trias politica is preserved and 
legislating is left to the legislature and, when it comes to contracts, the private nature 
of the text is kept private and judicial influence is kept out (or to a minimum). By way 
of a response, Hutchinson points out that it is by no means certain or self-evident that 
an intentionalist theory of interpretation will best serve democracy, especially as far 
as the desirability of being bound to the intentions of collective authors (legislatures) 
and past authors (long term contracts and constitutions) go.90 Furthermore, on a 
normative level, intentionalism is fraught with theoretical contradictions and linguistic 
problems. 
 
The critical insight that ultimately overwhelms the objectivist theories of 
intentionalism is the very insight that caused the emergence of these theories, namely 
the distancing effect of language. Subjective intentionalism is subject to practical 
criticism because it is difficult to prove a state of mind; and it is subject to theoretical 
                                                                                                                                            
“In my opinion it appears from reading the deeds of suretyship and the mortgage bonds as a whole that 
the above-cited passages are clear and unambiguous. On the proper construction of these passages in 
their contextual settings I am satisfied that they were intended (my emphasis) to cover any transaction 
which might arise out of the customer/banker relationship between the company and the Bank. The 
contract for the forward purchase of dollars indisputably qualifies as such a transaction”. 
88 Dworkin “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 60 Texas LR 527 at 529 Dworkin reflects that “…whenever 
judges pretend that they are discovering the intention behind (a text)…this is simply a smokescreen 
behind which the judges impose their own view of what the statute should have been”.  
89 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 9; Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The 
Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 1179. 
90 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 1180. 
Collective authors like the legislature often embody many divergent views on the text and the text is 
often the result of bargaining and legislative “horse trading”. Likewise different persons tend to hold 
very different purposes for statues and the idea that one must interpret a statute or contract according to 
its purpose is fraught with difficulty. Past authors often lived in societies that differ radically from ours 
as far as equality of woman and persons of colour go, and the aims and aspirations of those authors 
often represent views that we now find repugnant. See also De Ville Constitutional and Statutory 
Interpretation (2000) at 9-11. 
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criticism because the intention of the author is always communicated through 
language and this in itself perpetually distances the intention from the interpreter.91 
These criticisms inspired the objective theories of intentionalism that are aimed at 
remedying the shortcomings of subjective intentionalism. Objective intentionalists 
argue that they overcome the practical problems with subjective intentionalism 
because they focus only on the text and the need for all kinds of external evidence no 
longer exists.92 Furthermore, the theoretical problems are overcome since interpreters 
no longer need to surmount the distancing effect of language because they only seek a 
linguistic manifestation of intention and not intention itself. While objective 
intentionalism seems to overcome the problems of subjective intentionalism, a 
linguistic door has been opened that ultimately lets in an understanding that renders 
objective intentionalism powerless, namely that the author’s intention is already an 
effect rather than a pure source of meaning.93
 
All texts are linguistic in nature, and because of this, all texts depend upon shared 
understanding and relation.94 Meaning is the result of endless possible relations 
between words. The meaning of any text is never completely or permanently fixed 
and there are always meanings outside of the defined meaning of a text. This is a 
feature of language as such and not something that an author or reader has control 
over. Whenever language is used, this feature of language comes to the fore and 
consequently unintended meanings always slip into the text. The preference of one 
meaning over another is always relatively arbitrary and the interpreter does not have 
any privileged or objective way of interpreting a text.  
 
                                                 
91 The idea is that any evidence of intention is either directly linguistic in nature or there is a need to 
explain the intention orally or in writing. Language is always subject to interpretation and consequently 
the intention of the author is always subject to interpretation. See De Ville Constitutional and Statutory 
Interpretation (2000) at 10. 
92 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 9. 
93 Peller “The Metaphysics of American Law” (1985) 73 California LR 1151 at 1171. 
94 Peller “The Metaphysics of American Law” (1985) 73 California LR 1151 at 1173. In short this 
means that language is relational and not simply composed of signifiers. Language has more than a 
simple pointing out function and meaning is the result of interactions between words and contexts over 
which the author does not have control. There are always also other meanings possible in a text than 
the ones intended by the author, and these are inherent in language as such. For a more complete 
discussion of post-structuralist theory see chapter 2 section 7. See also De Ville Constitutional and 
Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 10. 
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It is also necessary to look at the practice of writing history.95 Any investigation into 
the intention of the author of a text is necessarily an investigation into history. When 
interpreting history, the interpreter is always bringing his present situatedness into the 
interpretation process and as a result his own beliefs and prejudices play a role in his 
perception of history.96 There can be no objective account of history because such an 
account cannot exist.97 As De Ville reminds us, what is perceived as “facts” depends 
largely upon the questions that are asked and the interpretation method that is used.98 
The weight that will be attached to these “facts” will differ from historian to historian 
and from context to context.99 Interpreters are also subject to various personal and 
shared contextual influences and pressures that have the effect of both diversifying 
their interpretations, so that it will never be completely objective, and at the same time 
linking their interpretations with others, making a completely subjective interpretation 
impossible.100As far as the intention itself is concerned, it will never be possible to 
completely record an intention, even where it is reduced to a text. Time, space, error, 
and various contextual influences like personal preference and selection exist in any 
given situation and, combined with the linguistic difficulties, any record of intention 
is doomed to be partial and incomplete.101 All we have are traces of a past that can 
only be evoked as a rhetorical device.102
 
In most legal systems jurists realize that intentionalism is not an appropriate and 
theoretically sound interpretation strategy.103 The response to this realization is 
                                                 
95 This idea is discussed in detail in the chapter 4.  
96 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 7; De Ville “Legislative History and 
Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) TSAR 211 at 212; Jenkins Re-Thinking History (1991) at 40. 
Jenkins states “…to all past events historians bring their own mind-set programmed in the present…”. 
97 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 7; De Ville “Legislative History and 
Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) TSAR 211 at 212. 
98 De Ville “Legislative History and Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) TSAR 211 at 212. Suppose X 
stated that he will pay R120 for Y’s watch and committed that to writing, but in the presence of many 
witnesses crossed his fingers and burst out laughing. It is conceivable that the “contract” will not be 
taken to exist if the subjective intentionalist theory was employed, but the subject to the objective 
theory of intention, X might well be held liable because of the impression that his writing creates. 
99 De Ville “Legislative History and Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) TSAR 211 at 212-213. 
100 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 7-8; De Ville “Legislative History 
and Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) TSAR 211 at 213. 
101De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 8; De Ville “Legislative History and 
Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) TSAR 211 at 213. 
102 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 8-11; De Ville “Legislative History 
and Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) TSAR 211 at 213. 
103 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1180. In South Africa intentionalism, or at least the ghost of intentionalism is alive and well, especially 
in the fields of contract and wills. 
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varied. Many (in South Africa read most) theorists still look for an authoritive and 
legitimate way of justifying interpretations and the standard responses are those of 
objectivism and rule theories.104 Most of these theories are aimed at restoring the 
interpreter to his silent, uninvolved and neutral position that will render law free from 
politics.  
 
The critical responses vary from free reading theories to critical re-evaluations of the 
role of the author in legal interpretation. These will be discussed in the following 
sections. Most of the critics of intentionalism reject the assumptions intentionalists 
hold regarding language. They reject the notion that the text can somehow 
(subjectively or objectively) reflect intention and they argue that meaning is always 
interpretive in nature. 
 
4. Free reading and intention creation 
The Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, under the influence of the American 
Realists, rejects intentionalism as a theory of interpretation and proposes radically 
different strategies of interpretation. They begin by systematically dismantling the 
theoretical framework of intentionalism by way of a critical analysis. The main 
project of this group is not to propose a rival strategy of interpretation but to expose 
the flaws in the present hegemony. However, once their works are closely examined, 
an alternative strategy becomes apparent. This section focuses on the views of 
selected CLS scholars like Mark Tushnet and the theory of interpretation that they 
seem to favor. The focus will then shift to neo-pragmatist interpretation theories and 
the work of post-structuralists like Michel Foucault. 
 
Mark Tushnet, one of the leaders of the CLS movement,105 shows the inadequacy of 
intentionalism by comparing it to hermeneutics.106 In the hermeneutic tradition, 
                                                 
104 For a more elaborate discussion see chapter 2. 
105 Van Blerk Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1998) at 162. 
106 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 798. This article by Tushnet is one of very few in which a member of the 
CLS seems to pose an alternative strategy to the one criticised in the work. As a result, most of the 
analysis will focus on this article. For more CLS work on this topic see for example Schlag “Le Hors 
de Texte, C'est Moi” - The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction (1990) 11 
Cardozo LR 1631; Schlag “Normativity and the Politics of Form” (1991) 139 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 801; Gabel and Kennedy “Roll over Beethoven” (1984) 36 Stanford LR 1; Tushnet 
Red White and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (1988) passim; Gabel “Reification in 
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history is regarded as the interpretive understanding of socially situated texts, while 
interpretivism is based on the assumption that past beliefs and intentions are 
determinate and knowable.107  In the hermeneutic tradition it is argued that in order to 
fully understand the intention of another, the interpreter must enter the mind of the 
author and see the world as the author saw it and understand the world in the same 
way the author understood it.108 The ways in which persons perceive the world 
around them informs the way in which they speak and the way they understand the 
words that they use.109 Only once the interpreter shares this understanding and 
worldview with the author can she claim to know the intention of the author when she 
uses certain language. The problem with intentionalism is that its historical method 
does not allow for the discovery of these comprehensive worldviews. In fact, no 
interpretation strategy can achieve this.110 For intentionalism to effectively constrain 
interpreters, it must be able to provide something inherent in the text, a determinate 
meaning against which the validity of the interpretation can be evaluated. However, 
the hermeneutic project shows that when we enter the imaginative past we do not only 
reconstruct past events, we in fact actively construct them.111 This necessarily 
involves the interpreter and her perspectives and as a result any reconstruction of a 
history involves some indeterminacy. This indeterminacy overwhelms intentionalism 
                                                                                                                                            
Legal Reasoning” in Boyle (ed) International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory (Schools 4) 
Critical Legal Studies (1992) at 1. For criticism see Michelman & Radin “Pragmatist and Post-
structuralist Legal Practice (1993) 39 University of Pennsylvania LR 1019.  
107 Michelman & Radin “Pragmatist and Post-structuralist Legal Practice (1993) 39 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 1019 at 1029; Schlag “Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi” - The Politics of Form and the 
Domestication of Deconstruction (1990) 11 Cardozo LR 1631 at 1636-37;Tushnet “Following the 
Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” (1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 
798. Tushnet defines the hermeneutic perspectives as “…the interpretive understanding that actors give 
their actions…”. 
108 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 798. 
109 Michelman & Radin “Pragmatist and Post-structuralist Legal Practice (1993) 39 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 1019 at 1019; Schlag “Normativity and the Politics of Form” (1991) 139 University 
of Pennsylvania LR 801 at 822-824; Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of 
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” (1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 799. Tushnet puts it this way 
“…the ways in which people understand the world give meaning to the words that they use, and only 
by recreating such global understandings can we interpret the document the framers wrote…”. 
110 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 799-800; Michelman & Radin “Pragmatist and Post-structuralist Legal 
Practice (1993) 39 University of Pennsylvania LR 1019 at 1029; Schlag “Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi” 
- The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction (1990) 11 Cardozo LR 1631 at 1637. 
111 Michelman & Radin “Pragmatist and Post-structuralist Legal Practice (1993) 39 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 1019 at 1019; Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism 
and Neutral Principles” (1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 800; Schlag “Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi” - The 
Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction (1990) 11 Cardozo LR 1631  The differences 
between the past and the present necessitate such creativity in order to negotiate the gaps between 
normative realities.  
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because it is the search for intention that ultimately introduces indeterminacy into the 
interpretation process. The touchstone turns out to be a quagmire. 
 
The same problem, namely the need for an imaginative bridge over a normative 
divide, introduces a further stumbling block to intentionalism. Even where the 
reconstructive imagination allows the interpreter to enter the world (and the mind) of 
the author, it highlights not the singularity of the author’s perspective but the many 
perspectives open to him.112 Added to this is the fact that our reconstructions of the 
past are shaped by our own situatedness, which means that any reconstruction is 
simply one of many possibilities.113
 
A hermeneutic strategy of interpretation forces the interpreter to take note of the 
resemblances and dissimilarities of our social contexts and that of the author.114 This 
forces the interpreter to take seriously both his own assumptions and beliefs and those 
of the author whose work he is interpreting. Tushnet argues that this should not lead 
to despair over the divide between the author and the reader, but should spur on the 
reader to find “creative” links between the ideals of the author and that of the 
reader.115 The interpreter is urged to recognize the creative component of his 
interpretation and its implications.116 While avoiding attempts at creating the past as it 
                                                 
112 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 802. The author inhabits a world, which, like our own, is shaped by 
multiple choices and influences rather than one concrete determinate progress. The significance of each 
influence is in turn determined by a multiplicity of factors not necessarily related to, or under the 
control of the author. See also Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism 
and Neutral Principles” (1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at note 59; Michelman & Radin “Pragmatist and 
Post-structuralist Legal Practice (1993) 39 University of Pennsylvania LR 1019 at 1022-1023.  
113 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 802; Schlag “Normativity and the Politics of Form” (1991) 139 
University of Pennsylvania LR 801 at 822-824; Michelman & Radin “Pragmatist and Post-structuralist 
Legal Practice (1993) 39 University of Pennsylvania LR 1019 at 1023. Michelman & Radin remarks 
that a unitary legal vision is not the result of a unitary meaning, but rather “…that all legal thought 
feels the cultural pressure to measure its adequacy, as legal thought, against the norm of the grand 
theory…”. 
114 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 803. 
115 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 803. See also Schlag “Cannibal Moves: The Metamorphoses of the Legal 
Distinction” (1988) 40 Stanford LR 929 at 961; Schlag “Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi” - The Politics of 
Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction (1990) 11 Cardozo LR 1631 at 1626-1637. Schlag 
warns that any institutionalisation of critical method would undermine the effectiveness of such 
methods. The “creative link” Tushnet speaks of can therefore never be an institutionalized one; it must 
always be situated and context sensitive.  
116Michelman & Radin “Pragmatist and Post-structuralist Legal Practice (1993) 39 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 1019 at 1039; Schlag “Normative and Nowhere to Go” (1990) 43 Stanford LR 167 at 
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was (which is after all not possible), the reader is advised to work with the 
commonalities between the present and the past. Tushnet argues that this will bring 
the interpreter face to face with the development of our society and will leave him 
with questions about the way society is changing and where we want to take it.117
 
Hutchinson analyses and comments on the interpretation methods of the CLS.118 He 
begins by highlighting the criticism of the CLS against supposed ideological 
neutrality119 and the legal positivist project of grounding interpretation in some 
objective practice or entity. The CLS showed that there is no such thing as a neutral 
legal strategy and any interpretation is either aimed at preserving a certain hierarchy 
or destroying it. They showed that the seemingly neutral principles of property and 
legal education are actually aimed at the preservation of the existing property 
dispensation and the existing hegemony of legal education.120 The movement 
embraced the so-called “death of the author” and explores the impact of this 
theoretical shift to the fullest. The CLS aimed to show that even seemingly restrictive 
texts like the US constitution could have transformative and expansive 
interpretations.121 With an enlightened reader any text can be utilized for social 
change. Finally, the CLS aimed to liberate texts from reactionary authors and to use 
                                                                                                                                            
185; Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 803-804. Tushnet argues “…in recognizing the magnitude of the creative 
component, we inevitably lose faith in the ability of interpretivism to provide the constraints on judges 
that liberal constitutional theory demands…”. 
117 Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” 
(1983) 96 Harvard LR 781 at 804. This is the crucial part of the theory. While this may look like a kind 
of subjective intentionalism, it is not. It is a theory that requires of the reader to fashion meaning that is 
transformative. It is essentially a reader-based theory, rather than an author-based or text-based theory. 
The theory calls for social awareness from the reader and begins to formulate a sort of transformative 
reading that is aimed at influencing the development of law as such. The goal is to change the way we 
think about law and the application of law. It asks not what the text says, but what it should say. See 
also Michelman & Radin “Pragmatist and Post-structuralist Legal Practice (1993) 39 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 1019 at 1029; Schlag “Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi” - The Politics of Form and the 
Domestication of Deconstruction (1990) 11 Cardozo LR 1631 at 1636-1637. 
118 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1181-1183. Hutchinson is an adherent of CLS, but he can be described as a critical scholar. 
119 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1181. 
120 See for example writings by Duncan Kennedy on property (Kennedy “Form and Substance in 
Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 89 Harvard LR 1685; Kennedy “Distributive and Paternalist 
Motives in Contract and Tort Law” (1984) 41 Maryland LR 563) and on Law Schools (Kennedy 
“’How the Law Schools Fail’ A Polemic” (1970) 1 Yale Review of Law and Social Action 71; Kennedy 
“ The Political Significance of the Structure of the Law School Curriculum” (1983) 14 Seton Hall LR 
1). 
121 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1181. 
 171
these texts for progressive ends. These CLS insights have influenced and still 
influence critical legal thinkers. Although many of the theoretical principles (such as 
deconstruction) on which its members based their critical analyses have been around 
for some time (especially in the field of literature), the CLS application of these 
principles enjoyed theoretical endorsement last witnessed when the realist movement 
was at its zenith. Interdisciplinary research is also approached in a new light since the 
CLS made this kind of analysis more common. 
 
With all this said, the CLS movement became the victims of their own success.122 As 
Hutchinson puts it, the rebuttal of mainstream legal beliefs came at the expense of 
reader anarchy.123 Because of the radical indeterminacy of meaning of texts as 
demonstrated by CLS, texts can now mean anything, and they therefore mean 
nothing.124 The validity of an interpretation cannot be tested and any interpretation 
goes. The only constraints on meaning are imaginative ingenuity and political 
cunning.125 Herzog argues that this line of reasoning will lead to the situation where 
all texts are superfluous and all an interpreter would need is a folio with the word 
“text” written in bold.126 The reader can then proceed to read whatever he wants on 
the page, be it Shakespeare or Henry James. 
 
With the practical criticism of CLS free reader theories comes a fundamental political 
criticism. Although they are themselves transformation minded, the theoretical 
success of the CLS analysis meant that they cut the ground from under their own 
                                                 
122 Michelman & Radin “Pragmatist and Post-structuralist Legal Practice (1993) 39 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 1019 at 1022; Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 
New England LR 1173 at 1182. 
123Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1181-1182. Hutchinson states that “[a]t bottom, the spirited rebuttal to critical attempts to sabotage the 
mainstream hermeneutical project rests upon the argument that the defeat of authorial tyranny and 
political inconvenience of textual certainty has been bought at the bankrupting price of reader 
anarchy”.   
124 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1182; Michelman & Radin “Pragmatist and Post-structuralist Legal Practice (1993) 39 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 1019 at 1033. 
125 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1182. Hutchinson proclaims “…the text becomes a blank cheque that can be written in the reader’s 
preferred political currency…”  See also Coombe “Same As It Ever Was: Rethinking the Politics of 
Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill LJ 603 at 630. 
126 Herzog “As Many as Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast” (1987) 75 California LR 609 at 629. 
See also Hutchinson’s discussion of the article: “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 
26 New England LR 1173 at 1182. 
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feet.127 By denying the existence of any objective foundation to their opponents, the 
movement managed to show that any interpretation strategy, even their own based on 
need, is historically contingent, subjective and unverifiable. Any political initiative 
aimed at social change is therefore doomed from the outset. This has enormous 
implications, especially in rights theory, where previously disadvantaged persons who 
finally began to make headway had the status of their newly acquired rights 
undermined.128 The threat is that the very weapons formed to free the enslaved will be 
used to re-enslave them. The ability to politicize an interpretation means nothing if 
one does not have the power to apply the interpretation. Furthermore, if 
deconstruction alone is such a powerful weapon for transformation, deconstructive 
readings of texts should suffice as transformative strategy and the diversification of 
the author base to include more works by marginalized authors would not be 
warranted.129 While it is not desirable or theoretically defensible to argue that authors 
wholly determine the meanings of the texts they create, it is not politically justifiable 
to argue for absolute reader anarchy either. 
 
5.  Neo-pragmatism and the author 
Neo-pragmatism is a theory about the influence of an interpreter’s social situatedness 
and the influence of her interpretive community on the meanings that result from the 
interpretive process. Stanley Fish is one of the leading neo-pragmatists who work in 
both law and literature.130 In “Working on the Chain Gang” he aims specifically to 
rebut Dworkinian objective intentionalism as raised in “Law as Interpretation”.131 The 
                                                 
127 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1182-83; Michelman & Radin “Pragmatist and Post-structuralist Legal Practice (1993) 39 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 1019 at 1033. 
128 Williams “Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights” (1987) 22 Harvard 
Civil Rights- Civil Liberties LR 401 at 413 proclaims “[f]or blacks, therefore, the battle is not 
deconstructing rights, in a world of no rights: nor of constructing statements of need, in a world of 
abundantly apparent need. Rather, the goal is to find a political mechanism that can confront the denial 
of need”. 
129 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1183. Hutchinson argues ”…moreover, the introduction of woman authored texts will be of no 
consequence because, as the critics themselves amply demonstrated, the authors of texts have no 
influence over the meaning that can be attributed to their texts; the text and its meaning will be 
interpreted as its readers decree…”. 
130 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) 87-102. 
For a more detailed discussion of the work by Fish and other neo-pragmatists see section 6 in the 
Chapter 2. In this section I will work mainly with the first mentioned article since it is specifically on 
intentionalism and its influence in legal interpretation. 
131 The article by Dworkin is discussed in section 3 of this chapter. 
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first theoretical assumption that Fish wishes to rebut is the assumption that a written 
text constrains both readers and the possible meanings that can be given to the text.132 
Underlying this assumption is the belief that there is something in the text, some 
foundational meaning, which will always be attributed to the text.133 The same idea 
underlies any objective intentionalist account of meaning since an intention can only 
be found if it existed in the area of investigation prior to the search. Fish argues that 
subsequent authors are not necessarily more constrained than the first but that both are 
equally free and constrained. The first author is constrained because he intends to 
write a novel (or a contract or a will or a statute).134 When this author starts his 
endeavor he is already constrained in the sense that he must create a text that will 
qualify as a novel in relation to his own understandings of a novel, which were 
formed by his interaction with various interpretive communities in which he finds 
himself. One cannot envisage a project in textual creation without thinking within a 
set of practices or understandings surrounding the intended project.135 The text creator 
is therefore constrained by “text creating” choices and is not free to do as he 
pleases.136 In fact, there is no doing as he pleases because his preferences will be 
determined in the same way. This does not mean that the author is completely 
constrained either. The author still has a choice whether he would like to follow what 
he perceives to be the conventions for writing a novel ( or contract or will) or not. As 
Fish puts it “…he is neither free nor constrained (if those words are understood as 
referring to absolute states), but free and constrained…”.137 Neo-pragmatists reject 
                                                 
132 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 88. 
Dworkin contended that the first author in a chain enterprise is the least constrained while the 
subsequent authors are progressively more constrained. See Dworkin “Law as Interpretation” (1982) 60 
Texas LR 527 at 542. 
133 The same idea is reflected by Hart The Concept of Law (1961) at121-132 who claims that some 
texts are inherently open textured but contains a core of determinate meanings. 
134 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 89. 
135 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 89. 
Fish explains that “[o]ne cannot think of beginning a novel without thinking within, as opposed to 
thinking ‘of’, these established practices, and even if one ‘decides’ to ‘ignore’ them or ‘violate’ them of 
‘set them aside’, the actions of ignoring and violating and setting aside will themselves have a shape 
that is constrained the pre-existing shape of those practices”. 
136 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 89. 
137 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 89. He 
continues, “[h]e is free to begin any kind of novel he decides to write, but he is constrained by the finite 
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both absolute meaning determinacy and relativism. They argue instead that (relative) 
meaning determinacy is possible. 
 
The writers (interpreters) following the initial writer are equally free and constrained. 
They are free to follow any path of textual creation that they please, but they must do 
so within that which they perceive to be “ways of continuing a chain novel”.138 The 
writer must have some understanding of what the previous writer wrote and this 
interpretation is subject to the constraints that interpreter perceives from the various 
interpretive communities he is part of. The important theoretical insight is that the 
initial writer and all subsequent writers are in exactly the same position. They must 
interpret the task before them and they must proceed in one of the ways they perceive 
open to them.139 Any meaning is subject to an interpretive act and the moment that 
the interpretation is noted is always after interpretation has taken place.140 Fish shows 
that it is not something determinate in the text (like a core meaning or objective 
intention) that constrains the interpreter. The text will appear differently in the light of 
different assumptions concerning it.141
 
Fish also shows how the assumption that the text is the only fact that can constrain the 
interpreter is false. Objective intentionalists are apprehensive about judicial activism, 
especially with relation to contracts and wills. Because of the liberal supposition that 
individuals should be free to organize their own affairs as they see fit within the law, 
objective intentionalists feel that interpreters of contracts and wills should be 
constrained to only give effect to the contract or will as intended by the parties who 
created those texts.142 The idea is that something in the text will check the judge who 
                                                                                                                                            
(although not unchanging) possibilities that are subsumed in the notions ‘kind of novel’ and ‘beginning 
a novel’”. 
138 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 89. 
139 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 90. 
140 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 90. 
Fish concludes “…No matter how much or little you have, it cannot be a check against interpretation 
because even when you first ‘see” it, interpretation has already done its work…”. 
141 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 90. 
142 Many people feel that an intentionalist theory of interpretation is non-negotiable in private matters 
such as contracts and wills. While “public law” intentionalism is not absolutely necessary for the 
justification of a liberal democratic theory of rights, “private law” intentionalism is crucial. Without it 
acknowledgement of public interference in private law and even an abandonment of the distinction 
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is tempted to strike off in a direction of his own.143 Fish begins his rebuttal by arguing 
that it is hard to imagine such an “own direction”.144 The reason for this is twofold. If 
a judge decides a case on reasons that are clearly not legal reasons, his decision would 
no longer be a legal decision. Conversely, if a judge could give reasons for his 
decision, the decision would not be absolutely new, but rather a choice of one of the 
options already open to the judge.145
 
It is also important to note that one does not simply find a text. An interpreter looks at 
materials assuming that they have some or other legal purpose and only then, against 
these assumptions of legal relevance, does she “find” a text.146 Not every interpreter 
would find the same text since not every interpreter will be proceeding from the same 
assumptions of legal relevance.147 Fish shares the belief of post-structuralists that 
history or law can only be adhered to by revising it to accommodate the issues raised 
by the present.148 In other words, law remains law by re-applying it to new situations. 
This is often the issue in contractual disputes, for example regarding the applicability 
of the contract to a situation not envisaged when the contract was concluded. The 
court “breaks” the contract (in the sense that the court removes the contract from the 
context envisaged at the conclusion of the agreement) in order to test its applicability 
in this new situation. Depending on the assumptions held by the court, the court might 
either find that the contract can in fact be “extended” to cover the new situation, or 
that it cannot. The point is that the contract can only be upheld by breaking it 
                                                                                                                                            
between public and private might be necessary. This will place the entire theory of liberalism and its 
reliance on individual autonomy in danger. Compare with chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
143 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 92. 
144 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 93. 
145 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 93. 
Fish states that the direction would not be new since “…it will have been implicit in the enterprise as a 
direction one could conceive of and argue for…”. 
146 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 93. 
147 For example, adherents of the will theory of contractual liability and of the declaration theory will 
regard different materials as contractual texts in the same factual situation. Where there is a written 
document, the will theorists will most likely see it as a manifestation of a subjective intention and 
therefore include evidence of the meanings of terms in the written document, as part of the contractual 
text. Declaration theorists are likely to regard only the written document as legally significant and 
conclude that it is the full extent of contractual text. 
148 Fish “Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature” in Fish Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 94. 
See also Derrida “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” in Cornell, Rosenfeld & Gray 
Carlson (eds.) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (1992) at 23. 
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(removing it from its initial context to test its applicability in the new situation) in the 
sense just described. Objective intentionalism is no more constraining than subjective 
intentionalism because the constant in the objectivist equation (the text) turns out to 
be a variable. The only (relative) constant is one’s interpretive context. 
 
The neo-pragmatist position can therefore be summarized as follows: 1) The creators 
of texts are both free and constrained and they always act within a set of assumptions 
about their project; 2) texts cannot constrain interpreters because the texts do not exist 
before interpretation and as a result the text is always the product of the interpretation; 
and 3) the distinction between finding and creating meaning cannot be upheld since 
both are always present in the interpretive process. 
 
6.  The author and referentiality 
Michel Foucault changed the way many critical scholars think about authors.149 
Foucault begins by describing writing as an act whereby the author creates a space 
into which he constantly disappears.150 What is described here is the constant 
alienation of the writer by the text that he creates. The traces of the author disappear 
among the possible meanings that the text represents. Foucault contrasts this view 
with the perception of the role of writing in our culture.151 He highlights the 
assumption that writing immortalizes the message of the author.152 With this contrast 
between the disappearance of the author into the text and the immortilization of the 
message a paradox emerges. The work, aimed at preserving the wishes of the author, 
becomes the destroyer of those wishes,153 the mark of the author is reduced to nothing 
                                                 
149 See for example Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England 
LR 1173 at 1175. Peller also drew from Foucault’s work in Peller “The Metaphysics of American Law” 
(1985) 73 California LR 1151 at 1171-1177 where he discusses the relevance of an author from the 
post-structuralist perspective. Both were strongly influenced by Foucault “What Is an Author?” in 
Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism (1979) 141. 
150 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 142. Foucault explains “[i]n writing, the point is not to manifest or exalt the act 
of writing, nor is it to pin a subject within language; it is rather a question of creating a space into 
which the writing subject disappears”. 
151 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 142-143. 
152 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 142. This assumption is also present in contractual practice and is manifested in 
rules like the parol-evidence rule, which aims to protect the supposed certainty of written contracts. 
153 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 142. Foucault states that “the work, which once had the duty of providing 
immortality, now possess the right to kill, to be its author’s murderer”. 
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more than his absence.154 Foucault then proceeds to discuss various elements of the 
author/reader/text relationship from this basis, always keeping this difficulty between 
the preservation of the message and the alienation of the author by the message in 
mind.  
 
The first element that Foucault analyses is that of the work. he problematizes the 
association of the definition of a work with the author of the text,155 arguing that a 
work cannot be understood apart from its author, but that the relation is not a simple 
one (of an author and his writings), since that would have made it possible to situate 
the absent author and to circumvent references to him.156 The complexity of language 
and the meaning possibilities that make up a text make this impossible. Foucault is 
not asking for the reinstatement of the author in his privileged position from where 
meanings can be cast in a neutral light, but rather to show the relational nature of 
authorship.157 Since the demise of the notion of absolute authorial control over textual 
meanings, the position previously occupied by the author became vacant.158
 
Foucault also investigates the complexity inherent in the characterization of a text by 
an author’s name.159 A name does not only have a pure signification function but also 
a description function. Calling someone by his name de facto entails a description of 
the person.160 This is relevant in law because it disrupts the simplistic notion of an 
                                                 
154 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 143. 
155 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 143. The claim is often that the text can be understood apart from the author or 
in other cases that the text cannot be understood apart from the author. Foucault argues that there is 
always a little of both involved. See also chapter 2 section 7, chapter 3 section 5 and chapter 4 section 
4. 
156 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 143. 
157 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 144. Foucault describes the unity of a work as similar to the individuality of the 
author, hence the relational composition of the work. For a discussion of the Foucaultian notion of the 
individual see Rabinow (ed) Michel Foucault: Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth (1997). 
158 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 145. It seems that spaces in this sense means interpretive possibilities and 
justifications for different meanings, but also that the entity of the author as such can be analysed. 
Foucault seems to follow the last suggestion, namely an analyses of the authorship role. 
159 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 145. 
160 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 146. This is true even if we do not know the person who is the author. By 
linking the name to the author we assign various characteristics to the author for example that the 
person is a human being, a writer and a literate person. None of the terms literate person, human being 
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author as a creative entity outside of the text. The name of the author becomes a 
volatile text with unpredictable consequences for the rest of the interpretation. For 
example, in a contract a description of the parties can influence the intentions that we 
ascribe to them. If I linked the name Rudi with that of a rich person (also a “Rudi“) 
which I know, I will understand Rudi’s actions as if Rudi were rich. This happens 
because I “read” Rudi in a way that describes the author to me. Consequently, I 
ascribe intentions to Rudi that I would normally ascribe to a rich person (or my 
perception of a rich person). The names of the contracting parties will therefore 
influence my interpretation of the contract. 
 
While the name of an author might have an admittedly limited effect on the 
interpreter, the so-called author-function will have a distinct influence. Foucault 
identifies the author-functions as the classification of texts by their authors.161 An 
investigation of the origins of this author-function yielded the conclusion that the 
author-function is determined by four factors. The first is the juridical and 
institutional systems that shape the discourse in a particular society. Foucault shows 
that pre-property oriented societies did not attach the same significance to the author 
of a text as is presently the case.162 The second factor is that the types of discourses 
that a particular society deems author worthy will shift from time to time.163 Different 
genres are more strongly linked to authors in different times. Foucault illustrates that 
literary texts used to be less linked to authors while scientific texts used to be strongly 
linked to authors.164 In modern society, things are the other way around. Thirdly, the 
author-function is not the result of a spontaneous attribution of a text to its producer 
                                                                                                                                            
or writer are independent and each term brings to the interpretive act various meaning possibilities. 
Added to this already complex characterization of the author, the interpreter will often relate the name 
to that of a person that she already knows and assign similar characteristics to the author. The name of 
the author is therefore not simply a signifier but a complex description of an entity, the extent of which 
cannot always be predicted beforehand by the author himself.  
161 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 147-153. 
162 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 148. The author-function is therefore often the effect of a need for ownership to 
settle somewhere. For a text to be property is must be capable of origin for ownership to settle. 
163 “Author worthy” describes the judgement whether a text is to be identified with reference to its 
author or not. 
164 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 149 In the Middle Ages scientific texts were not validated by experiments but 
with reference to their authors. Literary texts on the other hand, were validated by their 
“…ancientness…” and not by their authors.  
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but rather the result of a series of complex and specific operations.165 These 
operations consist of a process in which we construct a rational being that can be held 
responsible for various textual phenomena (which are often contradictory).166 
Fourthly, Foucault shows that the author-function is often not associated with a real 
individual, but with several selves simultaneously. The intention of the contractual 
author, for example, is the meeting of the minds of more than one individual. The 
author is the consensus. It is clear that the author-function is not a natural process by 
which the text is linked to the author; rather, the extent and shape of the author-
function will depend upon the particular social situatedness of the text and the 
interpreter. 
 
In essence, what Foucault tries to do is to find a link between the interpretation of a 
text, the ascription of the title of author and justice. Derrida provides a vivid account 
of justice in the post-structuralist mould.167 Justice lies in the destruction of the 
previous interpretation by the prospect of the new interpretation. While law is 
deconstructable, justice is not. Justice cannot be experienced, yet there is always a call 
for justice. Justice is always singular and particular. Ultimate justice is the ultimate 
(and impossible) recognition of the other as other. The law, on the other hand, is 
always general and universal. There is a constant struggle between the universal and 
the particular, between law and justice. Deconstruction takes place in the space 
between the deconstructable and the undeconstructable. When legal interpretation 
takes place, there is tension between the particularity of the text and the generality of 
the law. The interpreter seeks both what is just in the particular circumstance and 
what is justifiable under law. 
 
When one applies the work of Foucault to this description of justice, it reveals the 
importance of the author-function within law (specifically contract law). The author-
                                                 
165 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 150. 
166 Foucault “What Is an Author?” in Harari (ed) Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (1979) 141 at 150. Foucault identifies three such operations in modern literary theory, 
namely: 1) the author provides a basis for explaining the presence of certain events in a text as well as 
their transformations, distortions and modifications; 2) the author is the principle around which unity of 
writing is build. All differences can thus be resolved with reference to maturation of the author, the 
influences he was under and an evolution of his writings; 3) the author is a source of expression that is 
manifested in various forms like letters, works and sketches and so on. 
167 Derrida “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” in Cornell, Rosenfeld & Gray 
Carlson (eds) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (1992) 1 at 13-24. 
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function is in essence a study of the particularity of the text, while at the same time 
trying to discover the reason (justification) for the text. In a contractual situation, one 
tries to recognize the particular in the text (what did the parties actually intend?), 
while at the same time linking the text to law (how must the text be effected?). 
Foucault shows that the author-function is not a “natural” or essential function of 
interpretation. Like all interpretive applications, the author-function is subject to 
context, policy and linguistic indeterminacy. The author-function helps us to 
distinguish contractual texts from other legal texts, but it does not provide those 
contractual texts with predetermined meaning. It simply provides an avenue for 
further pursuit of illusive particularity. 
 
The pursuit of particularity will of course always bring with it the need for 
justification and thus, by implication, generalisation. No text can ever be completely 
unique and at the same time completely justifiable. As long as contracts belong to the 
genre “law of contract”, the author-function will have to include the linking of the text 
with what is justifiable. As long as contracts are in language, they will have to be 
readable, and thus not completely unique. 
 
7.  Are contracts without intention necessarily unintended contracts? 
Can we have a theory of contract and contractual interpretation that is not inherently 
intentionalist? Are contracts not by definition intentionalist? Contractual interpreters 
(especially judges and arbitrators) face the dilemma that contracts are mostly 
instruments of exchange and therefore have highly localized effects; to simply 
proclaim “the author is dead” will leave this important institution vulnerable. The 
existence of contracts are strongly linked to their effects. The creation of a contractual 
text is not aimed at creating an interpretable instrument but rather at ensuring certain 
practical effects. How do we ensure that these effects come into being without 
resorting to the intention that “created” them in the first place? 
 
Two postmodern answers to this dilemma come to mind. Firstly, the neo-pragmatist 
answer. Neo-pragmatists reject both absolute meaning determinacy and relativism. 
They argue instead that (relative) meaning determinacy is possible. Neo-pragmatists 
contend that interpreters are never free enough to find whatever they please in a 
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text168 and, on the other hand, they are never completely constrained by the text.169 In 
this model, meaning is the result of the influence of interpretive communities and not 
of the interpreter, author or text. A contractual interpreter would “find” the “intention” 
of the “author” because that specific meaning exists as a possibility with relation to 
the contractual text because of the specific interpretive community in which the 
interpreter happens to find himself. This does not mean that the interpreter is 
absolutely constrained by a specific interpretive community in the sense that the 
meaning he finds is the only meaning open to him, but simply that there is a range of 
meanings open to him because of his social situatedness. He is not completely free to 
find (or create) whatever meaning he pleases. When he finds (or creates) a meaning, 
that meaning already existed as a possibility in the interpretive context of the reading.  
 
The intention of the parties to the contract is therefore a text that existed as a 
possibility in the legal system before it was created. If the text (intention) were 
completely unrelated to the legal system in the sense that the text could not possibly 
be a legally valid intention, the contract would not be a legal contract. Consequently, 
legal contractual intentions are always halfway towards recognition and are related in 
some way to interpretations already recognized as legally valid intentions. When the 
parties formulate their contract, they do so within a set of beliefs and assumptions 
already in place. As a result, the contract will largely resemble the social and legal 
understandings of what a contract will look like and other members of society with 
shared interpretive contexts will reach the same conclusions (meanings) as the parties. 
When a dispute arises, the options open to the dispute resolutor will again be 
informed by his interpretive assumptions and beliefs. In large interpretive 
communities like the South African legal community, the “intentions” of the parties 
and the interpretations of the interpreters of the text are bound to correlate most of the 
time because the interpreters and text creators share certain assumptions.  
 
                                                 
168 Fish “Is There a Text in This Class” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class: The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (1980) at 306; Levinson “Law as Literature” in Schauer (ed) Law and 
Language (1993) at 351. 
169 Fish “Is There a Text in This Class” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class: The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (1980) at 307; Fish “Fish vs. Fiss” in Fish Doing What Comes Naturally: 
Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 126; Levinson 
“Law as Literature” in Schauer (ed) Law and Language (1993) at 351-353. 
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The neo-pragmatist position can therefore be summed up as follows: 1) Although it is 
not possible to find an actual intention or an expressed intention because the nature of 
interpretation prohibits such a finding, it is possible to project (with reasonable 
accuracy) what the parties wanted to achieve with a certain contractual text. 2) This is 
possible because the parties to the contract share assumptions that influence 
interpretation with the interpreters of the text, and as a result a strong possibility exists 
that the interpreters and the parties will agree on the meaning of the text. “Intentions” 
can be known because we share assumptions regarding the possible nature of those 
“intentions”. 
 
The big problem with this type of thinking is that it leaves little room for the creativity 
and interpretive suppleness often required in the resolution of contractual disputes. 
Because the interpreter is limited to assumptions already in place, it becomes very 
difficult to justify deviation from present hegemonies and hierarchal structures of 
meaning. Any deviation from the “normal” meaning requires justification and proof 
that the new direction is in fact a “legal” direction. If a judge sought to extend or limit 
the meaning of a word, that move must be justified in some way as either the 
manifested or the actual intention of the parties to the contract. Existing hegemonies 
are protected by the illusion that there is, somehow, a general interpretive consensus. 
 
The post-structuralist response to the dilemma of interpretive justification is to turn 
the problem on its head. Instead of asking why the judge arrives at a certain meaning, 
they ask whether it is the best possible way of resolving the dispute. In other words 
the aim is not to find what the parties intended, but rather to work out the best solution 
for the problem using the text provided by the parties. In this theory the language of 
the text is not an instrument for the preservation of a meaning, but rather a means to 
provide justice in the specific circumstances before the interpreter.170 Post-
                                                 
170 For the post-structuralist definition of justice see Derrida “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation 
of Authority” in Cornell, Rosenfeld & Gray Carlson (eds) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice 
(1992) 13-24. Justice lies in the destruction of the previous interpretation by the prospect of the new 
interpretation. While law is deconstructable, justice is not. Justice cannot be experienced, yet there is 
always a call for justice. Justice is always singular and particular. Ultimate justice is the ultimate (and 
impossible) recognition of the other as other. The law, on the other hand, is always general and 
universal. There is a constant struggle between the universal and the particular, between law and 
justice. Deconstruction takes place in the space between the deconstructable and the undeconstructable. 
When a legal interpretation takes place, therefore, there is tension between the particularity of the text 
 183
structuralists argue that meaning can never be the criterion that settles arguments. 
Meaning is always contested and the arguments about the meaning of texts are always 
aimed at the acquisition of the meaning.171 As Hutchinson remarks “…meaning is 
always to be argued for and never to be argued from”.172
 
The identity of the author and his or her experiences regarding the text is neither the 
sole determinant of value nor immaterial.173 While it is theoretically impossible to 
recapture the experience of the author as the sole determinant of value and politically 
(and socially) irresponsible to attempt to do so, the interpretation of a text will 
invariably be influenced by elements such as the identity of the parties to its creation, 
the circumstances surrounding its initiation and the purpose at the heart of its 
origin.174 The reader is no more the originator of meaning than the author, since with 
all readings there is always the “…inescapable element of the parasitic or the 
plagiarized”.175 The author and the reader are in a sense products of the text and not 
the other way round. Texts are interpreted in concrete settings and the influence of the 
reader and the author is inevitable, but the extent of that influence will depend upon 
the complex codes of power that are always political.176 Intention does matter, only 
not in the way envisaged by intentionalists. 
 
What the interpreter utilizing deconstruction must be aware of is that deconstruction is 
not a rival interpretive strategy. It can be used with multiple interpretive strategies, 
                                                                                                                                            
and the generality of the law. The interpreter seeks both what is just in the particular circumstance and 
what is justifiable under law. 
171 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1185. He argues “[m]eaning can never be a ground for discourse because discourse itself encloses 
meaning. Moreover, discourse is itself never grounding for anything; it is only a site or opportunity for 
interested attempts at hermeneutical acquisition. Reading ends not with a final affixing of meaning, but 
with temporary undecidability”. 
172 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1188. 
173 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1176; De Ville “Meaning and statutory interpretation” (1999) 62 THRHR 373 at 375. 
174 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1176. Hutchinson proclaims “identity is neither entirely dispensable nor completely determinative”. 
See also De Ville “Meaning and statutory interpretation” (1999) 62 THRHR 373 at 376. 
175 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1187. 
176 Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation” (1992) 26 New England LR 1173 at 
1188; De Ville “Meaning and statutory interpretation” (1999) 62 THRHR 373 at 376; De Ville 
“Legislative History and Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) TSAR 211 at 222. De Ville remarks here, 
“…A text acquires meaning within the context that it finds itself. In other words, a text is to be 
contextualised, but then by means of a context which itself has to be constructed…”. 
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including positivism.177 Although deconstruction is often utilized as a tool for the 
destabilization of existing hierarchies of power (which just happen to be positivist in 
South Africa) and is therefore often associated with leftist politics, it is not essentially 
a reformist or leftist political tool and the interpreter could use deconstruction to serve 
various political agendas. The important issue is that the interpreter realizes that he is 
always serving some political goal, even when expressly refraining from politics.   
 
As far as contractual interpretation is concerned, the post-structuralist response to the 
problem of interpretive authority would be to replace the notion of intention as 
justification with the notion of intention as creation. Every contract contains within it 
the solution of the contractual relationship, the ideal contractual outcome. However, 
this outcome is not independent of the parties to the contract. In fact, it is inseparably 
entwined with the parties and it is the role of the interpreter and the author to 
pronounce this outcome.178 Language (itself, not its use) does not serve a political 
agenda, but interpretation always does. The interpretation of the language act that is 
the contract is an activity caught between the paradox of creation and discovery. It is a 
forceful acquisition of meaning and the label of truth is hung on to that meaning by 
the legal process. The intention of the parties does not provide the court with a 
finished product, but rather with a starting point in the interpretation process. 
Intention is this regard is not a historical-psychological moment but rather the process 
of creating a contract. The contract is only concluded once it is interpreted.179 
Therefore un-intentionalist does not necessarily mean unintended. 
                                                 
177 A good example of this is in the work of Patrick Atiyah in The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of 
Contract (1979). In this book he uses deconstructive strategies to prove that the age of freedom of 
contract has passed. In its place he proposes an essentially positivist model of reliance liability. 
178 Ian MacNeil developed a modernist contractual theory called the relational theory of contract (see 
for example articles in “Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions - A Symposium in Honour 
of Ian MacNeil” in (2000) 84 North West University LR 737-852. The entire volume is dedicated to 
articles flowing out of the symposium. I was first alerted to the set of articles by Schemedemann 
“Beyond Words: An Empirical Study of the Role of Context in Contract Creation” (2003) 55 South 
Carolina LR 145 at 149). This theory is based on the belief that contracts are not relations between 
autonomous individuals, but rather the result of complex social relations and connections. MacNeil 
(and his followers) argue that contracts can only be analysed by identifying the most important social 
facts that give rise to the contract. When, for example, reading a contract of sale, the interpreter is 
required to also keep in mind the reasons why the seller wants to sell and why the buyer wants to buy. 
A detailed analysis of this theory of contract is beyond the scope of this study, but it is very useful as 
an alternative version of contractual relations and intentionalism. It shows that contracts are not 
necessarily liberal institutions and the demise of intentionalism need not prove fatal to contracts as we 
know them. 
179 This is not a once off interpretation but rather the process to make sense of the contract even while it 
is being formulated. The paradox is that a contract can be concluded even before it is finalized. 
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 8.  Conclusion 
Intentionalism can be divided into two streams, namely subjective intentionalism, 
which involves the search for actual historical psychological intention, and objective 
intentionalism, the belief that any intention can be gleaned from the evidence of the 
contract like the contractual text. The main criticism against subjective intentionalism 
is that 1) it portrays intentions in an overly simplistic way; 2) it is based on untenable 
assumptions about historical discovery; and 3) it necessitates abstraction of the text 
and the parties from the historical and social circumstances that inform their 
decisions. Objective intentionalism is criticized for 1) its lack of accountability of 
interpreters using this type of interpretation and; 2) the linguistic fallibility of 
intention deduction because intention is always already an interpretation and can 
therefore never be objective. Responses to the failure of intentionalism vary from a 
retreat into positivism to the advocacy of free reading theories. The CLS movement 
advocated a free reading theory based on the social situatedness of the reader and the 
developments since the inceptions of the text. The reader is urged to take serious 
notice of the transformative capabilities of the text and to interpret the text in a matter 
that will adapt the text to serve the needs of the situation. Later critical writers point 
out that this radical undermining of interpretation nullifies the transformative potential 
of for example feminism and rights/race theories. The problem with indeterminacy is 
that it is totally subjected to the power relations in society. Interpretations are 
indeterminate for everybody, and the prevailing meaning is necessarily that of the 
powerful.  
 
Neo-pragmatism offers an alternative theory about the nature of interpretation and the 
origin of meaning. Neo-pragmatists argue that the reader and the author are in the 
same position in that both are subject to the constraining influence of interpretive 
communities. They reason that an interpreter is always already constrained in the 
meaning possibilities open to her, but that she is also free to choose since she is part 
of various interpretive communities, each with its own constraints and freedoms. 
Post-structuralists seek to return the original difficulty to the interpretation process. 
They argue that the relation between author-text-reader is not a simple one and that 
the extent of the influence of one on the other is not stable but subject to continuous 
substitution and change. Both the author and the reader play a role in this theory, their 
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influence determined by the dominant political and social hegemony. In order to come 
to a just (and justifiable) interpretation, serious attention must be paid to the intention 
(as a process not a moment), but intention does not and cannot guide interpretation on 
its own.180  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
180 For a discussion of the distinction between a just and a justifiable interpretation see JWG van der 
Walt “Frankly Befriending the Fundamental Contradiction: Frank Michelman and Critical Legal 
Thought” in Botha, AJ van der Walt & JWG van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a 
Transformative Constitution (2003) 213-226 at 218-219. 
 187
Reprise 
 
During the first part of this thesis, four themes where discussed: 1) the nature of 
interpretation; 2) the nature of personhood; 3) the process by which texts are defined, 
and; 4) the nature of intentionalism. 
 
As far as interpretation is concerned, the main questions were: To what extent is 
interpretation determinate? How and to what extent can an interpreter be constrained 
by the language and context of the text and interpretive rules? Most liberal 
interpretation theories (of which the present contractual interpretation theory is one) 
teach that the interpreter can be constrained by the objective meaning of the text, by 
interpreting the text in the context in which it was created and by setting down 
interpretive rules to facilitate the interpretation process. In this way the interpreter can 
be absconded from interpretive responsibility, and the consequences of the text can be 
solely ascribed to the authors thereof. This is especially pertinent in contractual 
interpretation where the interpretation practice is inherently intentionalist. However, 
postmodern literary theory, especially with regards to neo-pragmatism and post-
structuralism, exploded the notion that the interpreter can escape interpretive 
responsibility. In the place of this notion, it is proposed that the interpreter is always 
influential in the interpretation process and that the text will by nature always include 
meaning other than the ones intended by the authors of the text. Instead of trying to 
justify their interpretations, interpreters are urged to take responsibility for their 
interpretations and to try to find the best possible answer to each interpretive 
dilemma.  
 
The second theme of part I was the nature of personhood. In liberal theory, 
individuals are regarded as autonomous, self-activating and interest bearing, while 
society is seen as the sum of individual preferences. Liberal theorists advocate the 
maximisation of individual autonomy. Contractual parties are regarded as autonomous 
persons who decide the consequences of their contract and, provided they make their 
intentions known unambiguously, effect must be given to their wishes. On the other 
hand, communitarians regard the individual as a product of society. They encourage a 
return to group values and communal interests in the place of individualistic self-
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pursuits. Communitarian contracts are interpreted in a way that serves the collective 
aims of society rather than the interests of the parties to the agreement. Critical 
theorists reject both the liberal conception of the self and the communitarian 
communal interest models. Critical self-rule, an ideal (as supposed to an actual or 
descriptive) critical theory of personhood, is suggested as an alternative to liberalism 
and communitarianism. This theory involves an interpretive notion of individuality, 
where the self engages in constant critical reflection regarding the nature of his 
existence. In the field of contractual interpretation this involves re-determination of 
the needs and rights of the parties each time they are confronted by a new (often 
unforeseen) situation. 
 
The definition of texts, as the third theme of part I, involved an analysis of traditional 
characterization of texts as records apart from other texts and also of the parol-
evidence rule as the premier rule dealing with texts. Both the traditional 
characterization and the parol-evidence rule (at least as it is presently applied) rest on 
the assumption that language has a functional nature. Texts are subsequently regarded 
as records of the intention of the author and moment when the contract is reduced to 
writing is regarded as the moment when the intention of the author is preserved and 
set apart from other texts. Post-structuralists criticize the functionalist description of 
language and in its place propose that language has a metaphoric and normative 
character. They argue that texts are never “found” but rather created through 
interpretation. On a practical level, this means that contracts are “created” or 
“defined” when they are applied in concrete situations. There is no final definition of 
the contractual text as long as there are potential situations in which the contract 
might find application. 
 
The final theme of part I was that of intentionalism and the role of the author during 
interpretation. Contractual interpretation is explicitly based on intentionalism, that is: 
The aim of interpretation is to ascertain the intentions of the authors of the contract. 
There are two types of intentionalism namely subjective intentionalism which 
involves a search for the actual intentions of the authors at the conclusion of the 
contract, and objective intentionalism, which involves an objective interpretation of 
the text to ascertain the objectively manifested intentions of the authors.  While most 
contractual theorists agree that ours is a subjective intentionalist interpretation 
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practice, many of the rules of interpretation have an objective intentionalist working. 
Various criticisms of intentionalism were discussed including those expressed by the 
CLS, neo-pragmatists and post-structuralists. Analyses of these criticisms led to the 
realization that contracts cannot but be interpreted with the parties in mind, but that 
contractual interpretation need not necessarily be intentionalist. By re-imagining the 
role of the author as an influence on (but not sole determinant of) meaning, and by 
approaching intention as an interpretation rather than a restraint, contractual 
interpretation can be flexible while at the same time retaining protection for the 
wishes of the parties.  
 
In part II various rules of contractual interpretation are analysed in order to 
demonstrate both the effect of theoretical assumptions regarding interpretation, legal 
subjectivity, the definition of texts and intention on the application of the rules and 
also to show how acceptance of postmodern interpretative theory would potentially 
impact on the application of these interpretation rules. 
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6 
Theory and the rules of contractual interpretation 
 
1. Introduction 
Three central themes, namely the golden rule of interpretation, the parol-evidence rule 
and good faith (bona fides), have been selected for discussion because of their 
importance for the theoretical understanding of the three main elements of contractual 
interpretation, namely intention (in a subjective historical sense), text (as a record) 
and person (as an autonomous subject). The golden rule concerns intention, the parol-
evidence rule is relevant for the definition of texts and bona fides relates to legal 
subjectivity. By studying the effect of a theoretical shift regarding interpretation on 
the application of the three “rules”, one can glimpse the nature of a postmodern 
contractual interpretation practice. 
 
In the preceding chapters aspects regarding prevailing contractual interpretation 
practices were evaluated against postmodern insights, the conclusion being that the 
present practice is based on certain specific theoretical misconceptions. This chapter 
evaluates the implications of a shift from the present interpretive theory to a more 
responsive postmodern (specifically post-structuralist and neo-pragmatist) theory of 
contractual interpretation. This evaluation will focus on various rules of contractual 
interpretation and explore the likely influence of a post-structuralist approach on the 
operation of these rules.  
 
Before moving on to the specific rules of interpretation, a short overview of the South 
African contractual interpretation practice is provided. After this overview, first to be 
considered is the so-called golden rule of interpretation which is specifically 
concerned with the intention of the parties to the contract. Analysis of the golden rule 
yields proposals regarding its operation in an alternative postmodern interpretation 
theory. The focus then shifts to the parol-evidence rule, which is also discussed in 
some detail in chapter 4.1 Here it will be approached from a post-structuralist/neo-
pragmatist interpretation perspective in order to determine its continued viability. In 
                                                 
1 In this chapter the parol-evidence rule was analysed with the purpose of exposing the assumptions 
about the nature of texts in the present contractual interpretation theory. 
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the penultimate section, the role of good faith (bona fides) as a factor in contractual 
interpretation is analyzed. Specific attention is paid to the relationship between the 
notion of dialogic self-rule and a contractual interpretation process based on good 
faith. In the final section, the conclusions of the chapter are drawn 
 
2. A brief overview of the application of contractual rules of interpretation  
In South Africa contracts are said to be based on consensus or a reliance on consensus 
and the aim of contractual interpretation is to ascertain the content of this consensus in 
order to give legal effect to the contract.2 As previously pointed out, our interpretation 
practice is of an intentionalist nature: The claim is that intention can be extracted from 
a contractual text by the application of rules.3  
 
2.1 Classification and systemization 
The rules reveal features of both subjective and objective intentionalism.4 Most 
authors agree that the search for actual intention must first be accommodated, but that 
it would often be necessary, if subjective intentionalist rules fail, to resort to objective 
intentionalist and finally normative rules to settle the dispute.5 Consequently, rules 
directed at revealing the actual intention are recognised in concert with rules 
concerned rather with the impression created by the contract (objective intention).6 
According to Van der Merwe et al, there are three classes of interpretive rules: 1) 
primary rules; 2) secondary rules; and, 3) tertiary rules.7 These “classes” pertain to the 
order in which the rules are applied, starting with the primary rules and, provided no 
                                                 
2 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 279. 
3 See chapter 2 section 3 and 4; chapter 3 section 2; chapter 5 section 2 and 3; chapter 5 sections 2 and 
3. 
4 See chapter 5 sections 2 and 3. 
5 See for example Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 4; 
Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract (2002) at 383; Fouchè Legal Principles of Contracts and 
Negotiable Instruments (2002) at 108; Joubert The General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) at 
59. 
6 See for example Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 29; chapter 5 
section 2 where the criticism on the literalist-cum-intentionalist interpretation practice is discussed.  
7 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 280. Keep in mind that “rules” as used 
here includes rules and presumptions. Although none of the other authors expressly accept the 
classification of the interpretive rules as primary, secondary and tertiary, most accept that subjective 
intentionalist rules (aimed at retrieving the actual intention of the authors) must first be applied, and if 
the ambiguity persists, then objective intentionalist rules must be applied and in the final instance if all 
else fails, normative considerations should be applied to bring the matter to a close. See for example 
Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract (2002) at 383; Fouchè Legal Principles of Contracts and 
Negotiable Instruments (2002) at 108; Joubert The General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) at 
59. 
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clear answer regarding the meaning of the text emerges, moving on to the secondary 
rules and so on.   
 
The primary rules regulate the search for the actual intention.  Should the application 
to the document of these rules, which include presumptions like the ordinary meaning 
presumption and the ordinary business meaning presumption, give the court a clear 
indication of the intention of the parties, no further interpretation is deemed necessary.  
If the primary rules fail to give a clear indication of the intention of the parties, the 
secondary rules would be applied. These rules are not aimed at ascertaining the actual 
intention of the parties, but rather at objectively appraising the meaning of the 
contract. Secondary rules require, inter alia, that the nature and purpose of the contract 
be considered, and that written words on a printed contract be given preference. The 
eiusdem generis rule, which states that general meanings are restricted when used in 
concert with words relating to a specific class and the expressio unius rule, which 
states that special reference to a specific subject excludes subjects that would 
otherwise have been implied in the circumstances, find application.8 Where there are 
two possible interpretations, one valid and one not, the contract will be interpreted so 
as to be valid. Penalty clauses are strictly construed to minimise their effect. The bona 
fides interpretation principle9 is also relevant here. The principle involves an 
interpretation of an ambiguous term as if the contractual parties were fair, honest and 
had an equitable result in mind. This principle is a departure from the assumption that 
parties to the contract are self-regulating and autonomous beings that make their 
intentions known unambiguously. As with the primary rules, if the court can resolve 
any ambiguity using the secondary rules, the process stops here. 
 
If the ambiguity persists after the application of the secondary rules, the court will 
apply the tertiary rules in respect of the text as identified by the parol-evidence rule. 
These rules are aimed at bringing the interpretation process to a close rather than 
finding the intention of the parties.10 Two rules are relevant here:11 According to the 
                                                 
8 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 282. 
9 In South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 340, the court 
proclaims that it will sometimes follow the most just interpretation of the contract where the parties’ 
intention is not clear.  See also Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 283 and fn 
353.  
10 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 283. 
11 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 284-285. 
 193
quod minimum rule, words of doubtful meaning must be construed so as to put the 
least possible burden on the debtor. The contra proferentem rule teaches that contracts 
must be construed against the party on behalf of whom the contract was formulated. 
These rules are applied as a last resort. 
 
2.2 Text/context 
The application of these rules is influenced by the parol-evidence rule which purports 
to demarcate/identify the text as the subject matter of the interpretative process where 
there is a written document which is claimed to be a memorial of the contract. On the 
traditional understanding of the parol-evidence rule, the document is in principle 
regarded as the exclusive memorial of the transaction and it therefore constitutes the 
text to which the primary rules/golden rule of interpretation and the secondary rules 
have to be applied in order to extract the intention of the parties to the contract.  The 
extent to which regard may be had to the factual context of the contract to understand 
the meaning of words in the document is regulated by the interpretation rule12 (as a 
part of the parol-evidence rule).  The parol-evidence rule is in a state of flux and the 
recent developments are considered below. 
 
The rules discussed in this chapter are mostly primary and secondary rules. The 
golden rule of interpretation is discussed because it is the most important “tool” for 
the discovery of intention. It is also one of the first rules to be applied to all contracts. 
The parol-evidence rule is important because it is relevant to all written contracts and 
plays a crucial role during the process by which the contractual text is defined. The 
role of bona fides during interpretation is discussed because it is the most prominent 
“principle” dealing with the attributes ascribed to the contractual parties.  At present it 
(bona fides) plays only a minor role: Principles of bona fides (as corrective 
interpretive measures) are not regarded as relevant during the application of the 
primary rules because the default conception of a contractual party is that of a self-
regulating and autonomous being that makes her intentions known unambiguously. 
Only if she fails to make her intentions known unambiguously, may the court (when 
                                                 
12 This rule regulates the admissibility of external evidence once the document has been found to be an 
exclusive memorial of the contract. 
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applying the secondary rules) interpret the contract as if the contractual parties 
intended a just result. 
 
By analysing and discussing these rules, the reader can evaluate the potential 
influence of the theories discussed in the preceding chapters for contractual 
interpretation and specifically the application of contractual rules of interpretation. 
 
3. The golden rule 
3.1. How it works 
 
“…The golden rule applicable to the interpretation of all contracts is to ascertain and to follow 
the intention of the parties; and, if the contract itself, or any evidence admissible under the 
circumstances, affords a definite indication of the meaning of the contracting parties, then it 
seems to me that a court should always give effect to that meaning…”13
 
The golden rule entails the following: First, the ordinary meaning of each word of the 
contract is assessed in the context provided by the contract. This is done by simply 
reading the contract. Then the relevant provision is interpreted, starting with the 
individual words, understood in conjunction with surrounding phrases and paragraphs 
and eventually the full grammatical context provided by the document in order to try 
and ascertain the meaning of the relevant sections. All the words are constructed 
separately and jointly because of the presumption that all the words are included in 
the text for a reason. Therefore all the words are first read in isolation, then in the 
context of smaller parts (phrases) and then bigger parts (paragraphs, sections).14 
Unless it is clearly not the intention of the parties, the words are also afforded the 
meaning that they will usually have in the business usage of which the contract forms 
part.15 The interpreter then arrives at what can be described as the ordinary meaning 
                                                 
13 Innes J in Joubert v Enslin 1910 AD 6 at 37. See also Rand Rietfontein Estates Ltd v Cohn 1937 AD 
317 at 324; Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v Morgenstern Family Estates (Pty) Ltd 1980 (1) SA 796 (A) at 803; 
Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 940-1; Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway’s Contract: 
Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 447 and 451; Kerr The Principles of The Law of Contract 
(2002) at 386. 
14 The courts sometimes approach this process inversely, that is first the big parts then the smaller parts 
and so on. See for example Swart en ‘n Ander v Cape Fabrix (Pty) Ltd 1979 (1) SA 195 (A). 
15 See for example Columbia Nitrogen Corporation v Royster Company 451 F. 2d 3 (1971) at 7. In this 
American case the court found that “will deliver 31000 tons of phosphate” actually means “projects to 
deliver 31000 tons of phosphate if the market forces allow”. See also Fish “The Law Wishes to Have a 
Formal Existence” in Norrie (ed) Closure or Critique: New Directions in Legal Theory (1993) at 165. 
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of the contract. During this stage a preliminary idea is formed about the meaning of 
the contract. Finally the preliminary contractual text, together with its ordinary 
meaning, is tested against all extrinsic evidence that may be admissible about the 
actual intention of the parties to the contract.16 During this stage, the parol-evidence 
rule (the integration rule) will play an important role. The full extent of the contract is 
also decided during this stage, involving both the ordinary meaning of the text and the 
so-called intention of the parties as evident from the admissible evidence. During this 
stage the substantive presumptions will play a role, as the intention of the parties and 
its enforceability are evaluated. 
 
In South Africa, the interpretation of contracts is based on the so-called historical-
psychological intention of the parties to the contract (that is the intention actually held 
by the parties at the conclusion of the contract).17 It is therefore not suprising that the 
primary rule of contractual interpretation is aimed at retrieving this intention.18 It 
should be kept in mind that the rule will usually be relevant when the parties do not 
agree about the meaning of the text, but it can also be relevant when they do agree.19 
The application of the rule involves various presumptions and rules of interpretation, 
and no understanding of the rule would be complete without a discussion of these 
“auxiliary” rules. Jansen JA explained the process by which the golden rule of 
interpretation must be applied in Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v Morgenstern Family Estates 
(Pty) Ltd.20 He stated that the most important part of the interpretation of the contract 
                                                                                                                                            
The position in South Africa is comparable. In one case the court found that the words “prairie fires” 
meant “veld fire” in the South African insurance context. See West Rand Estates Ltd v New Zealand 
Insurance Co Ltd 1925 AD 245 at 252. See for further examples Donovan v Turffontein Estate Co I 
(1895) 2 OR 298 at 304; Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v Morgenstern Family Estates (Pty) Ltd 1980 (1) SA 
796 (A) at 803; Finbro Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Bloemfontein 1985 (4) SA 773 (A) at 
777 and 791-792; Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 122. 
16 See section 4 of this chapter for discussion of the parol-evidence rule, which deals primarily with the 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence. 
17 Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway’s Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 
451; Kerr The Principles of The Law of Contract (2002) at 41 and 388. Van der Merwe et al Contract: 
General Principles (2003) at 20 and 279. The party who alleges his interpretation must not only prove 
that his interpretation of the contract is the correct interpretation, but also that it is the common 
intention of the parties. 
18 Kerr The Principles of The Law of Contract (2002) at 386. 
19 Kerr The Principles of The Law of Contract (2002) at 387. When the parties do agree, the court will 
normally give effect to the meaning they commonly hold. See Breed v Van den Berg and Others 1932 
AD 283 at 292; Telkom Suid-Afrika Bpk v Richardson 1995 (4) SA 283 (A) at 193. 
20 Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v Morgenstern Family Estates (Pty) Ltd 1980 (1) SA 796 (A) at 803; Lubbe & 
Murray Farlam and Hathaway’s Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 446. This 
approach was indorsed in Coopers & Lybrand and Others v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 768. 
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is the straightforward reading of the text,21 which must provide the interpreter with a 
general picture of the contract.22 This first step introduces the first presumption vital 
to the application of the golden rule, namely that words are taken to bear their 
ordinary meaning. This presumption is often called the ordinary meaning rule but 
usually serves as a presumption rather than a rule.23
 
The presumption that the words are used in their ordinary sense entails that the 
interpreter must attach to the words of the contract their ordinary meaning in relation 
to the way they are used in the contract.24 This presumption is justified by the 
assumption that the parties have a shared understanding of language and that there 
exists (on a general level) a degree of consensus about the meaning of words.25 In 
                                                 
21 Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v Morgenstern Family Estates (Pty) Ltd 1980 (1) SA 796 (A) at 803. He 
stated that “… At the risk of stating the obvious, it must be pointed out that the first step in interpreting 
a written contract is to read it…”. I for one believe that such a statement is not a “stating of the 
obvious”. Lawyers tend to forget (often in the dust of battle) that the contract is more than the clause 
that is the origin of the dispute. Many disputes can be resolved with reference to the whole, since the 
whole tends to give a bigger picture of the relationship than a localized focus on the disputed clauses. 
See also Swart en ‘n Ander v Cape Fabrix (Pty) Ltd 1979 (1) SA 195 (A). 
22 Jansen JA calls this “...attaching to each word that ordinary meaning (of the several which the word 
undoubtedly will bear) which the context seems to require and applying the common rules of 
grammar…”. (Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v Morgenstern Family Estates (Pty) Ltd 1980 (1) SA 796 (A) at 
803.) Kerr reminds us that the contract must reflect that the parties did in fact intend to enter a binding 
agreement. If the text does not reflect this it cannot be regarded as a contract and the interpretation 
stops at this stage. It must also be clear that the parties intended to contract with each other.  See Kerr 
The Principles of The Law of Contract (2002) at 45, 49 and 51-2. 
23 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 121. A presumption 
differs from a rule in the sense that presumptions are foundational norms or background norms while 
rules are generally aimed at regulating a specific situation. Presumptions are those conditions that the 
courts deem to be the normal conditions under which a text will be created and understood. In other 
words they embody expectations held by the court regarding the contract (or type of contract). Rules on 
the other hand are aimed at transforming or regulating behaviour in a very specific manner. A rule that 
persons must stop at a stop sign regulates behaviour in that most people will be expected  to stop at the 
sign (they can be forced to stop), while a presumption that persons stop at stop signs means that we will 
act, unless the contrary is proven, as if people stop at stop signs. See also Du Plessis Re-Interpretation 
of Statutes (2002) at 149-154. The utility of presumptions lies in the “background” (default meanings 
that the parties do not have to prove) that they provide to contractual interpretation. This background 
makes it possible for the parties to conclude an agreement without having to resort to recording every 
minute detail. Cornelius states, “…When parties reduce their contract to writing, a great deal inevitably 
remains unsaid. The purpose of the presumptions is to fill the resultant gaps…”. See Cornelius 
Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 118. 
24 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 121. Many theorists 
see the potential problems regarding the application of this issue as a rule rather than a presumption. 
The potential problems that are highlighted relate mostly to the intentionalist dilemma of finding an 
interpretive system that allows for swift and simple meaning generation while also catering for the need 
to find exactly what the parties intended. See Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway’s Contract: 
Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 453; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 
(2003) at 280. 
25 See Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway’s Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) 
at 453. The authors also note that a fair amount of criticism on the ordinary meaning presumption 
exists and that the courts do not look at the ordinary meaning presumption as an absolute.  
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other words, it is presumed that the words used in the contract bear the same meaning 
that they would usually bear in relation to the business area in which the contract was 
concluded. 
 
The presumption that words were used in their ordinary business sense also allows the 
court the opportunity to look at the context, purpose and nature of the contract. Words 
have many ordinary meanings, and it is recognized that the meaning that seems 
natural or ordinary in a contract will often be a product of the context of the text. The 
word “shoot” will have two different meanings in the film industry and on a firing 
range respectively. The ordinary meaning attached to a word will be the meaning that 
seems natural in the context created by the contract (and of course the context in 
which the contract was created).26 Because the contract provides the context that will 
ultimately strongly influence the eventual “ordinary meaning”, courts have used the 
presumption that a word will be taken to mean what the word ordinarily means in the 
business or trade in which the contract was concluded.27  This introduces the first 
departure from the actual intention of the parties during the application of the golden 
rule. A presumption is the point of departure, and it seems strange that a rule aimed at 
finding exactly what the parties meant with the contract is realized by means of a 
presumption informed by general business meanings rather than the intention of 
                                                 
26 Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v Morgenstern Family Estates (Pty) Ltd 1980 (1) SA 796 (A) at 803. Kerr The 
Principles of The Law of Contract (2002) at 385 uses the striking example of insurance contracts 
originally drafted in one country and later used in another country where the same concepts bear 
different names. See for example West Rand Estates Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd 1925 AD 
245 at 252; Incorporated General Insurances Ltd v Shooter t/a Shooter’s Fisheries 1987 (1) SA 842 
(A) at 858; The Wave Dancer: Nel v Toron Screen Corporation (Pty) Ltd And Another 1996 (4) SA 
1167 (A) at 1178; Van Zyl NO v Kiln Non-Marine Syndicate no 510 of Lloyds of London 2003 (2) SA 
440 (SCA) at 443. 
27 Donovan v Turffontein Estate Co I (1895) 2 OR 298 at 304; West Rand Estates Ltd v New Zealand 
Insurance Co Ltd 1925 AD 245 at 252; Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v Morgenstern Family Estates (Pty) Ltd 
1980 (1) SA 796 (A) at 803; Finbro Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Bloemfontein 1985 (4) 
SA 773 (A) at 777 and 791-792; Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa 
(2002) at 122. This interpretive strategy looks very much like purposive interpretation. The ratio of this 
type of interpretation is most likely that words commonly used in some or other sphere of business, 
were used in the contract to attain the type of performance that they typically signify in the ordinary 
run of that type of business. In First National Bank of SA Ltd v Rosenblum and Another 2001 (4 ) SA 
189 (SCA) at 196 Marais JA remarks “…it is perhaps necessary to emphasise that the task is one of 
interpretation of the particular clause and that caveats regarding the approach to the task are only points 
of departure. In the end the answer must be found in the language of the clause read in the context of 
the agreement as a whole in its commercial setting and against the background of the common law and, 
now, with due regard to any possible constitutional implication…”. 
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parties themselves.28 Our courts will often only depart from the ordinary meaning 
presumption if it will lead to absurdity.29  
 
After the application of the presumption that words bear their ordinary meaning, the 
interpreter arrives at a prima facie meaning of the contract.30 There might still be 
discrepancies between the meanings of the words (if taken in isolation) and the 
combinations of words (phrases and sentences) in the document as a whole. For the 
purpose of integrating the meanings of the individual words, phrases and sentences, 
the contractual text (of which the extent has now been decided) is read as a whole, 
and the meanings of the smaller parts may be modified to relate and integrate the 
meanings into one coherent whole.31 The need for the modification of the meanings 
of words and phrases that clash with the meaning of the coherent whole lies in the 
presumption that there are no superfluous words in a contract.32  This presumption 
simply entails that all the words in the contract must be regarded as being there for a 
purpose. In normal circumstances, where at least some sensible meaning can be 
attached to the individual words of the text in relation to the whole, the individual 
words will have a bearing on the eventual meaning of the contract as a whole. As 
explained so far, the text embodies a range of possible meanings, and the outcome of 
                                                 
28 It resembles an objective intentionalist presumption, and it is presumably aimed at easing the 
evidentiary burden on the parties. The onus would be on the party seeking to prove that her version of 
the contractual meaning (as agreed on by both parties) is one that deviates from the accepted business 
use of the word. It is interesting to note that the contract is informed by a source external to the 
negotiations of the parties, namely business practice. The applicable business practice is also a factual 
question to be answered in the trial, and the type of contract will have a large bearing on the type of 
business practices that will be deemed applicable. 
29 Kalil v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1967 (4) SA 550 (A) at 556; Racec (Mooifontein) (Pty) Ltd v 
Devonport Investment Holding Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 299 (W) at 302.  Courts are not allowed to 
deviate from the ordinary meaning of the words even where adherence will lead to a harsh bargain for 
one party. See for example Rapp and Maister v Aronovsky 1943 WLD 68 at 74; Rashid v Durban City 
Council 1975 (3) SA 920 (D) at 925; Robin v Guarantee Life Assurance Co Ltd 1984 (4) SA 558 (A) at 
566; Smith NO and Another v Van Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd and Another 2002 (2) SA 613 (D) at 623; 
Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway’s Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 454; 
Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 281-282. 
30 Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v Morgenstern Family Estates (Pty) Ltd 1980 (1) SA 796 (A) at 803. Jansen 
remarks that “…Thus we may arrive at a prima facie meaning of each word, phrase and sentence…”. It 
is conceivable that the meanings of the words as opposed to the phrases and the phrases as opposed to 
the sentences (which in many contacts can be a long as an entire paragraph) may differ in meaning 
since meaning is often combinatorial in nature. See also Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway’s 
Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 451-3. 
31 Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v Morgenstern Family Estates (Pty) Ltd 1980 (1) SA 796 (A) at 803; Sun 
Packaging (Pty) Ltd v Vreulink 1996 4 SA 176 (A) at 184; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General 
Principles (2003) at 281. 
32 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 123; Van der Merwe 
et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 281. 
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the interpretation process will depend largely upon the choice of combinations that the 
interpreter will use. In other words, the contractual text embodies a whole range of 
linguistic meaning possibilities and the task of the interpreter is to identify the 
meaning(s) intended by the parties.33
 
In the process of applying the golden rule of interpretation, the interpreter is now at 
the stage where she has formed some idea of what the contract means. In the objective 
intentionalist theories of interpretation, the process would stop here, since the aim is 
to arrive at the intention of the parties as it is evident from the contractual text.34 
Subjective intentionalists have to search further for the actual intention of the parties. 
As Jansen JA states “… it may be necessary to modify further the meanings thus 
arrived at so as to conform to the apparent intention of the parties…”.35 This 
remarkable statement shows that the golden rule is more than an instrument to 
interpret the contractual text. It is in fact an investigation (within the limits of the law 
of evidence and the parol-evidence rule) into the “text” (or context) surrounding the 
contractual text (as delineated in the interpretation process). It can include a 
modification of the meaning of the contractual text (as appears from the first reading) 
in order to bring the contractual outcomes (which depend upon the interpretation) in 
line with the perceived intention of the parties.36 In this sense, the golden rule affords 
the interpreter the chance to modify or even contradict the meanings of the contractual 
text (as read alone) in favour of a meaning revealed by evidence of the agreement 
(which might include evidence other than the contractual text). The golden rule of 
                                                 
33 The process itself begins to resemble more of a cutting process as described by Foucault than an 
extraction of meaning. See Rainbow Foucault: The Foucault Reader (1986) at 88; chapter 4 section 3. 
34 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 29. Cornelius states 
here that “[w]ords are the primary and main source of information from which the intention of the 
parties should be ascertained and an interpreter may not venture beyond the words of the text to 
determine the meaning thereof”. This is also mostly the case in (originalist and literalist-cum-
intentionalist) statutory interpretation, where the meaning of the statute must be ascertained from the 
statute alone. For the role of historical interpretation see Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 
at 259-270. 
35 Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v Morgenstern Family Estates (Pty) Ltd 1980 (1) SA 796 (A) at 803. The 
intention the interpreter has in mind here is the intention held by the parties at the moment of 
conclusion of the agreement. Also, the prevailing theory (subjective intentionalism) is aimed at 
ascertaining the thoughts behind the words rather than the meaning of the words themselves. Therefore, 
if the original intention of the parties can be found, effect must be given to that intention rather than the 
meanings revealed by the words alone.  See Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in 
South Africa (2002) at 18. 
36 Jansen JA supports this contention with reference to the early decision of Joubert v Enslin 1910 AD 
37. At 38 Innes J argued that the intention of the parties should be followed if “…the contract itself, or 
any evidence admissible under the circumstances affords a definite indication of the meaning of the 
contracting parties (my emphasis)…”. 
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interpretation is therefore not strictly a rule of interpretation (in the sense of meaning 
finding) but rather a rule of contractual construction (in the strong sense).37
 
 Upon closer scrutiny, the application of the golden rule includes references to the 
purpose of the contract as well as the wider contractual context.38 Purposive or 
teleological interpretation is not uncommon in statutory construction, but this strategy 
is very seldom explicitly used in contractual interpretation.39 The aim of teleological 
interpretation is to read the text in close relation with the purpose for which the text 
was created.40 As Du Plessis points out, purposive interpretation goes hand in hand 
with contextual interpretation.41 Any theory of purpose (of the text) necessarily 
involves a theory of context. The purpose of a contract is not freestanding, but 
connected to the parties and the specific context(s) in which they find themselves.42 
Also, like any other part of the contract, the purpose of the contract is never self-
evident, and any ruling as to the purpose of the contract is already an interpretation of 
the contract.43 Kerr argues that the aim of contractual teleological interpretation is to 
                                                 
37 See chapter 2 sections 3-7 for discussion of the distinction between interpretation and construction as 
approaches to interpretation. 
38 Swart en ‘n Ander v Cape Fabrix (Pty) Ltd 1979 (1) SA 195 (A) at 202; Lubbe & Murray Farlam 
and Hathaway’s Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 449-451; Kerr The Principles 
of The Law of Contract (2002) at 388-391. 
39  In West Rand Estates Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd 1925 AD 245 at 261 Kotzè remarks that 
“…It is the duty of the courts to construe language in keeping with the purpose and object which they 
had in view, and so render that language effectual…”. This is one of the few decisions in which the 
purposive approach seems to be explicitly endorsed. See also Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v Morgenstern 
Family Estates (Pty) Ltd 1980 (1) SA 796 (A) at 803-804; First National Bank of SA Ltd v Rosenblum 
and Another 2001 4 SA 9189 (SCA) at 196; Kerr The Principles of The Law of Contract (2002) at 387 
40 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 247. 
41 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 247. 
42 This point is very well illustrated by the facts of Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 
and Another 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). Two brothers concluded a loan agreement with the Bank of Lisbon 
and in an auxiliary agreement bound themselves as sureties for the loan (which was to their business). 
The auxiliary agreement stated that the brothers would be bound as sureties for any present or future 
indebtedness to the bank. They later discharged the original loan, but the bank held them liable for a 
subsequent debt. The majority of the court dismissed the defense of the brothers De Ornelas that the 
bank was acting in bad faith and that the brothers were therefore entitled to an exceptio doli generalis. 
When the court interpreted the agreement it held that the agreement was capable of the construction by 
the bank. However, upon a purposive construction the bank could not hold the brothers liable as 
sureties because the agreement was clearly aimed at the initial loan agreement. On the other hand, 
taking into account that the party arguing for a wide construction was a bank and that banks routinely 
hold sureties liable in similar circumstances, the construction approved by the court can prevail. The 
point is that purpose and context have a complex interaction, and one without the other can have a 
definite influence on the eventual interpretive outcome. The meaning is subject to both the wording and 
the context. 
43 For more on the teleological interpretation of contracts see Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway’s 
Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 455. Teleological interpretation does not solve 
the problems of intentionalism because the purpose of a contract is always already an effect rather than 
a pure source of meaning. The purpose is always already an interpretation, just like findings regarding 
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place the interpreter as closely as possible to the actual circumstances that existed at 
the conclusion of the contract and by so doing allowing the court to enter the shoes of 
the parties in order to ascertain their intentions.44 However, in most instances 
purposive interpretation is regarded as a secondary rule of interpretation, and 
therefore only becomes relevant when the intention of the parties is not “self-
evident”.45
 
3.2 Presumptions and the golden rule 
Presumptions can be divided into presumptions of interpretation and presumptions of 
substantive law. The presumptions of interpretation deal specifically with the 
interpretation and meaning formation process. They help the interpreter by giving 
weight (legal enforceability) to what is seen as common sense inferences.46 These 
presumptions are usually triggered by language use, for example when a contract 
deals with a certain type of business (say the film industry) the “ordinary business 
meaning” presumption will be triggered. These presumptions are not rules, but rather 
“anticipated” meanings. They are not aimed at regulating the contract, but rather at 
speeding up the process of proving the meaning of the contractual text. On the other 
hand, presumptions of substantive law are common law provisions that are not 
specifically “triggered” by language use but rather by the classification of a legal 
action as a contract. These presumptions are the legal rules that govern a contract and 
parties are assumed to have complied with them simply because they created a 
contractual relationship. This type of presumption is a good instrument for the 
implementation of policy. 
 
It is clear that presumptions play an important part in the application of the golden 
rule of interpretation. The nature of presumptions is such that they are default 
meanings that will come into operation unless the parties expressly provide 
                                                                                                                                            
the intention of the parties to the contract. Furthermore, like the intention of the parties to the contract, 
the purpose of the contract is a concept relating to the mental state of the parties and is therefore always 
behind a veil of language. 
44 Kerr The Principles of The Law of Contract (2002) at 391. 
45 Swart en ‘n Ander v Cape Fabrix (Pty) Ltd 1979 (1) SA 195 (A) at 202; Van der Merwe et al 
Contract: General Principles (2003) at 282. 
46 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 120. Whether 
something is common sense or not will of course depend upon the context and the interpretative 
community in which an interpreter finds herself. 
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otherwise.47 In other words, unless the parties are aware of all the presumptions that 
might influence the meaning of the contractual text that they created (and kept this in 
mind while creating the text), the presumptions are a sort of meaning by legal 
operation and not an intended meaning. Also, various arguments have been made that 
presumptions should be applied unless there is good reason why they should not be 
applied, because they form the basis of interpretation.48 The parties can therefore be 
fairly certain that presumptions will play a role if the court has to interpret their 
contract. The evidentiary burden rests upon the party trying to prove that the 
presumption must not be applied.49 Although presumptions do not stand in the way of 
intentionalism, the way they are used suggests that the court would rather resort to a 
so-called objective appreciation of the intention of the parties than an overly party-
orientated (and thus subjective) process. As Cornelius remarks “…[t]he presumptions 
deal with linguistic matters … they are aids to prevent or eliminate ambiguities or 
uncertainties...”.50 While the application of presumptions does not necessarily 
frustrate the goals of the golden rule, they definitely introduce a parallel agenda or 
purpose into the process of applying of the rule. The aim is no longer simply to find 
out what the parties intended, but also to attach meanings (where possible) to words in 
a way that has been proven to work in the past. 
 
Three substantive presumptions are of special importance during the application of 
the golden rule of interpretation. These are the presumptions 1) that a person does not 
write what she does not intend; 2) that a person is familiar with the contents of the 
documents he signs; and finally 3) that the parties intend to conclude a valid contract. 
Unlike interpretive presumptions, these (substantive) presumptions will always come 
into operation once a legal act is classified as a contract. The presumption that a 
person does not write what she does not intend originates from the Roman-Dutch law 
according to which a person should not act contrary to her own intentions, and that 
parties should express themselves truthfully in a document.51 The centrality of this 
presumption to the application of the golden rule is obvious. It provides a justification 
                                                 
47 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 118-119. 
48 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 119; Du Plessis Re-
Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 149-154. Du Plessis argues for example that “…presumption can 
thus ‘stand in’ for the Constitution where the Constitution does not cater for certain values…”. 
49 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 118. 
50 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 120. 
51 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 124-125. 
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for any finding of liability on the face of the contractual text because the party to the 
text is held legally responsible for the text (which in the intentionalist scheme is taken 
to reflect liability) that she created.52 This presumption places the onus on the party 
who avers that the real intention of the parties is different from the one reflected by 
the text.  
 
Secondly, a party to a contract who signed the text is presumed to be familiar with the 
contents of the document. The ratio for this presumption is probably a mixture of 
commercial concerns and the assumption that a person who signs a document had 
read it first.53 The presumption is central to the application of the golden rule because, 
like the presumption that one does not write what one does not intend, it justifies the 
allocation of liability according to the intentions reflected by the contractual 
document.54  
 
Finally, both parties are presumed to have intended to conclude a legally valid 
contract. This presumption flows from the principle that all persons are presumed to 
be law-abiding and innocent of wrongdoing.55 Cornelius also remarks that this 
presumption might be the result of widely held beliefs that contracts freely entered 
                                                 
52 Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302 at 314; S v Friedman Motors (Pty) Ltd and Another 1972 (1) SA 
76 (T) at 80; Premier Finance Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Rotainers (Pty) Ltd and Another 1975 (1) SA 79 
(W) at 81; Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste en ‘n Ander v Willers en Andere 1999 (3) SA 19 
(SCA) at 31; Michau v Maize Board 2003 (6) SA 459 (SCA) at 464; Cornelius Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 125. 
53 The commercial concerns can be formulated as the concern that the need to prove that a party is 
familiar with the contents of a document (in each case where he signs a document) will place a heavy 
burden on ordinary business transactions. Also since we are only working with a presumption and not a 
rule, the opportunity always exists for the aggrieved party to prove that he was in fact not familiar with 
the contents of the document because of, for example, fraud on the part of the counter party. It should 
be noted that unilateral mistake does not rebut the presumption. If both parties were mutually mistaking 
each other’s intentions and the intentions were reasonable, the contract will be void for lack of 
consensus. Where both parties labour under the same mistake, the contract can be rectified, or in 
certain circumstances, either of the parties may rescind the contract. See Cornelius Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 126. 
54 There is a direct correlation between the liberal belief in autonomy and ascribing liability for a 
signature. This type of liability ascription is only justifiable when it is assumed that individuals are self 
activating and autonomous. Also, when arguing that the person affixing her signature to a document is 
familiar with the content of that document, one is making an assumption about the nature of a text. 
Familiarity with the content of the document implies that the document is a record (in the sense 
discussed in chapter 4 section 2) and also that interpretation is an objective assessment of the consent 
of the text (in the sense described in chapter 2 section 3). 
55 Lesotho Diamond Works v Lurie 1975 (2) SA 142 (O) at 146; Brown v Oosthuizen en ‘n Ander 1980 
(2) SA 155 (O) at 162; Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 
127. 
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into must be upheld where at all possible.56 As far as this presumption goes, three 
levels of impact are identified.57 The first level of impact is on the onus of proof 
regarding the legality of a contract. Where a contract seems, on face value, to comply 
with whatever formalities there might be for the specific contract, the contract is 
presumed to comply. This means that the onus of proof is on the party averring that 
the contract does not comply with legal formalities. This impacts on the golden rule’s 
application because the text (whether legal or illegal) will be read as the legally valid 
option wherever practical.58  On a second level, where an interpretation yields two 
possible meanings of the text, one legal and one not, the legal meaning will be 
presumed to have been the intended one.59 The presumption influences the 
application the golden rule in that legality (and prevalent legal policy) is preferred 
over illegality (and non-prevalent policy).60 On a third level, constructions that render 
a contract valid and enforcable are preferred over constructions that render the 
contract inoperative. This has the effect that terms that can be interpreted as either 
void or operative are interpreted as operative and terms that cannot be interpreted as 
operative, but can be discarded without making the contract inoperative, will be 
discarded.61 This operation of the presumption affects the application of the golden 
rule in the sense that the interpreter is instructed to make sure that the “bad term” does 
not frustrate the overall intentions of the parties to the contract. 
 
3.3 Postmodernism, intention and the need for a golden rule 
3.3.1 The role of thought and language during intention-formation 
                                                 
56 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 127. This belief 
links with the liberal assumption that persons are autonomous beings largely in charge of their own 
destiny. 
57 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 127-8. 
58 The point is not that illegal intentions will be negated, but rather that contracts that look like 
contracts belonging to a genre necessitating legal formalities will be interpreted as a contract of that 
genre whether it was so intended or not. This also brings the presumption into play that the contractual 
terms used bear the meaning usually employed in that business sphere.  
59 Schoultz v Voorsitter, Personeel Advieskomittee van die Munisipale Raad van George 1983 (4) SA 
689 (C) at 706; Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 127  
60 Although this part of the presumption might relate to actual formal legality like criminal sanctions 
(for example the prohibition on the sale of scheduled medicines without a prescription) and prescribed 
forms (for example with regard to the sale of fixed property) it will mostly deal with contracts that can 
be interpreted as either contra bonos mores or as in line with the bona fides. The interpreter must now 
follow an interpretation in line with the bona fides. 
61 Kroukamp v Buitendag 1981 (1) SA 606 (W) at 610; Moodley v Moodley and Another1991 (1) SA 
358 (D) at 362; Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 128. 
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The intention of the parties is a product of both thought and language, not just thought 
or language.62 Subjective intentionalists argue that the object of interpretation is to 
find the thought of the authors, while objective intentionalists look for the meaning of 
the language they used. Both miss the mark. Subjective intentionalism fails because 
language contains more than just the thoughts of the authors of the text and objective 
intentionalism falls short because language is more than an expression of meaning; it 
is an interpretable medium. Intention consisting of both thought and language is 
therefore not the type of intention depicted by either subjective or objective 
intentionalism. Intention is a dynamic meaning, continuously created through 
communication. The moment of consensus necessary to justify either objective or 
subjective intentionalism does not (and cannot) exist. If the criticism against the 
intentionalism raised here and in chapter 5 is accepted, the theoretical basis of the 
golden rule has to be re-imagined.63
 
While the courts might have a different view of the golden rule of statutory 
interpretation (ie that it limits interpretation and provides an objectively certifiable 
interpretation), the theoretical premise of the rule can provide a basis for a different 
(postmodern?) understanding of the golden rule of interpretation. The application of 
the golden rule of statutory interpretation is the inverse of the same rule in contractual 
interpretation. The statutory golden rule of interpretation is an objective intentionalist 
(or literalist) rule aimed at preserving the literalist justification for interpretation, 
namely that the intention of the legislature (creator of the text) must be followed 
where this intention is plainly evident from the words of the statute.64 This rule 
requires the language of the statute to reasonably permit departure from the literal 
meaning of the text before such a departure would be authorized. Also, literal reading 
of the text must result in an absurdity that was clearly not intended by the legislature 
before departure from the “evident” meaning is permitted.65 Where the statutory rule 
is aimed at retrieving the ordinary meaning of the text (as evidencing the intention of 
                                                 
62 See chapter 5 section 6. 
63 See chapter 5 sections 2-4. 
64 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 103-4. This rule was first formulated in Venter v R 
1907 TS 910 at 914-5 and had confirmed by the SCA in 1999 in Manyasha v Minister of Law and 
Order1999 2 SA 179 (SCA) at 185 and was applied as recently as 2003 in Minister of Justice v 
Firstrand Bank Ltd and Others 2003 (6) SA 636 (SCA) at 641. 
65 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 104; Hatch v Koopoomal 1936 AD 190 at 212; 
Shenker v The Master 1936 AD 136 at 143. 
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the legislature), the contractual rule is aimed at retrieving the intention of the parties 
to the text (as evidenced by the plain meaning of the text). In contractual 
interpretation the text is regarded as evidence of the actual intention of the parties,66 
but in statutory interpretation the text is regarded as the actual intention of the 
legislature.67 The statutory golden rule is based on the assumption that the text is a 
product of the intention of the legislature, and that the intention is reflected through 
the language used. The text is a declaration of intent.68 By contrast, the contractual 
text is regarded as the result of an intention, a byproduct of the intention. The text is 
regarded as evidence of the intention.69 When one deals with statutes, the aim of the 
statute is to govern behaviour in a certain way, while contractual texts are the 
evidence of agreements to act in a certain way. The essential difference is that the 
necessity of applying (interpreting) the language of the statute in every unique context 
is recognized under the statutory golden rule, but not under the contractual golden 
rule. While the former recognizes the necessity of contextualisation (meaning 
following context), the latter does not. The contractual golden rule calls for a 
separation of thought and language (we must find what was meant) while the former 
calls for an implementation of thought through language (we must apply what was 
meant). 
 
In postmodern theory the connection between thought and language is analyzed and it 
is said that these two elements are not in conflict with each other, but rather in a 
mutually constituting relationship.70 Thought must always be expressed (and thought) 
in language and language is always the result of thought. Although thought in a sense 
always seeks to escape language, to be by itself, the process of expression (of seeking 
to escape) always drags language back into thought. The expression of thought can 
                                                 
66 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 28; National and 
Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato Board 1958 (2) SA 473 (A) at 479; Ponisammy 
and Another v Versailles Estates (Pty) Ltd 1973 (1) SA 372 (A) at 387; Sonap Petroleum (SA) Pty Ltd 
(formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A) at 239; Bierman v 
Mutual & Federal Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 2004 (1) SA 205 (O) at 211. 
67 See for example Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 103-105. 
68 See for example Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 103-105. 
69  See for example Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 28; 
National and Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato Board 1958 (2) SA 473 (A) at 479; 
Ponisammy and Another v Versailles Estates (Pty) Ltd 1973 (1) SA 372 (A) at 387; Sonap Petroleum 
(SA) Pty Ltd (formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A) at 239; 
Bierman v Mutual & Federal Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 2004 (1) SA 205 (O) at 211. 
70 See for example Derrida “The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy before Linguistics” in Harari (ed) 
Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism (1979) at 88-90. 
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only feature in language. Unlike the need (or urge) to express pure thought (to show 
the unique in thought), language always captures and delineates thought (to show how 
it is related to what is already there). Language is used to make thought known, and 
by so doing expresses (or expends) the totality of the thought. Language fails at this 
because residues of past thought always loiters in language use. Language is iterable, 
it can be repeated in many contexts and therefore past uses of language create 
expectations about the way language can be used and this residue (or expectation) 
contains thoughts previously expressed. There is a dynamic tension between the 
uniqueness of thought on the one hand and the iterability (or repeatability) of 
language on the other.71 When formulating meaning, some of the uniqueness of 
thought is lost through its expression in language, but language itself contains a 
residue of past expression and this residue influences the eventual outcome of the 
interpretation process.72 In other words, some of what is thought is lost in expression, 
but some of what is said (and unsaid) is gained.73 No rule can predict what will be lost 
or what will be “unintentionally” found. 
 
When two persons decide to contract with each other by corresponding declarations, 
they set out to create an “intention”. They communicate their thoughts to each other 
and, on the basis of those communications, decide what they want to accomplish with 
their relationship. During this stage, the mitigation (contamination?) of their thoughts 
by language and the introduction of possibilities of meaning by language use already 
take place for a second time. The first time this mitigating and introduction of 
possibility take place is when the parties formulate their intentions for themselves. 
They are never (and can never be) completely certain of what they intend.74 When the 
                                                 
71 Derrida “The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy before Linguistics” in Harari (ed) Textual 
Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism (1979) at 91-92. 
72 See in general Derrida “The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy before Linguistics” in Harari (ed) 
Textual Strategies:  Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism (1979) at 91-92; Derrida “Force of 
Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” in Cornell, Rosenfeld & Gray Carlson (eds) 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (1992) 1. 
73 This is the process by which the interpretive community of which one is part influences what one 
hears. This is not only a delineating process, but also an expansion of the possible meanings that the 
text may have. See for example Fish “What makes an Interpretation Acceptable?” in Fish Is There a 
Text in This Class: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (1980) at 338. Fish remarks that 
“…[d]isagreements are not settled by the facts, but are the means by which facts are settled…”. What is 
thought is always already in language. There is no step before language, but there is no language before 
thought either. 
74 Let’s say I intend to close the door of my office in the next ten seconds. Will I still do so if my 
promoter appears in the door? Would I do so if my phone rings? Does closing the door include locking 
it? Will I get up from my chair to close the door (my chair has wheels)? Yet when I proclaim that I am 
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parties create the contractual text they are in effect aiming to express their unique 
thoughts and, at the same time, attempting to delineate these thoughts through 
language. They want to tell us what they intend and what they do not intend.75
  
Because intention is a dynamic meaning created through communication and 
interpretation, intention cannot be “found”, nor can it be “recreated”. To find 
something, it must be hidden, not lost. Because intention is dynamic and the result of 
interaction, once the moment is past the intention is lost, not obscured. Intention is 
moment specific and not the product of a specific language and thought interaction 
alone. Intention cannot be recreated because much of the original “components” 
(context, situatedness of the authors, linguistic conceptions held by the authors etc) of 
the intention are irretrievably lost. What is left to discuss is whether deconstruction 
allows for an interpretive approach that reconciles the individual needs for recognition 
(having our thoughts and intentions heard and considered) and the collective need for 
practical enforcement (having others understand how our thoughts and intentions will 
effect them). 
 
3.3.2 Dichotomies and intention 
Underlying each text is a complex set of dichotomies that influence the meaning of 
the text. These dichotomies consist of opposites that are thrust to prominence in 
relation to the existing hegemonies of power in the interpretive community.76 In an 
interpretive community that values capitalism and individual autonomy, interpretation 
will reflect the values underlying these concepts, but this does not make interpretation 
                                                                                                                                            
going to close my door, most persons will have a very good idea of what I “intend” to do. The point is 
that I am saying something both by expressing my thoughts and by refraining from expressing others 
and by the listener hearing what I am expressing. The meaning is both the result of my expression and 
the act of interpretation on the part of the listener.  My “intention” is often the result of me not thinking 
about the intended action too much. As soon as I try to find out exactly what I intend, the intention is 
swamped by other possibilities. 
75 Although they cannot do either with 100% accuracy, nor have they conceived either to 100%. 
76 The concept of property exchange provides a striking example. Property exchange is based on a 
dichotomy of voluntary and non-voluntary action. When one deals with the sale of land, the general 
view is that one deals with voluntary property exchange (money for land). When interpreting contracts 
of sale (or most contracts for that matter) the interpreter would almost automatically afford a meaning 
to the property exchange that reflects this preference for voluntary property exchange over non-
voluntary exchange. Where it seems that one party (illegally) forced the other to sell her property, such 
a contract would not be enforced. On the other hand, when one deals with the activities of the asset 
forfeiture unit, the non-voluntary property exchange is the norm. The court would be much less likely 
to invalidate forced property seizure than was the case in the contractual scenario (The latter situation 
is not contractual in nature). The point is that the inherent preference of one of the opposing concepts 
will influence the eventual outcome of the interpretative exercise. 
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determinate. A society will never have one set of beliefs only, as there will always be 
a struggle for dominance by ideologies and beliefs other than the preferred ones in the 
present hegemony.  
 
In a deconstructive interpretive practice the interpreter would analyze the text as 
thoroughly as possible.77 During this process the input of the parties to the contract is 
crucial. They must form part of the analysis and it should be their responsibility to 
sketch for the court what they intended with the contract and how they understood the 
aim of the counter-party and the law should permit them to do so. The difference 
between this approach and subjective intentionalism is that the court will not base its 
decision upon the intention of the parties.  The input of the parties may not lead the 
court to their actual intentions, but it does allow the court to contextualize and place 
the contract. Why the contract was entered into is not important because it represents 
the intention of the parties then, but rather because it allows the court to ascribe a 
context sensitive meaning to the text now. It is not objective intentionalism either, 
since the court will not claim to attach liability to the intention expressed by the text. 
Instead, the court would base its decision upon an interpretation of the contractual 
text, influenced by the parties’ participation in the process, specifically aimed at 
providing a just solution in the specific circumstances. The solution will not be based 
on something in the text that existed prior to interpretation either, but rather on the 
possibilities inherent in the text. It cannot be a free construction of meaning, because 
the interpretation must still be justifiable with reference to the textual meaning 
possibilities.78  
 
3.4 Differences between an intentionalist and a postmodern golden rule 
Deconstructionists do not claim to know the actual intention of the parties (as 
subjective intentionalists do), nor do they claim to ascertain the parties’ intention by 
                                                 
77 It will never be possible to reach the core dichotomy required in structuralist thought. There will 
always be another level of analysis possible because meaning, being the result of diffèrance, can never 
be the result of only one concept. Meaning is born out of difference and where there is difference, there 
are always two concepts that are again the product of two further concepts and so on. See for example 
Green & LeBihan Critical Theory and Practice: Coursebook (1996) at 215; Schanck “Understanding 
Postmodern Thought and its Implications for Statutory Interpretation” (1992) 64 Southern California 
Law Review 2504 at 2523; Davies “Authority, Meaning, Legitimacy” in Goldsworthy & Campbell 
(eds) Legal Interpretation in Democratic States (2002) at 123. 
78 In this regard, the input of the parties must not be regarded lightly. It is after all they who will have to 
live with the decision of the court. 
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an objective appraisal of the text. Instead, deconstructionist interpreters recognize that 
any meaning (including a finding that a meaning is an “intention”) is a construction. 
 
Deconstructionist interpreters recognize that any interpretation necessarily involves a 
choice among the contradictory impulses (or dichotomies) that constitute meaning. 
They are sensitive to those impulses and recognize that a just interpretation is at the 
same time responsible and context-sensitive. The identification of these impulses 
requires a deeper analysis of the text than intentionalist interpretive practices allow 
for. One needs to let the text reveal its possibilities (so to speak). 
 
As far as the golden rule goes, it can no longer be taken to mean that the goal of 
interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties to the contract.79 
In postmodern theory intention is described as the situated interplay between thoughts 
and language as reflected by interpretation. Intention cannot be ascertained and every 
subsequent interpretation of the contractual text will yield a new intention. An 
alternative formulation would state that the goal of the interpretation of contracts (by 
the court) is to justly ascribe liability according to the meaning possibilities inherent 
in the contractual text.  
 
The so-called ordinary meaning presumption will become superfluous in a 
postmodern interpretive practice. As Stanley Fish reminds us, we are always already 
reading the ordinary meaning of a text because of our situatedness in a particular 
interpretive community.80 However, this does not mean that words have a determinate 
meaning, even on a “plain” or “ordinary” level. There will always be other ordinary 
meanings that can be as relevant for other interpretive communities, and since no one 
is part of only one interpretive community, ordinary meanings are not stable enough 
to provide a basis for interpretation.  
 
                                                 
79 As formulated by Innes J in Joubert v Enslin 1910 AD 6 at 37. See also Rand Rietfontein Estates Ltd 
v Cohn 1937 AD 317 at 324; Cinema City (Pty) Ltd v Morgenstern Family Estates (Pty) Ltd 1980 (1) 
SA 796 (A) at 803; Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 940-1; Lubbe & Murray Farlam and 
Hathaway’s Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 447 and 451; Kerr The Principles 
of The Law of Contract (2002) at 386. 
80 Fish “Is There a Text in This Class” in Fish Is There a Text in This Class: The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (1980) at 307; Fish “What makes an Interpretation Acceptable?” in Fish Is 
There a Text in This Class: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (1980) at 341. 
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Interpretive presumptions provide examples of the way legal (and political) policy can 
influence interpretation. If individual autonomy and responsibility for individual 
actions are valued, a substantive presumption that one does not write what one does 
not intend will make sense when dealing with two parties who willingly and 
knowingly entered an agreement which is marginally detrimental to those close to the 
parties (but no so much as to bring into play public policy considerations that would 
override the aforementioned policy). On the other hand, the same presumption will 
not be compatible with a commitment to family preservation and social-mindedness 
(as argued by strong communitarians), since the effect on the family unit will weigh 
more than the commitment to individual self-determination. The point is that these 
presumptions can play (and I believe do play) an important role in the implementation 
of policy. However, it is pertinent that courts consider the application of presumptions 
in each individual case to prevent presumptions from becoming just hollow 
justifications of meaning. Presumptions as embodiments of vague values and so-
called objective standards are not helpful in a deconstructive theory of contractual 
interpretation, but can be successfully utilized as value statements in a contextual 
analysis.  
 
In a postmodern practice, substantive presumptions will still fulfill the role of shifting 
the burden of proof onto the party who argues that the contract should not be valid. 
They do not expressly state the law, but provide certain procedural conditions that 
simplify and shorten the court process, while still allowing for judicial consideration 
when the presumptions cannot stand (for example when the contract would not be 
legal and therefore operates contrary to the presumption that contracts are legal).  
 
Finally, the rules and presumptions pertaining to the enforcement of the intention of 
the parties must be re-evaluated in the light of the changed theoretical position on 
interpretation.81 Intention in the deconstructionist scheme is neither a linguistic 
reflection nor a historical psychological moment, but rather the product of the 
interpretation process. 
 
 
                                                 
81 See chapter 5 section 7. 
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4.  Parol evidence: Letting in the outside (or is it already inside?) 
4.1 The parol-evidence rule in current contractual interpretation 
 
“…The law wishes in its distinctness to be perspicuous; that is, it desires that the components 
of its autonomous existence be self-declaring and not be in need of piecing-out by some 
supplementary discourse…”82
 
The parol-evidence rule was already the subject of discussion, so save for a brief 
restatement of the law as it stands, the aim is not to elaborate on the assumptions and 
on beliefs upon which the rule is based, but rather to imagine the rule in a new system 
of postmodern textual definition. The theoretical foundation of the rule is the belief 
that parties can fully record their agreement in a text and when this is the case, 
external or parol evidence will be irrelevant and misleading.83 The parol-evidence 
rule is made up of two supplementary rules, namely the integration rule and the 
interpretation rule.84 The integration rule states that the interpreter must assess to what 
extent the written document was intended to be an exclusive written memorial of the 
agreement (to what extent the contract is integrated into the written document).85 The 
second rule deals with the admissibility of external evidence once it has been 
ascertained that the written document was in fact intended to be a full integration of 
the contractual terms. In terms of this rule, external evidence is allowed to help with 
the interpretation of the written document so long as it does not contradict the 
apparent meaning of the document.86  
 
                                                 
82 Fish “The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence” in Norrie (ed) Closure or Critique: New 
Directions in Legal Theory (1993) at 157. 
83 Venter v Birchholtz 1972 (1) SA 276 (A) at 282; Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 944; 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Cohen 1993 (3) SA 846 (SE) at 849; Kerr The Principles of The Law of 
Contract (2002) at 349; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 158.  
84 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 157. 
85 This rule is often regarded as the parol-evidence rule proper. See for example Kerr The Principles of 
The Law of Contract (2002) at 348. 
86 Most indications are that the “apparent” meaning of the document would be the ordinary meaning of 
the terms in the document, but not always so. For some exceptions see Van der Merwe et al Contract: 
General Principles (2003) at 161; Ten Brink v Motala 2001 (1) SA 1011 (D) at 1013; Philmatt (Pty) 
Ltd v Mosselbank CC 1996 (2) SA 15 (A) at 23. 
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 The application of the parol-evidence rule is largely based on the judgement of 
Schreiner JA in Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis.87 Schreiner JA identified three 
scenarios in which external evidence would be relevant (but not necessarily equally 
admissible) to prove the meaning of the contractual text. The first arises where the 
meaning of a written document is unclear, but the uncertainty can be cleared up by 
“linguistic treatment” of the document.88 Linguistic treatment seems to involve 
seeking the ordinary meaning of the phrase in question, much like the application of 
the ordinary meaning presumption. Courts seem to accept that linguistic treatment 
means reading the text. During this initial stage extrinsic evidence is not allowed,89 
whether relevant or not and if linguistic treatment of the text leaves the court with a 
“plain meaning” the process stops here. 
 
The second scenario arises when the difficulty cannot be “sufficiently” cleared up 
with a “linguistic treatment” of the text.90 Recourse may then be had to evidence of 
the surrounding circumstances that might have been in the minds of the parties when 
they concluded the agreement, but not to the actual negotiations. Instances where 
extrinsic evidence will be allowed are treated as exceptions rather than the rule, 
because inferences made from extrinsic evidence are regarded as subjective judicial 
conclusions, while linguistic inferences are regarded as objective.91 Schreiner JA 
remarked that this type of case (when the difficulty cannot be “sufficiently” cleared 
up with “linguistic treatment”) should be called cases of uncertainty rather than cases 
of true ambiguity.  
 
                                                 
87 1955 3 SA 447 (A) at 453. The decision was cited with approval by the SCA as recently as 2004 in 
Van Wetten and Another v Bosch and Others 2004 (1) SA 348 (SCA) at 354. See also Lubbe & Murray 
Farlam and Hathaway’s Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 456-457. 
88 See for example Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board and Another 2001 (3) SA 1247 
(SCA) at 1258; Durban Add-Ventures Ltd v Premier, Kwazulu-Natal, and Others (No 1) 2001 (1) SA 
384 (N) at 386; Marques v Unibank Ltd 2001 (1) SA 145 (W) at 157; Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 
2002 (6) SA 453 (SCA) at 458; De Beer v Keyser and Others 2002 (1) SA 827 (SCA) at 835; Van Zyl 
NO v Kiln Non-Marine Syndicate no 510 of Lloyds of London 2003 (2) SA 440 (SCA) at 450; HNR 
Properties CC and Another v Standard Bank of  SA Ltd 2004 (4) SA 471 (SCA) at 478. 
89 In exceptional circumstances reference to very limited “background evidence” would be allowed. 
See discussion on new developments supra. 
90 Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 3 SA 447 (A) at 453; Lubbe & Murray Farlam and 
Hathaway’s Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 456-457. 
91In Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 3 SA 447 (A) at 455 Schreiner argues that “…whether 
there is sufficient certainty in the language of even badly drafted contracts to…make it unnecessary and 
therefore wrong to draw inferences from surrounding circumstances is a matter of individual judicial 
opinion in each case…”. 
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In cases of true ambiguity (the third scenario under the Delmas rule) the ambiguity 
persists even after recourse has been had to extrinsic evidence of the surrounding 
circumstances as indicated. In such cases the judge may look at evidence of the 
negotiations between the parties.92 The court reminded interpreters that extrinsic 
evidence should be used sparingly and with due circumspection, but added that 
recourse to such evidence must be permitted where it allows the court to reach the 
necessary degree of certainty as to the meaning of the contractual text.93
 
The Delmas rule encapsulates the essence of the parol-evidence rule as applied in 
South African law. The rule aims to protect the sanctity of written documents as 
records of contracts, where the parties agreed to reduce their entire contracts to 
written texts.94 Where a contract is made up of different parts, and one part is written 
and another not, only the written part would be subject to the parol-evidence rule.95 
Whether a contract was in fact intended to be a written memorial of the agreement is a 
factual question.96  
 
4.2 External evidence: New debates 
While the Delmas version of the parol-evidence rule has found widespread 
acceptance,97 recently the SCA seems to have revised the position regarding the 
admissibility of evidence regarding so-called “background circumstances”.98 In 
Coopers & Lybrand the court agued that evidence of background circumstances 
                                                 
92 Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 3 SA 447 (A) at 455. 
93 The reason for a recourse to external evidence was pronounced in Tesvan CC and Another v South 
African Bank of Athens 2000 (1) SA 268 (SCA) at 274-275 by Farlam AJA“… To allow the words the 
parties actually used in the documents to override their prior agreement or the common intention that 
they intended to record is to enforce what was not agreed and so overthrow the basis on which 
contracts rest in our law: the application of no contractual theory leads to such a result...”. See also 
Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 3 SA 447 (A) at 455. Confirmed as recently as 2004 in Van 
der Vyver v Du Toit 2004 (4) SA 420 (T) at 423. See also Industrial Development Corporation of SA 
(Pty) Ltd v Silver 2003 (1) SA 365 (SCA) at 370. Scott AJ discusses the admissibility of different types 
of extrinsic evidence in the case at 370-372. 
94 Union Government v Vianini Pipes (Pty) Ltd 1941 AD 43 at 47; Van der Merwe et al Contract: 
General Principles (2003) at 157; Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South 
Africa (2002) at 99. 
95 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 159. 
96 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 158; Tesvan CC and Another v South 
African Bank of Athens 2000 (1) SA 268 (SCA) at 274-275; Brits v Van Heerden 2001 (3) SA 257 (K) 
at 281. 
97 Venter v Birchholtz 1972 (1) SA 276 (A) at 282; Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 944; 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Cohen 1993 (3) SA 846 (SE) at 849; Kerr The Principles of The Law of 
Contract (2002) at 349; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 158. 
98 See Coopers & Lybrand and Others v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767; Sun Packaging (Pty) Ltd v 
Vreulink 1996 (4) SA 176 (A) at 183; Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 (6) SA 453 (SCA) at 467. 
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would always be relevant to prove “…the genesis and purpose of the contract, ie 
matters probably present in the minds of the parties when they contracted…”.99 In 
Sun Packaging Nestadt JA argued that “…[I]t would seem that…background facts, is 
(sic) part of the context and as such always admissible…”.100 He distinguishes 
“background facts” from evidence of the surrounding circumstances, which according 
to “conventional thinking” is only relevant when there is ambiguity.101 Nestadt JA 
goes further to say (obiter) that there is evidence of a liberalizing trend according to 
which ambiguity is no longer regarded as a prerequisite for the admissibility of 
evidence of the surrounding circumstances.102 On the face of it this new approach 
clashes with the Delmas approach, which requires that pure linguistic treatment of the 
contract must first prove to be unsuccessful in eliminating the ambiguity before 
external evidence can be admitted. 
 
The court is not clear on how this new approach impacts on the Delmas approach. I 
would suggest that there are at least three possible ways in which this new approach 
to evidence of background facts can be accommodated by the Delmas approach. The 
first is to separate instances where the Delmas approach would find application from 
situations where both parties wish to substantiate their versions of the contract with 
reference to external evidence. It can be argued that the Delmas approach was never 
meant to cater for the latter and, at least according to the present internationalist 
approach to interpretation, it would be unjust to prevent parties from adducing 
evidence that would prove their intentions, provided both parties choose to do so. In 
other words, Delmas was meant to protect a party who relied on the plain meaning of 
the text from having to prove such a plain meaning. Where the plain meaning is in 
dispute, and both parties wish to adduce evidence of the background facts to support 
                                                 
99 Joubert JA in Coopers & Lybrand and Others v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 768. 
100 Sun Packaging (Pty) Ltd v Vreulink 1996 (4) SA 176 (A) at 184. See also Coopers & Lybrand and 
Others v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 768, where Joubert JA made a similar statement. 
101 Sun Packaging (Pty) Ltd v Vreulink 1996 (4) SA 176 (A) at 184. 
102 Sun Packaging (Pty) Ltd v Vreulink 1996 (4) SA 176 (A) at 184. See also Pangbourne Properties v 
Gill & Ramsden 1996 (1) SA 1182 (A) at 1187 where Harms JA remarked in this regard “…[I]t 
appears to me that the time may be ripe for this Court to reconsider the limitations placed in this 
statement (made in Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 3 SA 447 (A) at 454 ) on the use of 
‘surrounding circumstances’ in interpreting documents. The present instance does not, however, 
require it and I shall regard myself bound by the restraints set out…”. 
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their particular “plain meaning”, the parties can be said to waive the first step of the 
Delmas approach.103
 
The second way of reconciling the Delmas approach with the more liberal resort to 
background facts is to incorporate the latter with the first step in the Delmas 
approach.104 By distinguishing evidence of background facts from other extrinsic 
evidence,105 the linguistic treatment of an ambiguous phrase can be said to include 
reference to background facts as a way of contextualising the phrase in dispute, and, 
by doing so, simply finding the ordinary meaning of the phrase.106 In this way the 
three steps of the Delmas approach can be retained. 
 
 The final way of accommodating the Delmas approach with the more liberal resort to 
background facts is to conflate the first two steps of the Delmas approach, which 
leaves it up to the parties to decide which evidence they would like to adduce, be it 
evidence regarding the surrounding circumstances or evidence regarding the ordinary 
meaning of the text in a linguistic sense or both.107 It would probably lead to the 
                                                 
103 While there is no support for this approach in the cases, in all three of the so-called “background 
circumstances” cases both parties adduced evidence to support their own version of the plain meaning. 
See Coopers & Lybrand and Others v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767; Sun Packaging (Pty) Ltd v 
Vreulink 1996 (4) SA 176 (A) at 183; Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 (6) SA 453 (SCA) at 467. 
Added to this, the parol-evidence rule does not seem to cater for situations where both parties adduce 
evidence regarding the plain meaning of the text. See Union Government v Vianini Pipes (Pty) Ltd 
1941 AD 43 at 47; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 157; Cornelius 
Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 99. 
104 There is support for the notion that extrinsic evidence of the background circumstances are always 
relevant during the assessment of the plain meaning of the text. See Haviland Estates (Pty) Ltd and 
Another v McMaster 1969 (2) SA 312 (A) at 336; Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein 1981 (2) SA 207 (W); 
Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 110. 
105 This was done in Coopers & Lybrand and Others v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 768. While 
evidence of background facts would place the interpreter in the shoes of the parties to from an objective 
opinion regarding the meaning of the disputed phrase, extrinsic evidence relates to evidence of the 
subjective intentions of each party such as previous negotiations and correspondence between the 
parties (as per Joubert JA in Coopers & Lybrand and Others v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 
768).This distinction would of course be difficult to make in practice. See for example the judgement 
by Lewis JA in Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 (6) SA 453 (SCA) at 465-468. Lewis JA has 
difficulty distinguishing the background facts from extrinsic evidence regarding the actual intentions of 
the parties and she states that the distinction is “…[p]erhaps…a distinction without a difference…”.  
106 The ordinary meaning presumption forms part of the golden rule of interpretation and Joubert JA 
explains his resort to background circumstances as an application of the golden rule. It also seems as if 
he regards evidence of the background circumstances as part of the first step of the Delmas approach 
and he substantiates his resort to such evidence with reference to the Delmas case. See Coopers & 
Lybrand and Others v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 768; Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of 
Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 110-111. 
107 This was also proposed by the South African Law Commission Report on Unreasonable 
Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts (Project 47) 1998 at clause 5. See also 
Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 109-111. 
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resolution of the tension between the Delmas approach and the more liberal resort to 
background facts when the court is faced in future with having to decide a dispute 
regarding the meaning of a phrase where one party avers an ordinary meaning of the 
phrase in a linguistic sense while the other relies on an ordinary meaning resulting 
from the admission of evidence regarding background facts. In such a dispute the 
court will be forced to deal with the potential conflict between the Delmas approach 
and the recent more liberal approach to surrounding evidence. 
 
 The important question for this chapter is how this more liberal resort to background 
facts impacts on the parol-evidence rule and the resulting assumptions about the 
nature of the definition of texts. Initially the idea that a text is individualized when it 
is created is maintained, since there is still a distinction between the text and the 
background facts. In other words, the text is still regarded as a record of the intentions 
of the authors and as an abstraction from the context in which it was created. 
However, the more liberal resort to background evidence involves (admittedly 
limited) recognition that texts are never “complete”. With the recognition of the need 
for contextualization of the text, the rationale for the parol-evidence rule is 
fundamentally compromised. If the text cannot signify its message without reference 
to evidence outside of the text, it is not of any more evidentiary value that unwritten 
texts. In short, if the meanings of written contracts are always subject to external 
proof, such contracts are no easier to prove than any other type of contract, and there 
is no reason why written contracts should receive special treatment. 
 
4.3 Criticism against the parol-evidence rule 
The parol-evidence rule has been criticized on two points. The first is the practical 
difficulties regarding the application of the rule (and the Delmas version in particular) 
that emerge when the interpreter has to decide whether the contractual document is 
sufficiently “uncertain”.108 The courts do not offer any indication as to the standard of 
uncertainty required before recourse may had to external evidence.109 This uncertainty 
                                                 
108 Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway’s Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 
461; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161. 
109  In Van Rensburg v City Credit (Natal) (Pty) Ltd 1980 4 SA 500 (N) at 506, Kriek J offers this 
explanation of the Delmas rule: “…In most cases it is unwise, if not impossible, to endeavour to effect 
a rigid division of the evidence which has a bearing upon the interpretation of the document into the 
three classes (of the Delmas rule (my insert)). The three classes are like the colours of a spectrum with 
diffused borders between the different colours…”. See also Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway’s 
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undermines the purpose of the parol-evidence rule, which is to restrict the inquiry into 
contractual meanings to the document where possible. Some academics try to 
negotiate this difficulty by construing the Delmas rule as subsequent steps in the 
interpretation process rather than three distinct types of situations.110 According to 
this reasoning, the Delmas rule seeks to force the court to first look at the text to see if 
that does not solve the problem by itself. Only after this has been done and the 
uncertainty persists may the court look at extrinsic evidence of a restricted scope; if 
this does not solve the difficulty it may have recourse to evidence of the negotiations 
between the parties. I would propose that the “threshold uncertainty” is unclear not 
because the courts do not spell out the requirements for uncertainty clearly, but rather 
because of the nature of language. Even the most perspicuous text has the potential 
(linguistically speaking) to have more than one equally relevant “ordinary” 
meaning.111 The “self-evidence” of any meaning is dependent upon the context of the 
interpretation and the situatedness of the interpreter, rather than on the nature of the 
text.112
 
The second problem with the parol-evidence rule is that it is (according to many) not 
compatible with a basic principle of South African theory of contract, namely that 
contractual liability follows the actual intention of the parties to the contract.113 It has 
been pointed out that there is some absurdity in defending the notion that liability 
follows the intention of the parties while at the same time prohibiting evidence 
relating to this intention.114 As Kerr points out in a similar vein, the parol-evidence 
rule contradicts the very purpose of its creation.115 It is this problem that evokes the 
                                                                                                                                            
Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 461; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General 
Principles (2003) at 159-161; Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank CC 1996 (2) SA 15 (A) at 23; Ten Brink 
v Motala 2001 (1) SA 1011 (D) at 1013. 
110 Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway’s Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 
461; Kerr The Principles of The Law of Contract (2002) at 406-407. 
111 See chapter 2 sections 6 and 7, especially the discussions around Fish’s idea of ordinary meaning in 
section 6 and the idea of diffèrance in section 7. 
112 See in this regard chapter 2 section 6. 
113 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 161; Cornelius Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 109; Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway’s 
Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 461. 
114 Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway’s Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 
461-3. 
115 Kerr The Principles of The Law of Contract (2002) at 407. He remarks “…[T]he first step is said to 
involve “linguistic treatment” that is, “studying the language” without recourse to any extrinsic 
evidence. It is suggested that this can only be successful [in highlighting the intention of the parties] 
where the parties have mentioned all the relevant circumstances in their contract…”. In other words, 
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most criticism against the parol-evidence rule; most of the proposed solutions are also 
aimed at solving this difficulty. The rule was aimed at simplifying the process of 
contractual interpretation and to provide certainty regarding the possible effects 
(meanings) interpreters would attach to (or find in) the contractual text. However, the 
rule creates the situation where the parties have to cater for all eventualities in the 
contractual text, since failing to do so will render the effects of the contract uncertain 
by leaving these effects to be decided by the court (who will have to decide whether 
or not to examine extrinsic evidence).116 This makes the contractual negotiation 
process cumbersome and it prolongs the period before the contract will come into 
operation. It must also be kept in mind that in most instances the problem is not 
whether the contract covers a situation envisaged by the parties, but rather whether it 
covers some unforeseen circumstance. Parties do not need the court to tell them what 
they intended, but rather whether it would be just to find liability in a specific 
(unforeseen) instance. 
 
The prevailing view in the law of contract is that texts are essentially records of the 
intention of the author and that the interpreter should not tamper with the text but 
simply extract the message deposited by the author of the text. The parol-evidence 
rule as it is presently applied strengthens this theory of texts and the influence of the 
interpreter on them. Two main criticisms are levelled against the rule, namely that it is 
theoretically incompatible with the subjective intentionalist will theory of contractual 
liability and that it is a practical failure. These criticisms are not aimed at undermining 
present understandings of texts, but rather at negotiating the problems that arise with 
regard to the application of the parol-evidence rule. Analysis of these criticisms shows 
that they in fact acknowledge the failure of the view of texts as records. The proposed 
remedies (such as liberalization of the rule or scrapping it altogether) are also 
motivated by the belief that the present interpretive dispensation (subjective 
intentionalism) will benefit from such remedies, rather than a reaction to the failure of 
the existing process for defining texts.117
 
4.4 The nature of texts and textual definition during contractual interpretation  
                                                                                                                                            
the contractual text can only be “protected” form the influence of extrinsic evidence if it is already 
sufficiently certain. In such a case the need for recourse to external evidence is no longer an issue. 
116 Postmodernists argue that this is in any event inevitable. See chapter 2 section 8. 
117 See chapter 4 section 4. 
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As pointed out in chapter 4, the parol-evidence rule is based on a set of assumptions 
about the nature of texts. Good historical texts (at least according to good traditional 
historians) are ones that reflect the constituting facts of their genre, and likewise good 
contractual texts are described as ones that reflect the necessary elements for a 
binding agreement. Texts are seen as mere reflections of “history” or “facts”,118 and 
therefore the type of text that the parol-evidence rule aims to “protect” is not the 
unclear text, but the unambiguous text that might be “complicated” by extrinsic 
evidence. 
 
Du Plessis distinguishes between narrative and normative texts119 and argues that a 
contract is an example of a hybrid law-text, one that is at the same time narrative and 
normative.120 Narrative texts are (or more accurately profess to be) records or 
accounts of factual occurrences that influence the working of the law.121 These texts 
are usually employed to trump some other account of the “facts” and, by so doing, 
influence the way in which the law will attach liability in a specific circumstance. 
Contracts are normally (in the intentionalist scheme) narrative texts. They are 
construed as accounts of the common intention reached between the parties during 
negotiations. The evidence in delict cases (such as motor vehicle accidents) is also 
                                                 
118 The relevant facts would of course be the agreement reached between the parties. In a perfect world 
the text would reflect exactly what the parties intended and how the parties intended the agreement to 
operate (even in unforeseen circumstances). 
119 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 12-14. He describes law-texts as “…compound 
linguistic signifiers that, in a complex interplay with one another (and with other signifiers), render 
“law” intelligible and therefore interpretable…”. 
120 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 13. It should be kept in mind that Du Plessis is not 
an intentionalist and does not share the positivist belief that texts can be a reflection of reality. Indeed 
at 12 he argues that “…[J]urists engaged in untangling questions of law do not actually work with 
“concrete facts” or “concrete norms”, but with linguistic renditions of what they understand to be facts 
and norms pertaining to “the law”, in other words, (narrative and normative law-)texts that they 
construct…”.  
121 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 12. Du Plessis strikingly remarks that 
“…[N]arrative law-texts profess to be linguistic accounts of (f)actual occurrences pertinent to the 
functioning of (the) law…”. This remark captures the essence of narrative texts. Firstly, narrative texts 
profess, they claim to be. Narrative texts cannot exist with other narrative texts about the same 
circumstances. These texts are always imposed upon, and in the place of another account of the 
situation. General accounts must always yield to the specific accounts. Secondly, narrative accounts are 
always represented as the true (or actual) accounts and as objectively (or factually) so. In other words 
the account is always immanent (the first-hand record) and unassailable (an objective account). For any 
text to be such, the text creator must be at the same time situated in the circumstance that the text 
appears to relate (in order to give a first had, unmitigated account of the event) and, conversely, have a 
holistic view of the events (in order for the account to be objective). Thirdly, the narrative law-text 
functions in a system of law where there is just one option open to the interpreter, namely giving effect 
to the actual truth. The law (in this scheme) is not flexible, but merely a system of rules that will be 
influenced in one way or another by the facts.  In other words the law is the constant in an equation and 
the facts are differentials. 
 221
treated as narrative text, that is, as reports of the facts as they happened. It is 
important to note that narrative accounts do not invite any interpretive creativity (or 
even involvement). The interpreter is required to simply read the text in order to 
comprehend “what actually happened”. This kind of text is created in order to 
“preserve” the factual reality that they are enlisted to record. They are in a sense 
monuments to the “facts”, lest distortions should influence the law in an unauthorized 
manner. The parol-evidence rule is meant to serve such narrative texts by protecting 
texts as monuments of past reality, because these texts are perceived to reflect the past 
more accurately than extrinsic evidence can. Paradoxically, the bulk of the criticism 
against the rule is aimed at its failure to adequately “protect” the intention of the 
parties. However, the parol-evidence rule fails not because of its operation, but rather 
because of the nature of language. The “message” gets lost, not because the parol-
evidence rule fails to operate accurately, or because the rule bars outside evidence, but 
because there is always already more than one possible “message”. 
 
The second type of law-text, namely a normative law-text, is also aimed at 
influencing the process by which legal effect is given to a text.122 However, unlike 
narrative law-texts that are aimed at relating a certain set of facts, normative texts 
verbalise expectations that certain future events or occurrences will be treated in a 
certain way. A statutory text envisages regulation of conduct across diverse 
circumstances, establishing a norm and relating certain actions to that norm and 
facilitating action according to the norm. The important aspect of a normative text is 
that it is flexible.123 The text itself is an abstraction of the norm (as supposed to the 
reflection of it), and it is recognized as such. There are two important stages here: 1) 
the creation of the normative text (the abstract text) and 2) the application 
(interpretation) of a normative text in a specific context (the interpreted text). A 
                                                 
122 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 12-13. Du Plessis argues that normative law-texts 
can 1) establish a legal norm, 2) relate a legal action to a legal norm or 3) regulate legal actions 
according to a certain legal standard. These possible meanings are all related and the application of any 
of the types of normative texts necessarily involves (to a larger or lesser degree) the application of the 
other two. No legal norm can ever be completely new, since any law must be justifiable, and legal 
justification lies in the relation of the new norm to some already existing principle or norm. Likewise, 
the creation of a new norm always involves the application of another norm. The relation of a legal 
action to a norm involves the extension of a norm to new circumstances, and by so doing the creation 
of a new norm. Also the relation of an action to a norm involves the application of the norm to which 
the action is related. Finally the regulation (or application) of a legal norm involves the establishment 
of a new norm by removing the norm from abstraction, and the relation of a action (the new 
circumstance) to the norm. 
123 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 12. 
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narrative text imposes a reading on the situation, but a normative text removes the 
norm (abstract text) from abstraction in order to relate the norm to the specific 
circumstance (to make it an interpreted text). Because this is the case (normative texts 
must always be reinterpreted in every new context), normative texts are always 
subject to the influence of the context and the interpreter. A normative text allows for 
reflection upon the circumstances in which the present interpretation takes place. With 
a normative text, there is always the expectation that the text will be moulded and 
modified to ensure that justice and responsibility is accounted for.124  
 
Although narrative and normative texts differ, no text can be only narrative or only 
normative.125 Narrative texts need normative aspects in order to have them imposed. 
A narrative text without any normative aspects becomes a story without any legal 
significance. A normative text without a narrative aspect becomes a hopeless 
abstraction, because narrative is necessary to link the norm with past legal practice 
and also with the birth of legal significance of the text (for example the passing of a 
bill, drawing up of a will or the formation of a contract). While the account of what 
the parties agreed to is a narrative law-text, the activation of the contractual legal 
norms makes the text a normative law-text. 
 
The act of defining a text (especially a legal text) always involves two urges, 
specifically the urge to find the unique in the text and the urge to find how the text fits 
in with other texts. The interpreter must take these urges seriously. He must pay close 
attention to what the parties seemed to intend, while at the same time keeping the 
needs of the particular situation in mind. He must find a text that is both just (in the 
circumstances) and one that can be justified (in the community in which the 
interpreter finds himself). No text is already defined (before interpretation); it is 
always waiting to be constructed.126
 
4.5 Evaluating the parol-evidence rule: Enter postmodern critique 
                                                 
124 Justice demands that the unique circumstance be recognized and catered for, while the law demands 
that the actions taken be responsible and connected to what is legal. Both the unique and what has (and 
can) been done must be kept in mind. 
125 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 13. He remarks, “…[A] distinctive feature of all 
kinds of legal texts is that they can be and indeed strive to be of effect. Any resolution of a legal issue 
always draws on both narrative and normative law-texts…”. 
126 See chapter 4 section 4. 
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The parol-evidence rule (as it stands, with its present ratio) cannot cater for normative 
law-texts (or for postmodern narrative texts for that matter). Reading a normative text 
necessarily involves the application of certain norms to the context or situation. This 
can only be achieved by relating the present situation to another situation where the 
norm has previously been applied or considered.127 In a contractual relationship this 
would necessarily involve an investigation into the origin and development of the 
contract. This would undermine the present ratio of the parol-evidence rule, namely 
the protection of documentary integration of the agreement and the supposed certainty 
(to the parties and the wider public) regarding the effects of the contract. The present 
rule is not of much use with regard to a postmodern narrative text. In postmodern 
theory narratives are recognized as interpretations driven by the possibilities of 
meaning inherent in language and the specific interpretative communities in which the 
interpreter (text creator) finds herself. Consequently, the text cannot be a reflection of 
reality because in this scheme reality is always a rendition of perspective and 
language. A postmodern narrative is not a record, but rather a version of reality drawn 
from an irreducibly plural whole. There can never be only one version of reality. The 
apparent message or reflection that the parol-evidence rule is aimed at protecting is 
always just one of many possibilities. In a sense, the gate is closed after the horse had 
already bolted (or the kraal filled up with all the animals imaginable). The rule 
protects singularity when plurality is already inescapable. 
 
It is clear that it is not necessarily the working of the rule that we need to amend but 
rather our theoretical understanding of texts. The problem is not so much that the 
parol-evidence rule does not work properly, but rather that the targets set for the rule 
are unattainable. Texts are always defined as much by what is said as by what is 
omitted.128 Even if interpreters were to have recourse to all extrinsic evidence 
regarding the intentions of the authors, this evidence will still only be text, 
                                                 
127 The interpretation of a contract will normally be an issue where the parties disagree about the nature 
of the contractual consequences (rights and duties). The court must attempt to show that their 
interpretation is somehow justified by either the text or the subjective intention of the parties to the 
agreement. Consequently, the court must link their interpretation with one that is manifestly accepted 
by the parties. 
128 Fish “Is There a Text in This Class” in Is There a Text in This Class: The Authority of Interpretive 
Communities (1980) at 318; Fish “Fish vs. Fiss” in Fish Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, 
Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 126. Fish remarks that the 
facts are not the elements that settle disagreements, but rather that disagreements are the means by 
which the facts are settled. See also Fish “What makes an Interpretation Acceptable?” in Fish Is There 
a Text in This Class: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (1980) at 338. 
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characterized by the same conditions as the original text that stands to be 
supplemented by the extrinsic evidence. In a sense, the outside evidence is already 
part of the interpretation process because it is omitted. No text can ever be interpreted 
in isolation and therefore any reading of the text includes a reconstruction of the 
context that gave birth to it.129 The text is already a reconstruction and not a 
reflection, and the extrinsic evidence likewise is a construction, and not some tool that 
can make the reflection of the text more accurate. With or without extrinsic evidence, 
we are in the same position. 
 
The question for this chapter is whether the parol-evidence rule can serve some 
purpose in a postmodern theory of contractual interpretation. Can the parol-evidence 
rule serve another purpose if the theoretical understanding of texts were to change? In 
a new theory, the focus would shift from texts as a preservation of a (singular) 
meaning to texts as possible meanings. The text becomes an abstraction of many 
possibilities, out of which the interpreter must fashion meanings that will be just and 
coherent in the circumstances before the court. There would no longer be a need to 
protect the sanctity of the textual message because it has been acknowledged that the 
message is the result of interpretation and not reflected by the text. Interpreters “sever 
meanings” rather than extracting them.130 The question is therefore whether the parol-
evidence rule can serve a purpose other than to protect meaning. 
 
4.6 How is the postmodern parol-evidence rule different? 
The parol-evidence rule can have a place in contractual interpretation if its theoretical 
basis shifts from a narrative approach to one combining both normative and narrative 
elements. As was pointed out above, the narrative approach to texts lies at the hart of 
                                                 
129 Fish “The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence” in Norrie (ed) Closure or Critique: New 
Directions in Legal Theory (1993) at 162-163. Fish strikingly remarks “…[I]n other words…, an 
instrument that seems clear and unambiguous on its face seems so because “extrinsic evidence” - 
information about the condition of its production, including the situation and state of mind of the 
contracting parties, etc. - is already in place and assumed as a background; that which the parol-
evidence rule is designed to exclude is already, and necessarily, invoked the moment that writing 
becomes intelligible…”. Fish further deconstructs the distinction between contradiction and 
explanation (which forms part of the rules that make up the parol-evidence rule. Evidence might be 
produced to explain the text but not vary or contradict it). Fish questions whether it is possible to 
distinguish the two types of evidence. If a text is self-explanatory, there is no need to produce extrinsic 
evidence. However if the text is not self-explanatory, the relation of the text to extrinsic evidence can 
only be judged once the evidence has been submitted. The point is that the relevance of the evidence 
can only be evaluated once it has been submitted and it is by definition no longer extrinsic. 
130 Rainbow Foucault: The Foucault Reader (1986) at 88. 
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the parol-evidence rule, because the rule (as it is presently understood and criticised) 
is mainly aimed at protecting the (textual) record of the facts (since the parties agreed 
that the text would be the record). If we shift the focus from what was (seemingly) 
already there (that is the message of the text), to what it can be (the normative 
possibilities inherent in the text), the parol-evidence rule would make sense. In this 
scenario, the text is the language act of the parties that governs the relationship 
between them.  
 
The text is not a fixed meaning, but rather the catalyst or origin of multiple potential 
solutions to the various contractual disputes that might arise. It is the task of the 
interpreter to construct a solution out of the variety of textual possibilities. The 
solution must simultaneously be capable of answering the unique questions before the 
court, and it must be responsible.131 The role of the parol-evidence rule is to ensure 
that the text is taken seriously.  
 
The idea that a contractual text can be both a normative and a narrative text is not 
new.132 The main reason for the rejection of this approach in the past lies with its 
implications for intentionalism.133 In the light of the developments in this field 
(namely the theoretical implosion of intentionalism) these objections are no longer 
valid.134   
                                                 
131 The concept of uniqueness is strongly related to the Derridian sense of justice. See Derrida “Force 
of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” in Cornell, Rosenfeld & Gray Carlson (eds) 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (1992) at 17-20. The responsibility concept relates to the 
need to have the decision related to law and the norms of law. The decision must be a legally 
defensible one. The decision or contractual meaning must stem from the legal setting and not some 
whim of the judge and, importantly, it must be seen to do so. 
132 GF Lubbe and CM Murray noted this possibility as early as 1988 in Lubbe & Murray Farlam and 
Hathaway’s Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary (1988) at 463-464. They highlighted the 
possibility that contractual interpretation can bear a normative character and that the parol-evidence 
rule can in fact facilitate cheaper and more just contractual interpretation by keeping disputes of fact 
out of the process. 
133 It was often (and is often) argued that the normative approach to contractual interpretation 
substitutes the intention of the parties with the intention of the court. See for example Kerr The 
Principles of The Law of Contract (2002) at 401. Kerr states here that “…A third possible reason may 
be the adoption by some of the theory that a court is not concerned with the parties” intention, only 
with what the words they chose mean to others who did not choose them, and who did not make the 
contract. This…is the most unacceptable theory of contract…”. In the light of recent developments in 
the field of linguistics, this objection is first realized and then proven to be beside the point. Yes, judges 
do substitute (in the sense that they form a new intention) the intention of the parties with their own 
interpretation of the text when using the normative approach. But the intention of the parties can never 
(not even in the narrative approach) be a restriction on judges because it is itself already an 
interpretation. 
134 See chapter 5 section 2-6. 
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 It should be noted that a normative approach must be linked with a narrative approach 
to allow optimal party participation. The narrative textual approach allows the parties 
to submit what they meant with the terms of the contract (much like the interpretation 
rule of the parol evidence process as presently applied) but, because of the normative 
aspects of the textual understanding, the narrative approach allows the court to decide 
to construct an interpretation other than that suggested by the evidence led by the 
parties. The court will be well and truly confined to the text and any interpretation that 
they endorse will have to be justifiable in terms of the policy that they seek to 
implement. The parol-evidence rule will no longer be a way of shifting responsibility 
for interpretation to the parties, but rather a way of forcing the court to take an active 
part in the construction of a responsible contractual solution. 
 
There are theoretical and practical consequences to accepting a post modern parol-
evidence rule. On a theoretical level, interpreters have to deal with the notion of texts 
as normative and interpretive as opposed to merely records of intention. We can no 
longer justify meanings as if these are merely reflected by the text. Rather, meanings 
must be justified in relation to the situation in which these meanings must be applied. 
In other words, the way in which the contract is applied must be justified. We no 
longer ask whether the parties intended a certain result, but rather if the result is 
justifiable given the specific circumstances and the context of the interpretive 
question. On a practical level, parties will no longer only supply the court with 
evidence of their intentions (although such evidence will still be relevant) but also of 
reasons why the court should interpret the contract in a certain way. Because it is 
recognized that intention is also an interpretation, the discovery of intention would no 
longer be the object of the interpretive exercise. The intention of the parties would 
now be a factor in the determination of the eventual outcome of the process, but it 
would not be determinative. 
 
5. The dialogic self and good faith in contractual interpretation 
5.1 Good faith and the courts 
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“…Where good faith dictated that the rights of one contracting party had to be extended in 
order to satisfy Roman society’s precepts of fairness and equity, the judge could employ the 
expansive working of bona fides to effect such an extension…”135
 
What remains for this chapter is to see how a re-evaluation of the nature of legal 
subjectivity will affect contractual interpretation. In order to do this the contractual 
interpretation practice must be evaluated to reveal the prevailing assumptions about 
subjectivity and to re-imagine the practice in the light of a postmodern description of 
subjectivity. The main contractual principle dealing with subjectivity is that of the 
bona fides. By examining the way in which bona fides principles are presently 
approached and by re-imagining the role of these principles in a hypothetical 
postmodern interpretation practice, the role of assumptions about legal subjectivity 
can be evaluated. 
 
It has been said that the South African law of contract is based (among other things) 
on good faith,136 but exactly what this means is unclear. Whenever bona fides and its 
relation to the law of contract are discussed, it is always stressed (by both the 
proponents of more active enforcement of bona fides and their antagonists) that this 
concept plays an important role in the law of contract, but the description of this role 
varies substantially.137 The recently adopted stance by the SCA is that bona fides only 
plays a background role in contract.138 The main objection to affording bona fides a 
more direct role seems to be that values like fairness and equity do not have a definite 
content and that resort to such values will inevitably lead to legal and commercial 
                                                 
135 Du Plessis “Good faith and equity in the law of contract in the civilian tradition” (2002) 65 THRHR 
397 at 400. 
136 Meskin v Anglo-American Corporation of SA Ltd and Another 1968 (4) SA 793 (W) at 804; Sasfin 
(Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) at 9; Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman 
NO 1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA) at 331; NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC and Others; 
Deeb and Another v ABSA Bank Ltd; Friedman v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) at 
937; Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 (1) SA 464 (K) at 474; Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 
(SCA) at 28; South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 339. 
137 See for example the divergent opinions expressed in Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika 
Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA) at 331 and Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 28. 
138 The opinion of the court was enunciated in South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 
2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 339 by Brand JA. He stated that “…although abstract values such as good 
faith, reasonableness and fairness are fundamental to our law of contract, they do not constitute 
independent substantive rules that the court can employ to intervene in contractual relationships…”. 
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uncertainty.139 In recent cases such as Brisley and York Timbers, the SCA held that 
the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom require that the court 
enforce contracts wherever possible.140 It seems that as far as using bona fides as a 
contractual standard is concerned, the required measure of good faith is not 
considerable. Once a party can show that her version of the contract is not against 
public policy (if it were the other party would be absolved), the contract is regarded as 
having satisfied the good faith requirement. The test for public policy is very thick 
and difficult to satisfy. 
 
The question now arises why we seem to place such a low value on good faith. The 
answer to this question can be found in the reasoning of the SCA. In Brisley v 
Drotsky, the majority141 explains the weak position of bona fides by ranking the 
requirement of good faith alongside the value of individual autonomy.142 They 
approvingly quote Hutchison: “…[good faith] is not, however, the only value or 
principle that underlies the law of contract; nor, perhaps, even the most important 
one…”.143 The court characterizes a decision based on good faith as a value 
                                                 
139 South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 339. Brand 
pronounces “…[A]fter all, it has been said that fairness and justice, like beauty, often lie in the eye of 
the beholder…” 
140 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 28 and South African Forestry Company Ltd v York 
Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 339. 
141 Consisting of Harms AR, Streicher AR en Brand AR (who also delivered Afrox Healthcare Beperk 
v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) and South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 
(3) SA 323 (SCA)). 
142 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 15. The learned judges remark that “…[W]at die rol van 
goeie trou betref, stem ons in wese saam met die siening van prof Hutchison (op 743 - 4) waarvolgens 
goeie trou nie ‘n onafhanklike, oftewel ‘n “free-floating”, basis vir die tersydestelling of die nie-
toepassing van kontraktuele bepalings bied nie. Goeie trou is ‘n grondbeginsel wat in die algemeen 
onderliggend is aan die kontraktereg en wat uiting vind in die besondere reëls en beginsels daarvan. Of, 
soos hy dit ter aangehaalde plaatse stel: “What emerges quite clearly from recent academic writing and 
from some of the leading cases, is that good faith may be regarded as an ethical value or controlling 
principle based on community standards of decency and fairness that underlies and informs the 
substantive law of contract. It finds expression in various technical rules and doctrines, defines their 
form, content and field of application and provides them with a moral and theoretical foundation. Good 
faith thus has a creative, a controlling and a legitimating or explanatory function. It is not, however, the 
only value or principle that underlies the law of contract; nor, perhaps, even the most important one.”   
 ‘n Ander waarde onderliggend aan die kontraktereg is deur Rabie HR in Magna Alloys and Research 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) op 893I-894A onderstreep toe hy daarop gewys het dat dit 
in die openbare belang is dat persone hulle moet hou aan ooreenkomste wat hulle aangegaan het. In 
laasgenoemde verband het Steyn HR in SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren en  Andere 
1964 (4) SA 760 (A) op 767A, gewag gemaak van – ‘“ die elementêre en grondliggende algemene 
beginsel dat kontrakte wat vrylik en in alle erns deur bevoegde partye aangegaan is, in die openbare 
belang afgedwing word”’…”.  
143 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 15. See also Dale Hutchison “Good Faith in the South 
African Law of Contract” SA Law Commission, Draft 199 at 743-744. This part of the quote is 
interesting because the rest of the quote was sufficient to bring the point the courts seeks to make 
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judgement and argues that deciding a case on the basis of such values would run 
counter to the established principle of pacta sunt servanda. According to this view the 
court must be the servant of the contract, not the other way round. The court’s view is 
related in broad terms to the objective intentionalist theories of contractual 
interpretation and liability, the idea being that parties should be able to ascertain what 
the contract says in order to act accordingly. The court argues that any good faith 
remedy would negate the value of the contractual text as evidence of the intention of 
the parties and would replace this intention with the value judgement of the 
interpreter.144  In closing, the court argued that the principle of good faith finds 
embodiment in public policy and that the court will only declare a contract to be 
contrary to public policy in exceptional cases.145
 
The implications of this judgement are important. Firstly, while contracts are based on 
good faith, it is just one of the values that influence contractual interpretation. 
Secondly, when faced with a conflict between freedom of contract and good faith 
(bona fides), the court must usually give preference to freedom of contract. The court 
may only disregard freedom of contract in cases where the contract is contra bonos 
mores, which leaves a much smaller scope for judicial interference than would a 
substantive application of the bona fides.146 Thirdly, the court follows (at least 
according to the public policy inquiry) an all-or-nothing approach to the application of 
remedies based on bona fides: according to the principles of contractual freedom the 
contract is either void for lack of good faith or it is valid.147 The court does not 
envisage any compromise between contractual freedom and principles of good faith. 
                                                                                                                                            
across. (See full quote in previous note.) The inclusion of the last part seems to emphasize the 
inferiority of good faith in relation to other values (especially individual autonomy and contractual 
freedom) in the eyes of the court. 
144 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 16. The judges argue that “…[D]ie gevolg sal immers 
wees dat die beginsel van pacta sunt servanda grotendeels verontagsaam sal word omdat die 
afdwingbaarheid van kontraktuele bepalings sal afhang van wat “n bepaalde Regter in die 
omstandighede as redelik en billik beskou. Die maatstaf is dan nie meer die reg nie  maar die Regter. 
Vanuit die hoek van die kontrakterende partye gesien, sal hulle nie kan handel op die algemene 
verwagting dat wanneer daar “n dispuut tussen hulle ontstaan hulle kontrak ooreenkomstig die terme 
daarvan afgedwing sal word nie. Hulle sal moet wag en sien of die individuele Regter die bepalings as 
redelik en billik beskou. Dat so “n algemene benadering nie aan die behoeftes  van die handelsverkeer 
sal voldoen nie, spreek eintlik vanself…”. 
145 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 18. 
146 Keep in mind that the court may find a “just” interpretation where the intention of the parties is not 
clear. See South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 340. 
147 Keep in mind that the court has more scope when interpreting an “unclear” contract. The court can 
also by the way of tacit terms and novel naturalia approach contractual parties in a normative way. See 
previous fn. 
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 The reasoning in South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd148 
reinforces the aforementioned view. In this case, the advocate for the appellant also 
sought to have the adverse effects of the contract (as interpreted by the court) negated 
by inferring that the principles of good faith that underlie the contractual relationship 
necessitated the relief sought by his client (SAFCOL).149  However, because 
arguments based on direct inferences from the principles of good faith failed in 
Brisley, the advocate sought to have an implied term recognized to the effect that the 
parties must not only follow the dictates of the contract, but also do so according to 
the principles of good faith.150 By doing so, the advocate sought to not only 
circumvent the restrictions of Brisley, but also to be able to cite Brisley as authority 
for the importation of the implied term.151
 
The court rejected this approach mainly because of the scope of implied terms in 
general. Unlike tacit terms that are specific to each individual agreement, implied 
terms (once recognized) will be part of every subsequent contract of a similar kind.152 
Implied terms become part of the law of contract in general when they deal with 
contracts generally, and part of the law of specific contracts when it is recognized in 
relation to a specific type of contract. The court argued that the wide implications of 
the recognition of an implied term trumps whatever dictates of fairness and good faith 
might be relevant in specific cases. Freedom of contract (as evidenced by the intention 
                                                 
148 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA). 
149 South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 338-341. 
150 South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 338. Brand 
formulates the term as the duty to “…not only perform… obligations in compliance with the contract, 
but they must do so in accordance with the dictates of fairness and good faith…”. 
151 South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 338-339. 
152 South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 339-340. Brand 
remarks “…[implied terms] can only be implied when it is considered good law in general. The 
particular parties and the set of facts can serve only as catalysts in the process of legal development…”. 
It is interesting that the parties specifically are denied recourse to justice because the general practice of 
law might be harmed in future. The conflict between justice and justification as identified by Derrida is 
acutely reflected by this statement by Brand JA. See Derrida “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation 
of Authority” in Cornell, Rosenfeld & Gray Carlson (eds) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice 
(1992) at 22. Derrida argues that justice and justifiability are two contradictory impulses always present 
in law. There is always the need for specific justice, specific attention to the context. At the same time 
any finding must be linked in some way to previous judgements, it must be justifiable. See further 
chapter 5 section 6. 
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of the parties) is the paramount value in the law of contract.153 The court specifically 
stated that it had “…no power to deviate from the intention of the parties, as 
determined through the interpretation of the contract, because it may be regarded as 
unfair to one of them …(my emphasis)”.154  
 
Brand JA, writing for the court, also disagreed with the contention that Brisley 
necessitated the importation of a tacit term requiring the parties to act in good faith 
and according to the dictates of fairness.155 He argued that recognition of the implied 
term suggested by the respondents would amount to a negation of the previous lines 
of reasoning followed by the court.156 The judge (quite correctly) pointed out that the 
hierarchy recognized by the court consists firstly of recognition and implementation 
of freedom of contract as evidenced by the agreement, and only if this proves 
inconclusive (after proper construction of the agreement) or grossly unreasonable 
(against public policy) may the court import notions of fairness and good faith.157 
While the method of relying on the notions of good faith and fairness may have been 
different from Brisley and Afrox (implied good faith vs a direct resort to good faith), 
the end result (against which the court argued so strongly) would be the same. If an 
implied term to the effect were recognized, courts would be required to make value 
judgements about the requirements of good faith in each specific case. Courts do not 
want to do this because such subjective value judgements go against the (perceived) 
neutrality of judges who just decide on what the parties put in front of them. Judges 
would be forced to come to judgments based on their own ideas of fairness and good 
                                                 
153 South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 340. This 
reason will of course no longer be valid if the critique on the present interpretive practice (specifically 
concerning intentionalism) is accepted. See part 2 of this section. 
154 South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 340. This quote 
can mean two things. Firstly, it can mean that the court will not infer the bona fides because to do so 
would not be fair to one of the parties. It can also mean that the court will not infer the bona fides 
solely because enforcement of the contract as it stands will be unfair to one of the parties. Both 
interpretations are the result of a belief that it is better to hold the parties to their agreement, because 
they agreed in the first place.  
155 South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 340. He argues 
“…[T]o say that contractual stipulations cannot be avoided on the basis of abstract notions such as 
fairness and good faith, but that the same result can be attained when a party’s conduct is said to offend 
these same abstract notions, because they have been imported by means of an implied term, amounts to 
a distinction without a difference…”. 
156 He was referring to Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) (where he formed part of the bench) and 
Afrox Healthcare Beperk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) (where he wrote the judgement). 
157 See South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 340. 
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faith, and in the present scheme this would constitute a betrayal of everything that 
seems to make contracts worthwhile.158  
 
It is important to realize that that the rationes of these judgements do not reflect a 
belief that the requirements of good faith and fairness are unimportant, but rather that 
the South African law of contract is already based on good faith and fairness. For the 
court, the principles of freedom of contract and individual contractual autonomy 
reflect the notions of fairness and good faith of our society. They believe that the best 
way to give effect to a contract is to do as the parties to the agreement intended. 
 
5.2 The present role of good faith and the contractual party 
The line of cases emanating from the SCA on the relevance of good faith and fairness 
is well argued and theoretically sound, given present beliefs regarding the nature (and 
role) of contractual parties.159 At present, a contract is seen as an agreement 
concluded between two autonomous individuals. The consequences of the contract are 
said to be the result of the agreement between the parties and therefore no party 
outside the agreement is allowed to influence the contractual outcome. This line of 
reasoning is based on beliefs regarding the nature of interpretation, intention, texts 
and the contracting party. In the present hierarchy the dominant value in contractual 
theory is that of the self-determination of contractual parties. Only when this self-
determination brings the individual’s wishes in conflict with the common good (also 
described as the maximisation of individual freedoms in many liberal dispensations) 
may the court (as the guardian of the common good) step in and modify the 
contractual outcomes. 
 
The attitude of the courts towards good faith is the direct result of beliefs about the 
nature of contractual parties (and legal subjects). Judges are hesitant to interfere in 
what they see as the actions of autonomous individuals. Autonomous individuals must 
be afforded the freedom to form associations (such as contracts) and to see out the 
                                                 
158 The judge does acknowledge that there might be cases where the interpretation of contract require of 
judges to make such individual judgements based on their personal judgments, but that this will only 
happen where the contract is ambiguous (which is after all the fault of the parties themselves). See 
South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 340. 
159 See Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 1812. 
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consequences of those associations as intended by them.160 The role of the court in 
such a system is that of the guardian of the common good (maximisation of individual 
freedom). It is not the task of the court to ensure fairness and good faith in contractual 
dealings, it is the responsibility of the autonomous parties. They are after all free to 
form the associations that they please and, if they strike a bad bargain, it is their own 
fault. In short, the present application of good faith reflects the liberal description of a 
contractual party as an autonomous individual,161 who stands apart from her social 
relations, with the result that the regulation of those social relations (which includes 
contracts) is up to the party herself and the courts. 
 
According to Michelman’s characterization of the liberal self,162 the self can be 
described as an interest bearing, ethically several, self-activating, communicative and 
reflective autonomous being. If a contractual remedy like the exceptio doli generalis 
or a general “good faith” remedy were recognized, many of these values would 
automatically be violated. For example, if X concluded a contract with Y within the 
acceptable parameters of public policy and the court were to set aside this contract on 
the value judgement of an individual judge, X would no longer be self-activating, or 
responsible for the consequences of her actions. Self-activation can only take place in 
a society were individuals can expect certain responses on their actions. In the ideal 
liberal dispensation, the effects of one’s actions must be objectively ascertainable. 
Any good faith remedy relies heavily on individual judicial discernment and this in 
itself is distinctly non-liberal. 
 
In the prevailing legal doctrine on good faith in the law of contract, the value of 
individual autonomy is postulated against intervention on the basis of good faith by 
the interpreter (mostly the court).163 It is also accepted that in most circumstances the 
                                                 
160 This description of a contractual party and the options open to her is the result of a culmination of 
beliefs about the nature of interpretation, intention and the will theory of contractual liability. See 
further chapter 2 section 3 and chapter 5 section 2-3. 
161 See chapter 3 section 2. 
162 See chapter 3 section 2.2; Michelman “The Subject of Liberalism” (1994) 46 Stanford LR 1807 at 
1812. 
163 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 16. The learned judges argue that “…[D]ie gevolg sal 
immers wees dat die beginsel van pacta sunt servanda grotendeels verontagsaam sal word omdat die 
afdwingbaarheid van kontraktuele bepalings sal afhang van wat “n bepaalde Regter in die 
omstandighede as redelik en billik beskou. Die maatstaf is dan nie meer die reg nie  maar die Regter. 
Vanuit die hoek van die kontrakterende partye gesien, sal hulle nie kan handel op die algemene 
verwagting dat wanneer daar ‘n dispuut tussen hulle ontstaan hulle kontrak ooreenkomstig die terme 
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value of individual autonomy will prevail over the inference of an external judgement 
of good faith into the contract. In short, we would rather have the parties decide what 
constitutes a fair bargain than leave it to the court. For this characterization to work, 
the parties have to “exist” prior to the existence of and separate from the agreement. 
The parties must be individuals in the liberal tradition. They must exist as atomistic, 
self-contained and self-regulating persons that take on various roles (in this case 
concluding a contract). The contract is a link between the two parties, but it does not 
constitute them. It might influence their behaviour, but not their autonomy. In this 
model of the self, the ideal is to give the self sufficient freedom to enter into whatever 
relations that he might desire and to influence the direction of his own existence in 
that way. Consequently, the court is understandably hesitant to interfere with the 
regulation of the lives of such autonomous beings, and only in exceptional 
circumstances will the court alter the consequences of agreements freely entered into 
by the parties.164
 
5.3 An alternative theoretical understanding of the contractual party and good 
faith 
The remaining question for this chapter is therefore: How would an alternative 
theoretical position on the nature of contractual parties influence the role of bona fides 
in contractual practice? Firstly, how would this alternative contractual party look 
(theoretically speaking)? I would propose that the contractual party should be 
described in terms of dialogic self-rule.165 Dialogic self-rule involves a reasoned and 
                                                                                                                                            
daarvan afgedwing sal word nie. Hulle sal moet wag en sien of die individuele Regter die bepalings as 
redelik en billik beskou. Dat so ‘n algemene benadering nie aan die behoeftes  van die handelsverkeer 
sal voldoen nie, spreek eintlik vanself…”. ; South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 
2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 338-341. 
164 This is the reason given for the decisions in most of the cases on bona fides regarding contracts.  In 
Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 35, Cameron JA remarks “…the constitutional values of 
dignity and equality and freedom require that the Courts approach their task of striking down contracts 
or declining to enforce them with perceptive restraint . . . contractual autonomy is part of freedom. 
Shorn of its obscene excesses, contractual autonomy informs also the constitutional value of 
dignity…”.  See also Afrox Healthcare Beperk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) at 38; South African 
Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 338-339. 
165 The phrase “dialogic self-rule” can be attributed to Frank Michelman. See Michelman “Law’s 
Republic” (1988) 97 Yale LJ 1493-1537. In “The Supreme Court 1985 Term – Foreword: Traces of 
Self-Government” (1986) 100 Harvard LR 4 at 31-36 Michelman argues that the self is always 
embedded in social relations, communities etc, but importantly, the self is still capable of self-revision. 
These contradictory thoughts (embeddedness and the ability to rise above the embeddedness through 
self-revision) underscore the concept of dialogic self-rule. See also Botha “Rights, Limitations and the 
(Im)Possibility of Self-Government” in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) Rights and 
Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 13 at 17. See also chapter 3 section 5. 
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constant re-determination of the terms under which we live. Proponents of dialogic 
self-rule reject the idea that the parameters of life are predefined and they argue that 
constant critical evaluation of our situation is necessary. 
 
In terms of the notion of dialogic self-rule, the focus (and therefore moral 
justification) is still on the individual. However, the individual (in this scheme) is 
distinctly post-liberal. While liberalism regard individuals as pre-social, dialogic self-
rule describes them as socially constituted.166 In other words, the self can only exist 
through interaction with others, and therefore the consciousness of the self is strongly 
related to her social situatedness. In terms of this theory, one cannot argue that the 
parties to the contract are wholly free to decide how they want to structure their 
relationship, since the nature of that relationship (and of the parties themselves) are 
subject to continuous (re-)formation. The parties’ decisions to contract do not just 
represent the mindsets of the parties, but also forms part of the social fabric that 
continuously (re-)constitutes the self.167
 
However, dialogic self-rule is not a purely communitarian phenomenon either. One of 
the most important distinctions between the communitarian conception of the self and 
that of dialogic self-rule lies in the latter’s emphasis on the human capacity for self-
revision. The communitarian self is locked into a social system over which she has no 
command. She is always subject to communal practices and constraints over which 
she has no control. In other words, it is not possible for the communitarian self to 
objectively face up to her own existence in order to radically change that subsistence. 
The possibilities of change (or lack thereof) will always already be in place. 
Conversely, the dialogic self is capable of what Michelman terms “self-
                                                 
166 Botha “Rights, Limitations and the (Im)Possibility of Self-Government” in Botha, Van der Walt & 
Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 13 at 15 
167 Michelman Brennan and Democracy (1999) at 133. He explains, “…Individuals are what matter in 
the end. Individuals are also, however, as a matter of fact, socially constituted, enmeshed in various 
relationships and communities, thoughtways and cultures, institutions and practices. Out of these 
multiple, overlapping formative contexts, individuality forms itself. Individuals…depend for their 
identities and self-understandings on affiliation and commitment…”. A contract would be an example 
of a social relation that forms the individual. My rental agreement, for example, will determine where I 
will live and as a consequence, have a bearing on how I see myself in relation to others.  See also Botha 
“Rights, Limitations and the (Im)Possibility of Self-Government” in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der 
Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 13 at 15. 
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transcendence”,168 the ability of the self to confront her own existence.  By processes 
of deliberation, debate and social (and political) arrangements geared towards 
constant revision of identity, the self is able to reformulate the terms of her 
existence.169
 
Dialogic self-rule also includes a specific view of rights. In a liberal dispensation, 
rights are trumps or boundaries that protect selves from infringements by other 
persons. In terms of dialogic self-rule, this description of rights cannot prevail. 
Instead, rights are recognized as social relations and practices.170 Because of the 
association of rights and social relations, rights can no longer be characterized as 
objective standards, but take on a normative character. The application of rights 
therefore depends upon an interpretive act that applies an abstract notion to a factual 
situation, bearing in mind that there are often competing norms that are equally 
applicable.171 In other words, the relations (rights) among the selves are subject to 
evaluation and reformation each time they are interpreted. Contracts, like rights, are 
also social relations between selves. If we see the self (the contractual party) in terms 
of dialogic self-rule, we can no longer regard contracts as embodiments of contractual 
“rights” in the liberal sense. Contracts are then social relations between selves and are 
therefore (like rights) subject to continuous reformulation when interpreted. 
 
This brings us to the second part of the question, namely: How would understanding a 
contractual party in terms of dialogic self-rule influence the legal position on the role 
and requirements of bona fides? According to the notion of dialogic self-rule, it is 
recognized that the self is not a pre-interpretation being. The self, according to this 
theory, exists because of her social relations and interaction. The self is therefore at 
the same time dependent upon the other for existence and responsible for the 
                                                 
168 Michelman Brennan and Democracy (1999) at 69; Botha “Rights, Limitations and the 
(Im)Possibility of Self-Government” in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) Rights and 
Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 13 at 16. 
169 Botha rightly remarks that this type of existence is only possible in a political dispensation that 
values debate, confrontation and deliberation. See Botha “Rights, Limitations and the (Im)Possibility of 
Self-Government” in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a 
Transformative Constitution (2003) 13 at 16. 
170 Michelman “Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a Contradictory World” in Pennock & 
Chapman (eds) Justification in Law, Ethics and Politics (1986) at 91; Botha “Rights, Limitations and 
the (Im)Possibility of Self-Government” in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt (eds) Rights and 
Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 13 at 16. 
171 See for example Kennedy “The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries” (1979) 28 Buffalo LR 205 
at 211. 
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existence (and the nature) of the other. In line with the arguments of Duncan 
Kennedy, the self depends upon others for a free existence and others simultaneously 
threaten the existence of the self.172  This insight leads to the realization that our 
interaction (interpretation and implementation) with the contractual text will have 
important implications for the existence of the parties to it. These implications do not 
merely concern the well-being of the contractual parties, but actually influence who 
these parties turn out to be. In other words, the way that we read the contract will 
influence the identity of those who entered into the agreement in the first place. 
 
If one accepts dialogic self-rule as the theoretical basis of legal identity, bona fides 
and autonomy can no longer be separate issues. One can no longer claim to balance 
the interests of the parties to the contract and that of the judge (as representative of 
society at large) because both these interests are mutually constitutive. The parties 
become that which they are allowed to become through the contract, and this is 
determined by the interpretation of the contract. The court, as a major player in the 
establishment of the bona fides as far as contracts are concerned, will have to work 
out the details of justice in every case. The court must decide how the parties must see 
out the contract. In doing this, courts are creating the types of self that are valued in 
contractual practice.173
 
By challenging current beliefs about the nature of legal personality and personhood, 
one shifts the boundaries of accepted contractual interpretation practices. The court 
has to take responsibility for the nature of contracting parties, but the parties have to 
take responsibility for the way in which they conduct themselves in the contractual 
relationship.  The court can only decide on that which is put in front of it, and the 
                                                 
172 See Kennedy  “The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries” (1979) 28 Buffalo LR 205 at 211-213; 
Botha “Rights, Limitations and the (Im)Possibility of Self-Government” in Botha, Van der Walt & Van 
der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 13 at 16; JWG van der 
Walt “Frankly Befriending the Fundamental Contradiction: Frank Michelman and Critical Legal 
Thought” in Botha H, Van der Walt AJ and Van der Walt JWG (eds) Rights and Democracy in a 
Transformative Constitution (2003) 213 at 223. It should of course be noted that the self is also a threat 
and a precondition to others. The fundamental contradiction is that the preconditions for any legal aim 
like individual autonomy, also involves the treat to that legal aim. With regards to individual autonomy 
other persons are always required for individual autonomy, but they are at the same time a threat to 
individual autonomy. 
173 The individual that the court “helps” will be the individual that future contractants will emulate. If 
we want persons to negotiate in good faith and to act fairly, then encourage such behaviour by 
accentuating those values (which already exist as possibilities in any interpretation) when interpreting 
contracts before the court. Before long, the general legal practice will strive to show that they acted 
fairly and in good faith because those are the parties that the court would assist. 
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parties must provide the court with evidence that will enable the court to make a just 
decision in each individual case. A change in theoretical understanding of the nature 
of the self can only influence the court insofar as it forces courts to consider the merits 
of each case and its relation to relevant considerations of bona fides. In other words, 
bona fides will always be relevant, but the precise nature of what is relevant in a 
particular case will depend on normative policy.174 In the end, policymakers like the 
legislature will have to decide what the relevant policy considerations must be in 
contractual practice. 
 
5.4 Toehold: Tacit terms and normative contractual parties  
Normative conceptions of individuality are not completely foreign to South African 
contract theorists. In fact, other than the bona fides interpretation principle,175 the 
notion of “ideal contractual parties” is also recognized as part of the tacit term 
doctrine. 
 
When a contract is interpreted and interpreters encounter a “gap” in the contract, that 
is to say there is no external manifestation indicating a term but there is evidence that 
the parties indeed intended such a term, they may in certain circumstances import a 
tacit term.176 Tacit terms are described as “…terms which derive (or at least are said 
to derive) from the common intention of the parties but which are not expressed by 
them…”.177 Courts are slow to import a tacit term, probably because of the 
assumption that the parties to the contract are self-regulating and that they would 
                                                 
174 It is interesting to note that the SCA has already given the first step in the direction of the 
recognition of the interpretive nature of individuality. South African Forestry Company Ltd v York 
Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 340, the court proclaims that it will sometimes follow the most 
just interpretation of the contract (where the parties’ intention is not clear).  This implies that the court 
assumes that the parties acted justly when they constructed the contract. The presuppose that the parties 
had a certain mindset (regardless of their actual mindset). It does not therefore require too big a leap of 
the imagination to envisage a contractual practice where all contracts (not just the ones where the 
intentions of the parties are unclear) are treated this way. 
175 See South African Forestry Company Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 340 and 
also the discussion above. 
176 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 153. 
177 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 256. 
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mention a term should they regard it as necessary.178 The term would be imported if it 
passes the so-called “innocent bystander” test.179
 
While the courts have consistently argued that tacit terms are based on the intention of 
the parties,180 various practices give the importation of these terms a normative 
character. The first of these practices is that a tacit term would sometimes be inferred 
even where the parties did not in fact think of such a term, as long as it is compatible 
with the rest of the contract.181 This practice lies in close relation to the imputation of 
a tacit term to give the contract business efficacy.182 Both of these involve a 
judgement by the court regarding the intentions of the parties regardless of their actual 
intentions. Provided the circumstances allow the importation of such a term, courts act 
as if the parties contemplated the business efficacy of their contract even if they did 
not.183 This is clearly a normative reading of the contract and also a normative 
                                                 
178 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 257; Cornelius Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 154; Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v 
Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) at 532; Wilkins NO v Voges 1994 (3) SA 
130 (A) at 143.  
179 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 257; Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd 
v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) at 532-533; Strydom v Duvenhage NO en 
'n Ander 1998 (4) SA 1037 (SCA) at 1044-1045. The test was formulated in Reigate v Union 
Manufacturing Co 118 LT 479 at 483 as “…You must only imply a term if it is necessary in the 
business sense to give efficacy to the contract; that is, if it is such a term that you can be confident that 
if at the time the contract was being negotiated someone had said to the parties: ‘What will happen in 
such a case?’ they would have both replied: ‘Of course, so-and-so. We did not trouble to say that; it is 
too clear…” and subsequently accepted as part of our law. 
180 See for example Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) 
SA 506 (A) at 532; Strydom v Duvenhage NO en 'n Ander 1998 (4) SA 1037 (SCA) at 1044; Van der 
Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 258. 
181 Joel Melamed and Hurwitz v Vorner Investments (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 155 (A) at 165; Muller v 
Pam Snyman Eiendomskonsultante (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 313 (C) at 320; Van der Merwe et al 
Contract: General Principles (2003) at 259. 
182 Wilkins NO v Voges 1994 (3) SA 130 (A) at 143; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 
(2003) at 259. Cornelius argues that business efficacy is not a prerequisite for the recognition of a tacit 
term, but that it would play a role in determining the feasibility of the term. See Cornelius Principles of 
the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 154; Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd 
v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 901 (N) at 909; Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Hall 1968 (3) 
SA 231 (W at 236 – 237. 
183 In Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 901 (N) at 
909 Hoexter J remarks that “…Although the hallowed ‘business efficacy’ test for reading a tacit term 
into a contract is capable of statement in simple language, its application in practice is often a matter of 
difficulty. Before trying to apply it to the facts of the present case two general considerations should, I 
think, be steadily borne in mind. Both are suggested by the fact that to some extent the test is an 
objective one. The first is that the test does not necessarily require that the contracting parties should 
consciously have directed their minds to the incidental contingency which might later supervene, and 
the need to provide for it. The test does not require that the parties should actually have intended the 
tacit term... The second consideration requiring brief mention is this. The test imports the standard of a 
reasonable man. The contracting parties questioned by the officious bystander must, I consider, be 
taken to be persons endowed with the degree of shrewdness, knowledge and prudence reasonably to be 
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understanding of the contractual parties and their intentions. Added to considerations 
regarding the business efficacy of the contract, courts often impute terms on the basis 
that such a term would have been consented to by reasonable parties (provided it is 
compatible with the rest of the contract), even if the parties to the agreement were not 
necessarily reasonable.184  
 
While typical liberal assumptions about the nature of contractual parties still underlie 
the interpretation of contracts (courts are after all very slow to import tacit terms), the 
way in which tacit terms are administrated suggests that a normative understanding of 
individuality is already (albeit to a limited degree) part of contractual interpretation. 
Extension of a critical normative understanding of contractual parties (such as critical 
self-rule) to all contractual situations is not impossible and not incompatible with our 
rules of interpretation. 
 
6. The beginning 
 
“…Legal meaning is a challenging enrichment of social life, a potential restraint on arbitrary 
power and violence. We ought to stop circumscribing the Nomos: we ought to invite new 
worlds…”185
 
The aim of this chapter and this thesis is to show that the present theoretical 
dispensation is not crucial to the survival of contractual practice in South Africa. In 
fact, much of the necessary reforms are short-circuited not by the practice itself, but 
rather by the theoretical understandings that underpin the contractual practice as it 
stands. The problem is often not the rules, but rather the reasons for the way the rules 
are used. Rules and practices are fleshed out by presumptions and beliefs, not by some 
independent content. By changing these assumptions, one can dramatically alter the 
way contracts are interpreted and realized. 
                                                                                                                                            
expected of persons ordinarily (my emphasis) engaged in the conclusion of the relevant contract…”. 
See also Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Hall 1968 (3) SA 231 (W) at 236 – 237. 
184 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2003) at 259; Wilkins NO v Voges 1994 (3) SA 
130 (A) at 141. Cornelius remarks in this regard that the tacit term need not be reasonable, but that the 
parties will be regarded as intending a reasonable and equitable result and being honest and reasonable 
themselves. See Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) at 154. 
See also quote by Hoexter J in Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 
901 (N) at 909 in previous fn. 
185 Cover “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4 at 68. 
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 Derrida recognizes that just legal action involves two contradictory impulses, justice 
and justification.186 Justice involves the (impossible) complete recognition of the 
other as other. It involves a completely contextualised interpretation of the unique 
question before the court and requires the court to answer the unique question in a 
unique way. On the other hand, any legal interpretation must be justifiable and must 
be connected to previous legal interpretations. In other words, legal interpretation 
must proceed in accordance with established legal tradition. According to the 
established legal dispensation, legal rules are primarily aimed (at least according to 
their present formulation) at regulating behaviour,187 at providing a justification for an 
interpretation. What the deconstructive approach shows is that mere application of 
rules is often not enough. We have to continually reflect on why we apply rules and 
whether application in the specific case is just. Consequently, what is needed is not 
merely a re-evaluation of the contractual rules of interpretation in the light of changed 
theoretical assumptions, but a re-imagination of how we apply rules. We should go 
further than asking whether an interpretation is justifiable and ask whether it is just. In 
the present practice, an interpretation is deemed just because it is formally justifiable. 
If rules are simply used to justify contractual meaning, the process of rule application 
tends to become a mechanical process. It might seem objective, but as Kennedy 
explains, there are always equally applicable counter rules, and any interpretation is 
therefore always relatively arbitrary.188 It is only once we start to look at our reasons 
for the application of the rules in every specific case, and at the same time do not 
                                                 
186 Derrida “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” in Cornell, Rosenfeld & Gray 
Carlson (eds) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (1992) 1 at 13-24. 
187 Twining & Miers How To Do Things With Rules (1999) at 123. See also ABSA Bank LTD v Deeb & 
Others 1999 (2) SA 656 (N) at 663; Phone-a-Copy Worldwide (Pty) Ltd v Orkin & Another (1986) (1) 
SA 729 (A) at 734; Detmold “Law as the Structure of Meaning” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) 
Legal Interpretation in Democratic States (2002) at 164. 
188 Kennedy “The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries” (1979) 28 Buffalo LR 205 at 211-213. In 
Kennedy “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 98 Harvard LR 1685 at 1685, he 
states “…substantive and formal conflict in private law cannot be reduced to disagreement about how 
to apply some neutral calculus that will “maximise the total satisfactions of human wants.” The 
opposed rhetorical modes lawyers use reflect a deeper level of contradiction. At this deeper level, we 
are divided, among ourselves and also within ourselves, between irreconcilable visions of humanity 
and society, and between radically different aspirations for our common future…”. See on the subject 
Kennedy A Critique of Adjudication (fin de siècle) (1997) at 105-07. For an explanation see Roux “Pro-
Poor Court, Anti-Poor Outcomes: Explaining the Performance of the South African Land Claims 
Court” at 19 presented: the Centre for Applied Legal Studies conference on Human Rights, Democracy 
and Social Transformation: When do Rights Work? (November 2003) and the University of the 
Witwatersrand Law School conference celebrating Twenty Years of Human Rights Scholarship and Ten 
Years of Democracy (July 2004) (Published as Roux “Pro-Poor Court, Anti-Poor Outcomes: 
Explaining the Performance of the South African Land Claims Court” (2004) 20 SAJHR 511-543. 
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hesitate to apply the rules when it would be just to do so, that we can break free of a 
(seemingly) objective method of rule application. In postmodern theory rules 
resemble normative policy rather than mechanical ways of guiding interpretation. 
Rules embody policy as an abstract notion, while the interpretation process 
determines the specific content of the policy in the specific situation facing the 
interpreter. Rule-guided interpretations must first be just, then justifiable.  
 
The golden rule of interpretation is used to justify the ascription of liability to the 
“intentional” actions of competent legal subjects. The rule is applied in various stages, 
comprising an initial evaluation of the so-called plain meaning of the contract 
(starting with the individual words and then moving to sentences and phrases until the 
contract as a whole is evaluated), followed by the application of various presumptions 
(both interpretive and substantive) and the evaluation of the (applicable) evidence 
outside the text concerning the intention of the parties to the contract. It was shown 
that the rule itself is the result of a belief in subjective intentionalism as a basis for 
interpretation (although the application of the rule is often based on objective 
intentionalism). The rule is aimed at “protecting” the intentions of the parties to the 
contract and to give effect to those intentions. In theoretical terms, the existence and 
application of the rule is based on the dual belief that: 1) Persons have intentions apart 
from the text and these intentions can be recovered or reconstructed; and 2) language 
has a reflection value, that is, language serves as a records of facts. Consequently, it is 
believed that language can have objectively certifiable meaning, and that careful users 
(of language) can create a contract that reflects their intentions accurately. In short, 
the golden rule and its application are based on the belief that thought and language 
can be separated. 
 
In postmodern thinking the distinction between thought and language is 
problematized (although not done away with). Post-structuralists (and to an extent 
neo-pragmatists) argue that thought and language, although conceptually separate, can 
never be separated in practice. Thought is always situated in language and language is 
always an expression of thoughts. With thought, there is the constant urge to express 
the uniqueness of the idea (thought), while language tends to delineate and show the 
connection between the idea (thought) and previous ideas. When thoughts (of which 
intentions are one type) are expressed in language, the thought loses some of its 
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uniqueness (individuality) because of the delineating effect of language, while 
language can never completely delineate (capture) thought because language is 
iterable (it contains traces of previous language use and therefore the possibility of 
other meanings). The effect of this insight is that intentions can never be captured or 
reconstructed perfectly. The uniqueness of the intention will always be lost in 
expression, while other meaning possibilities will emerge because of the traces of past 
expressions of the same language.  
 
The golden rule of interpretation can be re-imagined with a shift in the understanding 
of intention. A rule aiming for something that cannot be found should not be 
maintained. Contracts will always (at least in the foreseeable future) be instruments 
dealing with relations between legal subjects, and it is for this reason that one cannot 
simply jettison all ideas regarding intention. We cannot have a theory of contract (or 
interpretation of contracts) that does not take seriously the wishes of both parties to 
the agreement. In line with postmodern theories of interpretation, what is proposed is 
a theory of just interpretation. The aim of such a theory is to involve both parties 
extensively and to try to ascertain the needs of both parties to the relationship (and the 
way these needs are understood by the counter party). The interpreter must then 
enforce the contractual relationship in such a way that the (publicly known) normative 
policies of contract be served optimally. The new “intention” is a construction (not a 
reconstruction or a discovery), but it is developed with active participation of the 
parties to the contract. 
 
The main difference between the present concept of intention and a postmodern 
conception of intention lies in the normative character of the latter. At present, 
meanings are being justified by referring to them as the intention of the parties. In 
postmodern theory, it is recognized that intention (even during the negotiations and 
just after conclusion) is an abstract notion that only acquires meaning in concrete 
situations. The contractual text is a manifestation of this abstract intention and the role 
of the interpreter is to apply the text in the specific situation facing the court. In other 
words, the “intention of the parties” is only formulated when an interpreter deals with 
a question regarding the applicability of the contractual text to a specific 
circumstance. If the contract “covers” the circumstances, it can be found that the 
parties “intended” the contract to provide for the circumstances. If not, then it is found 
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that the parties did not intend to cover the circumstance in their agreement. The point 
is that intention cannot serve as a justification for a contractual meaning (as courts 
would like us to believe) because intention is reformulated in every new set of 
circumstances. In postmodern theory intention is a meaning, not a restraint. This does 
not make intention any less relevant, but it does require the interpreter to find other 
justifications for her interpretation. 
 
The parol-evidence rule is aimed at “protecting” the sanctity and certainty of written 
documents. The rule is an attempt at regulating the kinds of evidence that can be 
presented to explain the contents of a written contractual document. The rule consists 
of two parts, the integration rule and the interpretation rule. In terms of the former, it 
is determined whether a written contractual document was intended to serve as the 
exclusive memorial of the contractual terms. Where it is found that the document is an 
exclusive memorial, no evidence may be produced to contradict the terms of the 
contract as evidenced by the document. Where the document serves as a partial 
integration, the same applies to the integrated part. The interpretation rule is applied 
to determine the extent to which evidence outside of the document may be scrutinized 
in order to explain the document. All such (explanatory) evidence will be permissible 
save evidence that contradicts the written document. The parol-evidence rule is also 
geared to “protecting” narrative texts as records. 
 
Two main criticisms are raised against the rule; firstly that it is contrary to the 
accepted theory of contractual liability (subjective intentionalism), and secondly that 
the rule is difficult to apply. Both these criticisms and the rule itself are based on the 
assumption that texts serve as records of facts and, consequently, that written texts 
(which are very good records of facts) deserve special attention. This assumption is 
based on a functionalist understanding of language and a positivist historical view on 
the utility of texts. In short, the application process and the working of the rule are 
aimed at protecting written contracts as records of contractual facts. 
 
In postmodern interpretation theory, the role of interpretation is described as meaning 
construction rather than meaning reproduction or extraction. Meaning is described as 
the product of an interpretation process, encompassing irreducibly plural influences 
ranging from interpretive communities to the meaning possibilities inherent in all 
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language. Texts cannot be described as “containers” of meaning since no pre-
interpretation meaning exists and there are always meanings outside our definition. 
Contracts are better described as combined normative and narrative law-texts; texts 
telling a story but having to relate this story in various circumstances. In this light, the 
text becomes a catalyst of endless possibilities of meaning of which the interpreter 
must apply what is both just and justifiable in the specific circumstance. The text 
becomes the beginning of the understanding process and not the element that settles 
the meaning. The parol-evidence rule can no longer serve as “protection” of that 
which the text contains, but it can serve as a tool to force the interpreters to take the 
textual possibilities seriously. 
 
In South African law contracts are based on good faith (bona fides), but the Supreme 
Court of Appeal decided in a line of decisions (Brisley, Afrox and York Timbers), that 
we do not have a remedy or implied term to the effect that a contract can be modified 
to bring it in line with the bona fides. The court weighed up the value of contractual 
freedom and abstract values of fairness, good faith and equity and decided (first in 
Brisley and followed in the subsequent decisions) that, except in extraordinary 
circumstances, the value of freedom of contract must prevail. The court reasoned that 
it would be improper for it to infer by way of individual value judgement certain 
values of good faith to alter the contractual consequences which the parties 
themselves reached and which is reflected by the contract. The role of the bona fides 
in the law of contract is not indicative of a disregard for such values, but instead 
reflects a belief that individual autonomy is the quintessence of the bona fides. The 
highest value in a liberal society is that of individual autonomy or freedom to lead a 
life driven by one’s own decisions. 
 
In the place of the atomistic and autonomous self, postmodern theories of identity 
recognize the self as at the same time the seat of moral concern and constituted by her 
social relations and situatedness. The dialogic self is a person continuously 
reconstituted by her social interactions and situatedness, but also capable of 
reevaluating her situation through debate and confrontation. In other words, the 
dialogic self recognizes her dependence upon others, but is not powerless to affect her 
own destiny. Because of the realization that the self and her consciousness is 
continuously formed by her situatedness, the contractual relationship should not be 
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understood as involving an a priori atomistic self taking on a role, but rather as a 
continuing definition of the contractual relationship through interaction between the 
self, others and the circumstances in which they find themselves. The self is therefore 
consciously developing through the contractual relationship and the interpretation of 
the contract will affect who the parties to the contract will be. The court has an 
opportunity to create a contractual relationship that is sensitive to the context. 
Sometimes it will be necessary to have responsive parties who are prepared to 
compromise, at other times not. By being sensitive to the specific needs of the parties 
the court can, in line with normative considerations, decide whom they will help and 
how they will do this. We will no longer be ruled by the appearance of objective rules, 
but rather by the exigencies of the particular situation. 
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7 
Conclusion 
 
1. Introduction 
The present contractual interpretive practice is aimed at justifying interpretation. Four 
assumptions underlie this practice: 1) Interpretation is regarded as a meaning-
extraction exercise. It is assumed that interpreters (should they search for either the 
intention of the parties or the objective meaning of the text) have a minimal influence 
on the outcome of the interpretation process. As a result, the emphasis during the 
interpretative process is not on the eventual meaning, but rather on the “objectivity” 
of the process. 2) Contractual parties are assumed to be autonomous and self-
regulating. It is argued that the parties stand apart from the contractual relationship. 
Assumptions about legal subjectivity held in the present interpretive practice are 
reflected by the way in which bona fides  was applied during contractual 
interpretation. 3) Texts are assumed to be records of facts. Consequently, the parol-
evidence rule is aimed at protecting such “records” against the possible destabilizing 
influence of external evidence. 4) Finally, intention is regarded as a possible restraint 
on the interpreter. If the interpreter were to confine himself to finding the intention of 
the author of the text the interpretation process would be predictable and the influence 
of the interpreter would be minimal. It is therefore not strange that the principal rule 
of contractual interpretation, the “golden rule”, is aimed at facilitating the process of 
finding the intention of the contractual parties. All these assumptions (about 
interpretation, individuality, texts and intention) combine to release interpreters from 
responsibility for the meaning of contracts because the meaning of the contractual text 
is solely attributed to the contractual parties. 
 
On the other hand, postmodernism involves a search for just interpretations. In 
postmodern literature concepts like interpretation, the nature of subjectivity, the 
nature of texts and also intention are critically analysed and the results of these 
analyses have important implications for contractual interpretation because they 
contradict current assumptions about the nature of interpretation, legal subjectivity, 
the definition of texts and the possibility of intention discovery in contractual 
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interpretation. Postmodernists claim that meanings resulting from the interpretation of 
the text are created during the interpretive process rather than inhering in the text, that 
legal subjectivity is a construction rather than a metaphysical reality and that texts are 
“created” through the interpretive process. Consequently interpreters are just as 
responsible for contractual meanings as the contractual parties. 
 
In Part One, the leading postmodern insights on interpretation, individual autonomy, 
texts and intentionalism are discussed. The present interpretive practice surrounding 
contracts is critically analysed to identify the underlying assumptions of the practice. 
The assumptions identified during the critical analyses are then evaluated against the 
postmodern insights identified during the discussions on interpretation, texts, 
intentionalism and individual autonomy. This is done by analysing the present 
interpretive practice in four chapters.1 In Part Two, questions about the justifiability 
of the present interpretive theories are posed.2  
 
2. Part I (chapters 2-5) 
2.1 Meaning in legal interpretation 
In Chapter 2 the different theoretical positions on interpretation (especially 
interpretation of legal texts) were discussed together with the main criticism against 
each theory.  The chapter starts out in section 2 with a discussion of the uniqueness of 
legal interpretation as explained by Robert Cover. Where normal interpretation is 
characterized by (indeed aimed at creating) a space where inter-personal interaction 
can be facilitated, legal interpretation is characterized by the lack of a shared 
experience between the participants because of the violent nature of legal 
interpretation. Cover’s analysis of the nature of legal interpretation leads us to the 
important insight that working with (and theorizing about) legal interpretation is a 
serious business with potentially serious consequences.  
 
In section 3 various objective meaning theories were examined, including 
Objectivism, Plain Legal Language Theory (PLLM) and Natural Law Theory. All of 
                                                 
1 For a detailed discussion of the research results of each chapter in Part One, see sections 2.1-2.5 
below. 
2 For a detailed discussion of the research results of each chapter in Part Two, see sections 3.1-3.3 
below. 
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these theories are aimed at eliminating misunderstandings and by so doing, perfecting 
communication. Objectivists contend that language itself has independent (objectively 
certifiable) meaning and that careful language use eliminates misunderstandings. The 
PLLM contend that misunderstandings are the result of special-language (like legal 
language) use. They hold that standardization of terms and their meanings (correlation 
between signifiers and that which they signify) will minimize misunderstandings 
because there will be a correlation between what we say and what we mean. 
Metaphysical realism (as an example of natural law theory) is based on the contention 
that language has a pointing out (ostension) function, and perfect understanding is the 
result of a successful connection of the word (signifier) with that which it represents 
(signified). Metaphysical realists argue that one must look past the text (and the 
different meanings inherent in that text) to the actual intended message. The main 
criticism against all three theories is: The possibility of a correlation between 
signifiers and what they signify depends upon the possibility that signifiers do not 
correlate with only one signified. There must be the possibility of metaphoric 
communication. Linguistically, the possibility of a correlation of signifier and 
signified and the possibility of non-correlation is very important. Language can only 
signify because it can also miss-signify. The very element that objectivists want to 
limit (non-correlation of signifiers and signifieds) provides us with meaning.  
 
In section 4 the influence of rules of interpretation on the elimination of 
misunderstanding is examined. Many rule-theorists argue that consistent application 
of rules will lead to a situation where the outcome of the interpretation process is 
predictable. The main problem with the rule-based approach to interpretation is that 
rules are also linguistic texts and are therefore subject to the same conditions of 
interpretation as any other text.  
 
Context and interpretive communities (the subject of section 5) are also used to 
restrict the possible meanings of legal texts. Many interpretation theorists argue that 
careful consideration of the legal context in which a text is created eliminates possible 
meanings other than the contextually correct meaning, while others believe that the 
interpretive assumptions of the legal community serve as constraints on the legal 
interpreter. The greatest difficulty facing these theorists (who believe that either 
context or the interpretive community (or both) can restrict interpretation) is that any 
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interpreter is always bound to interpret any text from her unique perspective and is 
bound to be part of many diverse interpretive communities. A context can only 
constrain an interpretation insofar as that context can be reproduced and, as far as 
interpretive communities are concerned, any person is at the same time subject to 
various interpretive communities (and by implication interpretive influences). 
 
Neo-pragmatism (the subject of section 6) is the postmodern equivalent of 
pragmatism. Like pragmatists, neo-pragmatists reject the notion of objectively 
certifiable meaning and they believe that meaning (as a product of our interpretive 
communities, context and historic situatedness) can only exist after interpretation. 
Neo-pragmatists reject the belief that ultimate knowledge of the way we interpret is 
possible because of our historic situatedness. The main criticism against neo-
pragmatism is that it leaves the “authorization” of meaning in the hands of the 
powerful (or dominant interpretive community) and marginalizes the meanings of 
weaker interpretive communities. Neo-pragmatists rejoin by arguing that although 
interpretive communities are always already in place, the interpreter is free to broaden 
the influences on interpretation by including the marginalized and weak in the 
decision-making processes. Neo-pragmatists provide us with an alternative 
interpretation theory that is more theoretically sound than positivist theories. 
 
Post-structuralism (the subject of section 7) developed out of structuralism. Both 
theories hold that language predates understanding and that language consists of 
purely arbitrary relations between signs and what they signify. Meaning is the result 
of interplay between the signs and not the result of a relationship between the sign and 
that which it signifies. While structuralists hold that one would ultimately be able to 
know how language works, post-structuralists contend that this is not possible. In 
legal interpretation deconstruction (a post-structuralist way of interpreting) highlights 
the dependency of concepts like individual autonomy upon various preconditions that 
are often contradictory. Various criticisms have been levelled against post-
structuralism, ranging from allegations that post-structuralism is a relativist theory to 
arguments that post-structuralists are guilty of a performative contradiction. Post-
structuralists have been able to successfully defend the theory against all these 
criticisms and post-structuralism is at present the most promising theory of 
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interpretation as far as highlighting marginalized and critical meanings go. Post-
structuralism is therefore a potential alternative to the present interpretive practice. 
 
This chapter shows that interpretation is not a simple meaning-finding exercise, but 
rather a process of meaning construction in which neither the author, the reader or 
language has the conclusive influence. Meaning is the result of interplay between the 
interpreter, author and language. There are always multiple meanings and the 
challenge is not to provide the right meaning, but rather to identify the most just 
meaning. Contracts do not “say” or “reflect” anything; they only provide a starting 
point in the quest for the best answer in every situation. 
 
2.2   Contemplating individual autonomy 
In Chapter 3, three theoretical positions on the self were analysed, namely liberalism, 
communitarianism and critical theories of the self. In liberalism individual autonomy 
is valued both as a foundational principle and as an ideal. The theory relates a 
narrative of being in which the self is best served by extending autonomy and the state 
is relegated the role of guardian of the emerging autonomy. The self is valued higher 
than the community and the community is said to be a product of selves coming 
together. Communal influences are ignored or explained as the culmination of 
individual preferences. Contracts are ways in which autonomous individuals express 
themselves and, provided the contracts do not infringe on the autonomy of others, 
contracts are construed (in the liberal sense) to only have the consequences intended 
by the parties to the contract. The main criticism against liberalism is that a liberal 
dispensation does not necessarily attain the goals it sets for itself. In fact, rights in 
particular are often stumbling blocks in the way of freedom and the extension of 
freedom to all sectors of society.3  
 
Communitarianism is a reaction to some of the failures of liberalism. Communitarians 
claim that the self cannot be understood without reference to the social situatedness of 
the self and that the self often consists of not so much what the self is, but where the 
self is. It is also claimed that values are not universal but particular to the societies in 
                                                 
3 See for example the “fundamental contradiction” as explained by Kennedy “The Structure of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries” (1979) 28 Buffalo LR at 211-212. In short: While individuals are 
preconditions to freedom, they are at the same time also threats to freedom. 
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which they occur. Communitarians approach contracts from a different angle, namely 
from the communal nature of contracts and specifically contractual enforcement. 
They argue that contracts are not to be interpreted as individual means of exchange, 
but rather as legal actions with effects wider than only the parties involved. The aim 
of communitarian contract construction is to give the contract a meaning that will 
have the widest possible nett benefit, not only for the parties but also for the 
community at large. Various objections have been raised against the communitarian 
vision for society, largely centering on the lack of accountability in the 
communitarian model. There is no structure inherent in the community that can 
guarantee a restructuring and critical reflection that precedes greater material and 
social parity. In a purely communitarian model, strong communities will dominate 
weak ones, leaving members of the weak communities without recourse. 
 
Any viable theory of the self would have to incorporate both the need for autonomy 
and the need for social justice. Such a theory must provide space for individual selves 
to flourish, while at the same time realizing that the self is socially situated and 
therefore has a social responsibility. Dialogic self-rule incorporates both these 
elements. This depiction of the self requires that the self, when confronted with the 
other (typically in a dispute, but also in business, relationships etc), engage in a 
dialogue aimed at finding the best solution to the common dilemma. This is the ideal 
model for a contractual party because the parties to the contract are forced to reach a 
negotiated settlement (the parties must engage in dialogue) and where one party is 
unwilling, the court can enforce the just solution in that context. This model does not 
have the overly social nature of a communitarian model and the strong economic 
benefits of the present contractual dispensation are retained. It calls for a contractual 
interpretation that takes seriously the individual interests involved and the need for 
contextually sensitive critical reflection on contractual meaning and its impact. 
 
If one accepts dialogic self-rule as the theoretical basis of legal identity, one can no 
longer claim to balance the interests of the parties to the contract and that of the judge 
(as representative of society at large) because both these interests are mutually 
constitutive. The court must decide how the parties must see out the contract by the 
interpretation of the contract. In doing this, courts are creating the types of self that 
are valued in contractual practice. 
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2.3  Texts 
Chapter 4 started out with a discussion of the present, essentially positivist, 
understandings surrounding the nature of texts. Texts are regarded as records that are 
separate from other texts. Legal texts are classified as historical texts (to be 
distinguished from fictional texts). Maintaining a distinction between fact and fiction 
requires a system where reality can serve as an objective standard against which the 
accuracy of the text can be measured. In such a system, reality must be singular and 
objectively ascertainable. Texts are also portrayed as separate from other texts. 
Because texts are regarded as records of facts, they are seen to represent a “moment” 
or “incident” in time. Positivists see texts as separate entities, connected only by their 
reference to reality. The reality serves as a justification for texts since the reader can 
verify the truth of the text by examining its correlation with (the) reality. Also, 
although texts are connected through their messages, the texts themselves are 
distinguished from each other because (in positivist history) texts must highlight the 
unique message of each text. 
 
 The prevailing view in the law of contract is that contractual texts are essentially 
records of the intention of the author and that the interpreter should not tamper with 
the text but simply extract the message deposited by the author of the text. This is 
reflected by the foremost interpretive rule dealing with contractual texts; the parol-
evidence rule. The rule is divided into two parts: 1) the integration rule, aimed at 
establishing the extent to which the contract was integrated into the written document; 
and 2) the interpretation rule, aimed at ascertaining the message of the text as 
demarcated by the integration rule. Two main criticisms are levelled against the rule, 
namely that it is theoretically incompatible with the subjective intentionalist will 
theory of contractual liability and that it is a practical failure. The proposed remedies 
(such as liberalization of the rule or scrapping it altogether) are motivated by the 
belief that the present interpretive dispensation (subjective intentionalism) will benefit 
from such remedies, rather than reaction to the failure of the existing process for 
defining texts. 
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In the second part of the chapter, the definition of texts in the Marxist tradition is 
considered. This shows the relatively arbitrary nature of the traditional definition of 
texts and the importance of social situatedness in the perception of texts. Marxists 
argue that the definition of texts depends not on the content of the text, but rather on 
the dominant ideology in the interpretive community. Marxists also introduced 
concepts like the “other” and “definition by absence” to the theories of defining texts. 
They show that what is absent from a text is often just as indicative of the process of 
defining texts as the actual content of the text. Marxism represents the first departure 
from the formalist idea of texts and serves as a suitable introduction to 
postmodernism. 
 
The focus then shifted to post-structuralist definition of texts with special focus on the 
Barthian distinction between a work and a text and the metaphoric nature of language 
as analyzed by Derrida. Barthes shows that texts differ from works because 1) works 
are not physically separate from the texts, but rather while the work is something 
concrete (occupying book space for example), the text is a methodological field; 2) 
the relationship between the work and the sign is different to the one between the text 
and the sign; and finally 3) Barthes distinguishes work and text on account of the role 
of description. Derrida shows that language does not have a functionalist nature, but 
rather a metaphoric one. This means that language deals with the identification of the 
non-identical, an exercise in imagination. Understanding is premised on the 
possibility of misunderstanding. Together with this insight, Derrida shows that 
language can never be separated from thought. The positivist theory of defining texts 
(as separate and a record) hinges on the possibility that a work (in the Barthian sense) 
can exist. Derrida shows that it cannot.  
 
In the penultimate section it is shown that the interpreter has an important role in 
definition of texts and interpreters that they should take seriously the responsibility 
that goes with that. The act of defining a text (especially a legal text) always involves 
two urges, specifically the urge to find the unique in the text and the urge to find how 
the text fits in with other texts. The interpreter must take these inclinations seriously. 
No text is already defined (before interpretation); it is always waiting to be 
constructed. 
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As far as contractual interpretation goes, it is clear that contractual texts are not 
records of meaning. Rather, the interpreter constructs the contractual texts as he 
interprets it. A text cannot serve as justification for a meaning. The interpreter is not 
only responsible for meaning, but also for creating a contractual text. This must be 
done in a responsible and just manner. 
 
2.4 Intending intentionalism, intention discovery and intention creation 
Chapter 5 deals with theories about the nature of intention and the possibility of 
intention discovery (or recovery). Intentionalism (the belief that intention can be 
recovered or discovered) can be divided into two streams, namely subjective 
intentionalism, which involves the search for actual historical psychological intention, 
and objective intentionalism, the belief that any intention can be gleaned from the 
evidence of the contract like the contractual text. Subjective intentionalists argue that 
it is possible to ascertain the actual intention of the parties to the text. On the other 
hand, objective intentionalists argue that the actual intention of the parties (as a 
mental state) cannot be discovered (or recovered), but that it is possible to objectively 
ascertain what the intention of the author was by looking at his actions. In other 
words, the goal is not to find what he intended, but rather to find out what he seemed 
to intend. 
 
The main criticism against subjective intentionalism is that 1) it portrays intentions in 
an overly simplistic way; 2) it is based on untenable assumptions about historical 
discovery; 3) it necessitates abstraction of the text and the parties from the historical 
and social circumstances that inform their decisions. Objective intentionalism is 
criticized for 1) its lack of accountability of interpreters using this type of 
interpretation; 2) the linguistic fallibility of intention deduction because intention is 
always already an interpretation and can therefore never be objective.  
 
The responses to the failure of intentionalism vary from a retreat into positivism to the 
advocacy of free reading theories. The CLS movement advocated a free reading 
theory based on the social situatedness of the reader and the developments since the 
creation of the text. The reader is urged to take serious notice of the transformative 
capabilities of the text and to interpret the text in a matter that will adapt the text to 
serve the needs of the situation. Later critical writers point out that this radical 
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ungrounding of interpretation nullifies the transformative potential of for example 
feminism and rights/race theories. The problem with indeterminacy is that it is totally 
submitted to the power relations in society. Interpretations are indeterminate for 
everybody, and the prevailing meaning is necessarily that of the powerful.  
 
Neo-pragmatists argue that the reader and the author are in the same position in that 
both are subject to the constraining influence of interpretive communities. They 
reason that an interpreter is always already constrained in the meaning possibilities 
open to her, but that she is also free to choose since she is part of various interpretive 
communities, each with its own constraints and freedoms. Post-structuralists seek to 
return the original difficulty to the interpretation process. They argue that the relation 
between author-text-reader is not a simple one and that the extent of the influence of 
one on the other is not stable but subject to continuous substitution and change.  
 
2.5 End of Part I 
Liberal beliefs about the nature of interpretation, individual autonomy and the 
definition of texts are tied together by doctrines of intentionalism. If an interpreter is 
to be true to the values of liberalism, she has no choice but to interpret texts (as 
records of facts) in an intentionalist way, so that the actions (the act of text creation) 
of the (autonomous and self-regulating) author will have the effects that he (the text 
creator) intended. The inverse is also true, as intentionalism depends on general 
liberal beliefs about the nature of interpretation (as a recovery (or at most recreation) 
of meaning), the legal subject (as an autonomous self-regulating being) and texts (as 
records of facts). It is clear (from the critical analysis of intentionalism) that the way 
intention is presently approached is theoretically flawed. It is also apparent from the 
critique of liberal beliefs regarding the nature of interpretation, subjectivity and the 
definition of texts that the theoretical foundations of these beliefs are fundamentally 
flawed.  
 
A critical re-imagination of contractual interpretation is necessary. The question 
remains, can postmodern theories provide a point of departure? The first obvious 
question is whether a postmodern theory of contractual interpretation will require a 
rejection of the rules of contractual interpretation. This question is addressed in Part 
Two by analyzing the impact of postmodern theories of intention, texts and 
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subjectivity on contractual rules of interpretation dealing with intention, texts and 
subjectivity.  
 
3. Part II (chapter 6) 
3.1 On rules and outcomes: What role does theory play in the application of rules 
of interpretation? 
The aim of this chapter (and in fact this thesis) is to show that the present theoretical 
dispensation is not crucial to the survival of contractual practice in South Africa. In 
fact, much of the necessary reforms are short-circuited not by the practice itself, but 
rather by the theoretical understandings that underpin the contractual practice as it 
stands. The problem is often not the rules, but rather the way the rules are used. Rules 
and practices are fleshed out by presumptions and beliefs, not by some independent 
content. By changing these presumptions, one can dramatically alter the way contracts 
are interpreted and realized. Three “rules” are examined namely 1) the golden rule of 
interpretation (which deals with intentions discovery); 2) the parol-evidence rule 
(which deals with textual definition); and 3) the application of bona fides (which deals 
with subjectivity). 
 
The golden rule of interpretation is used to justify the ascription of liability to the 
“intentional” actions of competent legal subjects. The rule is aimed at “protecting” the 
intentions of the parties to the contract and to give effect to those intentions. In 
theoretical terms, the existence and application of the rule is based on the dual belief 
that 1) persons have intentions apart from the text and these intentions can be 
recovered/reconstructed; and 2) language has a reflection value, that is, language 
serves as records of facts. In short, the golden rule and its application are based on the 
belief that thought and language can be separated. 
 
In postmodern thinking the distinction between thought and language is 
problematized (although not done away with). Post-structuralists (and to an extent 
neo-pragmatists) argue that thought and language, although conceptually separate, can 
never be separated in practice. Thought is always situated in language and language is 
always an expression of thoughts. The effect of this insight is that intentions can never 
be captured or reconstructed perfectly. The uniqueness of the intention will always be 
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lost in expression, while other meaning possibilities will emerge because of the traces 
of past expressions of the same language.  
 
The golden rule of interpretation must be re-imagined with the shift in perception 
regarding intention. Contracts will always (at least in the foreseeable future) be 
instruments dealing with relations between legal subjects, and it is for this reason that 
one cannot simply jettison all ideas regarding intention. We cannot have a theory of 
contract (or interpretation of contracts) that does not take seriously the wishes of both 
parties to the agreement. In line with postmodern theories of interpretation, what is 
proposed is a theory of just interpretation. The new “intention” is a construction (not a 
reconstruction or a discovery), but it is assembled with active participation of the 
parties to the contract. 
 
The chief difference between the present concept of intention and a postmodern 
conception of intention lies in the normative character of the latter. At present, 
meanings are being justified by referring to them as the intention of the parties. In 
postmodern practice, it is recognized that intention (even during the negotiations and 
just after conclusion) is an abstract notion that only gets meaning in concrete 
situations. The point is that intention cannot serve as a justification for a contractual 
meaning (as courts would like us to believe) because intention is reformulated in 
every new circumstance. In postmodern theory intention is a meaning, not a restraint. 
This does not make intention any less relevant but it does require of the interpreter to 
find other justifications for her interpretation. 
 
The parol-evidence rule is aimed at “protecting” the sanctity and certainty of written 
documents. The rule is an attempt at regulating the types of evidence that can be 
presented to explain the contents of a written contractual document. The rule is based 
on the assumption that texts serve as records of facts and, consequently, written texts 
(which are very good records of facts) deserve special attention. This assumption is 
based on a functionalist understanding of language and a positivist historical view on 
the utility of texts. In short, the whole application process and the working of the rule 
are aimed at protecting written contracts as records of contractual facts. 
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In postmodern interpretation theory, texts cannot be described as “containers” of 
meaning since no pre-interpretation meaning exists and there are always meanings 
outside our definition. Contracts are better described as normative/narrative law-texts; 
texts telling a story but having to relate this story in various circumstances. In this 
light, the text becomes a catalyst of endless meaning possibilities of which the 
interpreter must apply what is both just and justifiable in the specific circumstance. 
The text becomes the beginning of the interpretation process and not the element that 
settles the meaning. The parol-evidence rule can no longer serve as “protection” of 
that which the text contains, but it can serve as a tool to force the interpreters to take 
the textual possibilities seriously. 
 
In South African Law contracts are based on good faith (bona fides). We do not have 
a substantive remedy or implied term to the effect that the contract can be modified to 
bring it in line with the bona fides. The position taken on the value of the bona fides 
in the law of contract is not indicative of a disregard for values, but rather reflects a 
belief that individual autonomy is the quintessence of the bona fides. The highest 
value in a liberal society is that of individual autonomy (freedom to lead a life driven 
by one’s own decisions). 
 
In the place of the atomistic and autonomous self, postmodern theories of identity 
recognize the self as at the same time the seat of moral concern and constituted by her 
social relations and situatedness. Because of the realization that the self and her 
consciousness are continuously formed by her situatedness, the contractual 
relationship is not a case of an a priori atomistic self taking on a role, but rather a 
continuing definition of the contractual relationship through interaction between the 
self, others and the circumstances in which they find themselves. The self is therefore 
consciously developing through the contractual relationship and the interpretation of 
the contract will affect who the parties to the contract are. The court has an 
opportunity to influence a contractual relationship so that it is sensitive to the context. 
Sometimes it would be necessary to have responsive parties who are prepared to 
compromise, at other times not. By being sensitive to the specific needs of the parties 
the court can, in line with normative policy, decide whom they will help and how they 
will do this.  
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Derrida recognizes that just legal action involves two contradictory impulses, justice 
and justification.4 Justice involves the (impossible) complete recognition of the other 
as other. It involves a completely contextualised interpretation of the unique question 
before the court and requires of the court to answer the unique question in a unique 
way. On the other hand, any legal interpretation must be justifiable and must be 
connected to previous legal interpretations. In other words, legal interpretation must 
take place in accordance with the established legal tradition. According to the 
established legal dispensation, legal rules are primarily aimed (at least according to 
their present formulation) at regulating behaviour.5 In this sense, rules are aimed at 
providing a justification for an interpretation. What the deconstructive approach 
shows is that mere application of rules is often not enough. We have to continually 
reflect on why we apply rules and whether application in the specific case is just. 
Consequently, what is needed is not merely a re-evaluation of the contractual rules of 
interpretation in the light of changed theoretical assumptions, but a re-imagination of 
how we apply rules. We should go further than asking whether an interpretation is 
justifiable. We should also ask whether it is just. In the present practice, an 
interpretation is deemed just because it is justifiable. If rules are simply used to justify 
contractual meaning, the process of rule application tends to become a mechanical 
process. It might seem objective, but as Kennedy explains, there are always equally 
applicable counter rules, and any interpretation is therefore always relatively 
arbitrary.6 It is only once we start to look at our reasons for the application of the 
rules in every specific case, and at the same time do not hesitate to apply the rules 
when it would be just to do so, that we can break free of a (seemingly) objective 
method of rule application. In postmodern theory rules are more like normative policy 
                                                 
4 Derrida “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” in Cornell, Rosenfeld and Gray 
Carlson (eds) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (1992) 1 at 13-24. 
5 Twining & Miers How To Do Things With Rules (1999) at 123. See also ABSA Bank LTD v Deeb & 
Others 1999 (2) SA 656 (N) at 663; Phone-a-Copy Worldwide (PTY) LTD v Orkin & Another (1986) 
(1) SA 729 (A) at 734; Detmold “Law as the Structure of Meaning” in Goldsworthy & Campbell (eds) 
Legal Interpretation in Democratic States (2002) at 164. 
6 Kennedy “The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries” (1979) 28 Buffalo LR 205 at 211-213. In 
Kennedy “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 98 Harvard LR 1685 at 1685, he 
states “…substantive and formal conflict in private law cannot be reduced to disagreement about how 
to apply some neutral calculus that will “maximise the total satisfactions of human wants.” The 
opposed rhetorical modes lawyers use reflect a deeper level of contradiction. At this deeper level, we 
are divided, among ourselves and also within ourselves, between irreconcilable visions of humanity 
and society, and between radically different aspirations for our common future…”. See also Kennedy A 
Critique of Adjudication (fin de sièecle) (1997) at 105-07. For an explanation see Roux “Pro-Poor 
Court, Anti-Poor Outcomes: Explaining the Performance of the South African Land Claims Court” 
(2004) 20 SAJHR 511-543. 
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than mechanical ways of guiding interpretation. In other words, rules are suggestions, 
not guidelines. Rules embody policy as an abstract notion, while the interpretation 
process determines the specific content of the policy in the specific situation facing 
the interpreter. Rule-guided interpretations must first be just, then justifiable.  
 
3.2 End of Part II 
It becomes clear that contractual practice does not consist of positivist assumptions; it 
is merely grounded in them. We can change our assumptions and still have a 
contractual practice. However, instead of an objective system, postmodernists propose 
a self-conscious system, struggling with the impulses to be at the same time particular 
and justifiable. This struggle is not a hindrance, it is a necessity.  
 
It was shown that rules depend not on their content for operation, but rather on the 
assumptions upon which they are grounded. Rules only make sense once they have 
been applied. We must think about the way in which we apply rules. Rules can never 
provide justification for meanings, but they can provide normative guidelines. In 
short, we do not have to do away with our rules of contractual interpretation, but we 
have to re-evaluate how we apply those rules. 
 
4. Checking Out… (But not leaving) 
“ [a]nd I was thinking to myself  
This could be Heaven or this could be Hell … 
Last thing I remember  
I was running for the door  
I had to find the passage back to the place I was before  
Relax said the nightman  
We are programmed to receive  
You can check out any time you like  
But you can never leave”7
 
                                                 
7 Artist: Eagles, Album: Hotel California, Song: Hotel California (1975) Elektra Records; see also 
http://www.reallyrics.com/Lyrics/E000200010001.asp. 
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Like the narrator in “Hotel California”, I find myself confronted by the impulse to 
“run” (rhetorically speaking).8 I feel like a guest who is seriously disillusioned by his 
lodgings. For someone trained in the general positivist tradition of contract 
interpretation with pre-determined contractual parties, easily identifiable contractual 
texts, rules to find actual intentions and, above all, a very simple theory of 
interpretation, digesting postmodern understandings on these subjects can be 
traumatic. When considering postmodern theory in general, one is immediately struck 
by the way in which it radically destabilizes all of the concepts on which contractual 
interpretation (as presently applied) rests. The central question of this thesis is 
whether contracts can survive without the stability provided by positivist theory.  
 
The version of contractual interpretation that I propose falls outside of the accepted 
norms. It is not an application of the present contractual theory (it is not a guest), nor 
does it involve an analysis of the way things are in order to come to a better 
understanding of the theory of interpretation of contracts (it is not an employee). It 
involves a re-imagination of the interpretation of contracts in a postmodern light 
where there is no general position. There can be no default theory of interpretation, of 
the nature of a contractual party, texts or intention. It consists only of exceptions. 
                                                 
8 Not just leave. Quite literally run away from the task of finishing what I started. As Allen (ed) The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1992) at 1055 explains: “…run;…2 flee, abscond. 3 
intr. go or travel hurriedly…”. Like the narrator in “Hotel California”, I come to the conclusion that 
leaving is not an option. Postmodernism does not leave scope for a retreat into a positivist position (or 
does it?). The illusion is shattered for ever. The only way back to the illusion is to reconstruct the hotel 
in the image of the illusion. That cannot be done while one is a guest. A guest is the “prisoner” of the 
hospitality of the hotel, a perpetuator of the institution. To change the hotel, one must check out, either 
to become an employee of the hotel or the continual antagonist. Employees can change the institution, 
but to do so is very hard. Since the institution pays the wages, why risk change (which might result in 
the demise of the institution and the alienation of the employee if he fails in his attempt to change the 
institution)? On the other hand, when one is outside of the institution (not a guest or an employee) but 
at the same time not allowed (or able) to leave, one’s presence can leave a distinct impression on the 
hotel. As neither a guest nor an employee, the outsider cannot expect hospitality or a wage. However, 
he can expect attention. He can pester guests, impede employees in the execution of their duties and 
interfere with the running of the institution because he cannot be forced to leave. (In a sense the 
outsider can be made to leave buy killing him. However, he cannot leave. He is already a ghost.) He 
can also help guests and employees. The point is that he will always occupy the position of outsider, 
which makes the running of the institution unpredictable. What will he do next? To eliminate the 
outsider (the ghost of the other), he must be accommodated in the institution. Make him a guest or 
employ him. Change the institution so that his otherness will be accommodated. In the same way, the 
interpretation of contracts cannot be changed if we continue to use it as we always have (being guests) 
because we will always be playing the game according to the prevailing rules. One can use the 
prevailing methods of contractual interpretation to achieve different results (becoming employees) but 
playing by the rules will be much easier, especially if it allows one to make money. Finally, we can 
become outsiders, using the prevailing methods when it suits the situation or using new methods when 
it will be just to do so. We cannot expect a wage or hospitality, but we can expect change. 
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Interpretation must always be particular, contractual parties must be continually re-
imagined, texts must be argued for (not from) and intentions are meanings, not 
constants. To think of interpretation as an unpredictable process of meaning 
construction, to image contractual parties in terms of dialogic self rule, to think of text 
creation rather than text discovery and to imagine intention rather than to find it, 
requires a rejection of our presuppositions about the nature of contracts and 
interpretation ( we have to check out). We have to become the Derridian “Other”, in 
order to refashion the way we see and think about contracts. Not all contracts are the 
same, nor should all contracts be approached in the same way. Let interpreters look 
for particularity before they search for sameness. We must first aim for a just 
interpretation and only then concern ourselves with justifiability.  Also, the answer is 
yes, contracts will survive without the “stability” provided by positivism. In fact, it 
will flourish. 
 
“…[t]here is no growth without change; 
there is no change without fear or loss; 
and there is no loss without pain. 
Every change involves a loss of some kind: 
You must let go of old ways in order to experience the new…”9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Warren The Purpose Driven Life (2002) at 220. 
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